Delhi District Court
Virender Kathuria vs Rinki on 18 July, 2026
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In the Court of Sh. Ashwani Kumar Sarpal, Principal
District & Sessions Judge, East District
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
(Crl. Appeal no. 196/2024)
Sh. Virender Kathuria & another
vs.
Rinki & others
Date of filing-------25-11-2024
Date of decision-----18-7-2026
(Appeal u/s 29 of P.W.D.V. Act against the order dated 16-10-2024)
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JUDGMENT:
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1) Respondent no. 3 in his written submissions filed in this court on 6-7-2026
stated that he as well as both the appellants have already filed an
application for modification of the earlier order dated 26-8-2023 (which is
already upheld earlier by Sessions Court partly) and impugned order dated
16-10-2024 before ld. Trial Court, in which notice has already been issued
to the respondent no. 1 and that application is pending for 6-8-2026. It is
very strange that appellants on one hand are pursuing this appeal against
the impugned order dated 16-10-2024 and simultaneously have approached
ld. Trial Court itself for modification/review of the same. Appellants
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cannot be allowed to seek same relief in two different courts at the same
time. Either they should have withdrawn their modification application
before ld. Trial Court or the present appeal but they are trying their luck in
both courts simultaneously, which recourse cannot be permitted. Such
conduct of the appellants amounts to an attempt to misuse the judicial
process and cannot be approved. On this ground alone, their appeal can be
rejected but still I deem it proper to decide the same on merits as lots of
and lengthy arguments were advanced by both sides on different dates.
After conclusion of final arguments, the matter was fixed for final
judgment today but in between on 16-7-2026, appellants engaged new
counsel who moved an application for placing on record three case laws
and sought permission to address arguments with regard to some CCTV
footages. On the basis of this application, further opportunity was given to
both the sides to address arguments today itself.
2) Section 2 (f) and (s) respectively defines what is ‘domestic relationship’
and what is ‘shared household’. Both the appellants being senior citizens
are father in law and mother in law of respondent no. 1 respectively, who
is wife of respondent no. 3. Respondent no. 2 is the minor son of respondent
no. 1 and 3 born on 11-1-2016, who is now living with his mother i.e.
respondent no. 1. Respondent no. 4 is another son of the appellants as well
as brother in law of respondent no. 1. Child custody case, maintenance
case, D.V. Act case and criminal case etc. are already pending in between
respondent no. 1 and 3 in different courts.
3) The marriage between the respondents no. 1 and 3 took place on 20-4-2014
and they started living in the matrimonial house i.e. property no. C-6/2,
second floor, Krishna Nagar, Lal Quarter, Delhi. Due to matrimonial
disputes, they are living separately since 15-8-2021. Respondent no. 1
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since then is living in her parent’s house. Respondent no. 3 husband has
also left that matrimonial house after executing gift deed of his share in the
above mentioned disputed property in favour of his mother i.e. appellant
no. 2 and is reported to be living in some rented accommodation.
4) There is no dispute of the fact that domestic relationship exists between the
parties as defined under Section 2 (f) of D.V. Act and if the status of
respondent no. 1 being woman as well as her allegations of domestic
violence as made in her complaint u/s 12 of D.V. Act are taken into
consideration, then she has to be prima facie treated as an ‘aggrieved
person’ as per Section 2 (a) of the Act. For the time being at this stage,
simple allegations made by her regarding commission of an act of domestic
violence in her complaint itself are sufficient to hold prima facie that she
is an ‘aggrieved person’ and only after trial, it can be conclusively said,
whether she actually comes within the definition and scope of an
‘aggrieved person’ or not.
5) As per trial court record, respondents no. 1 and 2 filed a complaint u/s 12
of D.V. Act on 3-1-2022 against her husband (present respondent no. 3),
mother in law (appellant no. 2), father in law (appellant no. 1), brother in
law (respondent no. 4) and one sister in law. However, ld. Trial Court
issued notice to respondents no. 1 to 3 only. Respondents no. 4 and sister
in law were never asked to appear in the court. In this complaint, both
appellants took a stand that disputed property in question belongs to them
but it also came on record that respondent no. 3 was having 1/3 rd share in
this property and he transferred his share in favour of his mother (i.e.
appellant no. 2) on 27-8-2021 by executing a gift deed, after the date of his
separation with respondent no. 1 dated 15-8-2021. This gift deed further
shows that respondent no. 3 was having 1/3rd undivided share in the entire
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second floor of the property bearing no. C-6/2, Krishna Nagar having area
of 293.1 sq. yards, which consisted of one drawing cum dining room, four
bed rooms, kitchen, three bath/WC with right to use common staircase,
common main gate entrance, lift etc. as well as undivided share in the stilt
floor parking also.
6) Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 26-8-2023 restrained present appellants
from transferring, parting with possession of the disputed property in
question and also restrained them from dispossessing the respondents no.
1 and 2 from the same. Appellants filed an appeal before Sessions Court
and vide order dated 23-1-2024, first part of the order was upheld but since
it has come on record that respondents no. 1 and 2 were living separately
and were not in possession of the property, so the restraint order of
dispossessing them from that property was set aside and matter was
remanded back for fresh decision. Ld. Trial Court again decided the interim
relief of respondent no. 1 in respect of her right of residence on 16-10-2024
and ordered the appellants to restore the possession of property in question
to her which was her matrimonial home/shared household from which she
was thrown on 15-8-2021. Ld. Trial Court further directed that she shall
not be dispossessed thereafter without orders of competent court.
Appellants have now challenged this order dated 16-10-2024 in the present
appeal.
