Delhi High Court
Vinay Mawandia vs Bimal Mawandia & Anr on 6 July, 2026
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 22.05.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 06.07.2026
+ O.M.P. 3/2024 & I.A. 3246/2024 (Stay)
VINAY MAWANDIA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Amit Bhagat and Ms.
Arzoo Raj, Advocates.
versus
BIMAL MAWANDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Niyati Kohli, Mr. Rishabh
Parikh and Mr. Pratham Vir
Agarwal, Advocates.
+ EX.P. 82/2023 & EX.APPL.(OS) 1564/2023 (Ex.)
BIMAL MAWANDIA & ANR. .....Decree Holders
Through: Ms. Niyati Kohli, Mr. Rishabh
Parikh and Mr. Pratham Vir
Agarwal, Advocates.
versus
VINAY MAWANDIA. .....Judgement Debtor
Through: Mr. Amit Bhagat and Ms.
Arzoo Raj, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The Execution Petition being EX.P. 82/2023 1 has been
instituted under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1
Execution Petition
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 1 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
19962, read with Order XXI and Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 3 , seeking the execution and enforcement of the
Interim Award dated 13.11.2021 4 passed by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal.
2. The Objection Petition being O.M.P. 3/2024 5 , has been
preferred under Section 34 of the A&C Act seeking the setting aside
of the aforesaid Interim Award, whereby the learned Arbitral Tribunal
issued directions in respect of two immovable properties, namely,
property bearing No. A-175 Sushant Lok, Phase 1, Gurugram,
Haryana6, and property bearing No. 24/25 Dobson Road, Howrah,
West Bengal 7.
3. Since both the petitions arise out of the same Interim Award
and involve interconnected questions of fact and law, they were, with
the consent of the parties, heard together and are being disposed of by
this common judgment.
4. For the sake of clarity, convenience and brevity, the parties
shall hereinafter be referred to in accordance with their array in the
Objection Petition. Accordingly, Shri Vijay Mawandia shall be
referred to as the “Petitioner”, whereas Shri Bimal Mawandia and Shri
Bijay Mawandia shall be referred to collectively as the
“Respondents”, unless the context otherwise requires.
5. Since the Execution Petition seeks enforcement of the very
Award which is under challenge in the Objection Petition, the
maintainability and outcome of the execution proceedings are
2
A&C Act
3
CPC
4
Impugned Award
5
Objection Petition
6
Subject Property
7
Second Property
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 2 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
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necessarily contingent upon the adjudication of the challenge under
Section 34 of the A&C Act. This Court, therefore, considers it
appropriate to first examine and decide the Objection Petition,
whereafter the Execution Petition shall be dealt with in accordance
with the findings returned therein.
BRIEF FACTS:
6. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts germane to the
institution of the present Petition are as follows:
a. The parties herein are brothers, having a common ancestor, Late
Mr. Bala Presad Mawandia.
b. The Parties were jointly carrying out their family business;
however, in or around the year 2019, the Petitioner and the
Respondents agreed to divide a few of the properties owned by
the Mawandia family or by their group companies and for the
said purposes, a Memorandum of Understanding dated
27.02.2019 8 was executed between the Parties, wherein the
details of the properties to be divided, along with the manner of
their division, were delineated.
c. Certain disputes arose pertaining to the terms of the MoU as
between the parties and the same was not acted upon. Pursuant
to the disputes that had arisen inter se the parties, they jointly,
with the aim to resolve the said disputes, entered into an
Arbitration Agreement dated 13.06.2021 9 , whereby it was
agreed between the parties that the disputes be referred to
arbitration, to be adjudicated by a tribunal consisting of three
8
MoU
9
Arbitration Agreement
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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arbitrators, who were specifically named in the Arbitration
Agreement.
d. Upon entering into the reference, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
conducted a meeting through Video Conferencing and heard the
parties, and thereafter, passed the said Award.
e. It is stated that the Impugned Award came to be passed without
there being any presentation of the claims or counterclaims on
behalf of the parties.
f. It is stated that the unsigned copy of the said Award was posted
on the WhatsApp group of the parties along with the learned
Arbitral Tribunal, on 13.11.2021.
g. It is stated that the signed copy of the Award came to the
knowledge of the Petitioner only upon receiving the Execution
Petition preferred by the Respondents, and that too, bore the
signatures of only 2 out of the 3 members of the learned
Arbitral Tribunal.
h. Aggrieved by the Award passed by the learned Tribunal, the
Petitioner has assailed the Award by way of the present
Objection Petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner would
impugn the Award stating it to be perverse and illegal on the ground
that the same is contrary to the provisions of the A&C Act and has
been passed without following any procedure.
