Whether Appellate court can grant interim relief in the appeal if suit was dismissed by trial court?

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    What we do not approve is the statement of law that once

    the suit is dismissed, no interim relief could be granted

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    pending the appeal preferred against such judgment and order

    passed by the trial court. Further, in our opinion, the

    reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI

    Rule 5, while declining to grant status quo, is grossly

    misplaced. This is because the considerations laid

    thereunder, such as that of causing substantial loss to the

    party applying for a stay, can only be considered when a

    stay is sought on the execution of a decree, which is not

    the case herein. {Para 16}

    17. An appeal is considered a continuation of the original

    suit, and the appellate court has co-extensive power to grant

    appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and

    preserve the status quo pending the final disposal of the

    appeal.

    18. The first appellate court can re-examine both questions

    of fact and law and may re-appreciate the evidence on record.

    Its powers are as extensive as the original court’s, meaning

    it can reconsider the need for interim protection.

    19. Interim relief is designed to aid the main relief and

    ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous. It

    aims to prevent irreparable harm that might be caused while

    the case is pending final determination.

    20. The grant of appropriate relief is a discretionary power

    of the appellate court, and the same must be exercised

    judicially based on the well-settled principles of a prima

    facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience.

    21. The court must weigh the potential injury to both

    parties. In a given case, the plaintiff whose suit has been

    dismissed may be in a position to highlight before the

    appellate court a palpable or gross error that might have

    been committed by the trial court and on the basis of which

    he may be in a position to argue that there are more than

    fair chances of his appeal being allowed.

    22. In essence, the appellate court must independently

    consider the application for interim relief pending final

    disposal of the appeal on its own merits and the established

    legal principles. It should not just look into the final

    outcome of the suit.

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO. ……… OF 2025

    (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 27549/2025)

    MOHAMMADHANIF MOHAMMADIBRAHIM 

    PATEL & ORS. V  PALLAVIBEN RAJENDRA KUMAR  

    PATEL & ORS.

    Dated: 18th November, 2025.

    Citation:  2025 INSC 1347.

    1. Leave granted.

    2. Our order dated 13.10.2025 reads thus;-

    “1. Heard Mr. Nirav Majumdar, the learned counsel

    appearing for the petitioners.

    2. We find the impugned order prima facie a bit

    unusual. The Appellate Court says that since the

    suit has been dismissed, no interim relief can be

    granted in an appeal. The High Court has affirmed

    such finding.

    3. Issue notice returnable on 10.11.2025.

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    4. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted.

    5. Parties are directed to maintain status quo as

    regards the nature, character and possession of the

    suit property.”

    3. The respondents-original defendants although served

    with the notice issued by this Court yet have chosen not to

    remain present before this Court and oppose this appeal.

    4. This appeal arises from the order passed by the High

    Court of Gujarat dated 10.06.2025 in Special Civil

    Application No.7298 of 2025 by which the petition filed by

    the appellant herein invoking the supervisory jurisdiction

    of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution came

    to be dismissed, thereby affirming the order passed by the

    appellate court declining to grant the relief prayed for by

    the appellants herein pending the final disposal of the

    Regular First Appeal.

    5. It appears from the materials on record that the

    appellants challenged the legality and validity of two

    consent decrees passed by the Civil Court on the ground of

    fraud by instituting two Civil Suits i.e. (1) Special Civil

    Suit No. 1036 of 1999 and (2) Special Civil Suit No. 1035 of

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    1999, respectively.

    6. Insofar as the Special Civil Suit No. 1036 of 1999 is

    concerned, the same came to be allowed, and the consent

    decree challenged therein was set aside. So far as the other

    suit is concerned i.e. Special Civil Suit No.1035 of 1999,

    the same came to be dismissed.

    7. The appellants herein, being dissatisfied with the

    dismissal of the Special Civil Suit No. 1035 of 1999,

    preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 205 of 2024 in the Court

    of District Judge, Vadodara.

    8. In the said appeal, the appellants preferred an Exhibit-

    5 application, praying that pending the final disposal of

    the First Appeal, the original defendants may be directed to

    maintain status quo.