7) Appellants are claiming that property no. C-6/2, second floor, Krishna
Nagar, Lal Quarter, Delhi now exclusively belongs to them in which their
daughter in law i.e. respondent no. 1 is having no right, title or interest, so
the same cannot be treated as ‘shared household’ and accordingly she has
no right to live or enter in this house. However, appellants are not disputing
the fact that respondent no. 1 after marriage with respondent no. 3 (son of
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both appellants) came in this house on 20-4-2014 and lived on second floor
in one room with common facility of kitchen etc. till 15-8-2021. Thus, it is
a matrimonial home of the respondent no. 1. The question of right, title or
interest of the woman in the matrimonial house is irrelevant consideration
as simple living of her in the said house, though belongs to her husband or
her in laws or even joint family or even property belonging to third party
makes such house as ‘shared household’. Section 17 (1) read with Section
2 (s) of D.V. Act makes it clear that every woman in a domestic
relationship shall have a right to reside in the shared household, whether or
not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. The court has
to hold inquiry only to an extent, whether the woman lived in shared
household or not. Where the parties are living or lived together in a
domestic relationship, then the consideration who owns that property need
not be discussed.
8) Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja
(2021) 1 SCC 414 held that while a daughter in law has a statutory right of
residence in a shared household but such right does not translate into any
proprietary or ownership interest in the property belonging to her in laws.
Such independent statutory right of the woman is not dependent upon the
ownership or title of the property nor expression shared household can be
given a narrow or restrictive interpretation by confining it only to the
premises owned or tenanted by the husband. The right of residence is a
protective right, intended to secure shelter and is subject to the balancing
of competing right including the right of senior citizens to peacefully enjoy
their property. In appropriate cases, the court may direct eviction of the
daughter in law from the shared household provided that the suitable
alternative accommodation or rent in lieu thereof is made available to her
in terms of Section 19 (1) (f) of D.V. Act.
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9) Section 17 (2) of the Act put restrictions that such woman cannot be evicted
or excluded from shared household except with due process of law.
Appellants being father in law and mother in law can only seek eviction of
daughter in law i.e. respondent no. 1 or to prohibit her entry in their house
only in two conditions, either they are able to get orders of any competent
court/authority or to provide her alternative reasonable accommodation or
rent in lieu of the same. They can also establish conclusively that
respondent no. 1 voluntarily left the matrimonial house and has no
intention to live in the shared household and complaint u/s 12 of D.V. Act
has been filed to enforce right of residence just to harass them, who are the
senior citizens.
10) In Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi (2022) 8 SCC 90, as relied upon by
respondent no. 1, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is the discretion of
the wife either to live with her husband in a separate accommodation or in
the house of in laws which is shared household. Even if the husband is
living separately and away from shared household, still that circumstances
does not extinguish the wife’s statutory right to seek appropriate residence
order under D.V. Act, as existence of domestic relationship and the shared
household remains the governing consideration. Thus, in the present
matter, shifting of respondent no. 3 husband in some another rented
accommodation does not create any restriction in the statutory rights of the
respondent no. 1 wife to claim right of residence in the property of the
appellants, which was once her shared household prior to 15-8-2021.
11) During arguments, it was informed by the parties that appellants in order
to restrain the respondent no. 1 from entering in the disputed property have
already filed a suit bearing no. 792/2026 titled as Virender Kathuria vs.
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Rinki in the court of ld. Civil Judge-02, Shahdara, but it is an admitted fact
that no interim relief in favour of the appellants have been granted till date
by the said court despite prayer made by them. Admittedly, appellants have
not filed any proceedings under Senior Citizens Act against the respondent
no. 1.
12) At the time of final hearing, respondent no. 1 daughter in law offered to the
appellants to shift her at third floor of the property no. C-6/2, Krishna
Nagar from second floor but no response was given on this offer by the
appellants and they preferred to keep mum. Even no offer has come from
side of the appellants themselves to give any alternative accommodation to
the respondent no. 1 or to pay any amount of rent for separate independent
house and they are just relying upon the offer given by their son i.e.
respondent no. 3 to respondent no. 1. In her complaint u/s 12 of D.V. Act,
respondent no. 1 has sought right of residence in her shared household or
in the alternative rented accommodation or rent of the same.
13) However, respondent no. 3 being husband of respondent no. 1 has made an
offer to her to live in rented accommodation in nearby area. He also offered
to deposit the advance rent and security amount of period of one year to
show his bonafide intentions. Appellants are saying that when an
alternative accommodation is being offered to the respondent no. 1 by their
son, then she cannot insist to live in her matrimonial shared household
property in which they are living. Respondent no. 1 is not accepting this
offer as she is suspecting that this offer of providing an alternative
accommodation is not bonafide but is made malafidely in order to frustrate
her legal and statutory right of residence. She pointed out some order sheets
of the Family Court to show that respondent no. 3 is committing defaults
even in making payment of maintenance amount regularly for the child and
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is in huge arrears, then how it can be expected from him that he will deposit
one year advance rent or security amount or other maintenance charges or
bills of basic amenities such as water, electricity, internet etc. in respect of
alternate accommodation being offered. Order dated 8-5-2026 passed by
Judge, Family Court in Ex. Crl. no. 349/2025 shows that respondent no. 3
was in arrears of Rs. 5,65,000/- on that day and court warned him to clear
all arrears within six months and atleast Rs. 50,000/- per month failing
which coercive action will be taken against him. Even, payment chart
Annexure-A filed by respondent no. 3 along with his written submissions
shows that he is still in arrears of Rs. 2,61,820/- and he was not making
regular payments every month and committing defaults sometimes
continuously for few months together. Though the calculations given by
respondent no. 3 in Annexure-A is disputed by the respondent no. 1 but
still it shows that he is committing various defaults again and again. He at
present is without any job for last about 6 months and resigned from his
services on 5-1-2026 (as per undisputed copy of e-mail filed by respondent
no. 1 on record) and is not earning anything, then how he will pay one year
advance rent, security amount of rented accommodation and other charges
of essential amenities is not an explainable fact. He has also not filed any
documentary evidence on record to show that he is having financial
capacity or savings to procure independent accommodation and to pay
advance rent/security of one year as alleged or also can pay charges of
essential amenities such as water, telephone/internet, electricity bills etc.
