Recent reporting suggests that the Union Government is preparing a revised legislative roadmap for the redistribution of Lok Sabha seats, following Parliament’s rejection of the proposed 131st Constitutional Amendment and Delimitation Bill. That rejection was seen as a highwater mark for opposition unity and a victory for federalism. But it was a defensive victory; it blocked redistribution on the Government’s terms without settling the underlying problem. Any revised proposal requiring a constitutional amendment will again need the opposition support to clear Parliament, so the real question is what the opposition should demand in return.
So far, the opposition has offered no unified answer beyond insisting that the existing allocation of Lok Sabha seats be retained. This position is unprincipled and politically hard to justify; it extends a status quo already unfavourable to the opposition, and mistakes seats in the Lok Sabha for power in Parliament. A better approach, as this piece argues, is to propose a genuine revamp of India’s federal compact, grounded in the Rajya Sabha.
From the perspective of constitutional law and design, the case for such a reform is obvious. The Indian Constitution has long had a ‘centralising drift’ that is antithetical to the principle of distributed power which undergirds constitutionalism. Re-balancing federalism is one way to restore this notion of distributed power. But it is worth spelling out why the national opposition should fight for States’ rights. Federalism has emerged as the most durable bulwark against the national executive, and State Governments remain the underlying source of power for most opposition parties. Even the Congress is unlikely to ever return to power without strong regional partners. The interests of the States and national opposition are, in other words, currently aligned. What strengthens the States strengthens the opposition.
Problem with extending the current allocation
The current allocation of seats in the Lok Sabha is based on state populations from 1971 and extended it is problematic. First, votes from more populous northern states would count for less in national elections, because their populations have grown faster since 1971. This both violates the principle of ‘one-person-one-vote’ and is politically hard to justify as the Lok Sabha was designed to represent citizens equally. Further, as Shruti Rajagopalan points out, such malapportionment disproportionately underrepresents younger, poorer, and marginalised citizens.
Second, continuing the existing seat allocation commits the opposition to prolonging the current state of Indian federalism, which is deeply unfavourable to the States. As things stand, State Governments have no direct say over budgetary legislation in Parliament, the appointment of the Finance Commission, or ad-hoc fiscal devolutions to States by the Union. Further, they have no say over appointments to national institutions that often affect their interest deeply, such as the Supreme Court of India, the Election Commission of India, or national investigative agencies. Securing a few additional seats in the Lok Sabha solves none of these problems for State Governments.
More seats in the Lok Sabha does increase a party’s chances of influencing government formation or being part of the Union Government. But this episodic relevance to coalition arithmetic should not be confused with durable power in Parliament. Increasing the power of the States, not preserving seats in the Lok Sabha, should be the starting point of the opposition’s response to delimitation. This is what should be demanded in return for the population-proportionate redistribution of Lok Sabha seats that the Government seeks. The best way to secure power for the States, I would argue, is to reform the Rajya Sabha.
Three proposed changes to the Rajya Sabha
Unlike the Lok Sabha, which was intended to represent people and thus allocates seats based on population, the Rajya was intended to represent States. Seats in the Rajya Sabha can therefore be allocated to States as constitutive units of the Union, without the concern for population-proportionality that governs the Lok Sabha. One option is to give every State the same number of seats in the Rajya Sabha. But given the vast divergences in State populations and finances, larger States may reject this out of hand. Inter-state parity also raises the problem of minority rule and gridlock, where a few states representing a small fraction of the population could repeatedly block legislation in Parliament. A more balanced solution would be to apply a degressive proportionality formula to seat allocations in the Rajya Sabha, giving all States a baseline number of seats (e.g., six) and the very largest getting a few more (e.g., ten). This would sharply equalise the power between small and large States in the Rajya Sabha, making each State a significant actor in the Chamber.
The second, and most obvious, change is to empower the Rajya Sabha with respect to budgetary legislation, fiscal devolutions to States, and national appointments. Second chambers in other federal countries such as the United States Senate, the German Bundesrat, the Australian Senate, and the Brazilian Federal Senate, all possess meaningful powers of this kind. The risk that States will block spending on key national priorities can be minimised by excluding items such as national defence from the Rajya Sabha’s ambit. But if the Rajya Sabha is to meaningfully advance States’ interests, it must be given power over the money flowing to the States and control over the institutions that affect them.
However, an empowered Rajya Sabha will be meaningless if its Members continue to be responsive to solely to national party leaders. While Members are nominally elected by State Assemblies, the anti-defection law requires them, once in Parliament, to vote in line with whips issued by the national leadership. The State Assemblies that elected these Members have no control over them. This disconnect between State Assemblies and Rajya Sabha MPs was on full display in the recent episode involving Raghav Chadha’s defection. The AAP’s MPs in the Rajya Sabha, claiming to represent the party, “merged” with the BJP in clear contradiction of the will of the Punjab Legislative Assembly that elected many of these MPs.
The third change would therefore replace elections to the Rajya Sabha, which in any case are mathematical along party lines, with a system of direct appointment and recall by state political parties. Every party in a State Assembly would be entitled to appoint, and recall at any time, the same number of Members to the Rajya Sabha as it would win under the current voting system. This would preserve the status of the Rajya Sabha as a permanent body while continually reflecting the composition of State Assemblies. In the event of President’s Rule or a hung assembly, existing appointees would stay on until replaced by the newly elected Assembly.
This would also allow the anti-defection law to be made inapplicable to the Rajya Sabha. The right to recall would impose comparable party discipline, since any Member who defected would be immediately recalled by their state party. The result would be Rajya Sabha Members who were truly responsive to the States, while leaving room for state and national party units to coordinate where necessary.
Why create a plan
One might argue that the Government will never accept such proposals, making them futile. But as noted at the outset, any constitutional amendment the Government introduces will needs some opposition votes. Articulating a clear opening position based on States’ rights can only strengthen the opposition’s hand in the negotiations to come. Doing so openly would also let citizens weigh the opposition’s vision against the Government’s and would put to rest the key charge that is merely obstructionist.
