Jharkhand High Court
Zeshaan Shekh @ Ricky Aged About 32 Years … vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Chief … on 26 March, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:8775-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P (Cr.) (DB) No.764 of 2025
.................
Zeshaan Shekh @ Ricky aged about 32 years son of Shekh Samiullah, R/o
Indian Aya Line Rinpass QU, P.O and P.S Kanke, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand)
.................. Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, having Office at
Project Bhawan, PO Dhurwa, PS Dhurwa District Ranchi (Jharkhand)
2. Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management, Government of Jharkhand, having Office at Project Bhawan, PO
Dhurwa, PS Dhurwa District Ranchi (Jharkhand)
3. Under Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and Disaster
Management, Government of Jharkhand, having Office at Project Bhawan, PO
Dhurwa, PS Dhurwa District Ranchi (Jharkhand)
4. The District Magistrate, Ranchi, Office at Ranchi, Jharkhand P.O
G.P.O and P.S Kotwali, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand)
5. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Ranchi, P.O G.P.O and P.S
Kotwali, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand)
6. The Jail Superintendent, Hotwar Central Jail, Ranchi P.O Hotwar and
P.S Khelgaon, District Ranchi (Jharkhand)
................ Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
-------
For the Petitioner : Mr. Suraj Kishore Prasad, Advocate
For the Resp-State : Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II
Mr. Srikant Swaroop, AC to AAG-II
C.A.V on 19.03.2026 Pronounced on 26/03/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for the following reliefs: –
“i. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s)
for quashing and setting aside the order of detention bearing
Order No. 13 dated 25.06.2025 (Annexure-2), passed by the1
2026:JHHC:8775-DBDeputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ranchi, and
communicated vide Memo No. 2512 (ii) dated 25.06.2025 to the
Jail Superintendent of Birsa Munda Jail Hotwar; whereby the
petitioner was directed to be placed under preventive detention
under Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002.;
ii. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s) for
quashing and setting aside the confirmation order dated
04.07.2025 (Annexure 3) issued by Under Secretary, Department
of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of
Jharkhand vide Memo No.5/CCA/01/46/2025/226/CCA dated
04.07.2025 confirming the petitioner’s detention under Section
12(2) of the said Act;
iii. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s)
for quashing and setting aside the detention order dated
08.08.2025 (Annexure 4) issued by Under Secretary, Department
of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of
Jharkhand vide Memo No. 5/CCA/01/46/2025/269/CCA dated
08.08.2025, confirming the petitioner’s detention under Section
21(1) and 22 of the said Act from 25.06.2025 to 24.09.2025);iv. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s)
for quashing and setting aside the detention order dated
23.09.2025 (Annexure 5) issued by Under Secretary, Department
of Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of
Jharkhand vide Memo No. 5/CCA/01/46/2025/346/CCA dated
23.09.2025 whereby the preventive detention of the petitioner has
been extended up to 24.12.2025, in a wholly mechanical and
routine manner, without recording any fresh material, new
adverse activity, or independent subjective satisfaction, as
mandated under Sections 21 and 22 of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002;
v. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s)
for quashing and setting aside the detention order dated
12.12.2025 (Annexure 6) issued by Respondent 3 vide Memo No.
5/CCA/01/46/2025/448/CCA dated 12.12.2025 whereby the
preventive detention of the petitioner has been extended up to2
2026:JHHC:8775-DB23.03.2026, in a wholly mechanical and routine manner, without
recording any fresh material, new adverse activity, or
independent subjective satisfaction, as mandated under Sections
21 and 22 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002;vi. For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/direction(s) to
the Respondents to immediate release of the petitioner from
preventive detention, who is presently under preventive detention
at Birsa Munda Central Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi.”
Factual Matrix:
2. The factual aspects, as have been pleaded in the writ petition, required
to be enumerated, which are as follows:
i. The District Magistrate, Ranchi has passed the impugned
detention order bearing Order No.13 dated 25.06.2025, under Section
12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002(hereinafter to be
referred as Act of 2002) which was communicated to the
Superintendent, Birsa Munda Central Jail, Ranchi, vide Memo
No.2512(ii) dated 25.06.2025. The issuance of the said order and its
transmission to the Jail Authority was done in a mechanical manner
and without any independent satisfaction.
ii. The State Government of Jharkhand, through its Home, Jail and
Disaster Management Department, Ranchi, vide Memo
No.5/CCA/01/46/2025/226/CCA dated 04.07.2025, confirmed the
detention of the petitioner under Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand
Crime Control Act, 2002, on the recommendation made by the
Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ranchi under
Section 12(2) of the said Act. The said recommendation was based
on Detention Order No.13 dated 25.06.2025, communicated through
Memo No.2512 (ii) dated 25.06.2025, whereby the petitioner,
3
2026:JHHC:8775-DBnamely, Zeshaan Shekh @ Ricky was directed to be preventively
detained.