from time to time. When he was not making regular payment of
maintenance for his own child during the period when he was earning
substantial amount and was in job, then the apprehension of the respondent
no. 1 that he will now not comply with such assurances given in respect of
alternative accommodation is not unfounded or baseless. In such
circumstances, respondent no. 1 was justified to reject the offer of her
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husband respondent no. 3 to live in an alternate rented accommodation
which was not bonafide and apparently made to frustrate the statutory
rights of the respondent no. 1 to have right of residence in shared
household. Appellants themselves have not given any offer to the
respondent no. 1 for any alternative accommodation at all but they were
relying upon the offer of their son only, which has been correctly rejected
by her and this court also feels that it is not bonafide, so the claim of the
respondent no. 1 to live in her matrimonial shared household becomes
more strong at this stage.
14) There is also no dispute of the fact that respondent no. 1 is not living in the
disputed property since 15-8-2021. Counsel for the appellants during
arguments stated that she herself voluntarily left the matrimonial house
with two big suitcases containing her cloths, documents, jewellery etc. and
there is a CCTV footage to prove it but on that day, she could not take the
child with her. It is alleged that respondent no. 1 after getting respondent
no. 3 arrested in case u/s 107/151 Cr.P.C., came to matrimonial house and
left the same herself with two big suitcases already packed within 2-3
minutes which shows that she had already made up a mind to leave the
house and had intention to desert the company of her husband. During
arguments today, new counsel for the appellants also informed that there
is one another CCTV footage dated 28-8-2023 available with them which
could show that respondent no. 1 and others came with cutters to break
open the locks of the house. However, I find no such CD/Pendrive on Trial
Court record containing any such footages. It means that no such CCTV
footages either of 15-8-2021 or 28-8-2023 were placed before the ld. Trial
Court at any time either by appellants or respondent no. 3, so the same
cannot be taken into consideration now.
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15) One Pendrive containing some CCTV footages was filed on 6-7-2026
along with the written submissions of respondent no. 3 first time in this
court. New counsel for appellants moved an application on 16-7-2026 for
addressing arguments with regard to CCTV footages which were already
part of the Trial Court Record but today those were not relied upon by new
counsel for the appellants on the ground that those were actually not filed
before ld. Trial Court at any time. Otherwise also, the alleged CCTV
footages of dated 15-8-2021 were already described as edited, selective and
incomplete during detailed arguments advanced by counsel for respondent
no. 1. The dispute whether respondent no. 1 herself left matrimonial house
or was thrown out of the said property after committing cruelty upon her
or she was compelled to leave the said matrimonial house under
compelling circumstances is a question to be decided after trial on basis of
an evidence. Counsel for respondent no. 1 rightly relied upon decision of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Nidhi Kumar Gandhi vs. State 2009 SCC
Online Del 814, wherein it is held that at the interim stage, disputed
questions are not to be decided which requires evidence. Hence, the
genuineness and correctness of the CCTV footages, if any are firstly to be
filed before ld. Trial Court, then it is to be established through expert report
that those are not edited and are without any cut/break and then whether it
is relevant or not to the controversy is left to be decided at final stage after
evidence by ld. Trial Court, so no benefit can be given to the appellants
even at this stage by simply producing the same in this court along with the
written submissions first time.
16) Respondent no. 1 is saying that she was subjected to physical and mental
cruelty and was actually thrown out of her matrimonial house. Respondent
no. 3 was arrested by police after medical examination of the respondent
no. 1 as she was given beatings on 15-8-2021. She also claimed that
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actually she was already thrown away from house and was not allowed to
re-enter but due to intervention of police, she was allowed to take her cloths
and other articles but she was not allowed to take the child with her on that
day. She also stated that custody of her child was given to her on next day
i.e. 16-8-2021 on the condition that she should give no objection for release
of the respondent no. 3 from custody on bail. It is also stated by counsel
for respondent no. 1 that her request made to the concerned authority to
release the respondent no. 3 on bail in this matter in lieu of taking of child
with her does not amount to condoning of alleged cruelty committed by
him or to waive/forgo her statutory right of residence in shared household.
17) From the fact of transfer of his own 1/3rd undivided share in the property
in question by respondent no. 3 secretly in favour of his mother i.e.
appellant no. 2 by executing gift deed on 27-8-2021 just few days after the
date of separation, the malafide of the respondent no. 3 is clear that in order
to avoid allowing his wife i.e. respondent no. 1 to live in her matrimonial
house and to defeat her residence right, this fraudulent transfer has been
done. It is very strange that respondent no. 3 after executing gift deed of
his undivided 1/3rd share in the property in favour of his mother out of love
and affection without any consideration would leave the house of his
parents and start living in rented accommodation, when it is not the case of
either appellants or respondent no. 3 that their relations were also not good
and comfortable. It is also not acceptable even at this stage that appellants
after getting property from respondent no. 3 would throw away him from
their life and house. Thus, there appears to be a collusiveness between the
appellants and respondent no. 3 in executing this sham gift deed just to
frustrate the statutory rights of the respondent no. 1. Accordingly, present
appellants cannot take a stand that they now have become exclusive owner
of the property in question, so the entry of respondent no. 1 in it is thus
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prohibited. In this regard, they have to obtain appropriate orders of the
competent court of jurisdiction first to prohibit her entry in the shared
household in which they have failed till date.
