Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Visva Bharati vs Geeta Ghosh on 6 May, 2026
2026:CHC-AS:675-DB
Form No. J(2)
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present: The Hon'be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury
M.A.T 1949 of 2025
IA No: CAN 1 of 2026
CAN 2 of 2026
Visva Bharati, a Central University and others
Vs.
Geeta Ghosh
For the appellants : Mr. Sucharita Biswas
Mr. Debapriya Gupta
Mr. Moni Shankar Sengupta
For the respondent : Mr. Abhrajit Mitra
Mr. Arindam Guha
Mr. Shuvasish Sengupta
Ms. Shalini Dey
Heard on : 06.05.2026
Judgment on : 06.05.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
In Re: CAN 1 of 2026
1. In view of sufficient explanations having been given, CAN 1 of
2026 is allowed, thereby condoning the delay in filing MAT 1949
of 2025.
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2. There will be no order as to costs.
In Re: MAT 1949 of 2025
3. The present appeal has been preferred against an order whereby
the learned Single Judge set aside an order passed by the
appellant/Visva Bharati, refusing to mutate the subject property
in the name of the respondent Smt. Geeta Ghosh, the wife of late
Priyabrata Ghosh.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants argues that in
terms of Clause 10 of the parent lease deed executed in favour of
late Gyan Ghosh, the ancestor of Priyabrata Ghosh, in the year
1951, the lessee will not, without the consent in writing of the
lessor first had and obtained, assign, transfer, let out or
mortgage the benefit of the lease thereby granted to any person,
provided that such consent will not be withheld in case of a
transfer, assignment or mortgage in favour of persons who are
life members of the Visva Bharati.
5. Learned counsel submits that at that juncture, Visva Bharati
was a registered society.
6. After Visva Bharati became a statutory body in terms of the
concerned statute, that is, the Visva Bharati University Act,
1951, the concept of life members has become obsolete.
7. However, even otherwise, a bequest by way of a Will comes
within the purview of the term “assign” in terms of Clause 10
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and is precluded without a prior written consent in writing from
the lessor, that is, Visva Bharati.
8. It is submitted that in the present case, although after the
demise of Gyan Ghosh, the original lessee, the plot was mutated
in the name of his son Priyabrata Ghosh, the same was done on
the basis of his nomination by the other heirs and not on the
strength of any transfer/assignment/Will.
9. Subsequently, on the demise of Priyabrata, who left behind as
his heirs the present respondent Geeta Ghosh (his widow) and
three sons, the mutation was sought by the respondent on the
strength of the Will executed by her husband, Priyabrata Ghosh.
10. Learned counsel argues that the said bequest, without prior
consent in writing of the lessor/Visva Bharati, was invalid in the
eye of law and contrary to the terms of the parent lease and, as
such, no mutation could be granted in favour of Geeta Ghosh on
the strength of the said Will.
11. Learned counsel further argues that in the judgments which
were relied on by the learned Single Judge, the proposition laid
down by the learned Single Judge was not enunciated.
12. Seeking to distinguish the said judgments on facts as well as
law, learned counsel submits that in paragraph no.9 of State of
West Bengal and another vs. Kailash Chandra Kapur and others
reported at (1997) 2 SCC 387, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
categorically observed that in their generic sense, the words
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“assign” or “transfer” include every kind of transfer of the
property from one to another, including testamentary
disposition.
13. It was further held that thereby it would be construed that in an
appropriate case where the property was assigned by
testamentary disposition, it may be a transfer for the purpose of
a particular Act or a Regulation, as the case may be, irrespective
of the restricted meaning of the word “transfer” defined under
Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act.
14. Learned counsel submits that the facts in the other two cases
relied on by the learned Single Judge, being Pawan Kumar
Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal reported at 2014 (1) CHN (Cal)
83 and the State of West Bengal and others vs. Smt. Kusum
Agarwal and another, reported at 2018 SCC Online Cal 6916,
were distinct and different from the present case.
15. Learned counsel places reliance on paragraph no.3 of Pawan
Kumar Agarwal (supra) and submits that the moot bone of
contention in the said case was whether mutation could be
effected unless transfer fees were paid.
16. Again, in Kusum Agarwal‘s case (supra), the consideration before
the court was regarding bequest to a stranger and whether it
should be considered as an assignment of the demised premises
which would take place on a future day.
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17. In both Kusum Agarwal‘s case and Pawan Kumar Agarwal
(supra), the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge of this
court respectively relied on Kailash Chandra Kapur (supra).
