Vidya Bharti Chinmaya Vidyalaya vs Subra Palit on 18 March, 2026

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    Jharkhand High Court

    Vidya Bharti Chinmaya Vidyalaya vs Subra Palit on 18 March, 2026

    Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

    Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad

                                                 2026:JHHC:7564-DB
    
    
         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                     A.C. (DB) Case No.02 of 2018
                                    --------
    1. Vidya Bharti Chinmaya Vidyalaya, Telco Colony, P.O. & P.S.
       Telco, Town - Jamshedpur, District- East Singhbhum, Pin-
       831004 (Jharkhand), Through its Chairman Sri Manas
       Kumar Mishra, aged about 56 years, son of Sri Saroj Kumar
       Mishra, residing at House No. 2, River View Enclave, Telco
       Colony, P.O. & P.S.- Telco, Town - Jamshedpur, District-
       East Singhbhum, (Jharkhand).
    2. Vidya Bharti Chinmaya Vidyalaya, Telco Colony, P.O. & P.S.-
       Telco, Town - Jamshedpur, District- East Singhbhum, Pin
       831004 (Jharkhand), Through its Secretary Sri Vishnu
       Chandra Dixit, aged about 47 years son of Sri Prakash Dixit,
       residing at 554, Alok Nanda Tower, Alok Vihar, P.O. & P.S.-
       Govindpur, Town Jamshedpur, District- East Singhbhum
       (Jharkhand).
                                                ...  ... Appellants
                           -Versus-
     Subra Palit, wife of Mr. S.K. Palit, resident of L-4/6, Cross Road,
     10-A, P.O. & P.S. - Telco, Town - Jamshedpur, District East
     Singhbhum, Pin-831004 (Jharkhand).
                                                ... ... Respondent
                            ------
     CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
                                          -----
     For the Appellants           : Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, Advocate
                                  : Ms. Mahi, Advocate
     For the Respondent           : Mr. Saurav Arun, Advocate
                                  : Mr. Abhishek Sinha, Advocate
                            ---------
     Order No.30/Dated : 18th March, 2026
    
     Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J :
    

    1. The instant appeal is under Section 15 of the Jharkhand

    Education Tribunal Act, 2004 directed against the judgment

    SPONSORED

    dated 03.08.2018 passed in A.C. (SB) No.15 of 2014 whereby

    and whereunder the appeal has been dismissed upholding the

    judgment passed by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal dated

    01.09.2014 by which while allowing the appeal, the order of

    termination passed by the Chairman, Vidya Bharti Chinmaya

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    Vidyalaya, Jamshedpur has been set aside with a direction

    upon the Management of the School to reinstate the petitioner

    (respondent herein) in service with 50% back wages and

    consequential benefits to which she would have been entitled

    had she not been unlawfully thrown out from service.

    The said back wages have been directed to be paid within

    a period of three months from the date of passing of the said

    judgment and further the direction was passed for physical

    reinstatement in service within two weeks from the date of

    passing of the judgment.

    2. The brief facts of the case require to be enumerated

    herein as per the pleading made before the Jharkhand

    Education Tribunal (hereinafter referred as the Tribunal).

    3. It is the case of the respondent (applicant before the

    tribunal) that she was appointed as primary teacher on

    01.04.2006. She was put under suspension in contemplation

    of the domestic enquiry. An enquiry officer was appointed after

    service of memorandum of charge so as to provide an

    opportunity to defend her case.

    4. The Enquiry Officer has concluded the enquiry and found

    the charges to be proved. The enquiry report has been

    forwarded before the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary

    authority has issued the show cause along with the copy of the

    enquiry report and after following the procedure which was to

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    be followed at that stage, the order of termination dated

    08.06.2010 was passed.

    5. The respondent has challenged the said order of

    termination before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi

    on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice by

    taking the plea that the place of enquiry has been changed

    without any information to the concerned delinquent and the

    first charge pertaining to implication in the criminal case has

    resulted into acquittal by the competent court of criminal

    jurisdiction.