8. It would be submitted that the learned Arbitrators failed to seek
any claims or counterclaims on behalf of the parties, which is contrary
to and in violation of the provisions of the A&C Act.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 4 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
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9. It would further be submitted that the Award that has come to
be passed is bereft of any reasoning and has been passed in a
completely arbitrary manner without any application of mind, contrary
to the provisions of Section 31 of the A&C Act.
10. It would also be submitted by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that by way of the said Award, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
has adjudicated upon and given directions for the transfer of
ownership rights in respect of subject property which is admittedly co-
owned by Mrs. Madhu Mawandia, Mrs. Uma Mawandia and Mr.
Vikash Mawandia, none of whom are either signatory to the
Arbitration Agreement nor were parties before the learned Arbitral
Tribunal. Therefore, passing an order giving directions to Mrs. Madhu
Mawandia, who is not even a party to the Arbitration Agreement, for
transfer of her ownership in a property clearly shows that the learned
Tribunal, while passing the Impugned Award, has exceeded its
authority and therefore, the Award is liable to be set aside.
11. It would also be submitted by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that the Impugned Award passed by the learned Tribunal is
also contrary to the provisions of Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section
31 of the A&C Act, which states that an award is to be made in
writing and shall be signed by all the members of the arbitral tribunal,
the only exception being that the signature of the majority of members
shall be sufficient as long as the reason for any omitted signature is
stated in the award. It is submitted that the Impugned Award only
contains the signatures of 2 of the 3 members of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal and the Impugned Award is silent on the omission of the
signature of the third member. No reason for the omission of the
signature of the third member is mentioned in the Impugned Award.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 5 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
Thus, the Impugned Award is not a proper award in terms of the
provisions of the A&C Act and is therefore also liable to be set-aside.
12. Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents would, at the very outset, seek to challenge the present
Petition on its maintainability on the ground of it being barred by
limitation. She would submit that the Impugned Award came to be
passed on 13.11.2021; however, the present Petition has only come to
be filed as late as in January 2024. She would submit that the
Petitioner, despite being aware of the Award having been passed,
chose to impugn the same only after the filing of the Execution
Petition, which clearly shows that the same is an afterthought and a
means to avoid its obligations under the Impugned Award.
13. It would also be submitted by the learned counsel for the
Respondents that the Petition is also not accompanied by an
application seeking condonation of the delay of more than 3 years, nor
has any sufficient cause in this respect been shown in the pleadings.
14. She would further submit that the Impugned Award, when it
came to be passed by the learned Tribunal, was shared on the
WhatsApp group created, which group comprised the members of the
family and who were/ are parties herein, and the same was
acknowledged by the Petitioner. It would be submitted that after
having received and acknowledged the Impugned Award, the
Petitioner slept over their rights for approximately three years before
challenging the Award.
15. It would further be submitted that not only has the Petitioner
acknowledged the Impugned Award, but steps have been taken by
both the parties to enforce the Award and carry out its terms. It would
be contended that after having accepted the Award and reaping
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 6 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
benefits out of the same, the Petitioner cannot now be allowed to step
back from the performance of its obligations under the Impugned
Award and challenge the same. She would seek to rely upon the
transcript of the WhatsApp chat as between the parties wherein the
acknowledgement of the Impugned Award has been accorded, and
steps to be carried thereof have been discussed between the parties
and carried out, which are as follows:
[22/04/21, 2:58:47 PM] Mawandia family setlm: You created
group “Mawandia family settelme”
****
[22/04/21, 3:14:57 PM] Bimal Mawandia: Sri vedaprkash desired
All 3 brothers to give required papers to Sri mahesh ji
Regarding below
1 – secured loan with bank n situation
2 – first initial understanding of three brothers
3 – remaining properties with value etc
4 – unsecured Loan update situation
5 – detail of properties sold in last 2/3 years n
how the fund utilized
6 – upto date all company n all persona files including all faimily
members up to 31/3/21
7 – Poddar ji account detail and how the money reed and used
8 – details of jewellery n other valuables of the groupAfter receipt of papers Mahesh ji will examine n give his findings
to Vedprakash ji n Jawaharji or if any informations /papers R
required by Mahesh ji he will write in this group or wil ask directly
to the brothers
For info to all
****
[22/06/21, 10:54:33 AM] Vinay Ji Correct No: Sub: Sushantlok
home:-we are paying 1271000.00 EMI every month which is not
workable by paying group and I m not interested by paying my
share. Brokers are around to buy home in approx 12.00 crore or
more. Bimal stopped showing home to home buyers., by selling the
home we reduce our bank liabilities and monthly burdens of money
****
[25/06/21, 2:54:38 PM] Vinay Ji Correct No: SLOK
We reduced liabilities earlier by selling properties, similarly SLOK
house to be sold and pay DB immediately. Balance amount to be
FD and used by permission of arbitrator. If Bimal and Bijay want
to retain the house, they can take it for 12cr. Or otherwise all 3
brothers have to decide to sell the property.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 7 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
****
[08/07/21, 4:52:53 PM] Vinay Ji Correct No : 1.1 offereei home
12.90 cr for land and building only, all movable items which are
common will be distributed
2. Payment terms 3 months only,10% advance to be given with in
15 days times ., this is the norms
3. EMI will not be paid by me any
4. Gift transaction possible as MADHUS share can be possible
capital I want to to gift . But capital earn and losses will be set by
bm and Bkm
6. All transactional expenses to be Bourne by the buyer as usual
and the group will not bear the cost of transferring as sellers.