18. However, in the present case, since there is no specific clause
pertaining to bequest in the parent lease; rather Clause 10
thereof precludes any assignment without prior written consent
in writing of the lessor. In terms of the said clause, no valid
transfer was effected by the Will at all.
19. Accordingly, it is submitted that the premise of the impugned
judgment of the learned Single Judge, that is, the probated Will
in favour of the respondent, could not be a valid basis of
directing mutation to be effected in favour of the respondent.
20. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent argues that
before the writ court, a lease deed was produced which shows
that all the heirs of Priyabrata, the deceased husband of the
respondent, other than the respondent/widow had executed
such deed relinquishing their rights in respect of the subject
plot in favour of the respondent Smt. Geeta Ghosh.
21. Learned senior counsel submits that under similar
circumstances, where there was a nomination of Priyabrata by
the other heirs of late Gyan Ghosh, Visva Bharati, the appellant,
itself had granted mutation in favour of Priyabrata.
22. Thus, the respective provisions of the aforementioned Clause
were interpreted by the Visva Bharati/appellant in the manner
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that if there is a nomination/release in favour of one of the heirs
of the deceased lessee, mutation can be granted in favour of
such nominee.
23. It is further argued that irrespective of the Will, the mutatio n
was rightly directed by the learned Single Judge to be granted in
favour of the respondent in the light of the release deed by the
other heirs of Priyabrata.
24. Upon a careful consideration of Clause 10, it transpires that, in
the light of the ratio laid down in Kailash Chandra Kapur
(supra), the appellant is justified in arguing that an assignment,
which is prohibited without prior consent in writing of the lessor
in the said Clause, comes within the broader ambit of a bequest.
25. Clause 10 does not distinguish between a transfer inter vivos
and a posthumous transfer and/or between a testate and
intestate devolution.
26. As such, there is a blanket bar to assignment, whether inter
vivos or posthumous, in Clause 10 unless there is a prior
consent in writing of the lessor.
27. The effect of a Will which deviates from the normal line of
succession definitely tantamounts to assignment in favour of
one of the heirs of the deceased lessee in exclusion of the others.
28. Hence, such contention of the appellants is justified and the
respondent could not be held to be entitled, in view of the bar of
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Clause 10 of the parent lease deed, to have rights as a lessee on
the strength of the Will Itself.
29. In such context, we are also to look into Clause 11(b)(v) of the
parent lease itself.
30. The said Clause is reproduced herein below:
“(v) if the Lessee dies without having made a transfer or bequest,
valid according to the terms of these presents, and if the heir of the
Lessee if he leaves one heir, or the nominee of the heirs if he leaves
more heirs than one, does not become a Life Member of the Visva
Bharati. Such legatee, heir or nominee of the heirs, of the Lessee, on
becoming a Life Member of the Visva-Bharati, will be entitled, and shall
be allowed by the Lessor, to hold the demises premises during the
unexpired period of the term of the lease hereby created, and shall be
recognized as a Lessee for all purposes subject to the conditions hereby
stipulated.
Provided that admission of the legatee, heir or the nominee of the
heirs of a deceased Lessee, as a Life Member of the Visva-Bharati,
shall not be refused by the Lessor; and in the case of the Lessee’s
death within 10 years of his admission as a Life Member of the Visva –
Bharati on payment of full admission fees and subscriptions, such
admission shall be effected by the Lessor without any further
admission fee or subscription.”
31. From the said Clause, it is clear that if the lessee dies without
having made a transfer or bequest, “valid according to the terms
of the deed”, and if the heir of the lessee (if he leaves only one
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heir) or the nominee of the heirs, if he leaves more heirs than
one, does not become a life member of the Visva Bharati, the
lessor, that is, the the Visva Bharati, can re-enter into
possession of the premises.
32. As such, an exception is carved out, precluding the lessor from
re-possessing the premises, inter alia, for a class of heirs of the
lessee, on the demise of the lessee, which class is nominated by
the other heirs of the lessee.
33. Although sub-clause (v) of Clause 11 puts in an additional rider
that such nominee has to become a life member of the Visva
Bharati to get the protection of the said sub-clause, the same is
adjuncted by the proviso to the sub-clause which stipulates that
admission of the legatee, heir or nominee of the heirs of a
deceased lessee as a life member of the Visva Bharati “shall not”
be refused by the lessor.
