Vikas Wadhwa vs Punjab And Sind Bank … on 21 April, 2026

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    Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

    Vikas Wadhwa vs Punjab And Sind Bank … on 21 April, 2026

    Author: Anand Sharma

    Bench: Anand Sharma

    [2026:RJ-JD:19003]
    
     HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR
                         S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6607/2026
    
    PETITIONER:
    Vikas Wadhwa S/o Rajesh Wadhwa, Aged About 43 years, R/o 83 D
    Block, Ward No. 06, Gajsinghpur City, Padampur, Ganganagar
    (Raj.)
    (Presently working at Zonal Office, Mogha Zone, Punjab).
                                                                              ----Petitioner
                                             Versus
    RESPONDENTS:
    1.       Punjab and Sind Bank, through General Manager, Corporate
             Office, Block 3M, NBCC Building, 2Nd Floor, Plate B, East
             Kidwai, Nagar, New Delhi-110023.
    2.       Deputy General Manager (HRD), Punjab and Sind Bank,
             Zonal Office, Mogha Branch.
                                                                           ----Respondents
    
    
    For Petitioner                 :    Mr. Madhav Vyas Advocate.
    For Respondents                :    Mr. Vikas Balia Senior Advocate
                                        assisted by Prateek Charan Advocate
                                        and Mr. Rajat Arora Advocate.
    
    
    
                   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA

    Judgment

    21/04/2026

    SPONSORED

    1. Although the instant petition has come up on an

    application under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India, yet

    during the course of arguments, a preliminary objection with regard

    to maintainability of the writ petition on account of lack of territorial

    jurisdiction was raised on behalf of the respondents, therefore, with

    the consent of learned counsel for the parties, arguments were heard

    on such preliminary objection.

    2. Petitioner has filed the present writ petition with following

    prayers:

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    “It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that the present petition
    for writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be allowed and;
    by an appropriate writ, order or direction:

    (i) The order dated 20.03.2026 (Annx.12) may kindly be
    quashed and the same may kindly be set aside.

    (ii) The respondents may kindly be directed to permit the
    petitioner to discharge his duties at Zonal Office, Moga Zone.

    (iii) Any other writ or direction that may be deemed fit, just and
    proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be
    issued in favour of the petitioner.

    (iv) Costs may kindly be awarded.”

    3. At the threshold, Mr. Vikas Balia, learned Senior Counsel

    appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that

    since no part of cause of action has accrued in the territory of state

    of Rajasthan, therefore, this court lacks territorial jurisdiction to

    entertain and adjudicate the present writ petition. It was submitted

    that the petitioner is presently posted and residing at Moga, Punjab,

    while the impugned suspension order dated 20.03.2026 has been

    passed by the competent authority, i.e., Deputy General Manager

    (HRD), at the Head Office situated in New Delhi, both of which lie

    outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

    4. It was further argued that the petitioner has failed to

    plead or establish any integral or material facts constituting a part of

    the cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

    Mere assertion of residence or incidental facts is not sufficient to

    confer jurisdiction unless such facts form an essential part of the

    cause of action.

    5. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is settled

    proposition of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction only

    when the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its

    territorial limits and such facts must be specifically pleaded and

    demonstrated. In the present case, no such foundational facts have
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    been disclosed in the writ petition. It was, therefore, contended that

    since the impugned order has been passed by an authority situated

    outside the jurisdiction of this Court and no part of the cause of

    action has arisen within territorial limits of this Court, the writ

    petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed on the

    ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

    6. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon judgment dated

    07.08.2023 delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in M/s

    Divya Upchar Sansthan & Others vs. Directorate General of

    Goods and Service Tax Intelligence & Others (D.B. Civil Writ

    Petition No. 8526/2022) as well as recent judgment dated

    26.02.2026 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Jaipur

    Bench in Surendra Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan & Others

    (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21768/2013).

    7. Per contra, Mr. Madhav Vyas, learned counsel for the

    petitioner opposed the preliminary objection regarding lack of

    territorial jurisdiction by placing reliance on Article 226(2) of the

    Constitution of India, contending that a High Court can exercise

    jurisdiction if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its

    territorial limits, irrespective of the location of the respondent

    authority.

    8. It was submitted that the expression “cause of action”

    must be understood in the same sense as under Section 20(c) of the

    Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., the bundle of material facts which are

    required to be proved for obtaining relief. For determining territorial

    jurisdiction, the Court is required to examine only the averments

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    made in the writ petition, without adjudicating upon their

    correctness.

