Himachal Pradesh High Court
Xyz vs K K & Others on 16 July, 2026
2026:HHC:29059
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision Nos. 217 of 2026 and
97 of 2017
Reserved on : 03.07.2026
.
Date of Decision: 16.07.2026
1. Cr. Revision No. 217 of 2026
XYZ ...Petitioner
Versus
of
K K & others ...Respondents
2. Cr. Revision No. 97 of 2017
State of H.P.
rt ....Petitioner
Versus
K K & another ....Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr Raju Ram Rahi, Advocate,
for the petitioner in
Cr.Revision No. 217 of
2026.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General,
for the petitioner in
Criminal Revision No. 97
of 2017.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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For the Respondent(s) : Mr Anubhav Chopra,
Advocate, for respondents No.
1 and 2 in Cr.Revision No. 217
of 2026 and respondents in
.
criminal Revision No. 97 of
2017.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General,
for respondent No.3 in
Criminal Revision No.217 of
2016
of
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revisions are directed against the
rt
judgment dated 16.07.2016, passed by learned Sessions Judge
(Forest), Shimla, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the
judgment of conviction dated 01.05.2013 and order of sentence
dated 06.05.2013, passed by the Principal Magistrate (Juvenile
Justice Board), (PMJJB), Shimla, District Shimla, HP were set
aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as
they were arrayed before the learned PMJJB Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revisions are that the police presented a challan against the
accused for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act). The victim (name being withheld to
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protect her identity) is the daughter of the accused K. Her father
had married the co-accused after his divorce from the victim’s
.
mother; however, the victim’s stepmother started torturing her
mentally and physically. She would feed her the refuse from the
toilet. Once, she was asked to eat the soap. She inserted a stick
into the victim’s private part. She threatened to humiliate the
of
victim by visiting her school in the presence of her friends. The
victim did not want to reside with her parents. Hence, she
rt
prayed that action be taken against her parents. This complaint
was forwarded by Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Urban) Shimla to
the PMJJB, Shimla, who directed the medical examination of the
victim. A Medical Board was constituted. Dr Arvind Sood (PW-1)
and Dr Nishi Sood (PW-2) examined the victim and found that
she had sustained multiple injuries. They issued reports
(Ext.PW-1/A and Ext.PW1/B). Subsequently, the victim made a
complaint to PMJJB that the accused had beaten her. The PMJJB
handed over the custody of the juvenile to her uncle. The
victim’s stepmother sent some Prasad (blessed food) through
two girls with the direction to hand it over to the victim. The
victim did not eat the Prasad. The accused threatened the victim
and asked her to withdraw the complaint filed against them, or
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she would be killed. The victim’s stepmother filed a false
complaint of molestation against the victim’s uncle. Therefore,
.
the victim prayed that action be taken against the accused to
save her.
3. Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) put a notice of accusation
to the accused for the commission of an offence punishable
of
under Section 23 of the JJ Act, to which the accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
rt
The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its
case. Dr Arvind Sood (PW-1) and Dr Nishi Sood (PW-2)
examined the victim. The victim (PW-3) narrated the incident.
Narinder Sharma (PW-4) and Meenakshi (PW-5) are the
members of the NGO to whom the victim had made the
complaint.
5. The accused, in their statements recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied
the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that the
victim’s father had a dispute with his brother over a property,
who instigated the victim to make a false complaint against
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them (the accused). They examined Dhan Ram (DW-1) and
themselves (DW-2 and DW-3) in their defence.
.
6. The PMJJB held that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. Normally, a
child will not make allegations against her parents unless there
is some truth in them. The plea taken by the accused that the
of
victim had made a false complaint against them at the instance
of her uncle was not acceptable because her uncle had less
rt
influence upon the victim than her parents. The statements of
Medical Officers corroborated the victim’s version as multiple
injuries were found on the victim’s body; therefore, JJB
convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable
under Section 23 of the JJ Act and sentenced them to undergo
simple imprisonment of five months each, and in default of
payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned JJB, Shimla, the accused filed an appeal, which was
decided by the learned Sessions Judge (Forest), Shimla, District
Shimla (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that
the victim’s testimony was unbelievable. She materially
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improved upon her version. She admitted that she was residing
away from the accused at the time of making the complaint.