****
[13/11/21, 5:47:48 PM] Jawaharji : : 1st Interim Award.pdf • 2
pages <attached:
00000198-1st Interim Award.pdf>
[13/11/21, 5:49:03 PM] Jawaharji : Dear All
pls find above 1st award, pls act accordingly .
Regards
Jawahar
[13/11/21, 6:31:49 PM] Vinay ji Correct No: Noted thanks
[16/11/21, 11:15:07 AM] Bimal Mawandia: We wil send below
gift deed by afternoon to
vinay ji n then Tom or day after registry is possible
1) madhu ji to vinay ji
2) vinay ji to Bimal n bijay
Court is closed 19-21/11
N then we r away till night of 26/11
Once we send gift deed to them wil confirm in this group n then
after checking
vinay ji to advise if to book registry as above
Rgds Bimal
****
[16/11/21, 1:35:20 PM] Bijay Ji X Watsup chacha: Respected
punches Kolkatta property for missing documents letter wasn’t
allowed to give physically to local police station only online.
We had lodged online complaint on police station site and set
papers to Vinay ji by email and a printout also attached herewith
Rgds/bijay
[16/11/21, 1:35:20 PM] Bijay Ji X Watsup chacha: Resent
attachment.
[16/11/21, 2:03:47 PM] Bimal Mawandia : <attached:
00000219-PHOTO-2021 – 11 – 16 – 14 – 03 – 47.jpg>
[16/11/21, 2:04:08 PM] Bimal Mawandi: <attached:
00000220-PHOTO-2021 – 11- 16 – 14 – 04 – 08.jpg>
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 8 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
[16/11/21, 3:07:55 PM] Bijay Ji X Watsup chacha: Scan 16 Nov 21
. 01·22·58.pdf •
1 page <attached: 00000221 -Scan 16 Nov 21 .01·22·58.pdf>
****
[19/11/21, 7:41:22 PM] Vinay Ji Correct No : <attached:
00000240-AUDIO-2021-11-19-19-41-23.opus>
****
[22/11/21, 9:10:03 AMI Vinay Ji Correct No: Jift deed draft .. pdf •
2 pages
<attached: 00000246-gift deed draft .. pdf>
[22/11/21, 9:10:47 AM] Vinay Ji Correct No: According to many
recent texts, a bhabhi can gift to devar. Maheshji please check and
confirm, so only one deed is made. I have gone thru the gift deed
and attaching first request on changes.
Gift deed will be signed only when:
1. All the things from SLOK is cleared by us.
2. We have a clear NOC from the bank that Vinay and Madhu are
exiting the loan and
no longer liable for this loan or no type of persona] guarantee.
3. Due to so many travel plans BMB, the timelines to prepare and
register documents
cannot be rushed. We need to satisfy ourselves before signing the
deed, receiving the compensation and gjving the possession.