34. Thus, the proviso and the provision of life membership cancel
out each other and it was, even at the relevant juncture when
Visva Bharati was merely a society, a matter of course, if an
admission to life membership was sought, for the same to be
granted.
35. Thus, the proviso cancels out the additional requirement of life
membership incorporated in the main body of sub-clause (5).
36. Accordingly, it would be mandatory for Visva Bharati, even at
the juncture when the parent lease was granted and Visva
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Bharati was a society, to permit the nominee of the other heirs
of a lessee to continue in possession of the subject plot till the
expiry of the tenure of the parent lease.
37. After Visva Bharati became a statutory university, the concept of
life membership has been obliterated.
38. Thus, the said provision has to be now read without the life
membership adjunct accompanying the other requirement of the
person wishing to continue in possession to be a nominee of the
other heirs of the deceased lessee.
39. We find that as lately as in the year 1995, to be precise, on
January 1, 1995, Priyabrata, the son of Gyan Ghosh (the
original lessee), on the demise of the latter, was granted similar
relief of mutation in his name on the strength of nomination by
the other heirs of the original lessee, Gyan Ghosh, since
deceased.
40. Hence, the Visva Bharati itself had interpreted Clause 10, read
with Clause 11(b )(v) in the sense that if there is a nomination
by the other heirs of a lessee in favour of one of the heirs,
mutation would be granted as a matter of right in favour of such
nominee.
41. Thus, the learned Single Judge was justified in taking note of
such grant of mutation in favour of Priyabrata in 1995 to come
to the conclusion, inter alia, that similar relief ought to have
been granted to the respondent.
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42. Although, as per our above discussion, the probated Will
executed by Priyabrata in favour of the respondent/his wife
could not be a valid consideration in the grant of mutation, even
otherwise, since a registered release deed (nomination in another
form) executed by the other heirs of Priyabrata was produced
before the Writ Court, the benefit of Clause 11(b)(v), which was
given to Priyabrata on the demise of Gyan Ghosh, ought also to
have been given to the respondent, independent and irrespective
of the Will bequeathing the property in her favour by Priyabrata.
43. Thus, even sans the Will, the respondent has a right of mutation
of the subject plot in her favour on the strength of the release
deed by the other heirs of Priyabrata.
44. Hence, although on somewhat modified reasons, we agree with
the conclusion of the learned Single Judge in setting aside the
impugned order of Visva Bharati refusing to grant mutation of
the subject plot in favour of the respondent.
45. As rightly pointed out by learned Senior counsel for the
respondent, Clause 11(b)(v) further provides that apart from
having the right to hold possession of the premises, the
nominated heir of the lessee shall also be recognized as a lessee
for all purposes, subject to the conditions stipulated in the lease
deed.
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46. Thus, the effect of nomination by the other heirs of Gyan Ghosh
in favour of Priyabrata, upon the demise of Gyan Ghosh, was
that Priyabrata himself had become a lessee for all purposes.
47. Hence, it cannot now be accepted, as contended by Visva
Bharati/appellant, that the other heirs of Gyan Ghosh have to
be embroiled afresh and have to give a fresh nomination to the
present respondent for the purpose of her becoming a lessee or
being entitled to mutation.
48. We say so because at the juncture when nomination was given
to Priyabrata and the subject plot was mutated in his favour by
the Visva Bharati, the effect of the said mutation and
nomination conjunctively was that Priyabrata had become a
lessee for all purposes, subject, of course, to the other
conditions prescribed in the lease deed.
49. Hence, the expression “lessee” in Clause 11(b)(v) vis-Ã -vis the
present respondent would connote Priyabrata himself, whose
other heirs have already nominated the respondent to continue
as a lessee for all practical purposes in possession of the subject
plot, till the end of the tenure of the parent lease.
50. In view of the above, we find that the learned Single Judge was
justified in passing the impugned judgment and setting aside the
order of the appellant refusing to grant mutation in favour of the
respondent.
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51. Accordingly, MAT 1949 of 2025 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the impugned judgment dated September 9, 2025
passed in WPA 22202 of 2022 and directing the appellant-
authority to mutate the name of the respondent Smt. Geeta
Ghosh in terms of her prayer in respect of the subject property
within a period of one month from date.
52. CAN 2 of 2026 is accordingly disposed of as well.
53. There will be no order as to costs.
54. Urgent photostat copies of this order, if applied for, be given to
the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Biswaroop Chowdhury, J.)
AD-01
AK