.
Therefore, the injuries sustained by her could not be attributed
to the accused. The students of the school to whom Prasad
(blessed food) was given were not examined. The victim stated
that the complaint was not written by her, but it was dictated to
of
her. The victim’s uncle was not called by any person, and he had
voluntarily appeared before the Board to take the victim’s
rt
custody, which probabilised the defence taken by the accused
that the victim was under her uncle’s influence. All these
circumstances made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Hence, the
learned Appellate Court acquitted the accused.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the
learned Appellate Court, the victim and the State have filed
separate revisions. In a revision filed by the victim bearing
revision No. 217 of 2017, it has been asserted that the learned
Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment
passed by JJB. The victim’s testimony was duly corroborated by
the medical evidence and the statements of the officials of the
NGO. The victim was a child, and she could not be expected to
make a statement like a mature person. Any discrepancy in her
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testimony should not have been used to discard her statement.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed
.
and the judgment passed by the Learned Appellate Court be set
aside.
9. In the revision filed by the State bearing Criminal
Revision No. 97 of 2017, it has been asserted that the learned
of
Appellate Court wrongly brushed aside the statements of
prosecution witnesses. The accused had neglected to maintain
rt
the victim and abused her. The testimonies of prosecution
witnesses were duly corroborated by the medical evidence, and
the learned Appellate Court erred in discarding the
prosecution’s version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned
Appellate Court be set aside.
10. I have heard Mr Raju Ram Rahi, learned counsel for
the victim, Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the accused
Nos. 1 & 2 and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the State.
11. Mr Lokender Kutlehia, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the State, submitted that the victim’s testimony
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was credible and was duly corroborated by the medical evidence.
The defence version was not believable. There was no reason for
.
the victim to depose falsely against her parents. Learned Trial
Court had rightly appreciated the evidence, but learned
Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment
of the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present
of
revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned
Appellate Court be set aside.
12.
rt
Mr Raju Ram Rahi, learned counsel for the victim,
adopted the submissions of Mr Lokender Kultheira, learned
Additional Advocate General, and prayed that the judgment
passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.
13. Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the accused,
submitted that the victim has not proved to be a juvenile as per
Rule 12(3) of the J.J Rules, 2007. The victim was residing away
from her parents at the time of the incident, and injuries were
found to be fresh by the Medical Officers; therefore, the injuries
could not have been connected to the accused. The victim had
improved upon her version, which made her testimony highly
doubtful. There was no corroboration of her testimony from any
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independent witness, and the learned Appellate Court had
rightly disbelieved her testimony. Learned Appellate Court had
.
taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this
Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the
learned Appellate Court. Therefore, he prayed that the revision
petitions be dismissed.
of
14. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
15.
rt
The present revision has been filed against the
judgment of acquittal passed by learned Appellate Court. It was
laid down by the Gauhati High Court in Subhas Das v. State of
Assam, 2016 SCC OnLine Gau 749, that the High Court can hear a
revision against an order of acquittal; however, it cannot
convert an acquittal into a conviction. It was observed: –
26. That being the position, it is no surprise that though
section 52 of the Juvenile Justice Act provides for filing ofan appeal against any order made by a competent
authority as contemplated under section 15 thereof, there
is a specific bar to filing an appeal against any order of
acquittal made by the Juvenile Justice Board in respect of
a juvenile alleged to have committed an offence. That
leaves the provisions relating to revision as provided
under section 53. Though this Section is quite broadly
worded, inasmuch as, the High Court has been vested
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passed an order, either on its own motion or on an
application filed, to satisfy itself as to the legality or
propriety of any such order, and, thereafter to pass such.
an order as it thinks fit, the only limitation being that
such order shall not be passed prejudicial to any person
without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being
heard, can such a power be extended to examine an order
of acquittal. Section 54 provides a clue, inasmuch as it
says that the procedure to be followed in hearing appeals
or revision proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act shall
of
be, as far as practicable, in accordance with the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
27. While section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, generally provides for the powers of revision vested
rt
in the High Court or a Court of Session, section 401
specifically deals with the High Court’s power of revision.