    6. Specific plea was taken that one witness, namely, Shri S.

    Velu, a teacher working in the school, has been made a

    management witness and his statement was recorded by the

    Enquiry Officer but subsequently he was not placed before the

    Enquiry Officer for his cross-examination even then the

    content of the statement in support of the charge has been

    accepted by the Enquiry Officer.

    7. The learned Tribunal has called upon the Management.

    The Management has filed a detailed counter affidavit denying

    the aspersion so made of violation of principle of natural

    justice, rather, the ground has been agitated therein that all

    efforts had been taken to provide an opportunity of hearing

    said to be sufficient and adequate and it is the delinquent who

    has not availed that opportunity, reason best known to her.

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    8. The ground has been taken that at the belated stage the

    requisition was made to defend through Advocate and the said

    request was rejected on the pretext that the requisition for

    defending through an Advocate ought to have been made at

    the inception but making it at the belated stage is nothing but

    delaying tactics of the delinquent employee.

    9. The learned Tribunal has appreciated the fact in entirety

    and has passed an order by considering the issue of violation

    of principle of natural justice, non-engagement of an Advocate,

    not presenting Shri S. Velu for his cross-examination to be

    carried out by the delinquent in course of enquiry and has

    come to the specific finding that the domestic enquiry cannot

    be said to be fair and as such, the order of termination has

    been said to be improper and illegal and in consequence

    thereof, the order of termination passed by the Chairman has

    been quashed and set aside with a direction of making

    payment of 50% back wages to be carried out within a period

    of three months. However, separate direction has been issued

    for physical reinstatement in service within two weeks from

    the date of passing of the judgment holding the petitioner

    entitled to all consequential benefits of her continuous service.

    The operative part of the order is being referred herein :-

    “30. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the order
    of termination passed by the Chairman is set aside
    and the petitioner is reinstated in service with 50% of
    back wages and consequential benefits to which she
    would have been entitled had she not been unlawfully

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    thrown out from service. The back wages payable to
    the petitioner shall be paid to her within 3 (three)
    months from today. The petitioner shall be physically
    reinstated in service within two weeks from today.
    The petitioner will be entitled to all consequential
    benefits of her continuous service.”

    10. The Management, the appellant herein, has challenged

    the order passed by the learned Tribunal before this Court by

    filing appeal being A.C.(SB) No.15 of 2014. The matter was

    heard by learned Single Judge of this Court.

    11. The respondent has been called upon, who has defended

    the case on merit by defending the order passed by the learned

    Tribunal and has also brought to the notice of the learned

    Single Judge regarding the irregularity said to be committed

    in course of enquiry, particularly, the violation of principle of

    natural justice and not allowing the important Management

    Witness, Shri S. Velu, for his cross-examination.

    12. The leaned Single Judge has considered the fact in

    entirety and has come to the conclusive finding as would be

    evident from paragraph 10 thereof wherein it has been

    referred, charge-wise, i.e., the first charge it has been found to

    be proved only on the basis of F.I.R. filed before the Enquiry

    Officer, without examining any evidence, since the delinquent

    has been acquitted in the said criminal case and, as such, the

    said charge has been said to be not proved having not been

    taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer.

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    13. The second charge has been taken to be proved based

    upon the typed examination-in-chief of the witness of the

    school/management who has not been allowed to be cross-

    examined by not allowing the said witness to participate in the

    proceeding.

    14. Learned Single Judge, based upon the aforesaid

    infirmities in the enquiry, has upheld the judgment passed by

    the learned Tribunal.

    15. The judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is the

    subject matter of the present appeal.

    Argument advanced on behalf of the appellant

    16. Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the

    appellant Management, has taken the following grounds :-

    (i) The learned Single Judge has not taken into

    consideration the fact that there is no violation of

    principle of natural justice as was agitated before the

    Tribunal at paragraph 13 and 14 of the counter

    affidavit wherein the fact has been brought to the

    notice of the learned Tribunal that the ample

    opportunity was tried to be given to the delinquent but

    it is the delinquent who has not availed the same,

    rather at the fag end of the proceeding, has made a

    requisition for defending her case through an

    Advocate. The requisition so made was rejected being

    agitated at the fag end.

