Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Vinod Kumar vs State And Ors on 17 July, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:26865]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3205/1987
URN: CW / 219U / 1987
1. Vinod Kumar Sharma S/o Ramji Lal Sharma,
2. Ramji Lal Sharma S/o. Kanhaiya Lal Sharma,
Both residents of Lalsot, Tehsil Lalsot, District Jaipur.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan through the Secrtetary to the
Government, Agriculture (Group 2-B), Department, Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
2. The Land Acquisition Officer, Dausa (the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Dausa).
3. The Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Lalsot, through its Secretary.
----Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. Rajeev Surana Senior Advocate
assisted by Ms. Muskan Verma
Advocate, Ms. Palak Sinha Advocate
and Mr. Anuj Rohila Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. S.S. Naruka Additional Advocate
General with Mr. Jitendra Kumar Takar
Advocate, Ms. Manju Joshi Advocate
and Ms. Ritika Naruka Advocate.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments :: 09.07.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 09.07.2026
Whether the full judgment or only
the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 17.07.2026
1. The petitioners have approached this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India laying challenge to the acquisition
proceedings initiated in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 1352
measuring 15 Biswas situated at Lalsot, Tehsil Lalsot, District Dausa
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(formerly Jaipur) [hereinafter be referred as ‘the land in question’],
seeking quashing of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the
Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter to be referred as
‘the Act of 1953’) and the subsequent notification issued under
Section 17(4) read with Section 6 of the Act of 1953 and further
praying for release/de-acquisition of the land in question by
maintaining Notification dated 14.06.1990.
2. The case set up by the petitioners is that they are
carrying on business of petrol pump, workshop, garage and allied
activities over Khasra No.1352 total measuring 15 Biswas and have
been earning their livelihood therefrom since the year 1969. It has
been pleaded that although a notification under Section 4(1) of the
Act of 1953 was issued by the State Government on 30.01.1985 for
acquisition of land for establishment of Krishi Upaj Mandi Yard,
Lalsot, whereby 6 Biswas land out of total 15 Biswas of Khasra No.
1352 was sought to be acquired. Aggrieved by the notification, the
petitioners filed objections and the Land Acquisition Officer, after site
inspection and due enquiry, recommended for release of the said
land from acquisition vide report dated 01.08.1986. However, land of
the petitioner was not released from acquisition. It has further been
pleaded that certain neighbouring lands were excluded from
acquisition and, therefore, acquisition of the petitioners’ land
amounts to hostile discrimination. The petitioners have also
challenged Notification dated 17.06.1986 for invocation of urgency
provisions under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953 on the ground that
there existed no real urgency warranting dispensation of enquiry
under Section 5-A of the Act of 1953. It is further pleaded that the
land was neither waste, nor arable land and, therefore, Section 17 of
the Act of 1953 could not have been invoked. By way of making
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amendment in the writ petition, the petitioners have additionally
relied upon notification dated 14.06.1990, whereby according to
them, a part of the acquired land was sought to be de-acquired
under Section 48 of the Act, and have contended that subsequent
notification dated 26.12.1990 issued by the respondent-Government
for withdrawing the earlier notification dated 14.06.1990 is illegal. It
has also been averred that neither possession of land in question
was taken by the respondents, nor award was passed pursuant to
above acquisition proceedings and consequently, the acquisition
proceedings have lapsed.
3. Shri Rajeev Surana, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioners vehemently argued that the proceedings
have been conducted by the respondents in utter disregard of the
mandatory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. He submitted that
the urgency provisions were invoked in malicious manner in order to
avoid the recommendations of Land Acquisition Officer suggesting
that the land in question was not fit for acquisition. While indicating
the time-gap between the date of issuance of Notification under
Section 4 of the Act of 1953 and the Notification under Section 17 of
the Act of 1953, learned Senior Counsel submitted that during such
long gap of around one and a half years, the respondents could have
easily completed the acquisition proceedings while resorting to the
normal procedure and there was no requirement to adopt urgency
provisions.
4. Shri Surana, learned Senior Counsel further submitted
that when once power to de-acquire petitioners’ land was exercised
by the State Government under Section 48 of the Act vide
notification dated 14.06.1990, there is no statutory provision
whatsoever to confer any power upon the respondent-Government to
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withdraw the earlier notification under Section 48 of the Act. Hence,
the subsequent notification dated 26.12.1990 issued by the State
Government to withdraw the earlier notification dated 14.06.1990
was without authority of law and devoid of any competence.
5. Learned Senior Counsel vociferously argued that no award
whatsoever was passed by the respondents in the above acquisition
proceedings and it was only when this Court issued various directions
during the course of writ petition, calling upon the respondents to
produce copy of the award, a forged and fabricated document
narrating the same to be award dated 29.02.1988 was produced
before the Court. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the certified
copy of the same document, which has also been placed on record,
does not bear the same signatures of the Land Acquisition Officer,
therefore, the very fact that the signatures on the alleged award
dated 29.02.1988 differs from the signatures drawn on its certified
copy, puts reasonable doubt over veracity and genuineness of the
document. Further, it was submitted that the said document dated
29.02.1988 does not bear any file or dispatch number, which in itself
is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion with regard to its
existence. In addition to above, it was submitted by the learned
Senior Counsel that the award has never been published in the
official Gazette, hence, even otherwise it cannot be said to be a legal
award.
6. Furthermore, it was submitted by learned Senior Counsel
that physical possession of the land in question is still with the
petitioners, hence, there cannot be any presumption of vesting of
the land in question with the respondents.
7. While pressing the plea of hostile discrimination, learned
Senior Counsel submitted that vide the same notification issued
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under Section 4 of the Act of 1953, land of Allah Bux and others
was also sought to be acquired and later on, their land was also de-
acquired vide notification dated 14.06.1990, and such de-acquisition
notification was further withdrawn by the State Government, in the
similar manner alike the petitioners, vide notification dated
26.12.1990. Thereupon, Allah Bux and others filed S.B.Civil Writ
Petition No. 261/1991 (Allah Bux & Others vs. State of
Rajasthan & Others), before this Court, which has been partly
allowed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated
28.10.1996 and consequently, land of Allah Bux and others has been
finally de-acquired. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since
case of the petitioners is exactly similar qua Allah Bux and others,
hence, they are also entitled for the similar relief.