Sub-section (3) of section 401 mentions that nothing
under section 401 shall be deemed to authorise a High
Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of
conviction. Thus, there is a bar on the High Court while
exercising the power of revision from converting a
finding of acquittal into one of conviction. When the
aforesaid provision is extrapolated into the provisions
contained in section 53 of the Juvenile Justice Act, it
becomes evidently clear that the power of revision vested
in the High Court cannot be extended to convert a finding
of acquittal into one of conviction. This is perfectly in
sync with the overall object of the Juvenile Justice Act.”
16. Rule 12 of J.J. Rules provides that in every case
concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the Court,
the Board or the Committee referred to in Rule 19 shall
determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in
conflict with law within 30 days from the date of making of the
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application. Section 23 provides for punishment for cruelty to a
juvenile or child. Therefore, it is essential that before a person
.
can be punished under Section 23 of the JJ Act, it has to be
proved that the accused had assaulted, abandoned or neglected
the juvenile or the child, which can be done after following the
procedure prescribed under Rule 12 of the J.J Rules.
of
17. It was held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta versus State of
U.P.& Ors (2019) 12 SCC 370 that Rule 12 (3)(a) provides that a
rt
matriculation certificate, if available, in its absence, the date of
Birth certificate from the school first attended, and in their
absence, the birth certificate given by the Corporation,
Municipal Authority or Panchayat would be considered. These
are in hierarchical order. Thus, where a matriculation certificate
is available, the birth certificate from the school and the birth
certificate given by the Corporation cannot be relied upon. It was
observed:
“12. Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) provides that for the purpose
of seeking evidence in the enquiry, the following
documents would have to be obtained:
(i) matriculation or equivalent certificate if
available;
(ii) in the absence of (i), the date of birth certificate
from the school first attended; and::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
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(iii) in the absence of (i) and (ii), the birth
certificate given by a corporation, municipal
authority or panchayat.
Clause (a) of Rule 12(3) contains a hierarchical ordering,
.
evident from the use of the language “in the absence
whereof”. This indicates that where a matriculation or
equivalent certificate is available, the documents
adverted to in (ii) and (iii) cannot be relied upon. The
matriculation certificate, in other words, is given
precedence. It is in the absence of a matriculation
certificate that the date of birth certificate of the school
of
first attended can be relied upon. It is in the absence of
both the matriculation and the birth certificates of the
first school attended that a birth certificate issued by the
corporation, municipal authority or panchayat could be
rt
obtained. This facet of Rule 12(3) was noticed in the two-
judge Bench decision of this Court in Ashwani Kumar
Saxena [Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9
SCC 750: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594].
13. K.S.P. Radhakrishnan, J. while holding that the
procedures laid down in CrPC cannot be imported while
making an enquiry in regard to a claim of juvenility under
the 2007 Rules observed: (Ashwani Kumar Saxena case
[Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594], SCC pp. 763-64, para 32)
“32. “Age determination inquiry”, contemplatedunder Section 7-A of the Act, read with Rule 12 of
the 2007 Rules, enables the court to seek evidence,
and in that process, the court can obtain thematriculation or equivalent certificates, if available.
Only in the absence of any matriculation or
equivalent certificates, the court needs to obtain
the date of birth certificate from the school first
attended, other than a play school. Only in the
absence of a matriculation or equivalent certificate
or the date of birth certificate from the school first
attended, the court needs to obtain the birth
certificate given by a corporation, a municipal
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authority or a panchayat (not an affidavit but
certificates or documents). The question of
obtaining a medical opinion from a duly constituted
Medical Board arises only if the abovementioned
.
documents are unavailable. In case an exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, then the
court, for reasons to be recorded, may, if
considered necessary, give the benefit to the child
or juvenile by considering his or her age on the
lower side within the margin of one year.”