    9. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal

    Kumar Basu & Others (1994) 4 SCC 711 and Kusum Ingots &

    Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India & Another (2004) 6 SCC 254,

    wherein it has been held that even if a part of the cause of action

    arises within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, it would be

    sufficient to confer jurisdiction and such determination must be

    based on the pleadings in the petition.

    10. Applying the aforesaid principles, it was contended that in

    the present case, a part of the cause of action has clearly arisen

    within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The allegations against

    the petitioner pertain to his functioning at the branch located within

    jurisdiction of this Court; the show cause notice, suspension orders

    and subsequent actions are intrinsically connected with such place

    and the FIR has also been registered within the territorial limits of

    this Court. Earlier interim orders passed by this Court in earlier writ

    petitions were also complied with by the respondents. It was further

    pointed out that at the time of alleged incidents referred in the

    impugned order, the petitioner was posted and residing within the

    jurisdiction of this Court. Learned Counsel submitted that as the

    impugned order is in furtherance of earlier incidents which took place

    within the territory of Rajasthan and the fundamental cause as well

    as facts related to the impugned order are also interlinked and

    interwoven, therefore, it is established that the impugned action has

    direct nexus thereto.

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    11. In view of above, it was submitted by learned counsel for

    the petitioner that the pleadings clearly disclose that at least a part

    of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of

    this Court and therefore, the objection raised by the respondents is

    liable to be rejected.

    12. This Court has given thoughtful consideration to the rival

    submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and

    perused the material available on record.

    13. The objection raised by the respondents goes to the root

    of the matter, as it pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court

    to entertain the present writ petition. It is a settled proposition of

    law that the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the

    Constitution is primarily determined by the situs of the cause of

    action, wholly or in part, as envisaged under Article 226(2).

    14. The expression “cause of action” has consistently been

    interpreted to mean a bundle of material facts which are necessary

    for the petitioner to plead and prove in order to obtain the relief

    claimed. For the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction, the

    Court is required to examine the averments made in the writ

    petition, without entering into the correctness or otherwise of such

    pleadings. However, it is equally well settled that such facts must

    constitute integral, essential or material facts forming part of the

    cause of action and not merely incidental or ancillary facts.

    15. In the present case, the admitted position which emerges

    from the record is that the petitioner is presently posted at Moga,

    Punjab and is residing there. The impugned order dated 20.03.2026

    has been passed by the competent authority, namely the Deputy

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    General Manager (HRD), at the Head Office of the respondent-Bank

    situated in New Delhi. Thus, both the situs of the petitioner’s posting

    as well as the authority passing the impugned order fall outside the

    territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

    16. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the

    petitioner, in the cases of Oil and Natural Gas Commission

    (supra) and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra), do not

    advance the case of the petitioner; rather, they reinforce the

    principle that only those facts which are integral to the cause of

    action can confer jurisdiction. In the present case, such foundational

    facts are conspicuously absent.

    17. After duly considering the aforesaid two judgments

    delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, Division Bench of this Court in

    the case of M/s Divya Upchar Sansthan & Others(supra) has

    held as under:

    “14. The undisputed facts which emerges from the pleadings
    are that the petitioner-Firm and its registered office of business
    is located in the State of Punjab. The authority, who has issued
    show cause notice to the petitioner-Firm, is located in the State
    of Punjab. The business transaction of the petitioner-Firm was
    with respondent No.7- M/s. Gagan Pharmaceuticals,
    Sriganganagar, who is located in the State of Rajasthan. The
    show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner-Firm and
    service of the same was also effected in the State of Punjab
    although the show cause notice emanates from the file of the
    respondent-Department which is common to both the
    petitioner-Firm and respondent No.7 for issuance of notices. It
    is also clear that the evasion of the Tax liability on both
    petitioner-Firm as well as the respondent No.7 is not similar
    and they are held liable for the violations/infractions
    respectively at their own ends. The petitioners were receiving
    the goods for onward sale etc. in the State of Punjab were
    manufactured by the respondent No.7 in the State of
    Rajasthan.

    16. On a careful scrutiny of the above mentioned facts clearly
    show that no part of cause of action has arisen within the
    territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the
    petitioner-Firm was having a business transaction with
    respondent No.7 and certain evasions having been pointed out
    in the same, will not give any cause of action to the petitioner-
    Firm to approach this Court by way of filing the present writ
    petition.