8. Per contra, Shri S.S. Naruka, learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the respondents opposed the writ petition and
submitted that the acquisition proceedings were undertaken for
establishment of Krishi Upaj Mandi Yard, which is undeniably a public
purpose. It has been contended that after due survey, preparation of
lay out plan and approval by the competent authorities, the State
Government invoked urgency provisions under Section 17(4) of the
Act of 1953. The respondents have specifically pleaded that
possession of the acquired land, including 6 Biswas of Khasra
No.1352, was taken on 24.07.1986 and mutation was also entered in
favour of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti. It has further been asserted that
the petitioners are actually running the petrol pump only over about
9 biswas of land and the remaining 6 biswas was vacant land, over
which no construction whatsoever was there. Hence, after issuance
of Notification under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953, possession
thereof was taken vide memo of possession dated 24.07.1986 and
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since then it remained in possession of the Mandi Samiti. There is no
element of malafides in invocation of urgency provisions and
notification under Section 17(4) has been validly issued. It has also
been contended that once possession was taken and award was
subsequently passed on 29.02.1988, the land vested absolutely in
the State free from all encumbrances and no question of withdrawal
from acquisition or de-acquisition survived. It is stated that after
vesting of land upon taking possession, withdrawal from acquisition
was legally impermissible.
9. Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted
that award dated 29.02.1988 has been issued in consonance with
the procedure contemplated under law and a genuine copy thereof
has been placed on record.
10. Learned Additional Advocate General sought to clarify that
case of the petitioners and that of Allah Bux and others is
distinguishable on account of site position and construction, and
hence, the petitioners cannot claim the same benefits as granted to
Allah Bux and others.
11. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the
writ petition filed by the petitioners is totally misconceived. Land
acquisition proceedings in the present case have been carried out by
the respondents strictly in accordance with law, which warrants no
interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
12. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the
material available on record, this Court finds the principal questions
which arise for consideration are that as to whether the acquisition
proceedings suffer from any illegality on account of invocation of
urgency provisions under Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953 and
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whether the petitioners can successfully challenge the acquisition
after passing of the award and taking of possession and whether
notification dated 14.06.1990 creates any enforceable right in favour
of the petitioners?
13. At the outset, it is not disputed that the acquisition
proceedings were undertaken for establishment of Krishi Upaj Mandi
Yard, Lalsot. Establishment of a regulated agricultural market yard is
undoubtedly a public purpose. The challenge raised by the
petitioners that acquisition for construction of a Mandi Yard does not
constitute public purpose deserves outright rejection. The concept of
public purpose has consistently received liberal interpretation from
the Courts and acquisition for development of market infrastructure
facilitating agricultural trade has repeatedly been recognised as a
public purpose.
14. The principal challenge of the petitioners is directed
against invocation of Section 17(4) of the Act of 1953. However,
mere time gap between the notification under Section 4 and Section
17 of the Act of 1953, would not in itself decisive to assume that the
invocation of urgency clause was either arbitrary or malicious. Such
challenge has become wholly irrelevant in view of the events which
have attained finality decades ago. The record reveals that
possession of the acquired land was taken by the acquiring authority
vide possession memo dated 24.07.1986. Significantly, the
petitioners have merely made a bald assertion that possession was
not taken. The respondents, on the other hand, have specifically
pleaded taking of possession of the land in question and mutation
thereof in favour of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti. The petitioners have
failed to place any cogent material demonstrating continued lawful
possession of the petitioners after 24.07.1986. Mere raising of
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unauthorised construction on part of boundary wall after preparation
of memo of possession, does not negate legal possession having
been taken by the acquiring authority, nor does it create any
presumption of possession in favour of the petitioners. It would be
relevant to refer that in the case of Banda Development
Authority, Banda vs Moti Lal Agarwal & Others, (2011) 5 SCC
394, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given guidelines with regard to
mode of taking possession in land acquisition proceedings. The Apex
Court, in no uncertain terms, has laid down that if the acquired land
is vacant, preparing a panchnama at the spot will ordinarily be
sufficient to constitute valid mode of taking possession. This Court
finds that in the light of above, in the present case, since the land in
question was a vacant land, therefore, preparation of memo of
possession in the presence of witnesses can be said to be a correct
and legitimate mode of taking possession.
15. The respondents have further brought on record that the
award came to be passed on 29.02.1988. Allegations levelled by the
petitioners with regard to veracity and genuineness of the award are
totally misconceived and unfounded. Merely on the ground that the
signatures of the authority passing award over the certified copy do
not match with the photocopy of the original award, no suspicion can
be raised by the petitioners. This court also perused the two
documents, which prima facie reflected that while issuing certified
copy of the award, signatures existed over the original document
might have been hidden and certified copy has been issued while
putting a mark having resemblance of “sd/-” at the place of
signatures in original document. Except such difference, learned
Senior Counsel appearing on behalf the petitioners has utterly failed
to point out any iota of difference in the photocopy of original and
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certified copy of the award. The submission that the award does not
bear any file or dispatch number also stands negated, as the last
page of the award not only bears letter number and date of sending
the award to the State Government for approval, but also has the
letter number and date of letter, whereby the award was approved
by the Government. Hence, it becomes clear that the allegations
have been levelled by the petitioners merely on the basis of fake and
unfounded assumptions. Argument raised on behalf of the petitioners
that non-publication of award in official gazette is fatal, is equally
unfounded and misconceived, as there exists no statutory provision
for requiring land acquisition award to be published in official
gazette.