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    (ii) It has been contended that the delinquent has also

    been allowed to contest the case before the Enquiry

    Officer but for one reason or the others, the

    opportunity has not been availed and the ground was

    taken before the adjudicatory forum for violation of

    principle of natural justice.

    (iii) So far as the question of non-examination of one

    witness, namely Shri S. Velu, is concerned, the

    argument has been advanced that no prejudice has

    been caused since typed copy of the examination-in-

    chief was already supplied to the delinquent and,

    hence, she could have defended from the said

    document.

    (iv) The argument has been advanced that even accepting

    that there is violation of principle of natural justice

    then the proper course would have been by the

    adjudicatory forum to remit the matter before the

    Management to initiate the proceeding afresh from the

    stage of enquiry after providing an opportunity of

    hearing to meet out the ground of violation of principle

    of natural justice, but having not done so, serious

    infirmity has been committed by the learned Tribunal,

    which has not been taken into consideration by the

    learned Single Judge of this Court.

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    (v) The ground has been taken on the issue of the

    direction of 50% back wages which cannot be said to

    be just and proper since no evidence is there of gainful

    employment.

    17. Learned counsel, in order to support the argument, has

    relied upon the following judgments :-

    (i) The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. V. Prabhat

    Kumar, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 736

    (ii) State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. V. Rajit Singh,

    (2022) 15 SCC 254

    (iii) Management of Regional Chief Engineer, Public

    Health and Engineering Department, Ranchi v.

    Their Workmen represented by District Secretary,

    (2019) 18 SCC 814

    Argument advanced on behalf of the respondent

    18. Per contra, Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel appearing

    for the respondent, has taken the following grounds in

    defending the judgment passed by the learned Tribunal and

    the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court.

    (i) It has been submitted that in a case of departmental

    enquiry, the principle of natural justice has important

    bearing, since, the memorandum of charge which is to

    be served to the delinquent employee is for the purpose

    of separating the delinquent employee from service in

    order to end the jural relationship. Since, an adverse

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    decision is decided to be taken against the delinquent,

    hence, the same cannot be allowed to be carried out

    without providing an opportunity said to be adequate

    and sufficient to the delinquent.

    (ii) It has been submitted that the fact about making

    requisition for engagement of an Advocate even though

    at belated stage but the basis which has been taken

    by the disciplinary authority and even by the Enquiry

    Officer in course of the conclusion of domestic enquiry,

    that the Management witness, namely, Shri S. Velu,

    has been examined in support of the memorandum of

    charge but he has not been allowed by the Enquiry

    Officer to cross-examine on the pretext that some

    threatening was given by the delinquent and, as such,

    he was not in a position to participate in the enquiry

    proceeding.

    (iii) The submission has been made that if the

    Management is intending to prove the memorandum

    of charge on the basis of presenting a witness, then it

    is bounden duty of the Management to secure the

    appearance of such witness for cross-examination and

    if the cross-examination is not being allowed to be

    carried out, certainly the serious prejudice will be said

    to be caused to the delinquent due to non-cross-

    examination of the said witness-MW-1 which has been

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    made basis of the order of termination by the

    Management.

    (iv) On the issue of remand, the argument has been

    advanced that the memorandum of charge was served

    way back in November, 2009 and since then more

    than 17 years have already lapsed and, as such, after

    lapse of 17 years if the matter would be remitted before

    the Management for initiating de novo enquiry, that

    will not be said to be just and proper that too when the

    said error has been committed by the disciplinary

    authority.

    (v) On the issue of back wages, it has been submitted that

    since the order of termination has been held to be

    unjust and improper which itself suggests that the

    delinquent was willing to discharge the duty but it is

    the Management who has forcibly not allowed to

    discharge the duty and in that context the principle of

    ‘no work no pay’ will not be applicable.