iii. The State Government has subsequently issued confirmation
order dated 08.08.2025, bearing Memo
No.5/CCA/01/46/2025/269/CCA, confirming the petitioner’s
preventive detention from 25.06.2025 to 24.09.2025 under Sections
21(1) and 22 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002.
iv. Thereafter, vide another order dated 23.09.2025, bearing Memo
No.5/CCA/01/46/2025-346/CCA, the petitioner’s detention has
again been extended upto 24.12.2025 under Sections 21 and 22 of the
Act.
v. Again, vide another order dated 12.12.2025, bearing Memo
No.5/CCA/01/46/2025-448/CCA, the petitioner’s detention has
again been extended upto 24.03.2026 under Sections 21 and 22 of the
Act.
vi. It is the further case of the petitioner that the detention order
dated 25.06.2025, its confirmation dated 04.07.2025, 08.08.2025 and
the subsequent extensions dated 23.09.2025 and 12.12.2025 have
been passed in a mechanical manner and without recording any fresh
or independent satisfaction and without complying the petitioner’s
pending representation. Hence, the extension order thus is ex-facie
illegal and arbitrary and as such, liable to be set aside.
vii. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of detention and orders
of extension of detention, the present writ petition has been filed.
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Submission on behalf of the writ petitioner:
3. Mr. Suraj Kishore Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned orders:
i. It has been contended that the petitioner has been illegally detained
on the false allegation and as such, the orders of detention are liable
to quashed and set aside.
ii. It has been contended that when the detenue is already in judicial
custody and the extension orders do not record any satisfaction
regarding the likelihood of release of the detenue, hence, the
continued preventive detention is completely baseless.
iii. It has been contended that the detention order is based upon non-
application of mind by the detaining authority as the said order has
been passed in a mechanical manner.
iv. It has been contended that the act of the respondents in passing the
impugned order of extending detention under the provisions of
Jharkhand Crime Control Act, is in violation of Article 22 of
the Constitution of India.
v. It has been contended that the act of the respondents in passing the
impugned order under the provisions of section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002, is without any application of
mind.
vi. It has been contended that the impugned detention order gives
absolutely no finding with respect to the present petitioner being an
anti-social element.
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2026:JHHC:8775-DB
vii.It has been contended that the preventive detention of the petitioner
is solely based upon the stale FIRs, private disputes/matrimonial
disputes and custodial remand without any proximity.
vi. It has been contended that non-supply of documents, failure in
communicating ground of detention and materials before confirming
and extending the detention, violates Article 22(5) and renders the
orders dated 04.07.2025,08.08.2025,23.09.2025 and 12.12.2025,
unconstitutional and liable to be quashed.
vii.The petitioner has made representation in form of Bandi Patra
through the Superintendent of Jail, Birsa Munda Central Jail, Hotwar,
Ranchi, but the same was not forwarded to the office of the Inspector
General of Prison and correctional services, Jharkhand and thus, the
same could not be forwarded to the Government of Jharkhand for
consideration.
viii.The petitioner has been granted bail by the court of law in five cases
out of the six criminal cases registered against the petitioner and
hence extension of detention order violates Article 22 of the
Constitution of India.
ix. It has been contended that the act of the respondents in passing the
impugned order under the provisions of section 12(2) of the
Jharkhand Crime Control Act is, is illegal and unsustainable in the
eyes of law as detention is based upon Station Diary Entries which
are not supported by any FIR or judicial proceeding.
x.It has been contended that the impugned detention order was passed
for a full term of twelve months at the initial stage by the District
6
2026:JHHC:8775-DBMagistrate, is against the provisions of section 12(3) of the Act of
2002.
xi.Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in case of
Munna alias Muneshwar Sao versus The State of Bihar and
Others, 1986 PLJR 1158; Jaseela Shaji v. The Union of India &
Ors., [2024]9S.C.R. 313 and Roshni Devi v. The State of Telangana
and Others [2026]2 S.C.R. 128
4. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned order, therefore, needs interference by this
Court.
Submission on behalf of the Respondent-State:
5. Per contra, Mr. Sachin Kumar, learned AAG-II appearing for
the respondent-State while defending the impugned order has taken the
following grounds:
i. It has been contended that the impugned detention order is
issued under the provision of section 12(2) of Jharkhand Crime
Control Act, 2002 as the petitioner is involved in several criminal
cases as well as it has been found that presence of the petitioner
among the public in general is prejudicial for the society and for the
public in general and as such, the present writ petition is not fit to be
entertained.
ii. It has been contended that prior to issuance of detention order the
petitioner has been given reasonable opportunity to defend
himself and, as such, the orders impugned is in accordance with law
which requires no interference.