16. It is settled preposition of law that once an award is made
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and possession of
the acquired land is taken by the acquiring authority, the land stands
vested in the State absolutely and free from all encumbrances. Such
vesting is not conditional, tentative or defeasible in nature; rather, it
is complete, absolute and irrevocable. The consequence of vesting is
that the title, interest and all proprietary rights of the erstwhile
landholder stand extinguished by operation of law and are
simultaneously transferred to and absorbed in the State. The legal
effect of such vesting is that the acquired land becomes the property
of the State free from all encumbrances and the acquisition
proceedings attain finality upon passing of the award and taking of
possession and the rights of the landowner thereafter stand confined
to the remedies available in relation to compensation alone.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain &
Others vs. State of U.P. & Others, (1993) 4 SCC 369, while
examining the aforesaid preposition has held as under:
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[2026:RJ-JP:26865] (10 of 28) [CW-3205/1987]“14. There are two judgments of this Court which we must
note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC
84 it was held that Government could not withdraw from
acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of
the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma (1970) 2
SCC 149 it was held that : (SCC p. 152, para 8)“… after possession has been taken pursuant to a
notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the
Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled
under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the
notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under
Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view
would enable the State Government to circumvent the
specific provision by relying upon a general power. When
possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the
land vests in the Government. There is no provision by
which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to
the original owner by mere cancellation of the
notification.”
15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land
proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in
respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the
taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is
to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title
to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section
11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the
award is made within a period of two years from the date of the
Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when
Government fails to make an award within two years of the
declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the
Government and its title remains with the owner, the
acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the
provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is
applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of
the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and
thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is
vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in
unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no
application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because
the lands have already vested in the Government and there is
no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in
the Government can revert to the owner.”
18. Similarly in the case of Rajasthan Housing Board &
Others vs. Shri Kishan & Others, (1993) 2 SCC 84, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed as under:
“26. We are of the further opinion that in any event the
Government could not have withdrawn from the acquisition
under Section 48 of the Act inasmuch as the Government had
taken possession of the land. Once the possession of the land is
taken it is not open to the Government to withdraw from the
acquisition. The very letter dated February 24, 1990 relied
upon by the counsel for the petitioner recites that “before
restoring the possession to the society the amount of
development charges will have to be returned back …”. This
shows clearly that possession was taken over by the Housing
Board. Indeed the very tenor of the letter is, asking the
Housing Board as to what development work they had carried
out on the land and how much expenditure they had incurred
thereon, which could not have been done unless the Board was
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[2026:RJ-JP:26865] (11 of 28) [CW-3205/1987]in possession of the land. The Housing Board was asked to send
the full particulars of the expenditure and not to carry on any
further development works on that land. Reading the letter as a
whole, it cannot but be said that the possession of the land was
taken by the Government and was also delivered to the
Housing Board. Since the possession of the land was taken,
there could be no question of withdrawing from the acquisition
under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”
19. Further in the matter of U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow
through its Chairman & Another vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.,
Lucknow & Others, (1996) 3 SCC 124, the Apex court has held
as under:
“3. xxxxxxxx In this case, notification under Section 4(1) was
published on 24-3-1973, possession of the land admittedly was
taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station house was
constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was
published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly power under Section
17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry under Section
5-A and on service of the notice under Section 9 possession
was taken, since urgency was acute, viz., pumping station
house was to be constructed to drain out flood water.
Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under Section
17(2) free from all encumbrances. xxxxxxxx”
20. Way back in Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh &
Another vs. Sri Avinash Sharma, 1970 (2) SCC 149, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court laid down as under:
“6. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act by the first sub-
section provides:
“Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the
Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the
acquisition of any land of which possession has not been
taken.”
Power to cancel a notification for compulsory acquisition is, it is
true, not affected by Section 48 of the Act; by a notification
under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Government
may cancel or rescind the notification issued under Sections 4
and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. But the power under Section
21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after the
land statutorily vests in the State Government.”
21. While deciding the case of State of Kerala & Others vs.
M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Another, (1997) 5 SCC 432, following
observations were made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
“4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question
was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation
of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the
State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges
whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile
owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public
purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the
land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there
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[2026:RJ-JP:26865] (12 of 28) [CW-3205/1987]is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then
instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the
land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in
the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose
envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the
present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in
consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore,
invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well
justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever
assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise,
the land of the Government should be sold only through the
public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting
a higher value.”
22. Furthermore, in the case of Bangalore Development
Authority & Others vs. R. Hanumaiah & Others, (2005) 12 SCC
508, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“43. In our considered view, the Division Bench has erred in
holding that the State Government could release the lands in
exercise of its power under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 from the acquisition.
44. This Court in Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma has
held in para 6 as under: (SCC p. 151)“Power to cancel a notification for compulsory acquisition is,
it is true, not affected by Section 48 of the Act; by a
notification under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
the Government may cancel or rescind the notification
issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
But the power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act
cannot be exercised after the land statutorily vests in the
State Government.”
It was concluded in para 8 that: (SCC p. 152)
“It is clearly implicit in the observations that after
possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under
Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and
the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the
General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn
in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land
Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State
Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying
upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken
under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government.
There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the
Government reverts to the original owner by mere
cancellation of the notification.”
45. Again in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 3 SCC 1 it was
reiterated that once the possession is taken and the land vests
in the Government then the Government cannot withdraw from
acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Same
view was reiterated by this Court in Mohan Singh v.
International Airports Authority of India (1997) 9 SCC 132 and
in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed (2004) 4 SCC 460.
46. The possession of the land in question was taken in the
year 1966 after the passing of the award by the Land
Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, the land vested in the
Government which was then transferred to CITB, predecessor-
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in-interest of the appellant. After the vesting of the land and
taking possession thereof, the notification for acquiring the land
could not be withdrawn or cancelled in exercise of powers under
Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Power under Section 21
of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after vesting of
the land statutorily in the State Government.”
23. In addition to above, in the case of V. Chandrasekaran
& Another vs. Administrative Officer & Others, (2012) 12 SCC
133, Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasised on following
preposition:
“25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is
vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be
divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even
if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period.
[Vide Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 6 SCC 31,
U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124,
Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman (1996) 6
SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of T.N. (2000) 4 SCC
322 and Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar (2005) 1 SCC 558.]
26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the
tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the
purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose
either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under
the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of
the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has
been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all
encumbrances. (Vide State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma
AIR 1966 SC 1593, Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma
(1970) 2 SCC 149, Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. (1993)
4 SCC 369, Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan (1993) 2
SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corpn. of India v.