****
[23/11/21, 10:32:46 AM] Bimal Mawandia: Mahesh ji called after
his discussion with
ved prakash ji
We had sent a mail last week to deutch bank t o give noc they need
a draft of gift deed t o check with there legal department n then wil
give noc
Meantime discusd with lawyers for all points raised by vinay ji n
afresh gift deed draft wil b shared soon n after is approved wil send
to bank fr required noc
Rgds Bimal bijay
[29/11/21, 9:33:53 AM] Bimal Mawandia : Mahesh ji called as per
his talk with Chiripal ji
Since there was no news I have some meetings i n first half tday n
available 4 pm onwards if vishal wants to come he might come to
see things
****
[29/11/21, 8:18:21 PM] Bimal Mawandia: Transfer Deed 2 Bimal
Ji.docx <attached:
00000253 – Transfer Deed 2 Bimal Ji.docx>
[29/11/21, 8:18:21 PM I Bimal Mawandia : Transfer Deed Plot
DLF III (4) .doc
<attached: 00000254-Transfer Deed Plot DLF III (4) . doc>
[29/11/21, 8:19:08 PM] Bimal Mawandia : Two transfer deeds r
attached once given ok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 9 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
wil send to deutch bank to give noc
[29/11/21, 8:21:40 PM] Bimal Mawandia : db repy.pdf • 1 page
<attached: 00000256 – db
repy . pdf>
[29/11/21, 8:21:40 PM] Bimal Mawandia: A 175 A. docx
<attached : 00000257-A 175A.doc x>
****
For Sushantlok home respected punches had given an award as
well some comments r also from them and accordingly movable
furniture etc can b taken away by vishal and this Sd b in one go n
in a period of 1-2 days
****
[08/12/21} 7:05:23 PM] Vinay Ji Correct No: draft 2.pdf • 3 pages
<attached:
00000262-draft 2.pdf>
****
[10/12/21, 2:53:11 PM] Bimal Mawandia: Transfer Deed Plot DLF
III (4) (l).doc
<attached: 00000267-Transfer Deed Plot DLF III (4) (1).doc>
[10/12/21, 2:53:11 PM] Bimal Mawandia : Transfer Deed 2 Bimal
Ji.docx <attached:
00000268-Transfer Deed 2 Bimal Ji.docx>
****
[13/02/22, 11:31:12 AM] Bimal Mawandia : Sushantlok home
Vishal has come to collect first round goods from here
[13/02/22, 8:00:33 PM] Bimal Mawandia: Vishal visited
Sushantlok home n took partial things from home in one truck n
two cars
Just FYI only
[17/02/22, 11:25:25 AM] Bimal Mawandia: From second floor
vishal had taken
everything n emptied the room except one bed which he can take
any time
He also wants to take fixed treys in Almiras in the dressing area of
his room n he
can take these treys also any time
Basement n Vinay’s ji room is still with them‖
16. It would further be submitted that the Impugned Award has
been passed with the consent of the parties and after deliberations
between the parties, taking into consideration the original MoU that
was entered into between them and therefore, the Petitioner cannot
now seek to challenge the Impugned Award that he himself consented
to.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 10 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
17. As regards the objections pertaining to Mrs. Madhu Mawandia,
it would be submitted by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Respondents that not only was Mrs. Madhu Mawandia aware of the
arbitral proceedings, but she also participated and made submissions
before the learned Tribunal. It would further be argued that just like
the Petitioner herein, Mrs. Madhu Mawandia has reaped benefits from
the Impugned Award and the doctrine of approbate and reprobate
would squarely apply to Mrs. Madhu Mawandia as after accepting the
Award and deriving benefit thereunder, they cannot be permitted to
challenge the same on any ground.
18. It would lastly be submitted that the reliance of the Petitioner on
the fact that the signed copy of the Award was never received by Mr.
Vinay Mawandia cannot be considered as a ground to extend
limitation when despite possessing knowledge of the Award and
having acknowledged the same on the WhatsApp and even receiving
benefit of the same, Mr. Vinay Mawandia did not make any attempt to
seek a signed copy of the Award from the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
19. Even otherwise, it would be submitted that this objection cannot
now be canvassed after having accepted the Award and after having
taken steps in furtherance of its terms and having reaped benefits from
the same.
ANALYSIS:
20. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced
on behalf of both sides and, with their able assistance, perused the
Impugned Award as well as the materials placed before this Court.
21. At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court remains
conscious of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
objection petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. There is a
consistent and evolving line of precedents whereby the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has authoritatively delineated and settled the contours
of judicial intervention in such proceedings.
22. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, after an exhaustive consideration of a catena of earlier
judgments, in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.10, while dealing with the grounds
of conflict with the public policy of India and patent illegality,
grounds which have also been urged in the present case, made certain
pertinent observations, which are reproduced hereunder:
“Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application for
setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2), (2-A)
and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section
34 has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five sub-clauses
which are not relevant to the issues raised before us. Insofar as
clause (b) is concerned, it has two sub-clauses, namely, (i) and (ii).
Sub-clause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to the controversy in
hand. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides that if the Court finds
that the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India,
it may set aside the award.
Public policy
31. ―Public policy‖ is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is
also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872
uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.
That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.
*****
37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of10
(2025) 2 SCC 417
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 12 of 29
BHATIA
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11:03:27
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
*****
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to
the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the
expression ―in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law‖ was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii)
or Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its
Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing
with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly
substituted/added Explanations would apply [Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in
place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it
does away with the use of words : (a) ―without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)‖ in the opening part of the pre-
amended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) ―without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section‖ in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);
secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three
specified categories by using the words ―only if‖.