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2026:JHHC:8775-DB
iii. It has been contended that the petitioner is the member of the gang,
who has been found to be an anti-social element, the law and order
may be disturbed by his presence and activities, if the detention order
is quashed.
iv. It has further been contended that there is possibility that when the
petitioner comes out from the detention he may involve in the illegal
and unlawful activity with his associates, thus, the detention order is
fully justified in order to maintain public order.
v. It has been contended that it was necessary to extend preventive
detention of petitioner in order to control organized crime in the
locality as well as in order to reduce the intensity of same.
vi.It has been contended that the impugned order of detention was
extended from time to time. The present petitioner is involved in
various illegal and criminal activities. He collects levy and extortion
money from the businessmen. There is a situation of disturbance of
public order if the petitioner is enlarged on bail.
vii. It has been submitted that the recommendation for detention of the
petitioner was based upon the criminal antecedents of the petitioner,
which is being quoted hereinbelow: –
Sl.No P.S. Case & section Date of Date of Present Status of
Arrest Remand Status of Trial
Bail
1. Kanke P.S. Case No.71/2023 dated 29.09.23 Evidence
20.03.2023 under section
498(A)/313 of the IPC and 3/5 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act and
section 4 of Protection of Muslim
Woman (Protection of Right on
Marriage) Act8
2026:JHHC:8775-DB
2. Ormanjhi P.S. Case No.189/24 03.12.2024 Bail Hearing
dated 22.11.2024 under sections
109/118(1)/ 118(2)/ 111(2)/ granted
111(3)/111(4)/111(5)/111(6)/ by the
111(7)/308(2)/308(3)/308(4)/
308(5) /61(2) of BNS and High
section 27 Arms Act.
Court
3. Chainpur P.S. Case No.245/24 17.02.2025 Bail Appearance
dated 01.12.2024 under section 311
of the BNS and 27 of the Arms Act granted
on
08.04.25
4. Chainpur P.S. Case No.246/24 19.02.2025 Bail Appearance
dated 01.12.2024 registered under
section 25(1-B)A/26, 35 of the granted
Arms Act
on
08.04.25
5. Pipra P.S. Case No.17/23 dated 03.07.23 Bail
04.07.2023 under section
385/386/387/326/307/34/120(B) of granted
the IPC and section 27 Arms Act
on
31.08.23
6. Lalpur P.S. Case No.253/24 dated
23.10.24 under section 25(1-
A)/26/35 of the Arms Act and
section 66(C) of the IT Act
viii. It has been contended that taking into consideration these aspects of
the matters, the District Magistrate, Ranchi has passed the impugned
detention order against the present petitioner bearing order no.13
dated 25.06.2025 under Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes Act, 2002 which was communicated to the Superintendent of
Birsa Munda Central Jail, Ranchi.
ix. It has also been contended that the further recommendation has also
been made by the Sr. Superintendent of Police, Ranchi for extension
of detention of the petitioner under Section 12(2) of the Act, 2002.
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6. Learned State Counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned orders, thus, need no interference and the
present writ petition is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis:
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition along with the relevant
documents annexed therewith.
8. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect, the following issues
require consideration herein:
i.Whether the criminal activities of petitioner come under the
purview of definition of ”Anti-social Elements” as defined under
section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002?ii.Whether preventive detention of the detenue was confirmed
without considering the representation (Bandi Patra) of the
detenue?
iii.Whether ground of detention was communicated to the detenue in
accordance with section 17 of the Act of 2002?
iv.Whether the recommendation of the District Magistrate for
detaining the detenue for the period of 12 months, is in violation
of section 12(2) of the Act of 2002?
v.Whether grant of bail to the petitioner in most of the cases is
ground for his release from the prevention detention passed under
12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002?Re: Issue No. (i)
9. But, before considering the first issue, the statutory provision, as
contained under the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,2002 needs to be
referred herein.
10
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10. The relevant provisions which require consideration herein are
Section 2(d), Section 12 and section 17 of the Jharkhand Control of
Crimes,2002, (referred hereinafter as the Act, 2002).
11. “Anti-social Element” has been defined under section 2(d) of the
Act, 2002, which reads hereunder as: –
” 2(d) Anti-social element” means a person who-
(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually
commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences
punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian
Penal Code;or
(ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the
Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; or
(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on
grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other
grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different
religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or
(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing
women or girls; or
(v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26, 27, 28 or 29
of the Arms Act of 1959.”
12. From perusal of Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act
of 2002, it is evident that “anti-social element” as a person who habitually
commits or abets offenses listed in Chapters XVI or XVII of the Indian
Penal Code, or certain other specific crimes. It needs to refer herein that
this definition requires a pattern of behaviour, not isolated incidents, and
aims to identify individuals whose acts cause alarm or terror among the
public, warranting preventive detention to maintain public order.
13. It requires to refer herein that the Act of 2002 was meant to make
special provisions for the control and suppression of anti-social elements
with a view to maintenance of public order. It also needs to refer herein
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that the “Law and order” problems typically affect only individuals or
small groups, whereas “public order” disruptions affect the community’s
normal functioning on a broader scale often generating fear or anxiety
among the general public.