Subodh Singh (2011) 11 SCC 100.)
27. The meaning of the word “vesting” has been considered by
this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants
Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust AIR 1957 SC 344 this Court
held that the meaning of the word “vesting” varies as per the
context of the statute, under which the property vests. So far
as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is
concerned, the Court held as under : (AIR p. 353, para 19)
“19…. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17
the property acquired becomes the property of the
Government without any condition or limitations either as
to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that
the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose
or limited duration.”
28. In Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC
800 in a similar situation, this Court held as under : (SCC p.
802, para 5)
“5….. once the original acquisition is valid and title has
vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is
no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis
for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law
by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided
because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a
public purpose other than the one stated in … declaration.”
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29. Similarly, in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5
SCC 432 this Court held as under : (SCC p. 433, para 4)
“4….. It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a
public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the
rest of the land could be used for any other public
purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for
which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way
of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to
public auction and the amount fetched in the public
auction can be better utilised for the public purpose
envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
See also C. Padma v. Govt. of T.N. (1997) 2 SCC 627, Bhagat
Singh v. State of U.P. (1999) 2 SCC 384, Niladri Narayan
Chandradhurja v. State of W.B. (2002) 9 SCC 682, Northern
Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh (2003) 1 SCC 335 and
Leelawanti v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 66.
30. In Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar (2005) 1 SCC 558, this
Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land
has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of
Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons
interested/tenure-holders, and that therefore, the question of
restitution of possession to the tenure-holder, does not arise.
[See also Pratap v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 3 SCC 1,
Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1996)
6 SCC 405, State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5 SCC
432, Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed (2004) 4 SCC 460,
Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah (2005) 12
SCC 508 and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.
(2011) 9 SCC 354]”
24. In a case arising out of the acquisition proceedings under
the provisions of the Urban Improvement Act, in the case of Pratap
& Another vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, (1996) 3 SCC 1,
following observation has been given by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court:-
“11. From the facts narrated hereinabove it is clear that the
Central Act was extended to the State of Rajasthan only after
the land in question had vested in the State Government with
the publication of the notification under Section 52(1) on 10-
10-1984. Once the vesting of the land in the State
Government, free from all encumbrances, was completed the
subsequent extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the
State of Rajasthan and the amendments made by the
Amending Acts to the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act
becomes wholly irrelevant and of no consequence. Neither the
amendments nor the extension of the Central Act can have the
effect, in law or otherwise, of divesting the State of ownership
of the land which had already been vested in it.”
25. Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court while
examining the various facets of land acquisition proceedings, in the
case of Indore Development Authority vs Manoharlal & Others,
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(2020) 8 SCC 129, after considering several earlier judgments as
well as meaning of the word ‘vest’, has laid down as under:
“136. In Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC
369], the concept of vesting under the 1894 Act had been
taken into consideration. The Government cannot withdraw
from acquisition under Section 48, once it has taken the
possession. This Court has observed that once possession has
been taken under Section 17(1), prior to the making of the
award, the owner is divested of the title to the land, which is
vested in the Government and there is no provision by which
land can be reverted to the owner. This Court has observed
thus : (SCC pp. 373-74, paras 14-15)“14. There are two judgments of this Court, which we must
note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [Rajasthan
Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84] it was held
that the Government could not withdraw from acquisition
under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the land.
In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma [Lt. Governor of
H.P. v. Avinash Sharma, (1970) 2 SCC 149] it was held that
: (SCC p. 152, para 8)‘8. … after possession has been taken pursuant to a
notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in
the Government, and the notification cannot be
cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the
powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Any other view would enable the State Government to
circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a
general power. When possession of the land is taken
under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government.
There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in
the Government reverts to the original owner by mere
cancellation of the notification.’
15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the
land proposed to be acquired only after an award of
compensation in respect thereof has been made under
Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in
the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses
to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16
states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to
benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made
within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6
declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when the
Government fails to make an award within two years of the
declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in
the Government and its title remains with the owner, the
acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of
the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is
applied by reason of urgency, the Government takes
possession of the land prior to the making of the award
under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of
the title to the land which is vested in the Government.
Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly,
Section 11-A can have no application to cases of
acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have
already vested in the Government and there is no provision
in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the
Government can revert to the owner.”
(emphasis supplied)
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This Court further observed in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of
U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369 that even if compensation was not paid
to the appellant under Section 17(3-A), it could not be said that
possession was taken illegally. Vesting is absolute. This Court
has observed thus : (SCC p. 375, para 17)
“17. In the instant case, even that 80% of the estimated
compensation was not paid to the appellants although
Section 17(3-A) required that it should have been paid
before possession of the said land was taken but that does
not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the
said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent. It
is, at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who, as
the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 27-6-
1990 shows, failed to make the necessary monies available
and who has been in occupation of the said land ever since
its possession was taken, to urge that the possession was
taken illegally and that, therefore, the said land has not
vested in the first respondent and the first respondent is
under no obligation to make an award.”
(emphasis supplied)
137. In Tika Ram v. State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689, the
question considered was in case possession is taken, and
compensation is not paid, what is the effect? This Court has
held that there is no lapse of acquisition and observed thus :
(SCC pp. 736-37, paras 91-93 & 95)
“91. However, the question is as to what happens when
such payment is not made and the possession is taken. Can
the whole acquisition be set at naught?
92. In our opinion, this contention on the part of the
appellants is also incorrect. If we find fault with the whole
acquisition process on account of the non-payment of 80%
of the compensation, then the further question would be as
to whether the estimation of 80% of compensation is
correct or not. A further controversy can then be raised by
the landlords that what was paid was not 80% and was
short of 80% and therefore, the acquisition should be set at
naught. Such extreme interpretation cannot be afforded
because indeed under Section 17 itself, the basic idea of
avoiding the enquiry under Section 5-A is in view of the
urgent need on the part of the State Government for the
land to be acquired for any eventuality discovered by either
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act.
93. The only question that would remain is that of the
estimation of the compensation. In our considered view,
even if the compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the
acquisition would not suffer. One could imagine the
unreasonableness of the situation. Now suppose, there is
state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the
Act and the compensation is not given, could the whole
acquisition come to a naught? It would entail serious
consequences.