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall
not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application
under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996
Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section
34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral
award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court
may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,
however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
us application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 13 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral
award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the
award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine
our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or
whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or
justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section
(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent
illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite
to consider as to how the expressions:
(a) ―in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law‖;
(b) ―in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice‖;
and
(c) ―patent illegality‖ have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
―in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law‖ was
not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase ―contrary to the public policy‖, this Court held that for a
foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of
law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is that after ―the 2015 Amendments‖ in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and
Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase ―in conflict with the
public policy of India‖ must be accorded a restricted meaning in
terms of Explanation 1. The expression ―in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law‖ by use of the word
―fundamental‖ before the phrase ―policy of Indian law‖ makes the
expression narrower in its application than the phrase ―in
contravention with the policy of Indian law‖, which means mere
contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.
To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of
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Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such
fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of
justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such
contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public interest,
are considered contravention of the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention
of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial
scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral award
not arising out of international commercial arbitrations, may also
be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited
by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso
to sub-section (2-A) states that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase ―public policy of India‖ as used in Section
34, this Court took the view that the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and public
interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates statutory
provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest. Thus, an award
could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It was, however,
clarified that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the
illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held that award is against
public policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996
Act.
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68. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of the
1996 Act. It was held that ―patent illegality appearing on the face
of the award‖ refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of law. It
was also clarified that what is not subsumed within ―the
fundamental policy of Indian law‖, namely, the contravention of a
statute not linked to ―public policy‖ or ―public interest‖, cannot be
brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award
on the ground of patent illegality [ See Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it
was observed, reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under
this category of challenge to an arbitral award [See Ssangyong
Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral
decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an
award is perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain tests
were laid down to determine whether a decision of an Arbitral
Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context, it was
observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision
would necessarily be perverse.
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when a
court applies these tests it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though, a
possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass
muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an
award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not
measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to
be invalid on that score.
71. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the 2015
Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed that a
decision which is perverse, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under ―public policy of India‖, would certainly amount
to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was
pointed out that an award based on no evidence, or which ignores
vital evidence, would be perverse and thus patently illegal. It was
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also observed that a finding based on documents taken behind the
back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a
decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not
based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also
have to be characterised as perverse [ See Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed in Ssangyong
Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 and
later approved by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Engg.
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC
167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in DMRC
Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357,
the ground of patent illegality/perversity was delineated in the
following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
―39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available
for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the
arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the
construction of the contract is such that no fair or
reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding based on
no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liabe to be set aside under the head of ―patent illegality‖.
An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.‖
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court does
not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with an
arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is to be
respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only when an arbitral
award could be categorised as perverse, that on an error of fact an
arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a mere erroneous
application of the law or wrong appreciation of evidence by itself
is not a ground to set aside an award as is clear from the provisions
of sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
75. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
are not to be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless
the court concludes that the perversity of the award goes to the root
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of the matter and there is no possibility of an alternative
interpretation that may sustain the arbitral award. It was observed
that jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be equated with the
normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the approach ought to be to
respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party’s
autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum
as provided under the law.‖
e to respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party’s
autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum
as provided under the law.‖
23. The principal questions that arise for consideration in the
present Petition are: (i) whether the present Petition under Section 34
of the A&C Act is barred by limitation; and (ii) if not, whether the
Interim Award dated 13.11.2021 suffers from any infirmity warranting
interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
24. Since the issue of limitation goes to the very root of the
maintainability of the present Petition, this Court considers it
appropriate to first examine whether the Petition has been instituted
within the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.
Section 34 of the Act reads as under:
―34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.–
****
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter….‖
25. The language employed by the legislature is explicit and
mandatory. The expression ―but not thereafter‖ occurring in the
proviso to Section 34(3) places a complete embargo on the power of
the Court to condone delay beyond the additional period of thirty
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days. This Court is guided by the Judgment of the Apex Court in
Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. 11 wherein it has been
held as follows:
―12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are ―but not thereafter‖ used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go
further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set
aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso,
would render the phrase ―but not thereafter‖ wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a result.‖
****
16. ―Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a
court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application
for setting aside such award ―in accordance with‖ sub-section (2)
and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting
aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an
application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-
section (3) would not be an application ―in accordance with‖ that
sub-section. Consequently, by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to
the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the
period prescribed.‖
26. This Court is further guided by the Judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India12,
wherein the following has been held:
―18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to
Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting
aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can
only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing
sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words ―but not
thereafter‖ in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot
be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay
of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict
timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso
to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be11
(2001) 8 SCC 470
12
(2019) 2 SCC 455
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condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear
statutory mandate.