18) Counsel for the appellants argued that right of residence in shared
household is not an indefeasible right and insistence of respondent no. 1 to
reside in their property is not justified which exclusively belongs to them
as well as when suitable alternate accommodation is offered by respondent
no. 3. He also argued that Magistrate has to pass a residence orders to
ensure that an aggrieved woman is not rendered roofless or left without a
safe place of residence but she cannot claim to live in a particular
accommodation only which once was her matrimonial or shared
household.
19) Section 17 of the D.V. Act provides that every woman in a domestic
relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether
or not she has any right, title or beneficially interest in the same. Aggrieved
person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any
part of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The
Act confers powers upon the court u/s 19 to restrain dispossession, direct
restoration of the possession or to provide alternate accommodation if
restoration is impractical. The court generally grants restoration when
household was genuinely shared in a domestic relationship, her shifting
was not voluntarily, there is no permanent separation and there is no serious
safety risk in returning and the request is bonafide. The court should
ordinarily consider restoration unless she has permanently settled
somewhere by choice. Providing alternate accommodation with same
facilities and of same standard with bonafide intention can be one of the
grounds to deny right of residence to the woman in a shared household.
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20) Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Vanita vs. Deputy Commissioner,
Bangalore Urban District 2020 SCC Online SC 1023 held that right of
the daughter in law under D.V. Act and those of senior citizens under
Senior Citizens Act ought to be balanced and courts must ensure that
neither right is obliterated but instead coexists to the extent possible. It is
also held that protection under D.V. Act cannot be overridden by simply
invoking the provisions of Senior Citizens Act through summary
proceedings. The woman’s right to reside in a shared household must be
balanced against the rights of the senior citizens to live in peace, especially
when the household in question belongs to them. In this case, it is also held
that merely because the ownership of the property has been subsequently
transferred to her in laws or that her estranged spouse is now residing
separately is no ground to deprive the wife of the protection under D.V.
Act.
21) The argument is advanced on behalf of appellants that respondent no. 1 is
required to live with her husband/respondent no. 3 where he is living now
and she cannot compel them to allow her entry in the erstwhile matrimonial
house. However, this submission cannot be accepted as in Kavita
Gambhir vs. Hari Chand Gambhir MANU/DE/2100/2009 Hon’ble
Delhi High Court held that if a husband settles down somewhere else after
leaving the matrimonial home of his wife, then that house where the wife
is left behind would not cease to be her matrimonial home. Counsel for
respondent no. 1 relied upon decision of Madras High Court in case
Vandana vs. T. Srikanth O.A. no. 764/2007 decided on 3-7-2007 in
which it is held that statutory right of the woman cannot be rendered
nugatory by asking the woman to look for a rental accommodation and
demand payment of the rent from husband. Decision of Hon’ble Delhi
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High Court is also relied upon by the respondent no. 1 in case Preeti Satija
vs. Raj Kumari RFA (OS) 24/2012 decided on 15-1-2024, wherein it is
held that statutory rights of the wife against members of husband’s family
cannot be simply denied merely on the ground that they have disowned
their son by public notice and thrown him out of their house by severing
their relations with him and daughter in law.
22) In Ritu Taneja vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi W.P. (C) 12721/2023 decided
by Hon’ble Delhi High Court on 8-5-2026 as relied by counsel for
appellants, the dispute was in respect of rights of in laws under Senior
Citizens Act only. Hon’ble High Court found justification in removal of
petitioner wife from the property of her in laws as there was evidence that
she had committed cruelty upon her in laws. It was also held that daughter
in law is not a destitute or vulnerable individual or a victim of domestic
violence requiring protection in the form of continued residence in a shared
household and she was gainfully employed and sufficient source of income
as well as in possession of another alternative accommodation situated as
Khirki Extension. The actual dispute between the parties was not arising
out of economic deprivation or lack of shelter but was primarily centered
around competing claims relating to some LIC policies and some rights in
the properties and income derived from ancestral business. Even in laws
showed willingness to handover the documents of that property of Khirki
Extension and other two plots in Faridabad to the daughter in law subject
to vacation of the disputed property. Here in the present case, still evidence
has to come whether respondent no. 1 committed cruelty upon appellants
or she was subjected to harassment and cruelty in the hands of appellants
and her husband respondent no. 3. Further, there is no offer of providing
any alternative accommodation given by the appellants themselves and
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such offer given by the husband respondent no. 3 is found not bonafide and
acceptable.
23) Reliance is placed upon case Manju Arora vs. Neelam Arora RFA (OS)
64/2025 decided on 30-10-2025 by Hon’ble Delhi High Court on behalf
of appellants wherein question involved was whether the senior citizens
are entitled to live peacefully with dignity in their own property,
particularly when adequate steps have been taken to protect the daughter
in law by them. In this cited case, Hon’ble High Court upheld the decree
of eviction of daughter in law from the house belonging to in laws, after
safeguarding her rights as alternate arrangements were made for her
residence as required u/s 19 (1) (f) of D.V. Act by ordering to pay Rs.