    Analysis and Consideration

    19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

    20. This Court, on consideration of the argument advanced

    on behalf of the parties and after going through the order

    passed by the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge,

    requires to consider the following issues :-

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    (i) Whether the view taken by the learned Tribunal on the

    issue of violation of principle of natural justice on the

    ground of not allowing the Management witness to be

    cross-examined by the delinquent in course of

    domestic enquiry if has been accepted to be violation

    of principle of natural justice, can such finding be said

    to suffer from an error?

    (ii) The learned Tribunal has come to the conclusion of

    unfairness of the domestic enquiry on the ground of

    not providing adequate and sufficient opportunity to

    the delinquent which has been made basis of the order

    of termination, but if the domestic enquiry itself has

    been held to be unfair, then the order of termination if

    has been quashed and set aside with a direction of

    reinstatement, can it be said to suffer from an error?

    (iii) Whether after lapse of about 17 years, if the matter

    will be remitted before the Management to initiate a

    proceeding de novo can it be said to be just and proper

    that too if the error lies on the part of the

    Management?

    (iv) Whether the finding recorded by the Tribunal of

    holding the delinquent entitled for 50% back wages on

    the pretext of the fact that the order of termination has

    been found to be per se improper can it be said to

    unjustified?

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    21. All the issues, on facts herein, since are interlinked, as

    such, are being taken up together for its consideration.

    22. This Court, before considering the aforesaid issues, once

    again, at the risk of brevity, is referring the admitted facts

    herein which have been admitted by the parties in course of

    argument on the basis of the documents available on record :-

    (i) The delinquent employee (respondent herein) was

    appointed as a teacher on 01.04.2006 in the

    concerned school, the appellant herein. She was put

    under suspension in contemplation of domestic

    enquiry while the memo issued in this regard on

    09.11.2009.

    (ii) The Management thereafter has decided to initiate the

    disciplinary proceeding and decided to serve the

    memorandum of charge dated 12.11.2009 imputing

    the following allegations against the delinquent :-

    58(1) Participating in or inciting others to participate in
    activities detrimental to the school’s interest 08(3)”Any act
    or disorderly or indecent behaviour or any act subversive
    to discipline”

    68(1) Wilful violation of any of the rules of the service
    conditions set forth therein” read with Clause 21. An
    employee shall at all times conduct himself soberly and
    decently.”

    Brief description of the incidents corresponding to the acts
    of misconduct as stated above:-

    It has also come to the notice of the School Management
    that Telco PS Case No.371/2009 dated 07.11.2009 u/s

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    341,342,344 ,323,2 324, 307,368,370,504,506,34 I.P.C.
    and under Section 23 JHWaNES
    Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
    2000 has been registered against you and your husband
    Mr. Saumen KumarPalit Prima facie, alleged offences
    besides being offence under Indian Penal Code also
    constitute offence against human rights It is a matter of
    record that the said criminal case has been registered
    against you and your husband on the basis of faryad
    bayan of the victim Vijay Dehari aged about 13 years S/O
    Mantu Dehari of Village Kumar Dubi, P.S. Bersol District
    West Singhbhum Jharkhand.

    It is further alleged against you that on 12.09.09 you
    along with your husband had entered the school premises
    and was behaving in an indecent and disorderly manner
    in front of the staff of the school on an issue pertaining to
    School which was unwarranted.

    By exhibiting your behaviour inconsistent with the
    dignity of the pious profession to which you belong you
    have not only brought the School to disrepute but have
    also made yourself liable to be proceeded against for the
    misconduct(s) as specified herein above. You are also
    aware that any inconsistency in preaching and practice of
    a teacher is unacceptable to the society and detrimental to
    the interest of the institution.”

    (iii) The Enquiry Officer was appointed. It was

    communicated to the delinquent for her participation

    in the enquiry proceeding. The adjournment, however,

    has been sought for on behalf of the delinquent before

    the Enquiry Officer but subsequently she has

    participated and made a request to allow her to be

    defended through an Advocate.