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    17. Secondly, merely because the show cause notice has been
    issued to the petitioner-Firm on the basis of a common file
    maintained by the official respondents, will not be relevant to
    draw a presumption that part of cause of action has arisen to
    the petitioner-Firm in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court,
    merely because on the basis of the same common file, the
    show cause notice has been issued to the respondent No.7.

    19. In view of authoritative pronouncements of the judgments
    by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the arguments of learned Sr.
    Counsel that the proceedings out of the present show cause
    notice have started from a file of even number from which the
    proceedings were started against the respondent No.7, has no
    bearing giving rise to any cause of action to file the present writ
    petition before this Court. Further, merely because the
    petitioner-Firm is having a business transaction with
    respondent No.7, who is located in the State of Rajasthan and
    on certain transactions, the evasion of duty is alleged will not
    give any cause of action to the petitioner-Firm for filing writ
    petition before this Court for the simple reason that the
    evasion, if any, done by the petitioners were taken note of by
    the authorities located in State of Punjab and, therefore, they
    have rightly issued show cause notice to the petitioners for
    undertaking the proceedings in the State of Punjab.”

    18. Similarly in the case of Surendra Singh (supra), Co-

    ordinate Bench of this Court at Jaipur has sustained the objection

    regarding lack of territorial jurisdiction on the basis of following

    observations:-

    “32. Upon consideration of the various judgments rendered by
    the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the High Courts, the consistent
    legal position that emerges is that the invocation of territorial
    jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
    dependent upon the place where the cause of action, wholly or
    in part, arises, and not merely upon the location of the parties
    or the place where the order is communicated. Ordinarily, in
    matters relating to termination of service, the cause of action
    arises at the place where the disciplinary proceedings are
    initiated, conducted and concluded, and where the impugned
    order is passed. The residential address of the employee, by
    itself, has no nexus with the disciplinary process. In a different
    factual matrix, for instance, where the charge pertains to wilful
    absence or abandonment of duty and the charge-sheet or
    notices are required to be served at the employee’s residential
    address, the place of such service may assume relevance in
    determining territorial jurisdiction; however, such
    determination would necessarily depend upon the nature of the
    charges and the role of service of notice in completing the
    cause of action.

    33. In the present case, the disciplinary proceedings were
    neither initiated nor conducted within the territorial limits of
    this Court. The order of termination was issued outside the
    State and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was also
    considered and decided outside the jurisdiction of this Court.
    The petitioner’s place of residence does not constitute an
    essential or integral fact for adjudication of the disciplinary
    action. The communication of the termination order at the
    petitioner’s residential address merely confers knowledge of the
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    decision already taken and, at best, furnishes a right to initiate
    proceedings; it does not, in the facts of the present case, form
    part of the bundle of material facts constituting the cause of
    action.”

    19. A careful reading of the writ petition does not reveal any

    specific pleading demonstrating that any part of the cause of action,

    in its material sense, has arisen within the territorial limits of this

    Court. The petitioner has made general assertions regarding certain

    events having nexus with a place falling within the jurisdiction of this

    Court. However, such assertions, even if taken at face value, do not

    constitute essential or integral facts for conferring territorial

    jurisdiction to this Court.

    20. The cause of action in the present case primarily arises

    from the passing of the impugned suspension order and its

    consequences. Both these aspects are clearly located outside the

    territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Mere reference to prior events or

    allegations, which are not directly determinative of the relief sought,

    cannot be construed as giving rise to a part of the cause of action

    within jurisdiction of this Court.

    21. The contention of the petitioner that the respondents have

    participated in the proceedings or complied with certain interim

    directions of this Court also does not confer jurisdiction where none

    exists in law. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent,

    acquiescence, or waiver, and the principle of approbation and

    reprobation cannot override a statutory or constitutional limitation on

    jurisdiction.

    22. This Court also finds substance in the objection raised by

    the respondents that mere residence of the petitioner or existence of

    some incidental facts within the State would not, by itself, confer

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    territorial jurisdiction unless such facts form a material part of the

    cause of action. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate such nexus.

    23. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered

    opinion that no part of the cause of action, either wholly or in part,

    has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court so as to

    invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

    India.

    24. Accordingly, the preliminary objection raised by the

    respondents is sustained. This Court holds that it lacks territorial

    jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition.

    25. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground

    of lack of territorial jurisdiction. However, it is made clear that the

    petitioner shall be at liberty to avail appropriate remedy before the

    competent Court having jurisdiction in accordance with law.

    26. Pending Applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

    (ANAND SHARMA),J
    MANOJ NARWANI/179

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