14. It is pertinent to mention herein that the primary element with
respect to Section 2(d)(i) seems to be the word “habitual”. It would thus
mean that a person who is frequently engaged in committing or attempting
or abating commission of an offence in terms of Chapter XVI or Chapter
XVII of the Indian Penal Code would be an anti-social element. In this
context, we may refer to the case of Vijay Narayan Singh Vs. State of
Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 wherein the word “habitually” has
been sought to be enumerated in the following manner:
“31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the
detention of an anti-social element. If a person is not an antisocial element,
he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should,
therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made
under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section
2(d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act
which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted
from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need
to be examined closely are sub clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Under
sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or
as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to
commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI
dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing
with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to
be an anti-social element. Under subclause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act,
a person who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing
women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both these sub clauses, the
word “habitually” is used. The expression “habitually” means “repeatedly”
or “persistently”. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar
repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated,
individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit.
It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind
referred to in each of the said sub clauses or an aggregate of similar acts
or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word
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“habitually” separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub- clause (iv)
of Section 2(d) and not in sub clauses (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d). If the
State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or
omissions referred to in any of the sub- clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was
sufficient to make a person an “anti-social element”, the definition would
have run as “Anti-social element” means “a person who habitually is. ..”.
As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub-clause (iii) or
sub-clause (v) of Section 2(d) a single act or omission referred to in them
may be enough to treat the person concerned as an ‘antisocial element’, in
the case of sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iv), there should
be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-
clause (i), subclause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to
treat him as an “anti-social element”. Commission of an act or omission
referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or
omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be
sufficient to treat a person as an “anti-social element”. A single act or
omission falling under subclause (i) and a single act or omission falling
under sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterized
as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea
of “habit” involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the
acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in
question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when
they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot
be treated as habitual ones.”
15. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that if a person is not an
antisocial element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining
authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an
order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as
defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of
the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a
gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission
of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting
the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property,
of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Further
the expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It
implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts.
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Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar
acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit.
16. It requires to refer herein that Section 12 of the Act of 2002
contains the word “anti-social” which qualifies the section 12 of Act of
2002 for passing the order of detention of any individual or others. Section
12 of the Act is the initiation of the process of detaining a person under
the Act, for ready reference, the same is being quoted herein, which reads
as under: –
“12. Power to make order detaining certain persons. – The State
Government may- (1) if satisfied with respect to any person that with a
view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities
of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the
immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-
social element be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in
any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate,
the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an
order in writing direct, that during such period as may be specified in the
order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-
section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section:
Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State
Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance exceed
three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that
it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time
to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.(3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall forthwith
report, the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which
the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have
a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more
than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been
approved by the State Government:
Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are
communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later
than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply
14
2026:JHHC:8775-DBsubject to the modification that, for the words “twelve days”, the words
“fifteen days” shall be substituted.”
17. Thus, from the perusal of Section 12 of the Act, 2002, it is
evident that power to make orders detaining certain persons are provided
in section 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. Section
12(1) provides that if State Government is satisfied with respect to any
person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear
that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise
than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that
such anti-social element be detained.
18. Hence, section 12(1) empowers the State Government to detain
anti-social element if there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social
elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of
such person. The anti-social element has been defined in Section 2(d) of
the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and section 2(d)(i) of the Act
provides that “Anti-social Element” means a person who either by himself
or as a member of or leader of gang habitually commits, or attempts to
commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter
XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code.
19. Section 17 of the Act, 2002 stipulates that ground of orders of
detention to be disclosed to the person affected by the order. Section 17 of
the Act, 2002 reads as under-
“17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person
affected by the order. – (1) When a person is detained in
pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order
shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days15
2026:JHHC:8775-DBand in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of
detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order
has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of
making a representation against the order to the State
Government.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to
disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest
to disclose.”
20. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law, this Court
is now, reverting to the first issue, “whether the criminal activities of
petitioner come under the purview of definition of “Anti-social Elements”
as defined under section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002.”
21. On going through the impugned detention order dated
25.06.2025 (Annexure-2), this court finds that detention order is passed
by the respondent no.4- District Magistrate, Ranchi, wherein
involvement of the petitioner in six criminal cases and three cases based
on sanha has been mentioned.
22. This Court finds from the impugned detention order dated
25.06.2025 (Annexure-2), the following six FIRs have been registered
against the detenue/petitioner in different police stations:
1. Ormanjhi P.S. Case No.189 of 2024 dated 22.11.2024 under sections 109/118(1)/
118(2)/ 111(2)/ 111(3)/ 111(4)/ 111(5)/111(6)/ 111(7)/308(2)/ 308(3)/ 308(4)/
308(5) /61(2) of BNS and section 27 Arms Act.