19. The respondent received the arbitral award on 31-10-2014.
Exactly ninety days after the receipt of the award, the respondent
filed an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the
District Judge, Port Blair on 30-1-2015. On 12-2-2016, the District
Judge dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction and on 28-
3-2016, the respondent filed an application before the High Court
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside the arbitral
award. After the order of dismissal of the application by the
District Judge, the respondent took almost 44 days (excluding the
date of dismissal of the application by the District Judge and the
date of filing of application before the High Court) in filing the
application before the High Court. Hence, even if the respondent is
given the benefit of the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act in respect of the period spent in pursuing the proceedings
before the District Judge, Port Blair, the petition under Section 34
was filed much beyond the outer period of ninety days.‖
27. Section 34(3) of the A&C Act prescribes that an application for
setting aside an arbitral award may not be made after three months
have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application
had received the arbitral award. The proviso empowers the Court to
condone a further delay of only thirty days upon sufficient cause being
shown, but expressly prohibits condonation beyond the said period. It
is now well settled that the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3)
is mandatory and admits of no further extension.
28. The principal contention of the Petitioner is that no signed copy
of the Award was ever delivered to him in terms of Section 31(5) of
the A&C Act and, therefore, the period of limitation never
commenced. It has further been contended that the Petitioner became
aware of the signed Impugned Award only upon receipt of the
Execution Petition filed by the Respondents.
29. This contention, though attractive at first blush, does not merit
acceptance in the peculiar facts of the present case. The material
placed on record unmistakably demonstrates that immediately after
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the Award was uploaded in the WhatsApp group created for resolution
of the disputes, the Petitioner acknowledged receipt thereof by
responding “Noted thanks”. Such acknowledgement was not a mere
formal response but was followed by continuous discussions amongst
the parties regarding the implementation of the Award.
30. The WhatsApp conversations placed on record reveal that
subsequent to the Impugned Award dated 13.11.2021, the parties
actively deliberated upon preparation of gift deeds, transfer deeds,
obtaining No Objection Certificates from the lending bank, removal of
movables from the subject property and other consequential steps
necessary for implementation of the Impugned Award.
31. Significantly, these discussions were not unilateral
communications by the Respondents but involved active participation
of the Petitioner, who not only raised conditions regarding execution
of the transfer documents but also suggested modifications to the draft
deeds. Such conduct unequivocally establishes that the Petitioner had
accepted the existence of the Impugned Award and consciously acted
upon the same.
32. Even assuming that the Petitioner had not received a signed
copy of the Impugned Award, the conduct of the Petitioner assumes
considerable significance. Having admittedly become aware of the
Impugned Award in November, 2021, the Petitioner neither addressed
any communication to the learned Arbitral Tribunal seeking a signed
copy of the Impugned Award nor raised any grievance regarding non-
compliance with Section 31(5) of the A&C Act for nearly two years.
The plea regarding non-delivery of the signed Impugned Award
surfaced only after the Respondents initiated execution proceedings.
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Such conduct disentitles the Petitioner from invoking the equitable
jurisdiction of this Court.
33. The doctrine that a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate is
founded upon the elementary principle that one who knowingly
accepts benefits flowing from a transaction cannot subsequently
challenge the validity of the very transaction. The material on record
demonstrates that the Petitioner actively participated in implementing
the Award, negotiated the modalities of transfer, insisted upon
fulfilment of conditions before execution of deeds and permitted
implementation of various directions contained therein. Having
elected to act upon the Impugned Award and derive benefits
therefrom, it does not now lie in the mouth of the Petitioner to contend
that the Impugned Award is void or non est.
34. Further, the material on record also indicates that the arbitral
proceedings were initiated mutually and with the consent of all the
parties. The Parties have, in the Arbitration Agreement, also stated
that the decision of the learned Tribunal would be final and binding on
the parties. Therefore, it cannot now be canvassed by the Petitioner
that there was no consensus ad idem as to the arbitral proceedings and
the resultant Award. This Court is guided by the judgment in
Midpoint Commodeal Private Limited v Fidatocity Homes Private
Limited & Ors.13 wherein it has been held as under:
―35. More particularly, this Court is required to examine
whether there existed a mutual and unequivocal intention on the
part of the parties not only to undertake defined contractual
obligations inter se, but also to submit any disputes arising
therefrom to arbitration in terms of a valid arbitration agreement
within the meaning of Section 7 of the A&C Act. At this juncture,
this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce Section 7 of the A&C
Act, which reads as follows:
13
2026 SCC OnLine Del 4476
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“7. Arbitration agreement. – (1) In this Part, ―arbitration
agreement‖ means an agreement by the parties to submit
to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an
arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate
agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.