65,000/- per month towards rent besides separate charges for electricity,
water, maintenance and other charges etc. Hon’ble High Court also found
that there were 25 cases between the parties and sharing of common space
such as kitchen, living area, entry etc. is wholly impracticable and
inconsistent with peaceful and dignified living. Here in this matter in hand,
no offer has come from side of appellants to make arrangements of
alternative accommodations or payment of any rent for reasonable space,
so this judgment can be distinguished from present facts and circumstances
especially when the offer given by the respondent no. 3 husband is neither
bonafide nor gives any guarantee or even there is absence of any proof that
he is capable to fulfil his assurances.
24) Counsel for the appellants also relied upon decisions of Tanu Gupta vs.
State of NCT of Delhi Crl. M.C. 1797/2020 decided on 21-10-2024 and
Ravneet Kaur vs. Prithpal Singh Dhingra RFA 832/2018 decided on
24-2-2022 by Hon’ble Delhi High Court wherein condition is put that
alternative accommodation should be made available to the daughter in
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law, if the senior citizens in laws have to live alone peacefully. However,
when appellants themselves are not coming forward to provide any
alternative accommodation to the respondent no. 1, till then she has a
statutory and legal right to live in her matrimonial house.
25) Reliance was also placed by counsel for the appellants upon decision in
case Reena Grover vs. Ramesh Grover Crl. M.C. 8722/2024 decided
by Hon’ble Delhi High Court on 9-2-2026 and counsel argued that where
the wife voluntarily establishes a separate residence or has access to
alternate accommodation, a direction or restoration to a previously
occupied premises is not automatic and may be declined as D.V. Act
secures protection against dispossession but does not compel reinstatement
into a residence abandoned by choice. In this cited matter, wife allegedly
left matrimonial house after 30 years situated at Green Park area and
shifted to her daughter’s house at Safdarjung Enclave for treatment
purposes and when her health improved, then she tried to re-enter the house
but was prevented, so she filed complaint u/s 12 of D.V. Act. Infact the real
dispute was that respondents were not ready to give any share in the
property to the daughter of the petitioner. Hon’ble High Court itself found
that D.V. Act proceedings predominantly arise out of an inter se property
dispute between the parties rather than a case warranting interference under
the protective framework of D.V. Act. It is also found that petitioner was
residing in the house of her daughter which also belonged to the respondent
and when her husband is already offering to provide alternative
accommodation, then she cannot insist that she would live in a particular
house only which was once her matrimonial house. Hon’ble High Court
also held that petitioner wife had not shifted to her daughter’s house on
temporary basis just for treatment purposes but she voluntarily left the
matrimonial house intentionally to settle at another place. Hence, present
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appellants cannot take benefit of this cited judgment also which is
distinguishable from the present facts and situation because it is still in
dispute whether the respondent no. 1 herself voluntarily left the
matrimonial house or was thrown or the appellants or respondent no. 3
created such circumstances that she was compelled to leave her
matrimonial house. Until this controversy is solved through evidence, till
then she has to be allowed entry in her matrimonial house for time being
subject to decision of any other competent court, especially when it is
already held that offer given by her husband respondent no. 3 to live in a
separate rented accommodation is not bonafide and genuine.
26) Counsel for appellants relied upon decision of Ritika Kalra vs. Govt. of
NCT of Delhi W.P. (C) 3099/2026 decided on 23-4-2026. In this matter,
petitioner challenged the findings of Maintenance Tribunal constituted
under Senior Citizens Act, which has given directions to her to vacate the
property of her in laws. Hon’ble High Court rejected the petition of
petitioner daughter in law as it was proved that she had committed cruelty
upon her in laws and ill treated them, who even had offered her to live in a
separate suitable rented accommodation and agreed to pay rent of the same.
Moreover, petitioner had already purchased a house at the expenses of her
in laws and the property which was described by petitioner as her
matrimonial house was belonging to her in laws. However, the facts of the
present matter can be distinguished as appellants have not given any offer
to pay any rent or to provide any other suitable accommodation to the
respondent no. 1 and there exists a dispute whether respondent no. 1 had
committed cruelty upon the appellants or not, where in the cited case the
bad act and conduct of petitioner towards her in laws was upheld being
correct by Hon’ble High Court as findings of Maintenance Tribunal and
Appellate Authority were not challenged by the petitioner. Further, present
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appellants of this case though have filed civil suit against the respondent
no. 1 for restraining her entry in the matrimonial house but could not get
any relief in this regard despite making prayer. They have not initiated any
proceedings till date under Senior Citizens Act. The giving of an offer by
respondent no. 3 to respondent no. 1 to live in rented accommodation is
already found unjustified as held above. The act and conduct of the
respondent no. 3 to transfer his share in the disputed property to appellant
no. 2 just within few days of separation from his wife/respondent no. 1 also
indicates malafide on the part of the appellants that they wanted to deny
the legitimate right of the respondent no. 1 to enjoy shared household. In
this cited case, Hon’ble High Court after directing the in laws to pay Rs.
35,000/- per month towards rental charges to daughter in law rejected her
request to live in matrimonial house. Here, in the present matter, no such
offer has been given by the appellants themselves to the respondent no. 1.
27) Counsel for the appellants also relied upon para no. 43 of decision of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case Piare Khan vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
W.P. (C) 14078/2023 decided on 21-11-2025, wherein it is held that a
senior citizen can seek to evict his/her legal heirs/children from his/her
property in which he/she has a ‘right or interest’. However, this matter was
instituted by petitioner against his own daughter and her husband and
others under Senior Citizens Act. There was no issue involved of any
dispute between right of daughter in law under D.V. Act and or any clash
of this Act with provisions of Senior Citizens Act. Thus, this judgment is
not applicable in the present facts and situation.
