Telangana High Court
M/S. Sash Infra vs Sri. Peddu Chandrasekhara Rao on 28 July, 2026
Author: K.Lakshman
Bench: K. Lakshman
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT: HYDERABAD
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
AND
HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R. MADHUSUDHAN RAO
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1952 OF 2026
Date:28 -07-2026
Between
M/s Sash Infra .....Petitioner
and
Sri Peddu Chandrasekhara Rao
and others ....Respondents
This Court passed the following
ORDER:
(per Hon’ble Sri Justice K.Lakshman)
Heard Sri K.S. Suneel, learned counsel for the petitioner and
Mr. J. Prabhakar, learned Senior Counsel representing Smt.
D. Venkata Padmaja, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
2. The Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 22.06.2026 passed in
I.A.No.01 of 2026 in Arb.Appl.No.278 of 2024 by the Arbitral
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Tribunal comprising of sole Arbitrator Sri V.V. Raghavan (Retired
District Judge).
3. The facts leading to filing of the present revision are as
follows:-
i) The petitioner and respondent entered into a Development
Agreement – cum – General Power of Attorney (for short
‘DA-cum-GPA) dated 19.08.2019 on the specific terms and
conditions mentioned therein.
ii) According to the respondents, there were disputes between the
respondents and the petitioner regarding the execution of the
said DA-cum-GPA. As the same were arbitrable, they had filed
an application vide Arb.Appl.No.278 of 2024 under Section 11
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the
Act, 1996’), this Court allowed the said application and
appointed Sri V.V. Raghavan, (Retd.) Chief Judge, City Civil
Court, Hyderabad, as an Arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator had
passed an Award dated 22.11.2025. Operative portion of the
same is as follows:-
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a. The respondent is given 6 months time from today for
obtaining the approval of layout plan from HMDA, to level the
land and put the stones or peg marks for each plot in the
approved layout.
b. Both the parties can sit together and decide the plots to be
allotted to the claimants towards their 60% share and the plots
allotted to the respondent towards their 40% share, in the event,
the respondent is able to comply with the direction given in
Clause-A.
c. The claimant shall take possession of the land, if the
respondent is not able to complete his part of the contract as
mentioned in Clause-A within six (6) months subject to the
claimant paying Rs.40,00,000/- to the respondent.
4. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed an interlocutory
application vide I.A. No.1 of 2026 in Arb.Appl.No.278 of 2024 under
Section 148 read with Section 151 of CPC, seeking enlargement of
time by three months to comply with the award contending that
pursuant to the award dated 22.11.2025, he has submitted fresh
application on 04.12.2015, to grant lay out permission, but the said
application was returned with certain shortfalls i.e. by Joint Collector,
Irrigation Department EE regarding the existing water body on the
site.
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5. They have obtained NOC from the EE and Joint Collector in
2024 itself but the concerned office declined to consider the said NOC
in view of the extent of ‘Edula Kunta’ lake was enhanced from
Ac.24.00 guntas to Ac.27.09 guntas, as such he was constrained to go
for fresh NOC. The Irrigation Department, conducted inspection and
gave report that out of 17602.47 sqm, land admeasuring 237 sqm, was
affected in the FTL and land admeasuring 657 sqm, was affected in
the Buffer Zone and remaining extent of 16709.47 sqm, is feasible for
the layout.
6. The HMDA authorities also raised certain shortfalls like
revenue sketch issued by the Tahsildar earmarking the proposed site,
road confirmation letter from local body regarding approached road,
PDF plan duly signed by the owner and Architect, NALA conversion
certificate, Location Plan and to upload pahanies and all the shortfalls
were cleared however some of the shortfalls are inter-related with the
NOC from the Irrigation Department and Joint Collector. The
Irrigation Department has conducted inspection and given clearance
on 30.04.2026 and the Application No.017326/ HMDA/ 04422/
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SWDL/SHZ/2026 is pending with the HMDA for final approval. They
spent substantial amount and time to obtain final approval but were
not able to obtain the same within the timeframe fixed by the tribunal.
Therefore, they filed the said application seeking enlargement of time
for three months to comply with the award.
7. The respondents opposed the application contending that it is
not maintainable and that once the learned Arbitrator passed an
Award, the Arbitral Tribunal becomes functus officio.
8. Vide the impugned order, learned Arbitrator dismissed the
said application holding that on passing the Award, the Arbitral
Tribunal becomes functus officio.
9. Challenging the said order, the petitioner filed the present
revision.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned senior counsel appearing for respondents.
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11. With regard to the maintainability of the present revision,
Sri J.Prabhakar, learned Senior Counsel fairly submits that the present
revision is maintainable.
12. It is pertinent to note that the present Civil Revision Petition
has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The said
provision confers upon the High Court, the power of superintendence
over all courts and tribunals within the State. It is trite law that
jurisdiction under Article 227 should be exercised sparingly and only
in exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances include
orders passed without jurisdiction, cases where mala fides are writ
large, instances of flagrant violation of fundamental rights, etc.