95. Further, in a judgment of this Court in Pratap v. State of
Rajasthan [Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1] a
similar view was reported. That was a case under the
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1987, under which the
acquisition was made using Section 17 of the Act. The Court
took the view that once the possession was taken under
Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdraw
from that position under Section 18 and even the provisions
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[2026:RJ-JP:26865] (17 of 28) [CW-3205/1987]of Section 11-A were not attracted. That was of course a
case where the award was not passed under Section 11-A
after taking of the possession. A clear-cut observation came
to be made in that behalf in para 12, to the effect that the
non-compliance with Section 17 of the Act, insofar as,
payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in
lapsing of the land acquisition proceedings. The law laid
down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P.
was approved. The Court also relied on the decision in P.
Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh
Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 where
similar view was taken regarding the land acquisition
proceedings not getting lapsed. The only result that may
follow by the non-payment would be the payment of
interest, as contemplated in Section 34 and the proviso
added thereto by the 1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish
to further refer the matter, as suggested by Shri Trivedi,
learned Senior Counsel and Shri Qamar Ahmad, learned
counsel for the appellants. Therefore, even on the sixth
question, there is no necessity of any reference.”
(emphasis supplied)
It has further been observed that the only result that may
follow by the non-payment would be the payment of interest as
contemplated in Section 34 of the 1894 Act.
138. In Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 3 SCC 1, this
Court held that when the possession of land is taken under
Section 17(1), the land vests absolutely in the Government free
from all encumbrances and the Government cannot withdraw
from acquisition under Section 48 and the provisions of Section
11-A of passing the award within two years were not attracted.
The proceedings would not lapse on failure to make an award
within the period prescribed under Section 11-A, once
possession had been taken. The part-payment of compensation
would also not render the possession illegal. This Court
observed thus : (SCC pp. 8-9, para 12)
“12. The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 52 are
somewhat similar to Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. Just as publication of a notification under Section
52(1) vests the land in the State, free from all
encumbrances, as provided by Section 52(4), similarly
when possession of land is taken under Section 17(1) the
land vests absolutely in the Government free from all
encumbrances. A question arose before this Court that if
there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A
and an award is not made in respect to the land so
acquired, would the acquisition proceedings lapse. In
Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (1993) 4 SCC 369
this Court held that once possession had been taken under
Section 17(1) and the land vested in the Government then
the Government could not withdraw from acquisition under
Section 48 and the provisions of Section 11-A were not
attracted and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings would
not lapse on failure to make an award within the period
prescribed therein. It was further held that non-compliance
with Section 17(3-A), regarding part payment of
compensation before taking possession, would also not
render the possession illegal and entitle the Government to
withdraw from acquisition. The aforesaid principle has been
reiterated by this Court in P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P.,
(1994) 5 SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of
Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31. In view of the aforesaid ratio it
follows that the provisions of Section 11-A are not attracted
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[2026:RJ-JP:26865] (18 of 28) [CW-3205/1987]
in the present case and even if it be assumed that the
award has not been passed within the stipulated period, the
acquisition of land does not come to an end.”
(emphasis supplied)
139. In Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC
31, question was raised with respect to the lapse of acquisition
proceedings in view of the provisions contained in Section 11-A
as award had not been made within 2 years from the date of
commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984.
Possession had been taken by the Government under Section
17(1). It was held that it was not open to the Government to
withdraw from the acquisition. Provisions of Section 11-A was
not attracted. Following is the relevant portion of the
observations made by this Court : (SCC p. 37, para 8)
“8. … It was contended that in view of Section 11-A of the
Act the entire land acquisition proceedings lapsed as no
award under Section 11 had been made within 2 years from
the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition
Amendment Act, 1984. We are of the view that the above
plea has no force. In this case, the Government had taken
possession of the land in question under Section 17(1) of
the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from
the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a case,
Section 11-A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition
proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no
award was made within the period prescribed by Section
11-A of the Act.”
140. In P. Chinnanna v. State of A.P., (1994) 5 SCC 486
question again arose with respect to possession taken under
Section 17(1) invoking urgency clause, this Court has held that
once possession is taken, there is absolute vesting and
subsequent proceedings were void. This Court stated as follows
: (SCC pp. 493-94, para 10)
“10. The said provision enables the appropriate Government
to take possession of the land concerned on the expiration
of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in
Section 9 sub-section (1) notwithstanding the fact that no
award has been made in respect of it. When the possession
of the land concerned is once taken as provided for
thereunder such land is made to vest absolutely in the
Government free from all encumbrances. It must be noted
here that taking possession of the land concerned and its
vesting absolutely in the Government free from all
encumbrances does not depend upon an award to be made
under Section 11, making of which award alone in the case
of ordinary acquisition of land could have empowered the
Collector to take possession of the land under Section 16
and the taking of which possession would have made the
land vest absolutely in the Government free from all
encumbrances. As seen from the judgment dated 23-8-
1982 of the High Court in WP No. 3416 of 1978, taking
possession of the appellants’ land along with land of others
by the Collector on 10-7-1978 under Section 17(1) is, in
fact, made the basis for its holding that invoking of urgency
clause to dispense with Section 5-A enquiry was made by
the Government mechanically. No doubt, when the High
Court took the view that acquisition of the land concerned
under Section 17 of the Act was made pursuant to an order
of the Government without application of its mind in the
matter of making Section 5-A not to apply, it was open to it
to set aside or quash the subsequent acquisition
proceedings except Section 4(1) notification which had
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followed and restore the ownership of the land to the
appellants’ land if it had to order fresh enquiry on the basis
of Section 4(1) notification. Such a setting aside or
quashing was inevitable because the acquisition
proceedings had been completed under Section 17 and the
land had vested in the State Government, inasmuch as,
without setting aside that vesting of the land in the State
Government and restoring the land to the appellant owners,
that land was unavailable for subsequent acquisition by
following the procedure under Section 5-A, Section 6,
Section 11 and Section 16. Thus, in the circumstances of
the case in respect of the land of the appellants, when
publication of Section 4(1) notification was made on 21-7-
1977, when declaration under Section 6 was published on
21-7-1977 and taking possession of that land under Section
17(1) by the Collector was made on 10-7-1978 and the
vesting in the State Government of that land had occurred
on that day, setting aside by the judgment of the High
Court in WP No. 3416 of 1978 of merely the direction given
by the Government relating to non-applicability of Section
5-A to the land, given on 7-7-1977, in our view, did not
enable the Court to order the starting of fresh proceedings
for acquisition of the land concerned under Section 5-A,
inasmuch as, that land concerned on Section 4(1)
notification had already become the land of the
Government. In this state of facts, when the previous
acquisition of the land of the appellants made under Section
17 of the Act did never stand affected. Section 5-A enquiry
held and subsequent declaration made were superfluous
proceedings which were inconsequential. Hence, we feel
that there is no need to set aside the impugned declaration
inasmuch as the earlier acquisition was complete and had
resulted in vesting of the land in the State Government and
there was no land available for acquisition in the
subsequent proceedings which have been carried out
pursuant to the judgment of the High Court made in WP No.