(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained
in-
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or
other means of
telecommunication including
communication through electronic means
which provide a record of the agreement;
or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and
defence in which the existence of the
agreement is alleged by one party and not
denied by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing
an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if
the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to
make that arbitration clause part of the contract.‖
36. At this stage, it would be apposite to advert to the
foundational principles embodied in the Indian Contract Act,
187214, which govern the formation and enforceability of contracts
in law. Section 2(e) of the ICA defines an ―agreement‖ to mean
―every promise and every set of promises, forming the
consideration for each other.‖ The statutory definition itself makes
it abundantly clear that the existence of reciprocal promises
founded upon mutual assent forms the very basis of a legally
recognizable agreement.
37. Further, Section 2(b) of the ICA stipulates that when a
proposal is accepted, it becomes a promise. Thus, the essence of a
legally binding agreement lies in the existence of a lawful proposal
meeting with an absolute, unconditional, and unequivocal
acceptance. The statutory scheme under Section 2 of the ICA
clearly postulates that contractual obligations arise only where
there exists a clear manifestation of assent by the parties to the
same proposal. For ready reference, the relevant extracts of Section
2 of the ICA are reproduced herein below:
14
ICA
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“2. Interpretation clause. – In this Act the following
words and expressions are used in the following senses,
unless a contrary intention appears from the context:–
(a) When one person signifies to another his willingness to
do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to
obtaining the assent of that other to such act or
abstinence, he is said to make a proposal;
(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made
signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be
accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a
promise;
(c) The person proposing is called the ―promisor‖, and the
person accepting the proposal is called the ―promisee‖;
(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or
any other person has done or abstained from doing or
does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to
abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence
or promise is called a consideration for the promise;
(e) Every promise and every set of promises, forming the
consideration for each other, is an agreement;
(f) Promises which form the consideration or part of the
consideration for each other, are called reciprocal
promises;
(g) An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be
void;
(h) An agreement enforceable by law is a contract;
(i) An agreement which is enforceable by law at the option
of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the
option of the other or others, is a voidable contract;
(j) A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law
becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable.‖
(emphasis supplied)
38. In continuation thereof, Section 10 of the ICA provides that
all agreements become enforceable in law only when they are
made with the free consent of parties competent to contract, for
lawful consideration and with a lawful object. The expression ―free
consent‖ assumes considerable significance in the present context,
for consent in the eyes of law cannot be equated with a unilateral
understanding, subjective assumption, or uncommunicated
intention of one of the parties. The statutory requirement is one of
consensus ad idem, namely, meeting of minds between the parties
upon the same thing in the same sense, as expressly postulated
under Section 13 of the ICA. Sections 10 and 13 of the ICA read as
follows:
“10. What agreements are contracts. – All agreements
are contracts if they are made by the free consent of
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and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly
declared to be void.
Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force
in [India] and not hereby expressly repealed, by which
any contract is required to be made in writing2or in the
presence of witnesses, or any law relating to the
registration of documents.‖
*****
“13. “Consent” defined.- Two or more persons are said
to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the
same sense.‖
(emphasis supplied)
39. The doctrine of consensus ad idem constitutes the very
foundation and soul of binding terms between them. Unless it is
demonstrated that the parties had mutually agreed upon the
essential and material terms governing the transaction with
certainty, clarity, and finality, no concluded agreement can be said
to exist in the eyes of the law.‖
35. Tested upon that anvil and in view of the material placed on
record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Impugned
Award was not the outcome of a contested adjudicatory process but
was rendered upon the consensus and mutual understanding arrived at
between the parties. The Arbitration Agreement itself records the
parties’ intention to amicably resolve their inter se disputes through
the named Arbitrators, and the material placed before this Court,
particularly the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchanges and the
conduct of the parties after the passing of the Impugned Award,
clearly establishes that the Impugned Award embodied the mutually
agreed terms of settlement.
36. The parties thereafter proceeded to act upon the Impugned
Award by exchanging draft transfer deeds, discussing modalities of
implementation, seeking No Objection Certificates from the lending
bank and taking steps towards transfer of possession and ownership in
accordance with the directions contained therein.
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37. Having consciously accepted the Impugned Award as a
consensual resolution of their disputes and having acted upon the
same without protest, the Petitioner cannot now be permitted to
approbate and reprobate by questioning the very Award which had
been accepted and sought to be implemented.