2. Kanke PS Case No.71 of 2023 dated 20.03.2023 under sections 498A/313 of
IPC,3/4 of DP Act, Section 4 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage)
Act,2019
3. Pipra PS Case No.17 of 2023 dated 04.07.2023 under sections
385/386/387/326/387/326/307/34/120B of IPC and section 27 Arms Act.
4. Lalpur PS Case No.253 of 2024 dated 23.10.2024 under section 25(1-A)/26,35 of
Arms Act, Section 2 of Bengal Gambling Act and section 66 (C), 66 (D) of IT Act.
5. Chainpur P.S. Case No.245 of 2024 dated 01.12.2024 under section 311 BNS and
section 27 Arms Act.
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6. Chainpur P.S. Case No.246 of 2024 dated 01.12.2024 under section 311 BNS and
under sections 25(1-B)A/26,35 of Arms Act.
23. Hence, from the FIRs mentioned in the detention order dated
25.06.2025 (Annexure-2), this Court finds that the petitioner is habitual
offender and crime committed by the petitioner ranges from attempt to
murder, involvement in organized crime, extortion etc. and
the several cases under Arms Act has also been registered against the
petitioner.
24. Though, in the impugned detention order, out of six FIRs against
the detenue, one FIR is Kanke P.S. Case No.71 of 2023 dated 20.03.2023
which is under sections 498A/313 of IPC,3/4 of DP Act and Section 4 of
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019, and this
case is private / matrimonial dispute and therefore, will not disturb public
order, but, this case has also been mentioned in the impugned detention
order. But, even if this case is excluded, then also there are five FIRs
against the petitioner which are registered for attempt to murder,
involvement in organized crime, extortion etc. and the several cases under
the Arms Act.
25. Thus, the petitioner habitually commits offences punishable
under Section Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code as
defined in section 2(d)(i) of the Act, 2002.
26. Further, the detaining authority-respondent no.4 while passing
the detention order dated 25.06.2025 (Annexure-2), under section 12(2) of
the Act was satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was necessary, as
continuous criminal activities of the petitioner was causing threat to
maintenance of public order.
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27. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid factual aspect, is of
the view that the authority concerned has rightly considered that the act of
the petitioner comes under the purview of the ”Anti-social Elements” as
stipulated under Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act,
2002. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the orders of detention
dated 25.06.2025 (Annexure-2), on this score need no interference.
28. Accordingly issue no. (i) is, hereby, answered.
Re: issue no. (ii) and (iii)
29. These issues are whether preventive detention of the detenue was
confirmed without considering the representation (Bandi Patra) of the
detenue and whether ground of detention was communicated to the
detenue in accordance with Section 17 of the Act, 2002?
30. Submission has been made by the detenue/petitioner counsel that
representation(Bandi Patra) of the detenue was not decided, though,
petitioner had submitted representation(Bandi Patra) from inside the jail
and the same was handed over to the Jail authorities, but, the said
representation was neither forwarded by the Jail Superintendent nor it was
placed before the State Government prior to issuance of the confirmation
order dated 04.07.2025(Annexure-3) and subsequent extension orders
dated 08.08.2025 and 23.09.2025.
31. Here, it is pertinent to note that earlier for the same relief
detenue/petitioner had filed Writ Petition (Cr.) (DB) No.490/2025, but
prayer was made to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to challenge
the order passed by the State Government by approaching appropriate
forum and the prayer was allowed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court,
vide order dated 19.09.2025.
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32. Further, in paragraph-17 and 18 of the amended writ petition,
petitioner has stated that in the first writ Petition being Writ Petition (Cr.)
No. (D.B.) 490/2025, authorities had admitted that the petitioner’s
representation was received only on 16.09.2025 and representation of the
petitioner was not forwarded by the Jail Authority nor considered by the
State Government prior to passing of the Confirmation order
04.07.2025(Annexure-3) and subsequent extension orders dated
08.08.2025 and 23.09.2025.
33. But, ongoing through the record, this Court finds that the
supplementary counter affidavit filed by the Director (Administration)
Inspector of Jail and Correctional Services, in Writ Petition (Cr.) No.
(D.B.) 490/2025, has been placed before this Court, wherein, respondent
has admitted that representation (Bandi Patra) of the petitioner was
received by the authority concerned on 16.09.2025.
34. It has also been stated in the supplementary counter affidavit that
petitioner has made representation in form of Bandi Patra through the
Superintendent of Jail, Birsa Munda Central Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi, but,
same was not forwarded to the office of the Inspector General Prison and
Correctional Services, Jharkhand, thus, the same could not be forwarded
to the Government of Jharkhand for consideration.