28) Newly engaged counsel for the appellants also cited case Sonia Mehra vs.
Romy Mehra 2025 DHC 10984, wherein Hon’ble Delhi High Court by
balancing the rights of senior citizens in laws to live peacefully in their
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property as well as statutory rights of residence of daughter in law u/s 17
of D.V. Act, ordered daughter in law to vacate the property belonging to
her in laws but subject to certain conditions imposed upon them which
included payment of Rs. 2.5 lakhs per month towards rent and other
charges to her. The court also found on the basis of reports of counsellor
that atmosphere in the suit property has become toxic due to continuous
acrimony between the parties and adversely affecting the minor children
also besides affecting the falling health of one old senior citizen. At the
first instance, daughter in law was given an option to choose herself any
suitable, adequate and dignified alternative accommodation and parents in
laws were to make payment of rent etc. According to court, the daughter in
law though has a right of residence granted under the Act but not in respect
of any particular property. Same view is given in another decision of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case Eveneet Singh vs. Prashant Chaudhri
2010 DHC 6125 wherein it is again held that the right of residence which
a wife undoubtly has does not mean the right to reside in a particular
property, it may of course, mean the right to reside in a commensurate
property with her lifestyle and current residence. However, in the present
matter, appellants themselves are not coming forward to provide any
separate alternative accommodation to the respondent no. 1 and instead
relied upon the offer of respondent no. 3 which is already found not sincere
and bonafide.
29) In Ambika Jain vs. Ram Prakash Sharma 2019 SCC Online Del 11886
as cited by new counsel for the appellants, civil suits filed by father/mother
in law were decreed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and daughters in law were
ordered to be evicted from the property owned by them. In D.V. Act cases,
daughters in law have obtained interim protections against their eviction
on the ground that the property owned by in laws is a shared household.
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Hon’ble High Court interpreted the words ‘procedure established by law’
as appearing in Section 17 (2) of D.V. Act and ultimately held that while
deciding any civil suit on basis of ownership and title of in laws, the
statutory right of the daughter in law to live in the shared household also
to be considered and the right of residence given to her under law cannot
be ignored and she cannot be left without a shelter. The right of both the
parties is to be balanced. It is also held that civil court can also while
dealing with the suit for possession filed by in laws, can deal with the
statutory rights of the daughter in law as given under D.V. Act regarding
right to residence under powers of Section 26 of the Act. Accordingly, in
the matters, decree passed were set aside and matters were remanded to the
concerned civil courts to decide the same afresh after considering the rights
of the daughter in law in shared household including making provisions of
alternative accommodation for her. Counsel for the respondent no. 1
informed that this judgment was partly not approved by Hon’ble Supreme
Court subsequently in Satish Chandra Ahuja‘s case.
30) Appellants also stated that there is only one kitchen on the second floor and
it is not possible to share that kitchen with the respondent no. 1. But during
arguments it was informed that on the second floor there are total four
rooms and three bathrooms. One small room on this floor can be converted
into kitchen meant for the respondent no. 1, if the appellants hesitate to
allow their own kitchen to be used by respondent no. 1. Moreover,
appellants have not filed any plan of the entire building to show that there
cannot be any space in entire second floor which cannot be used as
temporary kitchen exclusively for respondent no. 1. When respondent no.
1 herself offered to shift to third floor, then again appellants did not
respond, though it is not in dispute that this floor also belonged to them.
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31) Ld. Trial Court has not asked the appellants to vacate their property but
just ordered that one room on second floor of matrimonial house along with
common use of bathroom and kitchen which was in possession of
respondent no. 1 prior to 15-8-2021 be restored to her. Admittedly,
appellants are having possession of other floors also in the same property
which they can enjoy for themselves comfortably and thus no prejudice or
inconvenience shall be caused to them. The possibility cannot be ruled out
that living of respondent no. 2 minor son of respondent no. 1 and 3 and
only grand child of appellants in the same property may help in smoothing
the relationship of the parties in future as it is not denied that both the
appellants have love and affection with their minor grand child and custody
case is already filed in this regard by respondent no. 3.
32) Before ld. Trial Court, respondent no. 4 brother in law of respondent no. 1
was not a party as no notice was ever issued to him besides one sister in
law. However, appellants made him also as a party in the present appeal
who addressed arguments as notice of this appeal was also issued to him
by this court. His counsel argued that respondent no. 4/brother in law is
also living in the same property on different floor against whom respondent
no. 1 levelled certain allegations of sexual misconduct, then why she is
insisting to live in the same house again. It is also argued that respondent
no. 3 has already left his parents i.e. appellants and now respondent no. 4
is looking after them. He is apprehending that respondent no. 1 may repeat
the alleged false allegations of sexual misconduct against him if she is
allowed to live in the same house again and in that situation, he will have
no option except to leave this house and in his absence, there will be no
one to look after his parents/appellants. On these simple apprehensions of
possible future confrontation, the legal and statutory rights of the
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respondent no. 1 accruing even at this stage cannot allowed to be be
frustrated.