3416 of 1978. Therefore, in the stated facts, although we
find that no need arises to declare the impugned declaration
as void, we clarify that the earlier proceedings which had
taken place in respect of the appellants’ land, resulting in its
vesting in the State Government free from encumbrances,
has stood unaffected and any award made by the Collector
or be made by him under the LA Act shall be regarded as
that based on earlier acquisition proceedings.”
142. This Court in May George v. Tahsildar, (2010) 13 SCC 98
opined, therefore, that once the land vests in the State, it
cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the
acquisition proceedings. There is nothing in the 1894 Act to
show that non-compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to
any penalty.
143. Now, coming back to the main issue, the legal fiction of
lapsing [under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act] cannot be
extended to denude title which has already vested in the
beneficiaries of the acquisition corporation/local bodies, etc.
and who, in turn, have also conveyed title and transferred the
land to some other persons after development. In CST v. Modi
Sugar Mills Ltd., (1961) 2 SCR 189 the Court has held that “a
legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it has
been created and cannot be extended beyond its legitimate
field.” Similarly, in Braithwaite & Co. (India) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn.,
(1968) 1 SCR 771, this Court held that a legal fiction is adopted
in law for a limited and definite purpose only and there is no
justification for extending it beyond the purpose for which the
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legislature has adopted. Lapsing is provided only where
possession has not been taken nor compensation has been
paid, divesting of vested land is not intended nor specifically
provided.
144.Black’s Law Dictionary defines “vested” as follows:
“vested, adj. (18c) Having become a completed,
consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not
contingent; unconditional; absolute <a vested interest in
the estate>.
‘[U]nfortunately, the word “vested” is used in two
senses. Firstly, an interest may be vested in possession,
when there is a right to present enjoyment, e.g. when I
own and occupy Blackacre. But an interest may be
vested, even where it does not carry a right to
immediate possession if it does confer a fixed right of
taking possession in the future.’ George Whitecross
Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence 305 (CW. Paton &
David P. Derham eds., 4th Edn., 1972).
‘A future interest is vested if it meets two requirements :
first, that there be no condition precedent to the
interest’s becoming a present estate other than the
natural expiration of those estates that are prior to it in
possession; and second, that it be theoretically possible
to identify who would get the right to possession if the
interest should become a present estate at any time.’
Thomas F. Bergin & Paul C. Haskell, Preface to Estates in
Land and Future Interests 66-67 (2nd Edn., 1984).”
(emphasis in original)
145. In Webster’s Dictionary, “vested” is defined as:
“vested adj. [pp. of vest] 1. Clothed; robed, especially in
church vestments. 2. in law, fixed; settled; absolute; not
contingent upon anything : as, a vested interest.”
146. In State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram, (1997) 9 SCC 544, it
has been observed that once possession is taken and the award
has been passed, no title remains with the landowner and the
land cannot be de-notified under Section 48(1) and observed
thus : (SCC p. 545, para 3)
“3. The learned Judge having noticed the procedure
prescribed in disposal of the land acquired by the
Government for public purposes, has held that the said
procedure was not followed for surrendering the land to the
erstwhile owners. The respondent having purchased the
land had improved upon the land and is, therefore, entitled
to be an equitable owner of the land. We wholly fail to
appreciate the view taken by the High Court. The learned
Judge had not referred to the relevant provisions of the Act
and law. It is an undisputed fact that consequent upon the
passing of the award under Section 11 and possession
taken of the land, by operation of Section 16 of the Act, the
right, title and interest of the erstwhile owner stood
extinguished and the Government became absolute owner
of the property free from all encumbrances. Thereby, no
one has nor claimed any right, title and interest in respect
of the acquired land. Before the possession could be taken,
the Government have power under Section 48(1) of the Act
to denotify the land. In that event, land is required to be
surrendered to the erstwhile owners. That is not the case on
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the facts of this case. Under these circumstances, the
Government having become the absolute owner of the
property free from all encumbrances, unless the title is
conferred on any person in accordance with a procedure
known to law, no one can claim any title much less
equitable title by remaining in possession. The trial court as
well as the appellate court negatived the plea of the
respondent that he was inducted into possession as a lessee
for a period of 20 years. On the other hand, the finding was
that he was in possession as a lessee on yearly basis.
Having lawfully come into possession as a lessee of the
Government, Section 116 of the Evidence Act estops him
from denying title of the Government and set it up in third
party. By disclaiming government title, he forfeited even the
annual lease. Under these circumstances, having come into
possession as a lessee, after expiry and forfeiture of the
lease, he has no right. Illegal and unlawful possession of the
land entails payment of damages to the Government.”
147. In Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11
SCC 698, it was observed that once the award has been passed
and possession has been taken, the land vests in the State free
from all encumbrances. This Court held thus : (SCC p. 699,
para 2)
“2. This special leave petition arises from the judgment of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court made on 25-4-1996 in
Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, LPA No. 437 of
1996, order dated 25-4-1996 (P&H)] . Notification under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short
“the Act”) was published on 1-6-1976. Declaration under
Section 6 of the Act was published on 16-2-1977. The
award was passed on 3-7-1981. Thereafter, the reference
also became final. The petitioner has challenged the
notification, the declaration, and the award as illegal. It
contends that the award does not come in the way of the
petitioner in filing the writ petition on 21-1-1994. The High
Court has dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of
laches.”