35. On perusal of representation (Bandi Patra), annexed with the
aforesaid supplementary counter affidavit filed by the Director
(Administration) Inspector of Jail and Correctional Services in Writ
Petition (Cr.) No. (D.B.) 490/2025, this Court finds that petitioner has
addressed the aforesaid representation (Bandi Patra) to the Under
Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and Disaster Management,
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Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi. The aforesaid representation (Bandi
Patra), bears the signature of the detenue/petitioner in English, but, in this
representation (Bandi Patra), neither the date is mentioned with the
signature of the petitioner nor date is mentioned at the heading of the
representation (Bandi Patra).
36. Hence, this Court is unable to find when the aforesaid
representation (Bandi Patra), was written by the detenue, but it appears
that date of receiving of the representation (Bandi Patra) by the official,
is there in the representation (Bandi Patra), which is noted as ‘6/7/xxx’.
37. Hence, it is evident that the impugned detention order dated
25.06.2025, passed against the detenue petitioner was confirmed by the
Government/State under Section 12(3) of the Act of 2002 on
04.07.2025(Annexure-3), i.e., before the representation (Bandi Patra) was
filed by the detenue on 06.07.2025.
38. Hence, it is admitted fact that when confirmation order was
passed by the Government on 04.07.2025(Annexure-3), in exercise of
power conferred under Section 12(3) of the Act, there was no
representation (Bandi Patra) of the detenue before the Government, so,
that Government could have taken into consideration the representation of
the detenue.
39. Hence, question arises whether impugned detention order dated
25.06.2025 was communicated to the petitioner by the authorities within
the statutory time as provided under section 17 of the Act of 2002, so that
detenue/petitioner could have avail earliest opportunity of making
representation against the detention order to the State Government.
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40. Section 17 of the Act of 2002 stipulates that grounds of order of
detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order wherein it is
provided that authority making the detention order shall, as soon as may
be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances
and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the
date of detention, communicate to detune the grounds on which the order
has been made.
41. Hence, as per section 17 of the Act of 2002, aforesaid detention
order has to be communicated to the detune from the ‘date of detention’
which is ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional
circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten
days.
42. In the present case, the detenue/petitioner at paragraph-15 of the
amended writ petition has himself specifically admitted that the petitioner
has submitted a timely representation against the detention order from
inside the jail, strictly in accordance with law.
43. Hence, due to the specific admission of the detenue/petitioner
made at paragraph -15 of the amended writ petition that detenue/petitioner
has submitted a timely representation against the detention order from
inside the jail, this Court therefore is of the view that detaining authorities
has communicated detention order dated 25.06.2025(Annexure-2) to the
detenue/petitioner within the statutory time, as provided under section 17
of the Act, hence, the authorities have provided the opportunity of making
representation to the detenue to the State Government.
44. Before, proceeding further, it would be pertinent to mention the
case of Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587,
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wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down certain principles to be
observed by the Constitutional Court while examining the legality of
orders of preventive detention, for ready reference, paragraph-28 of the
said judgment is being quoted hereinbelow:-
“28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court
when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive
detention would be entitled to examine whether:
28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit
subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such
satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which
validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine
qua non for the exercise of the power not being satisfied;
28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority
has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is
not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the
statute;
28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which
it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not
authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires;
28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or under the
dictation of another body;
28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of
policy or in any other manner not authorised by the governing
statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each
individual case;
28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials
which are of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority
has given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate;
28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence
of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person
and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which
is stale;
28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is/are
such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and
prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant to
the subject-matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction
is to be reached;
28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests
are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with
sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the detention,
giving him the opportunity to make a suitable representation; and
28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly
adhered to.”
45. Hence, in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana (supra), the
Hon’ble Apex Court has inter alia laid down that the Constitutional Court
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while examining the legality of orders of preventive detention, timelines
provided under the statue, shall be strictly adhered to.
46. In the backdrop of the principles observed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana(supra), wherein it is laid
down that timelines provided under the preventive law shall be strictly
adhered to, therefore, this Court, is proceeding to examine the issue in
hand.
47. Section 12(3) of the Act of 2002, provides that when detention
order is passed by the District Magistrate, then, the detention order remain
in force for not more than 12 days after making thereof unless, in the
meantime, it has been approved by the State Government.
48. In the case in hand, the impugned detention order was passed by
the District Magistrate, on 25.06.2025(Annexure-2) and statutory time of
12 days, as provided under section 12(3) of the Act of 2002 comes to
06.07.2026. Meaning thereby that the detention order passed by the
District Magistrate will remain in force till 06.07.2026 unless in the
meantime detention order is approved by the State Government.
49. In the present case, Government in exercise of power conferred
under section 12(3) of the Act of 2002 has confirmed the detention order
on 04.07.2025(Annexure-3) and at that time, i.e., till 04.07.2025, no
representation (Bandi Patra), was filed by the detenue/petitioner before
the Government, though detenue/petitioner was communicated the
ground of detention within statutory time as provided under section 17 of
the Act, and was provided earliest opportunity of making representation
to the State Government, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
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50. Hence, if the detenue/petitioner himself did not file his
representation after being communicated to him the ground of detention
and did not avail earliest opportunity of making representation before the
State Government, then, in such situation, Government will fail to comply
with the statutory time limit provided for confirming the detention order,
as provided in section 12(3) of the Act of 2002, which will ultimately
frustrate the very object of the preventive detention law.