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    (iv) The requisition/request to defend through an

    Advocate was rejected by the Enquiry Officer.

    (v) The enquiry proceeded. The Management has come

    out with one witness namely, Shri S Velu. His

    statement was recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the

    capacity of the Management Witness No.1. He,

    however, has supported the memorandum of charge

    pertaining to the charge as has been alleged against

    the delinquent employee.

    (vi) The said M.W.-1 S.Velu has not been produced for his

    cross examination by the delinquent.

    (vii) The Enquiry Officer has given the finding of charge

    having been proved. The finding on the issue of proved

    charge is that the institution of F.I.R. against the

    delinquent along with her husband and the second

    charge regarding the alleged irregularity committed in

    course of discharge of duty which was supported by

    Shri S. Velu, M.W.-1.

    (viii) The enquiry report, after being forwarded by the

    Enquiry Officer, has been accepted and thereafter, the

    order of termination was passed.

    (ix) It is in this background of the factual aspect, the

    delinquent has approached the Jharkhand Education

    Tribunal, Ranchi challenging the order of termination.

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    (x) The Tribunal after appreciating the evidences had

    passed an order by considering the issue of violation

    of principle of natural justice, non-engagement of an

    Advocate, not presenting Shri S. Velu for his cross-

    examination to be carried out by the delinquent in

    course of enquiry and has held that the domestic

    enquiry cannot be said to be fair and as such, the

    order of termination has been said to be improper and

    illegal and in consequence thereof, the order of

    termination passed by the Chairman has been

    quashed and set aside with a direction of making

    payment of 50% back wages to be carried out within a

    period of three months.

    (xi) The Management, the appellant herein, has

    challenged the order passed by the learned Tribunal

    before the learned single Judge of this Court by filing

    appeal being A.C.(SB) No.15 of 2014. The matter was

    heard by learned Single Judge of this Court.

    (xii) The leaned Single Judge has observed that the first

    charge has been found to be proved only on the basis

    of F.I.R. before the Enquiry Officer, without examining

    any evidence and since the delinquent has been

    acquitted in the said criminal case and, as such, the

    said charge has been said to be not proved having not

    been taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer.

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    (xiii) It has further been observed by the learned single

    Judge that the second charge has been taken to be

    proved based upon the typed examination-in-chief of

    the witness of the school/management but the said

    witness has not been allowed to be cross-examined.

    (xiv) Learned Single Judge, based upon the aforesaid

    infirmities in the enquiry, has upheld the judgment

    passed by the learned Tribunal, against which the

    instant appeal has been filed.

    23. This Court is now proceeding to consider the issue in the

    backdrop of the aforesaid admitted facts.

    24. The first issue of violation of principle of natural justice

    has been taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal and

    upheld by the learned Single Judge under its appellate

    jurisdiction.

    25. The principle of natural justice is not a straightjacket

    formula, rather, it is to be seen for its observance based upon

    the factual aspect.

    26. The question of prejudice is the paramount consideration

    in the matter of observance of principle of natural justice

    which is inbuilt and the same is to be adhered to before taking

    any adverse decision leading to civil consequence. However,

    depending upon the facts, if no prejudice is being caused, then

    the principle of natural justice is not required to be followed.

    Such situation can be there if the imputation made against the

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    concerned is being admitted or the irregularity or any

    allegation if the delinquent is not in a position to dispute on

    the basis of admitted fact, then in such circumstances, since

    there is no chance of change in the circumstances, the

    principle of natural justice is not required to be followed

    otherwise the same will be an empty formality and futile

    exercise, reference in this regard is to be made to the

    judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

    Escorts Farms Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Kumaon Division,