33) Counsel for the appellants also argued that appellants are senior citizens,
suffering from various ailments, appellant no. 2 mother in law has already
undergone heart surgery and they should be allowed to live peacefully for
rest of their life and when various serious allegations are levelled against
them of physical and mental cruelty, giving of threats to kill, demand of
dowry, wrongful restraint etc. as per her own complaint u/s 12 of D.V. Act,
then why the respondent no. 1 still insisting to live in the same house in
between the appellants is not understandable. Counsel also stated that she
should have lived with her husband respondent no. 3 in separate rented
accommodation who is also offering her to live with him. So far the offer
of the husband/respondent no. 3 given to the respondent no. 1 to live in a
separate rented accommodation is concerned, it is rightly rejected by her
because when he is not complying with the directions of the court regularly
in paying maintenance for his own child and has secretly transferred his
share in the property to his mother just within few days of separation, then
how it can be expected from him that he will continue to pay the rent and
other charges for separate accommodation. Respondent no. 1 is not asking
that while allowing her to live in the matrimonial house, appellants should
be asked to leave the said house but she is ready to live in the same house
but in her separate one room on second floor which was already given to
her after marriage and is her shared household. Parties can live in the same
house even peacefully in separate portions and apprehension shown by the
appellants that again disputes will occur and litigations will increase is only
a presumption at this stage just to keep away the respondent no. 1 from her
matrimonial house/shared household. This apprehension in the minds of
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the appellants is not sufficient to deny the statutory rights of the respondent
no. 1 and in this regard some safe guards can be ordered by the court.
34) The plea taken on behalf of appellants that there is a shortage of
accommodation in the house and two independent families cannot reside
in the same without causing any hinderance to each other is not acceptable
because appellants are in possession of other floors also in the same
building. Simple fact that there is no separate entry/exit of the house and
staircase are common is not a ground to decline the relief as claimed by the
respondent no. 1. Another plea taken by appellants that there is no intention
of the respondent no. 1 to live in the house and she is asking possession
just to cause harassment to the appellants can be removed by imposing
some conditions upon her.
35) Respondent no. 1 no doubt is living in her parent’s house at present at their
mercy out of love and affection. She is having roof over her head and not
living on road. However, mere this fact does not disentitle her to forgo her
right to live in shared household. After marriage, daughter in law has to
live at first instance in her ‘Sasural’. The parents of such woman are not
legally bound to keep married daughter forever with them. The arguments
of the counsel for the appellants that when she is living in her parent’s
house for the last about 5 years, then she can still live with them in future
also is not an acceptable submission as if respondent no. 1 is trying to
manage herself for so many years, then her statutory right does not come
to an end or automatically extinguished, when she is asking for her right
from the court for the last about 5 years.
36) Respondent no. 3 in his written arguments also alleged that once he and
respondent no. 1 compromised the matter before mediator on 19-11-2024
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and she agreed to live with him in separate rented accommodation and also
agreed not to claim residential rights in the matrimonial house. However,
it is a fact that this alleged mediation settlement was not approved before
the ld. Trial Court and unless it is endorsed by the court concerned after
recording the statements of parties, any such settlement can be withdrawn
at any stage and becomes unenforceable at the discretion of either of the
parties. Otherwise also, any verbal arrangement between respondent no. 1
and 3 at any particular time which was not finalized by the court will not
override the statutory rights of the respondent no. 1.
37) This fact is not in dispute that respondent no. 1 is working as an officer in
Canara Bank and as per her affidavit filed before ld. Trial Court dated 2-9-
2022, she was getting salary of Rs. 64,075/- at that time including House
Rent Allowance. Respondent no. 3 is saying that at present this salary
might have gone beyond Rs. 1 lakh and she must be getting good
substantial amount of HRA which may not be less than approximately Rs.
20-25 thousands. As per counsel for appellants, respondent no. 1 cannot be
treated as a woman in distress and when she is capable to maintain herself
as well as child, then she should not be allowed to enter in the house
belonging to them to ruin their peace of mind who are at the fag end of
their lives. However, this fact alone is not sufficient to reject the prayer of
the respondent no. 1 because HRA is given to every govt. employee, bank
employee and even employee of big companies/corporations who are not
given accommodation by their department or employer. Whether such an
employee lives in his own house or in rented premises is entitled to get the
HRA but when employer or govt. provides house to live, then separate
HRA is not given. Some times it becomes the discretion of the employee
to get house from his employer or HRA. Normally when house is provided
by employer/govt., then expenses of its renovation, repairs and
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maintenance etc. are normally incurred by such employer. Hence, simple
fact that respondent no. 1 is getting HRA from her office, she cannot be
directed to live separately by searching herself her own accommodation
and utilize that entire HRA amount without any liability and responsibility
of husband and in laws.
38) Ground of approaching court at delayed stage is also pleaded by counsel
for the appellants. Complaint was filed by respondent u/s 12 of D.V. Act
just within 4½ months of her allegedly thrown away from matrimonial
house dated 15-8-2021. In the complaint itself she demanded right of
residence. Mere fact that she pressed for interim relief of right of residence
after about 20 months of institution of the complaint will not make any
difference and the impugned order cannot be set aside only on this ground.
The alleged delay of 4½ months in approaching the court for filing the
present complaint u/s 12 of D.V. Act cannot be treated as a big delay to
decline the relief to the respondent no. 1. If ld. Trial Court has given relief
after about 2 years, then respondent no. 1 cannot be allowed to suffer for
the same as act of court cannot prejudice any party. The crucial date is
when the party approached the court for a particular relief and not when
the court granted the same. Otherwise also, no limitation is prescribed
under D.V. Act for claiming relief of right of residence. Respondent no. 1
had already asked for right of residence in her original complaint u/s 12 of
D.V. Act and mere fact that she requested for early hearing and disposal of
her interim relief after few months does not amount to intentional delay.