51. So, when no representation was filed by the detenue before the
State Government, before the issuance of confirmation order i.e. on
04.07.2025 (Annexure-4), by the State Government under section 12(3)
of the Act of 2002, though detenue/petitioner was communicated ground
of detention within statutory time as provided under section 17 of the Act
and when representation (Bandi Patra) appears to be filed by the detenue
on 06.07.2025 i.e. subsequent to the passing of the confirmation order on
04.07.2025, then submission of detenue/petitioner counsel that Jail
Authorities did not forward the representation is misplaced or in other
words, no prejudice was caused to the detenue.
52. Hence, this court is of view that no prejudice was caused to the
detenue/petitioner, once the statutory time provided for communicating
the detention order as provided under section 17 of the Act of 2002, was
complied by the authorities, but the detenue himself failed to avail earliest
opportunity of making representation.
53. Accordingly, issue no. (ii) and (iii), are hereby answered.
Re : Issue No. (iv)
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54. “Whether the recommendation of the District Magistrate for
detaining the detenue for period of 12 months, is in violation of section
12(2) of the Act?
55. Submission has been made by the detenue/petitioner that
Detaining Authority, at the very outset, has imposed the detention of 12
months, but, as per section 12(2) of the Act of 2002, no detention can
initially exceed a period of three months.
56. Section 12 of the Act of 2002, is the initiation of the process of
detaining a person, who is an anti-social element under the Act and in the
present case this Court on going through the impugned detention order
dated 25.06.2025(Annexure-2), finds that District Magistrate in exercise
of power conferred on him under Section12(2) of the Act has made
recommendation before the Government of necessity to detain the
detenue/petitioner for a period of 12 months.
57. But, proviso to Section 12(2) of the Act of 2002 provides that
period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-
section shall not in the first instance exceed three months, but, the State
Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary so to do, amend such
order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding
three months at any one time.
58. Hence, Section 12(2) of the Act, District Magistrate makes
recommendation for detaining an anti-social element to the State
Government and it is the state Government, who at the first instance has
to pass the order of detention which shall not exceed three months at the
first instance as per proviso provided under Section 12(2) of the Act.
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59. In the present case, it is the State Government who has passed
detention order for the period from 25.06.2025 to 24.09.2025, i.e., three
months, vide Memo No. 5/CCA/01/46/2025/269/CCA dated
08.08.2025(Annexure-4) and thereafter, further two detention orders were
passed by the Government extending the detention for three months each,
vide Memo No. 5/CCA/01/46/2025-346/CCA dated
23.09.2025(Annexure-5) and Memo No. 5/CCA/01/46/2025/448/CCA
dated 12.12.2025(Annexure-6).
60. Hence, the submission made by the detenue/petitioner that
Detaining Authority at the very outset has imposed the detention of 12
months, whereas, as per section 12(2) of the Act, no detention can initially
exceed a period of three months is misconceived as detention order under
the Act is passed by the State Government under proviso to section 12(2)
which at the first instance shall not exceed three months and in the present
case, the State Government while extending the period of detention vide
Annexure-4, Annexure-5 and Annexure-6, has never exceeded period of
detention for three months at any time.
61. Accordingly, issue no. (iv), is hereby answered.
Re: Issue No. (v)
62. Whether grant of bail to the petitioner in most of the cases is
ground for his release from the prevention detention passed under section
12(2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and in this regard
petitioner has raised ground that petitioner has been granted bail by the
Court of law, and the said cases were relied by the detaining authority
while passing the impugned order of detention dated
25.06.2025(Annexure-2) and hence, detention order cannot be sustained.
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63. This Court finds that in the detention order dated
25.06.2025(Annexure-2), there is reference of six criminal cases against
the petitioner, i.e., Ormanjhi P.S. Case No.189 of 2024 dated 22.11.2024,
Kanke PS Case No.71 of 2023 dated 20.03.2023, Pipra PS Case No.17 of
2023 dated 04.07.2023, Lalpur PS Case No.253 of 2024 dated
23.10.2024, Chainpur P.S. Case No.245 of 2024 dated 01.12.2024 and
Chainpur P.S. Case No.246 of 2024 dated 01.12.2024 and out of these six
criminal cases, in five cases, the petitioner had been enlarged on bail.
64. Hence, release of the petitioner on bail, in aforesaid pending
cases is concerned, this Court finds that it is the subjective satisfaction
of the Detaining Authority that in spite of his continuous activities
causing threat to maintenance of public order and in such
circumstances, based on the relevant materials and satisfying itself, that
it would not be possible to control his habituality in continuing the
criminal activities by resorting the normal procedures, the Detaining
Authority has passed an order detaining him under the Jharkhand
Control of Crimes Act, 2002.