38. A consensual and mutually accepted award carries with it a
higher degree of sanctity, and absent any allegation of fraud, coercion
or vitiating circumstances, a party cannot be permitted to resile from
the settlement merely because it has subsequently had a change of
heart. The present challenge, therefore, is not only barred by limitation
but is also contrary to the Petitioner’s own conduct, which
unequivocally demonstrates acceptance of the Impugned Award as a
binding and consensual determination of the disputes.
39. Equally significant is the fact that the present Petition is not
accompanied by any application seeking condonation of delay. Even
in the body of the Petition, no satisfactory explanation has been
furnished accounting for the inordinate delay of more than two years
from the date on which the Petitioner admittedly acquired knowledge
of the Impugned Award and acknowledged the same. The pleadings
are conspicuously silent as to why no steps whatsoever were taken
during this entire period either to obtain a signed copy or to challenge
the Impugned Award. The complete absence of any explanation
further reinforces the Respondents’ contention that the present
challenge is merely an afterthought devised after the institution of
execution proceedings.
40. The conduct of the parties subsequent to the passing of the
Impugned Award also assumes relevance. The record reveals that
transfer documents were prepared, draft gift deeds were exchanged,
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discussions with Deutsche Bank were undertaken for obtaining
necessary clearances and possession of movable assets was partially
acted upon. These acts unmistakably indicate that the parties
themselves treated the Award as binding and proceeded to implement
the same. The Petitioner’s participation in such implementation is
wholly inconsistent with his present stand questioning the legality of
the Impugned Award.
41. The submission of the Petitioner that the Impugned Award is
liable to be set aside as it contains directions affecting the rights of
Mrs. Madhu Mawandia also deserves rejection.
42. The Respondents have specifically placed on record that Mrs.
Madhu Mawandia was fully aware of the arbitral proceedings and had
participated therein. More importantly, the material on record
indicates that she too accepted and acted upon the Impugned Award.
Even otherwise, the present challenge has been instituted by the
Petitioner and not by Mrs. Madhu Mawandia. The Petitioner cannot be
permitted to assail the Impugned Award on behalf of a third person
who has herself chosen not to question the Award.
43. Likewise, the contention that the Impugned Award bears only
two signatures cannot assist the Petitioner at this belated stage.
Assuming that any procedural irregularity existed, the same was well
within the Petitioner’s knowledge immediately upon receipt of the
Award in November, 2021. Having accepted the Award and
proceeded to implement it without demur, the Petitioner cannot raise
such technical objections after an inordinate lapse of time solely
because execution proceedings have been initiated.
44. This Court is of the considered view that the entire course of
conduct adopted by the Petitioner establishes acquiescence in the
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BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
Impugned Award. The challenge has been mounted only after the
Respondents sought enforcement of the Award through execution
proceedings. Such conduct militates against the principles governing
challenges to arbitral awards and is wholly inconsistent with the object
of the A&C Act, which seeks to ensure finality and expeditious
enforcement of arbitral awards.
45. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that the
Petitioner had complete knowledge of the Impugned Award
immediately upon its pronouncement, acknowledged the same,
actively participated in its implementation and accepted benefits
flowing therefrom. The present Petition, instituted only after
commencement of execution proceedings and unsupported by any
application seeking condonation of delay or any satisfactory
explanation for the prolonged inaction, is hopelessly barred by
limitation under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act.
46. Consequently, the present Objection Petition is liable to be
dismissed as being barred by limitation alone.
DECISION:
I. O.M.P. 3/2024
47. In view of the foregoing discussion and having held that the
present Objection Petition is barred by limitation, this Court does not
consider it either necessary or appropriate to examine the merits of the
various grounds urged by the Petitioner for setting aside the Impugned
Award under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
48. Consequently, the Objection Petition, along with all pending
application(s), if any, stands dismissed as being barred by limitation.
49. No Order as to costs.
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BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
II. EX.P. 82/2023
50. In view of the judgment rendered in the connected Objection
Petition dismissing the challenge to the Interim Award, this Court
finds no legal impediment to proceeding further with the present
Execution Petition.
51. Consequently, the Judgment Debtor is directed to transfer the
property bearing No. A-175, Sushant Lok, Phase-I, Gurugram, being
the subject property, in favour of the Decree Holders in terms of
Direction No. 2 of the Interim Award and in accordance with the
procedure and mechanism stipulated in Directions 2(A) to 2(F)
thereof, within a period of six weeks from today.
52. List the matter before the Roster Bench on 20.08.2026 for
necessary compliance.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 06, 2026/va
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR O.M.P. 3/2024 & connected matter Page 29 of 29
BHATIA
Signing Date:08.07.2026
11:03:27