148. A similar view has been taken in Market Committee v.
Krishan Murari, (1996) 1 SCC 311 and Puttu Lal v. State of
U.P., (1996) 3 SCC 99. The concept of “vesting” was also
considered in Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi
Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344. Once vesting takes
place, and is with possession, after which a person who
remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful
possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession
in the State. xxxxxxx.
256. This Court in V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer,
(2012) 12 SCC 133 dealt with the concept of vesting under the
1894 Act. The facts of the said case indicated that the
appellants and the officials of the State and Development Board
connived with each other to enable the appellant to
grab/encroach upon the public land, which was acquired and
falsified the documents so as to construct flats thereon.
Considering the gravamen of the fraud, the Chief Secretary of
the State was directed to trace out such officials and to take
suitable action against each of them. It was also held by this
Court that alienation of land subsequent to notification under
Section 4(1) is void and no title passes on the basis of such
sale deed. This Court held that once land vested in the State
free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested. Once land
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has been acquired, it cannot be restored to
tenure-holders/persons interested, even if it is not used for the
purpose for which it is so acquired. Once possession of land has
been taken, it vests in the State free from all encumbrances.
Under Sections 16 and 17, the acquired property becomes the
property of the Government without any limitation or condition
either as to title or possession. Reliance has been placed on
Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union, AIR 1957 SC 344 : (AIR p.
353, para 19)
“19. That the word “vest” is a word of variable import is
shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example,
Section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920)
empowers the court at the time of the making of the order
of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the
property of the insolvent and further provides that “such
property shall thereupon vest in such receiver”. The
property vests in the receiver for the purpose of
administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of
his debts after realising his assets. The property of the
insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only
for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has
no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand,
Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894),
provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening
of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in the Government
free from all encumbrances”. In the cases contemplated by
Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the
property of Government without any conditions or
limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature
has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for
any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus
appear that the word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation,
meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the
person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in
title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited
sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been
used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of
the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54
and 54-A when they speak of a certain building or street or
square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local
body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership
has passed to any of them.”
(emphasis supplied)
257. In National Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. Nareshkumar
Badrikumar Jagad, (2011) 12 SCC 695, the concept of vesting
was considered. This Court observed that vesting means an
absolute and indefeasible right. Vesting, in general sense,
means vesting in possession. Vesting may include vesting of
interest too. This Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 710-11, para
38)
“38. “Vesting” means having obtained an absolute and
indefeasible right. It refers to and is used for transfer or
conveyance. “Vesting” in the general sense, means vesting
in possession. However, “vesting” does not necessarily and
always means possession but includes vesting of interest as
well. “Vesting” may mean vesting in title, vesting in
possession or vesting in a limited sense, as indicated in the
context in which it is used in a particular provision of the
Act. The word “vest” has different shades, taking colour
from the context in which it is used. It does not necessarily
mean absolute vesting in every situation and is capable of
bearing the meaning of a limited vesting, being limited, in
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title as well as duration. Thus, the word “vest” clothes
varied colours from the context and situation in which the
word came to be used in the statute. The expression “vest”
is a word of ambiguous import since it has no fixed
connotation and the same has to be understood in a
different context under different sets of circumstances.
[Vide Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi
Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, Maharaj Singh v.
State of U.P., (1977) 1 SCC 155], Municipal Corpn. of
Hyderabad v. P.N. Murthy, (1987) 1 SCC 568,
Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama
Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, M. Ismail Faruqui v.
Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, SCC p. 404, para 41,
State of A.P. v. Nizam, Hyderabad, (1996) 3 SCC 282, K.V.
Shivakumar v. Appropriate Authority, (2000) 3 SCC 485,
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn., (2001) 8 SCC 143 and Sulochana Chandrakant
Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport, (2010) 8 SCC 467.”
(emphasis supplied)
258. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and
the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the 1894
Act that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It
is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession
thereafter. The vesting specified under Section 16, takes place
after various steps, such as, notification under Section 4,
declaration under Section 6, notice under Section 9, award
under Section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision
of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances
has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in
the State but all other encumbrances are also removed
forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the State
becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property.
Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the
property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and
to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or
otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken
by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of
trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner.
259. After the land has vested in the State, the total control is
of the State. Only the State has a right to deal with the same.
In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn., (2001) 8 SCC 143, this Court discussed the concept of
vesting in the context of Section 220 of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act. It has referred to various decisions including
that of Richardson v. Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75] thus : (SCC
pp. 147 & 149, paras 8 & 15)
“8. It is no doubt true that Section 220 provides that any
drain which vests in the Corporation is a municipal drain
and shall be under the control of the Corporation. In this
context, the question arises as to what meaning is required
to assign to the word “vest” occurring in Section 220 of the
Act? In Richardson v. Robertson LT p. 78, it was observed
by Lord Cranworth as under : (LT p. 78)
‘The word “vest” is a word, at least, of ambiguous
import. Prima facie “vesting” in possession is the more
natural meaning. The expressions “investiture” —
“clothing” — and whatever else be the explanation as to
the origin of the word, point prima facie rather to the
enjoyment than to the obtaining of a right. But I am
willing to accede to the argument that was pressed at
the Bar, that by long usage “vesting” originally means
the having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right,
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[2026:RJ-JP:26865] (24 of 28) [CW-3205/1987]as contradistinguished from the not having so obtained
it. But it cannot be disputed that the word “vesting” may
mean, and often does mean, that which is its primary
etymological signification, namely, vesting in
possession.’
15. We are, therefore, of the view that the word “vest”
means vesting in title, vesting in possession or vesting in a
limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it is used
in a particular provision of the Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
260. The word “vest” has to be construed in the context in
which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is
absolute and free from all encumbrances that includes
possession. Once there is vesting of land, once possession has
been taken, Section 24(2) does not contemplate divesting of
the property from the State as mentioned above.”