65. Further, the ground of bail cannot be said to affect the decision
taken by the competent authority of detention, rather, the accusation so
made in the First Information Report is to be seen for the purpose to
have the subjective satisfaction of the nature of accusation made in the
said FIR. Since, the detention order is to be passed by the competent
authority anticipating the criminality of the concerned and it would be
evident from the accusation made in the impugned detention order dated
25.06.2025(Annexure-2), passed by the District Collector, wherein six
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pending criminal cases registered against the detenue have been
mentioned.
66. The consideration of coming from judicial custody by virtue of
order passed by the Court to release on bail has been taken into
consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.M Nagaraja Versus
Government of Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215,
wherein, detenue has challenged his detention order. The Hon’ble Apex
Court in this case has noted at paragraph-17 that the even after release on
bail detenue again started indulging in the same type of offences,
particularly, threatening the public life, damaging public property, etc. and
hence, detenue appeal was dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the
aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court had noted the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order
against the detenue, for the ready reference, Paragraph-17 and 20 of the
case of D.M. Nagaraja (supra) is quoted hereinbelow:-
“17. All the abovementioned details which have been
correctly stated in the detention order clearly show that the
appellant is not amenable to ordinary course of law. It also
shows that even after his release on bail from the prison on
various occasions, he again started indulging in the same
type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life,
damaging public property, etc. All these aspects have been
meticulously considered by the detaining authority and after
finding that in order to maintain public order, since his
activities are prejudicial to the public, causing harm and
danger, the detaining authority detained him as “goonda”
under Karnataka Act 12 of 1985 for a period of 12 months
and the same was rightly approved by the Advisory Board
and the State Government. Inasmuch as the detaining
authority has taken note of all the relevant materials and
strictly followed all the safeguards as provided in the Act
ensuring the liberty of the detenue, we are in entire
agreement with the decision of the detaining authority as well
as the impugned order of the High Court affirming the same.”
Xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted
criminality, criminal activities starting from the age of 30 and
details relating to eleven cases mentioned in the grounds of
detention. It is not in dispute that in one case he has been
convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
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for a term of nine years. He had been acquitted in two cases
and four cases are pending against him wherein he was
granted bail by the courts. It is the subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority that in spite of his continuous
activities causing threat to maintenance of public order, he
was getting bail one after another and indulging in the same
activities. In such circumstances, based on the relevant
materials and satisfying itself, namely, that it would not be
possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal
activities by resorting to normal procedure, the detaining
authority passed an order detaining him under Act 12 of
1985.”
67. In the present case, as per the impugned detention order dated
25.06.2025, it is apparent that out of the six cases registered against the
detenue leaving the Kanke P.S. Case No. 71/2023 (matrimonial dispute),
in five cases, the crime committed by the detenue is with respect to attempt
to murder, involvement in organized crime, extortion etc. and
the several cases of the Arms Act.
68. From, the impugned detention order dated 25.06.2025, it also
appears that one crime was committed by the detenue in the year 2023.
Thereafter, petitioner again in 2024, committed four criminal cases.
69. The authority concerned while passing the impugned detention
order which was passed on 25.06.2025 has taken into consideration the
entire history of accusation against the petitioner and only thereafter has
passed the order of detention. Hence, satisfaction has been arrived by
the detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live and proximate
link between the past conduct of the petitioner and material which is not
stale.
70. Thus, from the impugned detention order dated 25.06.2025, it is
evident that the detenue/petitioner is habitually involved in offences which
ranges from attempt to murder, involvement in organized crime, extortion
etc. and the several cases under the Arms Act and further, on the basis of
subjective satisfaction, the detaining authority has arrived to conclusion
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that the well-organized manner in which such pre-judicial activities have
been carried on and nexus between dates of incidents and passing of the
detention order and the said observation is according to the ratio laid down
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.M Nagaraja Versus
Government of Karnataka and others (supra) therefore, the said
observation of the detaining authority cannot be said to suffer from an
error.
71. Accordingly, Issue No.(v) is hereby answered.
72. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the orders of detention
need no interference.
73. Accordingly, the detention order dated 25.06.2025(Annexure-2)
passed by the Respondent No.4 and order dated 04.07.2025(Annexure-3)
passed by the Respondent No.3, confirming the detention order dated
25.06.2025 and subsequent extension orders dated 08.08.2025(Annexure-
4), 23.09.2025(Annexure-5) and 12.12.2025(Annexure-6), extending the
period of preventive detention are hereby sustained and upheld.
74. In the result, the instant writ petition stands dismissed.
75. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Dated:26/03/2026
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Rohit/-
A.F.R.
Uploaded on 30/03/2026
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