The Court took notice of the fact that there could be
of
situations in which the date of birth recorded in the
matriculation certificate, or, for that matter, in the other
certificates referred to in Rule 12(3)(a), may not be
correct. The Court held that it was only when those
rt
documents are found to be fabricated or manipulated
could the date of birth as reflected could be discarded. The
Court held: (Ashwani Kumar Saxena case [Ashwani Kumar
Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri)
594], SCC p. 764, para 34)
“34. … There may be situations where the entry
made in the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, date of birth certificate from the school
first attended, and even the birth certificate given
by a corporation, a municipal authority or a
panchayat may not be correct. But the court,
Juvenile Justice Board or a committee functioning
under the JJ Act is not expected to conduct such a
roving enquiry and to go behind those certificates
to examine the correctness of those documents
kept during the normal course of business. Only in
cases where those documents or certificates are
found to be fabricated or manipulated, the court,
the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee need to
go for a medical report for age determination.”
In the view of the Court, it was only if the above
conditions were fulfilled that a medical report could be
called.
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14. The decision in Ashwani Kumar Saxena [Ashwani
Kumar Saxena v. State of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750: (2013) 1
SCC (Cri) 594] was rendered on 13-9-2012. Soon
thereafter, a three-judge Bench of this Court considered
.
the provisions of Section 7-A and Rule 12 in Abuzar
Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83]. R.M. Lodha, J. (as the learned Chief
Justice then was), speaking for himself and Anil R. Dave, J.
observed: (Abuzar Hossain case [Abuzar Hossain v. State of
W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83], SCC pp.
509-10, para 39)
of
“39.3. As to what materials would prima facie
satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for
discharging the initial burden cannot be
rt catalogued, nor can it be laid down as to what
weight should be given to a specific piece of
evidence which may be sufficient to raise
presumption of juvenility but the documents
referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall
definitely be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction
of the court about the age of the delinquent
necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code is
too tentative and may not by itself be sufficient
ordinarily to justify or reject the claim of juvenility.
The credibility and/or acceptability of the
documents, like the school-leaving certificate or
the voters’ list, etc., obtained after conviction
would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case, and no hard-and-fast rule can be
prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted
or rejected. In Akbar Sheikh [Akbar Sheikh v. State of
W.B., (2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 431] and
Pawan [Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 15 SCC
259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522] these documents were
not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra
Singh [Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 13 SCC
523 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 857] the documents viz.
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school-leaving certificate, marksheet and the
medical report were treated sufficient for directing
an inquiry and verification of the appellant’s age. If
such documents prima facie inspire confidence of
.
the court, the court may act upon such documents
for the purposes of Section 7-A and order an
enquiry for the determination of the age of the
delinquent.”
15. The above decision in Abuzar Hossain [Abuzar Hossain
v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83]
was rendered on 10-10-2012. Though the earlier decision
of
in Ashwani Kumar Saxena [Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State
of M.P., (2012) 9 SCC 750 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 594] was not
cited before the Court, it appears from the above extract
that the three-Judge Bench observed that the credibility
rt
and acceptability of the documents, including the school
leaving certificate, would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and no hard-and-fast rule as
such could be laid down. Concurring with the judgment of
R.M. Lodha, J., T.S. Thakur, J. (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) observed that directing an inquiry is not the
same thing as declaring the accused to be a juvenile. In
the former, the court simply records a prima facie
conclusion, while in the latter, a declaration is made on
the basis of evidence. Hence, the approach at the stage of
directing the inquiry has to be more liberal (Abuzar
Hossain case [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC
489: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83], SCC pp. 513-14, para 48)
“48. If one were to adopt a wooden approach, one
could say nothing short of a certificate, whether
from the school or a municipal authority, which
would satisfy the court’s conscience before
directing an enquiry. But then directing an enquiry
is not the same thing as declaring the accused to be
a juvenile. The standard of proof required is
different for both. In the former, the court simply
records a prima facie conclusion. In the latter, the
court makes a declaration on evidence that it
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scrutinises and accepts only if it is worthy of such
acceptance. The approach at the stage of directing
the enquiry has necessarily to be more liberal, lest
there is an avoidable miscarriage of justice. Suffice
.