    Nainital, U.P. & others, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 281,

    wherein at paragraph no.64 it has been held which reads as

    under:-

    “64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a
    valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach
    of statutory procedure prescribed and violation of
    rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by
    the holder of lands and some other transferees, we
    have found that the terms of government grant did
    not permit transfers of land without permission of the
    State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of
    transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be
    of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal
    question all affected parties have got full opportunity
    of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal
    before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be
    followed for doing substantial justice and not for
    completing a mere ritual of hearing without
    possibility of any change in the decision of the case
    on merits. In view of the legal position explained by
    us above, we therefore, refrain from remanding these
    cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under
    Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”

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    27. Similarly in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Gauhati and Ors., (2015)

    8 SCC 519 wherein their Lordships have held at paragraph-

    39 which is being reproduced as under:-

    “39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the
    present case as the issue relates to giving of notice
    before taking action. While emphasizing that the
    principles of natural justice cannot be applied in
    straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are
    given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis
    of adhering to the principles of natural justice which
    are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness,
    accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals,
    etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for
    some reason- perhaps because the evidence against
    the individual is thought to be utterly compelling- it
    is felt that a fair hearing “would make no difference”-
    meaning that a hearing would not change the
    ultimate conclusion reached by the decisionmaker.”

    28. But, vice versa to such situation, particularly, in a case

    of disciplinary proceeding, the bearing of the observance of

    natural justice is must and without providing an opportunity,

    the service of an employee cannot be taken away. The principle

    has been dealt with way back after the enactment of The Public

    Servants (Enquiries) Act, wherein it has been laid down that

    before taking away service of an employee, adequate and

    sufficient opportunity is to be provided to the delinquent, for

    ready reference, the Public Servants (Enquiries) Act, is being

    referred herein :-

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    THE PUBLIC SERVANTS (INQUIRIES) ACT, 1850
    (37 of 1850)
    1st November, 1850.

    For regulating inquiries into the behavior of Public
    Servants
    WHEREAS it is expedient to amend the law for
    regulating inquiries into the behavior of public servants not
    removable [from their appointments] without the sanction of
    Government and to maker the same uniform throughout
    [India]. It is enacted as follows:-

    Short title, “The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850” given
    by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act (1850) Amendment Act,
    1897
    (1 of 1897).

    Articles of charge to be drawn out for public inquiry into
    conduct of certain public servants

    2. Whenever the Government shall be of opinion that three are
    good grounds for making a formal and public inquiry into the
    truth of any imputation of misbehavior by any person in the
    service of [the Government, not removable from his
    appointment without the sanction of the Government,] it [may]
    cause the substance of the imputations to be drawn into
    distinct articles of charge, and [may] order a formal and public
    inquiry to be made into the truth thereof.

    Authorities to whom inquiry may be committed – Notice
    to accused

    3. The inquiry may be committed either to the Court, Board or
    other authority to which the person accused is subordinate or
    to any other person or persons, to be specially appointed by
    the Government, commissioners for the purpose: notice of
    which commission shall be given to the person accused ten
    days at least before the beginning of the inquiry.
    Conduct of Government prosecution

    4. When the Government shall think fit to conduct the
    prosecution, it shall nominate some person to conduct the
    same on its behalf.

    Charge by accuser to be written and verified-penalty for
    false accusation Institution of inquiry by Government.
    5 . When the charge shall be brought by an accuser, the
    Government shall require the accusation to be reduced to

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    writing, and verified by the oath or solemn affirmation of the
    accuser; and every person who shall wilfully and maliciously
    make any false accusation under the Act, upon such oath or
    affirmation, shall be liable to the penalties of perjury; but this
    enactment shall not be construed to prevent the Government
    from instituting any inquiry which it shall think fit, without
    such accusation on oath or solemn affirmation as aforesaid.
    Security from accuser left by Government to prosecute

    6. Where the imputations shall have been made by an accuser
    and the Government shall think fit to leave to him the conduct
    of the prosecution, the Government before appointing the
    commission shall require him to furnish reasonable security
    that he will attend and prosecute the charge thoroughly and
    effectually, and also, will be forthcoming to answer any
    counter-charge or action which may be afterwards brought
    against him for malicious prosecution or perjury or
    subordination of perjury, as the case may be.
    Power of Government to abandon prosecution and to allow
    accuser to continue it

    7. At any subsequent stage of the proceedings, the
    Government may, if it think fit abandon the prosecution, and
    in such case may, if it think fit , on the application of the
    accuser, allow him to continue the prosecution, if he is
    desirous of so doing, on his furnishing such security as is
    hereinbefore mentioned.