26. It is by now well settled through above catena of decisions
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that once land vests in the State upon
taking possession, such vesting cannot ordinarily be undone and the
land cannot be divested except by an express statutory provision
authorizing such divestment. In the absence of any such statutory
authority, neither executive action, nor any subsequent
administrative decision can revest the land in the original owner.
Consequently, a challenge to the acquisition proceedings after the
stage of award and possession is viewed by the Courts with great
circumspection, as interference at such a stage would not only
unsettle vested rights but would also adversely affect the public
purpose for which the acquisition was undertaken. Therefore, after
vesting has taken place, the original landholder ceases to have any
proprietary interest in the acquired land and, save in exceptional
cases involving patent lack of jurisdiction or fraud going to the root
of the matter, the acquisition cannot ordinarily be reopened or
invalidated.
27. The argument founded upon the report dated 01.08.1986
of the Land Acquisition Officer also does not advance the petitioners’
case. A report made by the Land Acquisition Officer is merely
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[2026:RJ-JP:26865] (25 of 28) [CW-3205/1987]
recommendatory in nature and does not create any vested or
enforceable right in favour of a landholder. Even otherwise in the
present case, admittedly, notification under Section 17(4) of the Act
to dispense with enquiry was issued on 07.06.1986 and thereafter,
possession was also taken on 24.07.1986, hence, any report of
enquiry submitted thereafter by the Land Acquisition Officer on
01.08.1986 is meaningless and has got no enforceable legal effect,
being against the scheme of the Act. Merely because the Land
Acquisition Officer, after publication of Notification under Section
17(4) and after taking possession, expressed an opinion that the
land may be released from acquisition, the petitioners cannot claim
any legal entitlement to de-acquisition.
28. The petitioners have also heavily relied upon the
notification dated 14.06.1990. However, the respondents have
specifically pleaded that the said notification was issued by mistake
and was subsequently withdrawn by notification dated 26.12.1990.
More importantly, by the time the notification dated 14.06.1990 was
issued, possession had already been taken on 24.07.1986 and the
award had also been passed on 29.02.1988. Therefore, the land had
already vested in the State. Once vesting has occurred, there
remains no authority in law to withdraw from acquisition.
Consequently, even if any tentative or erroneous notification
proposing de-acquisition was issued, the same could not confer any
legal right upon the petitioners.
29. It is equally well settled that the power of the Government
to withdraw from acquisition or to de-acquire land can be exercised
only so long as the acquired land has not vested in the State. Once
possession of the land is taken in pursuance of acquisition
proceedings and vesting takes place by operation of law, the State
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itself becomes divested of any authority to withdraw from the
acquisition in the absence of a specific statutory provision enabling
such action. The rationale behind the aforesaid principle is that
vesting of acquired land is not a mere administrative consequence
but a statutory consequence flowing from the acquisition
proceedings. Once such vesting takes place, neither the
Government, nor any of its authorities can, by an executive order or
administrative decision, nullify the legal effect of vesting. Any
contrary view would create uncertainty in public projects and defeat
the very object of compulsory acquisition undertaken for a public
purpose.
30. Therefore, notification dated 14.06.1990, having been
issued after possession had already been taken and vesting had
already occurred, was clearly dehors the provisions of law and
incapable of conferring any legal, vested or enforceable right upon
the petitioners. The petitioners, therefore, cannot claim any benefit
on the basis of the said notification nor can they assert any
legitimate expectation founded thereupon. In fact, the subsequent
notification dated 26.12.1990, whereby the earlier notification dated
14.06.1990 was withdrawn, was only a corrective measure
undertaken to rectify an action which was otherwise unsustainable in
law.
31. The above view of this Court is well supported by the
judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan Housing Board
& Others vs. Shri Kishan & Others (supra), Satendra Prasad
Jain & Others (supra) and Bangalore Development Authority &
Others (supra) and Indore Development Authority (supra), as
well as judgment of this Court in the case of Allah Bux & Others
(supra), wherein it was held that once statutory vesting has taken
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place, there exists no mechanism under the law by which the land
can revert to the original owner merely on the basis of a subsequent
executive decision.
32. Thus, viewed from any angle, the petitioners cannot
derive any advantage from the notification dated 14.06.1990, and
the challenge to the subsequent notification dated 26.12.1990 is
wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. The withdrawal of the
earlier notification dated 14.06.1990 was legally justified, as the
respondents could not have permitted an action which was itself
contrary to the statutory consequences flowing from the acquisition
proceedings and the vesting of land in the State.
33. The plea of discrimination based upon exclusion of
neighbouring land of Allah Bux and others also deserves rejection. It
reveals from the judgment of Allah Bux & Others (supra) that the
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court directed to release the land of Allah
Bux and others only on account of the fact that construction was
existing on his land and it was not a vacant land. Whereas in the
present case, the respondents have come out with a specific case
that out of total measurement of 15 Biswas of Petitioners’ land,
Petrol pump and other construction were existing only over 9 Biswas,
hence, other part measuring 6 Biswas, which was a vacant land was
acquired by the respondents. The petitioners have not produced any
material demonstrating that the allegedly excluded land was
identically situated in all respects. Mere exclusion of some parcels of
land does not ipso facto establish hostile discrimination. Hence, the
reliance placed by the petitioners upon the decision in the case of
Allah Bux & Others (supra) is also misconceived, in which relief
was granted by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court upon its own
facts and circumstances. Moreover, a claim founded on parity cannot
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override statutory consequences flowing from vesting of land after
award and possession.
34. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the acquisition proceedings have long since
attained finality. The award dated 29.02.1988 and possession memo
dated 24.07.1986 conclusively establish that the acquired land
vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The alleged
recommendation of the Land Acquisition Officer given after
notification under Section 17(4) and after taking possession of the
land in question and the subsequently withdrawn notification dated
14.06.1990 do not confer any enforceable right upon the petitioners.
No arbitrariness, mala fides, violation of constitutional provisions or
jurisdictional error has been established warranting interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
35. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of merit,
deserves dismissal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
36. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI/
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