it to say that while affidavits may not be generally
accepted as a good enough basis for directing an
enquiry, that they are not so accepted is not a rule
of law but a rule of prudence. The Court would,
therefore, in each case weigh the relevant factors,
insist upon filing better affidavits if the need so
arises, and even direct any additional information
of
considered relevant, including the information
regarding the age of the parents, the age of siblings
and the like, to be furnished before it decides on a
rt case-to-case basis whether or not an enquiry under
Section 7-A ought to be conducted. It will
eventually depend on how the court evaluates such
material for a prima facie conclusion that the court
may or may not direct an enquiry.”
16. Both these judgments have since been considered by a
two-judge Bench of this Court in Parag Bhati [Parag Bhati
v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 744 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 819],
where it was observed : (SCC p. 758, para 36)
“36. It is a settled position of law that if the
matriculation or equivalent certificates are
available and there is no other material to prove the
correctness of the date of birth, the date of birth
mentioned in the matriculation certificate has to be
treated as conclusive proof of the date of birth of
the accused. However, if there is any doubt or a
contradictory stand being taken by the accused
which raises doubt on the correctness of the date of
birth then as laid down by this Court in Abuzar
Hossain [Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10
SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83], an enquiry for
determination of the age of the accused is
permissible which has been done in the present
case.”
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17. The 2015 Act came into force on 15-1-2016. Section 111
repeals the earlier 2000 Act but stipulates that, despite
the repeal, anything done or any action taken under the
said Acts shall be deemed to have been done or taken
.
under the corresponding provisions of the new
legislation. Section 94 contains provisions in regard to
the determination of age, is in the following terms:
“94. Presumption and determination of age.–(1)
Where it is obvious to the Committee or the Board,
based on the appearance of the person brought
before it under any of the provisions of this Actof
(other than for the purpose of giving evidence),
that the said person is a child, the Committee or the
Board shall record such observation stating the age
rt of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with
the inquiry under Section 14 or Section 36, as the
case may be, without waiting for furtherconfirmation of the age.
(2) In case the Committee or the Board has reasonable
grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought
before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, asthe case may be, shall undertake the process of age
determination by seeking evidence by obtaining–
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or
the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the
Examination Board concerned, if available; and inthe absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation, a
municipal authority, or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age
shall be determined by an ossification test or any
other latest medical age determination test
conducted on the orders of the Committee or the
Board:
Provided that such age determination test conducted on
the order of the Committee or the Board shall be::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
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order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be
the age of a person so brought before it shall, for the.
purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that
person.”
Clause (i) of Section 94(2) places the date of birth
certificate from the school and the matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the Examination Board
concerned in the same category [namely (i) above].
In the absence thereof, category (ii) provides for
of
obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation,
municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the
absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by
means of medical analysis is provided. Section
rt 94(2)(i) indicates a significant change over the
provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of
the 2007 Rules made under the 2000 Act. Under
Rule 12(3)(a)(i), the matriculation or equivalent
certificate was given precedence, and it was only in
the event of the certificate not being available that
the date of birth certificate from the school first
attended could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i),
both the date of birth certificate from the school as
well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate
are placed in the same category.
18 Thus, it was essential for the prosecution to prove
the age of the victim by a matriculation or equivalent certificate,
a date of birth certificate; however, in the present case, no
certificate was produced on record to determine the age of the
child victim. Hence, the PMJJB erred in proceeding further
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without determining the fact whether the victim was a child or
not.
.
19. Even otherwise, the prosecution was relying upon
the sole testimony of the victim. The victim was stated to be a
child witness. Learned PMJJB conducted a voir dire to determine
her competence to depose and found that she could understand
of
the questions put to her and answer them rationally. Therefore,
the JJB had proceeded on the basis that the victim was a child.