Further, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, the High
Court cannot pass any orders not contemplated under law. In Estralla
Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
explaining the scope of Article 227 held as follows:
6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and
jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the1
(2001) 8 SCC 97.
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Constitution of India is examined and explained in a
number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of
power under this article involves a duty on the High
Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within
the bounds of their authority and to see that they do
the duty expected or required of them in a legal
manner. The High Court is not vested with any
unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship
or wrong decisions made within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals.
Exercise of this power and interfering with the
orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases
of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation
of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if
the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice
remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the
High Court while acting under this article cannot
exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute
its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate
court to correct an error, which is not apparent on
the face of the record. The High Court can set aside
or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or
tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the
finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can
possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court
or tribunal has come to.
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7. This Court in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co.
Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand [(1972) 1 SCC 898 :
AIR 1972 SC 1598] in para 12 has stated that the
power under Article 227 of the Constitution is
intended to be used sparingly and only in
appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the
subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds
of their authority and, not for correcting mere
errors. Reference also has been made in this regard to
the case Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [AIR 1954 SC
215 : 1954 SCR 565] . This Court in Bathutmal
Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte [(1975) 1 SCC
858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297] has observed that the power
of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be
invoked to correct an error of fact which only a
superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power
as a court of appeal and that the High Court in
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot
convert itself into a court of appeal when the
legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. Judged
by these pronounced principles, the High Court
clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 in
passing the impugned order.
(emphasis supplied)
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13. In Kelvin Air Conditioning and Ventilation System
Pvt.Ltd.Vs. Triumph Reality Pvt. Ltd.2, the Delhi High Court laid
down certain conditions in exercising jurisdiction under Article
226/227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant conditions are
extracted below:-
“(v) Interference is permissible only if the order is completely
perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.
(vi) High Courts ought to discourage litigation which necessarily
interfere with the arbitral process.
(vii) Excessive judicial interference in the arbitral process is not
encouraged.
(viii) It is prudent not to exercise jurisdiction under Articles
226/227.
(ix) The power should be exercised in ‘exceptional rarity’ or if
there is ‘bad faith’ which is shown.
(x) Efficiency of the arbitral process ought not to be allowed to
diminish and hence interdicting the arbitral process should be
completely avoided.”
14. In Serosoft Solutions Pvt.Ltd. vs. Dexter Capital
Advisors Pvt.Ltd.3, the Apex Court considered the aforesaid
conditions and on examination of the facts therein, held that
interference under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is
2
(2024) SCC OnLine Del 7137
3
(2025) SCC OnLine SC 22
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permissible “only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the
perversity must stare in the face.”
15. In the light of the aforesaid principle, this Court is of the
view that the revision is maintainable challenging the interlocutory
orders passed by arbitral tribunal under certain circumstances.
16. Although the present Civil Revision Petition is maintainable
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in the opinion of this
Court, the same cannot be entertained. As stated above, jurisdiction
under Article 227 can be exercised in limited circumstances.
According to this Court, no such circumstances exist warranting
interference with the impugned order.
17. It is not in dispute that the award dated 22.11.2025 was
passed granting 06 months’ time to the Petitioner. There is no
challenge to the said Award. As such, the same had attained finality. It
is a settled position of law that the arbitral tribunal becomes functus
officio and its mandate terminates once an award has been passed. In
Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam vs. Navigant Technologies
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Private Limited 4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that arbitral
proceedings get terminated under Section 32 of the Act 1996, once the
final award is passed, and arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio, on
passing Award.
18. Once the award dated 22.11.2025 was passed, the arbitral
tribunal became functus officio. Therefore, it cannot entertain any
application and pass orders.
19. In the present case, the learned Arbitrator had already
passed the final award dated 22.11.2025 in the manner stated above.
Six (6) months’ time was granted to obtain the approval of the layout
plan from the HMDA, to level the land and put the stones or peg
marks for each plot in the approved layout, etc. The petitioner sought
enlargement of three months time by filing an application vide
I.A.No.1 of 2026 in the Arb.Appl.No.278 of 2024 before the learned
Arbitrator. The said application is not maintainable. The Act, 1996,
does not contemplate or confer any post-final award jurisdiction on
the arbitral tribunal. On consideration of the said aspect only, learned
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(2021) 7 SCC 657
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arbitrator dismissed the aforesaid Interlocutory Application and there
is no error in it.
20. Without prejudice to the respective contentions of the
parties, this Court is of the view that the petitioner’s plea that the
delay in obtaining the requisite approvals was on account of
circumstances beyond its control warrants due adjudication on merits.
The appropriate remedy available to the petitioner is under Section 9
of the Act, 1996. Under the said provision, a party may, before or
during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the
arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section
36, seek appropriate interim measures. In the present case, though the
final award has been passed, the petitioner can invoke Section 9 of the
Act, 1996, and seek any interim measure in relation to the final award.
21. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this revision is
dismissed. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek remedy
under Section 9 of the Act, before the appropriate Court. There is no
order as to costs.
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Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in the
revision shall stand closed.
____________________
K. LAKSHMAN, J
________________________________________
JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO
Date:28.07.2026.
Vvr