    Powers of commissioners -Their protection- Service of
    their process Powers of Court, etc. acting under
    commission

    8. The commissioners shall have the same power of punishing
    contempts and obstructions to their proceedings, as is given
    to Civil and Criminal Court by [ the Code of Criminal
    Procedure
    , 1898,] and shall have the same powers for the
    summons of witnesses, and for compelling the production of
    documents, and for the discharge of their duty under the
    commission, and shall be entitled to the same protection as
    the Zila and City Judges, except that all process to cause the
    attendance of witnesses or other compulsory process, shall be
    served through and executed by the Zila or City Judge in
    whose jurisdiction the witness or other person resides, on

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    whom the process is to be served, and if he resides within
    Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, then through the Supreme
    Court of Judicature thereto. When the commission has been
    issued to a Court, or other person or persons having power to
    issue such process in the exercise of their ordinary authority,
    they may also use all such power for the purposes of the
    commission.

    Penalty for disobedience to process

    9. All persons disobeying any lawful process issued as
    aforesaid for the purposes of the commission shall be liable to
    the same penalties as if the same had issued originally from
    the Court or other authority through whom it is executed.
    Copy of charge and list to be furnished to accused

    10. A copy of the articles of charge, and list of the documents
    and witnesses by which each charge is to be sustained shall
    be delivered to the person accused, at least three days before
    the beginning of the inquiry, exclusive of the day of delivery
    and the first day of the inquiry.

    Procedure at beginning of inquiry- Non-appearance of
    accused and admission of charge

    11. At the beginning of the inquiry the prosecutor shall exhibit
    the articles of charge to the commissioners, which shall be
    openly read, and the person accused shall thereupon be
    required to plead “guilty” or “not guilty” to each of them, which
    pleas shall be forthwith recorded with the articles of charge. If
    the person accused refuses, or without reasonable cause
    neglects, to appear to answer the charge either personally or
    by his counsel or agent, he shall be taken to admit the truth
    of the articles of charge.

    Prosecutor’s right of address

    12. The prosecutor shall then be entitled to address the
    commissioners in explanation of the articles of charge, and of
    the evidence by which they are to be proved: his address shall
    not be recorded.

    Evidence for prosecution and examination of witnesses-
    Re-examination by prosecution

    13. The oral and documentary evidence for the prosecution
    shall then be exhibited; the witnesses shall be examined by or
    on behalf of the prosecutor and may be cross-examined by or

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    on behalf of the person accused. The prosecutor shall be
    entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any points on which,
    they have been cross-examined, but not on any new matter,
    without leave of the commissioners who also may put such
    questions as they think fit.

    Power to admit or call for new evidence or prosecution-
    Accused’s right to adjournment

    14. If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case for
    the prosecution, the commissioners may in their discretion
    allow the prosecutor to exhibit evidence not included in the
    list given to the person accused, or may themselves call for
    new evidence; and in such case the person accused shall be
    entitled to have, if he demands it, an adjournment of the
    proceedings for three clear days, before the exhibition and of
    the adjournment and of the day to which he proceedings are
    adjourned.

    Defence of accused-To be recorded only when written.

    15. When the case for the prosecution is closed, the person
    accused shall be required to make his defence, orally or in
    writing as he shall prefer. If made orally, it shall not be
    recorded, if made in writing, it shall be recorded, after being
    openly read, and in that case a copy shall be given at the same
    time to the prosecutor.