20.
rt
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.
Venkateshwarlu v. State of A.P., (2012) 8 SCC 73: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri)
795: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 484: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 613, that the
Court can act upon the testimony of a child witness if it is
satisfied that he is not tutored and his testimony has a ring of
truth. It was observed at page 78:
9. Several child witnesses have been relied upon in this
case. The evidence of a child witness has to be subjectedto the closest scrutiny and can be accepted only if the
court comes to the conclusion that the child understands
the question put to him and is capable of giving rational
answers (see Section 118 of the Evidence Act). A child
witness, by reason of his tender age, is a pliable witness.
He can be tutored easily either by threat, coercion or
inducement. Therefore, the court must be satisfied that
the attendant circumstances do not show that the child
was acting under the influence of someone or was under a
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threat or coercion. Evidence of a child witness can be
relied upon if the court, with its expertise and ability to
evaluate the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the
child is not tutored and his evidence has a ring of truth. It
.
is safe and prudent to look for corroboration for the
evidence of a child witness from the other evidence on
record, because while giving evidence, a child may give
scope to his imagination and exaggerate his version or
may develop cold feet and not tell the truth or may repeat
what he has been asked to say, not knowing the
consequences of his deposition in the court. Careful
of
evaluation of the evidence of a child witness in the
background and context of other evidence on record is a
must before the court decides to rely upon it.
21. It was held in Digamber Vaishnav v. State of
rt
Chhattisgarh, (2019) 4 SCC 522: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 300: 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 316 that the testimony of a child witness must be
evaluated carefully because the child may be swayed by what
was told to him, and he is an easy prey for tutoring. It was
observed at page 528:
“21. The case of the prosecution is mainly dependent on
the testimony of Chandni, the child witness, who was
examined as PW 8. Section 118 of the Evidence Act
governs the competence of persons to testify, which alsoincludes a child witness. Evidence of the child witness and
its credibility could depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. There is no rule of practice
that in every case, the evidence of a child witness has to
be corroborated by other evidence before a conviction can
be allowed to stand, but as a matter of prudence, the court
always finds it desirable to seek corroboration for such
evidence from other reliable evidence placed on record.
The only precaution that the court has to bear in mind::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:29059while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the
witness must be a reliable one.
22. This Court has consistently held that evidence of a
child witness must be evaluated carefully, as the child.
may be swayed by what others tell him, and he is easy
prey to tutoring. Therefore, the evidence of a child
witness must find adequate corroboration before it can be
relied upon. It is more a rule of practical wisdom than law.
[See Panchhi v. State of U.P. [Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998)
7 SCC 177: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561], State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit
[State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70: 2000 SCC (Cri)of
579] and State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash [State of
Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745: 2002 SCC (Cri)
1210].]
23. In Alagupandi v. State of T.N. [Alagupandi v. State of
rt
T.N., (2012) 10 SCC 451: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1027], this Court
has emphasised the need to accept the testimony of achild with caution after substantial corroboration before
acting upon it. It was held that: (SCC p. 463, para 36)
“36. It is a settled principle of law that a child witness
can be a competent witness provided a statement ofsuch a witness is reliable, truthful and corroborated by
other prosecution evidence. The court, in such
circumstances, can safely rely upon the statement of achild witness, and it can form the basis for a
conviction as well. Further, the evidence of a childwitness and the credibility thereof would depend upon
the circumstances of each case. The only precaution
which the court should bear in mind while assessingthe evidence of a child witness is that the witness must
be a reliable one, his/her demeanour must be like any
other competent witness and that there exists no
likelihood of being tutored. There is no rule or practice
that in every case, the evidence of such a witness be
corroborated by other evidence before a conviction can
be allowed to stand, but as a rule of prudence, the
court always finds it desirable to seek corroboration of
such evidence from other reliable evidence placed on::: Downloaded on – 20/07/2026 20:30:39 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:29059record. Further, it is not the law that if a witness is a
child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found
reliable.”