    9. The appellate court declined to grant the relief as

    prayed for, saying that as the suit had stood dismissed

    thereby declining to grant the declaration as prayed for

    therein, no question of seeking any interim relief in the

    First appeal in the form of status quo till its final

    disposal would arise. The relevant observations made by the

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    first appellate court below Exhibit- 5 read thus:

    “In view of the above provision, the facts of the

    present case are that the claim made by the

    appellants in the above details has been rejected

    by the trial court. Thus, the order passed in the

    suit is not to be executed and the appellants are

    not adversely affected because the suit filed by

    the appellants has been rejected. The suit is not

    to be executed, therefore, there is no

    possibility of any substantial loss to the

    appellants. Thus, since this application lacks

    the elements mentioned in C.P.C. Order 41 Rule 5,

    the order mentioned in the said provision cannot

    be made…”

    10. We are constrained to observe that the translation

    provided as referred to above is extremely poor and

    incorrect.

    11. In view of the aforesaid, the appellants went before

    the High Court and prayed for the necessary relief. The

    High Court also took the same view, saying that since the

    suit itself had been dismissed, no question thereafter would

    arise for the grant of any interim relief in the appeal

    preferred by the appellants.

    12. Para 11 of the impugned order passed by the High Court

    reads thus:-

    “Thus, looking at from any angle, once plaintiff

    having lost in suit unless such judgement/decree

    set aside by appellate court, question of

    granting injunction would not arise.”

    13. With all humility at our command, we are of the view

    that both the first appellate court and the High Court are

    not right in taking such a view.

    14. Just because the original suit came to be dismissed,

    that does not mean that in the pending appeal, the appellate

    court cannot grant appropriate relief as prayed for. Of

    course, the appellant has to make out more than a prima facie

    case for the grant of such relief on its own merits.

    15. To illustrate, in a suit for specific performance

    concerning an immovable property, if the relief sought is

    not granted and the aggrieved party appeals, then an

    application seeking to maintain the status quo filed before

    the appellate court cannot be dismissed solely because the

    suit for specific performance stood dismissed.

    16. What we do not approve is the statement of law that once

    the suit is dismissed, no interim relief could be granted

    pending the appeal preferred against such judgment and order

    passed by the trial court. Further, in our opinion, the

    reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI

    Rule 5, while declining to grant status quo, is grossly

    misplaced. This is because the considerations laid

    thereunder, such as that of causing substantial loss to the

    party applying for a stay, can only be considered when a

    stay is sought on the execution of a decree, which is not

    the case herein.

    17. An appeal is considered a continuation of the original

    suit, and the appellate court has co-extensive power to grant

    appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and

    preserve the status quo pending the final disposal of the

    appeal.

    18. The first appellate court can re-examine both questions

    of fact and law and may re-appreciate the evidence on record.

    Its powers are as extensive as the original court’s, meaning

    it can reconsider the need for interim protection.

    19. Interim relief is designed to aid the main relief and

    ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous. It

    aims to prevent irreparable harm that might be caused while

    the case is pending final determination.

    20. The grant of appropriate relief is a discretionary power

    of the appellate court, and the same must be exercised

    judicially based on the well-settled principles of a prima

    facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience.

    21. The court must weigh the potential injury to both

    parties. In a given case, the plaintiff whose suit has been

    dismissed may be in a position to highlight before the

    appellate court a palpable or gross error that might have

    been committed by the trial court and on the basis of which

    he may be in a position to argue that there are more than

    fair chances of his appeal being allowed.

    22. In essence, the appellate court must independently

    consider the application for interim relief pending final

    disposal of the appeal on its own merits and the established

    legal principles. It should not just look into the final

    outcome of the suit.

    23. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order passed by

    the High Court is set aside. So also the order passed by the

    District Court dated 25.11.2024 is set aside.

    24. We could have remitted the matter to the High Court for

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    fresh consideration. However, we deem fit to remit the matter

    to the District Court for fresh hearing of the original

    application-Exhibit-5 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 205 of

    2024.

    25. The appellate court shall hear all the parties concerned

    afresh and pass an appropriate order on its own merits in

    accordance with law.

    26. Let Exhibit-5 application filed in Regular Civil Appeal

    No. 205 of 2024 be heard and disposed of within a period of

    two months from today.

    27. Till the disposal of the Exhibit 5, referred to above,

    the interim order passed by this Court shall continue to

    operate.

    28. The parties shall appear before the District Court on

    1st December, 2025 and produce this order passed by us today.

    29. On production of this order, the court concerned shall

    fix one particular date for fresh hearing of the Exhibit-5

    application filed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 205 of 2024.

    30. With the aforesaid, this appeal stands disposed of.

    31. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

    ……………….J.

    [J.B.PARDIWALA]

    ……………….J.

    [K.V. VISWANATHAN]

    New Delhi

    18th November, 2025.

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