Respondent no. 1 cannot be denied the relief on account of any alleged
delay.
39) It is also argued on behalf of appellants that respondent no. 1 is the
complainant and appellants are accused persons in the criminal case and
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they should not be brought in face to face to each other as it would amount
to violation of provisions of Witness Protection Scheme. However, these
provisions applies only when the complainant or any prosecution witness
requests for grant of any safety and security, and respondent no. 1 had not
made any such request to the competent authority. Appellants cannot be
allowed to take shelter of this scheme in order to deny the legitimate rights
of the respondent no. 1. Another stand taken that allowing the respondent
no. 1 to live in the house where entry/exit is only one and there is single
kitchen and this will create more disputes and will increase multiplicity of
litigations is only an unfounded apprehension being already discussed
above.
40) In view of the above discussions, it is held that respondent no. 1 is entitled
to re-enter in her matrimonial shared household along with her child even
if it is owned by the appellants. The offer given by respondent no. 3 alone
to the respondent no. 1 in respect of providing alternative accommodation
is not bonafide and even he has not shown his financial capacity to bear
such expenses of separate accommodation for her. I find no ground to
disturb the findings of ld. Trial Court which are correct and there is no
infirmity in it, so the present appeal is hereby dismissed. Impugned order
dated 16-10-2024 is upheld by giving some more following directions;
(a) Appellants are directed to allow entry of respondent no. 1 in the
disputed property bearing no. C-6/2, Krishna Nagar, Delhi on 1-8-2026
at 11 a.m. on the second floor in the same room which was earlier in her
possession prior to the date of separation dated 15-8-2021 and allow her
to live in the same with her son respondent no. 2 peacefully. In case,
any restrictions or obstructions are caused in this entry and disturbance
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in her subsequent possession by anyone, then respondent no. 1 can
apply to ld. Trial Court for police help in this regard.
(b) However, respondent no. 1 shall pay to the appellants an amount
equivalent to 2/3rd of HRA (which she will get from her office from time
to time) towards electricity, water, maintenance and other charges etc.
with effect from September, 2026 onwards.
(c) This payment shall be deposited in the bank account of any of the
appellants regularly by respondent no. 1 before 5th day of each
succeeding month who are directed to provide bank details in which this
amount has to be deposited. In case of non deposit of this amount
continuously for three months, appellants can move ld. Trial Court for
eviction of respondent no. 1 from their property.
(d) Further, appellants are entitled to get installed CCTV cameras in and
around common area, lobby, stairs, entry/exit, in their own rooms if
wishes (but not in the room of the respondent no. 1, bathroom or kitchen
to be used by her) etc., at their own expenses to rule out any
apprehension accruing in their minds in respect of possible happening
of any untoward incident or dispute in future in the alleged hands of the
respondent no. 1.
(e) Appellants can convert one small room/store/study room on second
floor into a working and habitable kitchen for respondent no. 1 by
providing shelfs, water connection, chimney, water outlet etc., if they
are not interested to allow her to use common kitchen on the second
floor with them. This exercise has to be completed before 1-8-2026 on
which date respondent no. 1 has to enter the house.
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(f) Appellants still however can think about the option given by the
respondent no. 1 that instead of second floor in the property she can be
shifted to third floor of the same property with facility of one
independent room of same size which is on second floor, reasonable
size kitchen and bathroom.
(g) If in future any concrete offer is made by the appellants themselves or
by respondent no. 3/husband to provide alternative accommodation in
the same locality or nearby locality with similar accommodation
situated upto second floor with advance deposit of minimum one year
rent, security amount, brokerage and written undertaking to pay full
electricity and water bills and other charges from time to time etc., then
they can move an application before the ld. Trial Court itself for
modification of this order and shifting of respondent no. 1 in that rented
accommodation but till then, respondent no. 1 and 2 have to be allowed
entry in the disputed property with dignity and same facilities which she
was enjoying prior to the date of 15-8-2021 and her peaceful possession
in it is not to be disturbed at all. In case appellants or respondent no. 3
offers to provide alternate accommodation on rent, then in that situation,
they have to execute registered rent agreement with owner of the said
property atleast for 2 years period at first instance and it shall be
specifically mentioned in it that respondents no. 1 and 2 will live in the
same and appellants or husband as the case may be, shall make
payments of all rents and other charges. In that situation, the entire
liability to pay all rent, bills etc. shall be of appellants and respondent
no. 3 and respondents no. 1 and 2 cannot be burdened in any manner
nor they will claim any share in HRA of respondent no. 1.
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(h) The above arrangement shall be continued till the disposal of the
complaint u/s 12 of D.V. Act finally and subject to that final decision.
If in between appellants are successful in obtaining any order from civil
court or other competent authority for eviction of the respondent no. 1
and 2, then that order will prevail and order of right to residence
provided under D.V. Act will come to an end only in the disputed
property but provisions of alternative accommodation still have to be
made by them until the respondent no. 1 and 3 are finally separated
permanently by divorce decree.
41) With these observations, appeal is dismissed by imposing the above
conditions. Ld. Trial Court now can proceed with the matter as per law.
Parties are directed to appear before ld. Trial Court now on 25-7-2026 at
10 a.m. Trial Court record be returned with copy of this order and appeal
Digitally signed
file be consigned to record room. by ASHWANI
ASHWANI SARPAL
SARPAL Date: 2026.07.18
17:11:31 +0530
Dt- 18-7-2026. (Ashwani Kumar Sarpal)
Principal District & Sessions Judge
East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi..