22. It was held in Hari Om v. State of U.P., (2021) 4 SCC
.
345: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 440: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 2 that the Court
should evaluate the testimony of a child witness carefully and
act upon it after being satisfied with its credibility and reliability.
of
It was observed at page 368:
“22. At the outset, we must note the perspective from
which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered.
rt
The caution expressed by this Court in Suryanarayana
[Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 9 SCC 129:
2002 SCC (Cri) 413] that “corroboration of the testimony of a
child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and
prudence” is a well-accepted principle. While applying
said principle to the facts of that case, this Court inSuryanarayana [Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka,
(2001) 9 SCC 129: 2002 SCC (Cri) 413] observed : (SCC pp.
133-35, paras 5-9)
“5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of the
occurrence was about four years of age, is the only
solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath.
The time and place of the occurrence and the attending
circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of
there being any other person as an eyewitness. The
evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se,
but the court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider
such evidence with scrutiny and only on being convinced
about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base
a conviction by accepting the statement of the child
witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded only
on the grounds of her being of tender age. The fact of
PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to
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scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is
shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and
there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution
can rightly claim a conviction based on her testimony
.
alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is
not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some
discrepancies in the statement of a child witness
cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony.
Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material
particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a
child witness who, under normal circumstances,
of
would like to mix up what the witness saw with what
he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While
appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the
courts are required to rule out the possibility of the
rt
child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation
regarding tutoring or using the child witness for
ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have
no option but to rely upon the confidence-inspiring
testimony of such a witness for the purposes of
holding the accused guilty or not.
6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P. [Panchhi v. State
of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561] held that
the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated
more carefully and with greater circumspection
because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what
others tell him and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The
evidence of the child witness must find adequate
corroboration before it is relied upon, as the rule of
corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law (vide
Prakash v. State of M.P. [Prakash v. State of M.P., (1992)
4 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 853]; Baby Kandayanathil v.
State of Kerala [Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala,
1993 Supp (3) SCC 667: 1993 SCC (Cri) 1084]; Raja Ram
Yadav v. State of Bihar [Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar,
(1996) 9 SCC 287: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1004] and Dattu
Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra [Dattu Ramrao
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24
2026:HHC:29059
Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341: 1997
SCC (Cri) 685] ).
7. To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P. v.
Ashok Dixit [State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70:
.
2000 SCC (Cri) 579].”
23. A similar view was taken in Pramila v. State of U.P.,
(2021) 12 SCC 550: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 223: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 711,
wherein it was observed at page 552
of
“5. Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the
evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be
discarded. A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years
certainly has reasonably developed mental faculties to
rt
see, absorb and appreciate. In a given case, the evidence
of a child witness alone can also form the basis for aconviction. The mere absence of any corroborative
evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself
cannot alone discredit a child witness. But the courts have
regularly held that where a child witness is to beconsidered, and more so when he is the sole witness, a
heightened level of scrutiny is called for of the evidence
so that the court is satisfied with regard to the reliabilityand genuineness of the evidence of the child witness. PW
2 was examined nearly one year after the occurrence. TheCourt has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities
of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out, and what was
deposed was nothing but the truth.
6. The evidence of a child witness and the manner of its
consideration has been dealt with in State of M.P. v.
Ramesh [State of M.P. v. Ramesh, (2011) 4 SCC 786: (2011) 2
SCC (Cri) 493], as follows : (SCC p. 792, para 14)
“14. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that the deposition of a child
witness may require corroboration, but in case his
deposition inspires the confidence of the court and
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2026:HHC:29059
there is no embellishment or improvement therein,
the court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a
child witness must be evaluated more carefully with
greater circumspection because he is susceptible to
.
tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to
show that a child has been tutored, the court can reject
his statement partly or fully. However, an inference as
to whether the child has been tutored or not can be
drawn from the contents of his deposition.”
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
of
Pradeep v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 777, that the child
witness is susceptible to tutoring, and the Court should evaluate
rt
the same carefully. It was observed:
“9. It is a well-settled principle that corroboration of the
testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of
caution and prudence. A child witness of tender age is
easily susceptible to tutoring. However, that by itself is noground to reject the evidence of a child witness. The Court
must make a careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child
witness. The Court must apply its mind to the question
whether there is a possibility of the child witness beingtutored. Therefore, scrutiny of the evidence of a child
witness is required to be made by the Court with care and
caution.”
25. The PMJJB failed to consider the parameters for
assessing the testimony of the minor.
26. The victim admitted in her cross-examination that
she was residing in the house of her maternal uncle for 7-8
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months, which shows that she was not residing with the accused
at the time of the incident.
.
27. The reports (Ext.PW-1/A and Ext.PW-1/B)
specifically mentioned that all injuries from 1 to 9 and 14 were
simple with a duration of more than 21 days, injuries No. 10 to 13
and 15 were simple with a duration of more than 7 days. It was
of
rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that if the victim was
residing with her maternal uncle, the accused could not have
rt
caused injuries to her during that period, and the medical
evidence does not corroborate the victim’s version that injuries
were caused to her by the accused.
28. The victim further stated in her cross-examination
that the complaint (Mark-X) was not written by her, but was
dictated to her by the NGO. She had not written the portion ‘A to
A’ of Mark X, but it was dictated to her. She wrote whatever was
being dictated to her. She volunteered to say that she was told to
inform the officials of the NGO and thereafter reduce it into
writing. Meenakshi (PW-5) denied in her cross-examination
that the contents of the complaint ‘mark X’ were dictated to the
victim. She was not re-examined, which means that this part of
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her testimony was accepted as correct. Thus, the testimony of
Meenakshi (PW-5) contradicts the victim’s testimony.
.
29. The victim made vague statements regarding the
cruelty meted out to her. She stated in her cross-examination
that she could not tell the dates of the incidents. The JJB had
rightly held that the victim was a minor and she cannot be
of
expected to behave like a mature person; however, the accused
cannot be convicted based on vague allegations, which cannot be
rt
verified by any independent evidence.
30. The victim stated in her cross-examination that her
father had made many efforts to get her admitted to the present
school. She was provisionally admitted, and thereafter her
admission was regularised. She admitted in her cross-
examination that she was taken to the hospital for her
treatment. These admissions make her testimony doubtful that
she was being neglected and beaten. No parent would have taken
the child to the hospital after beating him.
31. The victim admitted in her cross-examination that
the relationship between her father and her uncle was strained,
and many cases were pending between them over the property.
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She admitted that both parties filed complaints against each
other before the Court and the police, which show that the
.
relationship was highly strained. The victim was immediately
residing with her uncle, and her testimony was required to be
seen with due care and caution.
32. The victim stated in her cross-examination that she
of
was kept properly by her maternal uncle when she resided with
him; however, she had made a complaint to the Protection
rt
Officer stating that her maternal uncle had attempted to rape
her. This shows that the victim cannot be trusted as a truthful
witness, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in seeking
the corroboration of her testimony.
33. Learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that
there was no corroboration of the victim’s testimony. The names
of the students to whom Prasad (blessed food) was given with a
direction to hand it over to the victim were not mentioned. The
victim claimed that she was caught near her school and was
threatened. The place of the incident mentioned by her is a busy
place, and many children and parents are present at that place to
drop off their children. It is difficult to believe that the
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prosecution would not have been able to get even a single
witness to corroborate the victim’s version. The victim said that
.
she had narrated the incident to her friends; however, no friend
was examined to establish this fact.
34. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a
reasonable view, while acquitting the accused, and no
of
interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned
Appellate Court in the present revision
35
rt
No other point was raised
36. In view of the above, the present revisions fail, and
the same are dismissed.
37. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondents are directed to
furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one
surety in the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four
weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation
that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this
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judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of
notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
.
38 A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the
learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
39. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
of
(Rakesh Kainthla)
16 July, 2026
th
(Ravinder)
rt
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