    Evidence for defence and examination of witnesses

    16. The evidence for the defence shall then be exhibited, and
    the witnesses examined, who shall be liable to cross-
    examination and re-examination and to examination by the
    commissioners according to the like rules as the witnesses for
    the prosecution.

    17. [Examination of witnesses and evidence by prosecutor.]
    Repealed by the Repealing Act, 1876 (12 of 1876). Section 2
    and Schedule, Part I.
    Notes of oral evidence

    18. The commissioners or some person appointed by them
    shall take notes in English of all oral evidence which shall be
    read aloud to each witness by whom the same was given, and,
    if necessary, explained to him in the language in which it was
    given, and shall be recorded with the proceedings.

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    Inquiry when closed with defence-Prosecutor when
    entitled to reply and given evidence-Accused not entitled
    to adjournment

    19. It the person accused makes only an oral defence, and
    exhibits no evidence, the inquiry shall end with his defence; if
    he records a written defence, or exhibits evidence, the
    prosecutor shall be entitled to a general oral reply on the whole
    case; and may also exhibit evidence to contradict any evidence
    exhibited for the defence, in which case the person accused
    shall not be entitled to any adjournment of the proceedings,
    although such new evidence were not included in the list
    furnished to him.

    Power to require amendment of charge and to adjourn-
    Reason for refusing adjournment to be recorded

    20. When the commissioners shall be of opinion that the
    articles of charge, or any of them are not drawn with sufficient
    clearness and precision, the commissioners may, in their
    discretion, require the same to be amended, and may
    thereupon, on the application of the person accused, adjourn
    the inquiry for a reasonable time. The commissioners may
    also, if they think fit, adjourn the inquiry from time to time,
    on the application of either the prosecutor or the person
    accused, on the ground of sickness or unavoidable absence of
    any witness or other reasonable cause. When such application
    is made and refused, the commissioners shall record the
    application, and their reason for refusing to comply with it.
    Report of commissioners’ proceedings

    21. After the close of inquiry the commissioners shall
    forthwith report to Government their proceedings under the
    commission, and shall send with the record thereof their
    opinion upon each of the articles of charge separately, with
    such observations as they think fit on the whole case.
    Power to call for further evidence or explanation-Inquiry
    into additional articles of charge- Reference of report of
    special commissioners’ final orders.

    22. The Government, on consideration of the report of the
    commissioners, may order to take further evidence, or give
    further explanation of their opinions. It may also order
    additional articles of charge to be framed, in which case the

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    inquiry into the truth of such additional articles shall be made
    in the same manner as is herein directed with respect to the
    original charges. When special commissioners have been
    appointed, the Government may also, if it thinks fit refer the
    report of the commissioners to the Court or other authority to
    which the person accused is subordinate, for their opinion on
    the case; and will finally pass such orders thereon as appear
    just and consistent with its powers in such cases.
    Definition of “Government”

    ‘[23. In this Act, “the Government” means the Central
    Government in the case of persons employed under that
    Government and the [State] Government in the case of
    persons employed under that Government].
    Saving of enactments as to dismissal of certain officers –
    Commission under Act for their trial

    24. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal any Act or
    Regulation in force for the suspension or dismissal of Principal
    and other Sadr Amins or of Deputy Magistrates or Deputy
    Collectors, but a commission may be issued for the trial of any
    charge against any of the said officers, under this Act, in any
    case in which the Government shall think it expedient.
    Saving of power of removal without inquiry under Act

    25. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the
    authority of Government, for suspending or removing any
    public servant for any cause without an inquiry under this
    Act.

    29. The reference of the Public Servants (Enquiries) Act, 1850

    is necessary herein, since one of the arguments of the learned

    counsel for the appellant is that in the bylaws there is no

    provision to provide an opportunity of hearing.

    30. This Court is of the view that whether it has been

    provided in the bylaws or not is immaterial, rather, the

    observance of principle of natural justice since has been held

    to be inbuilt and hence, it is mandatorily to be followed. At this

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    juncture, reference of the judgment rendered by the

    Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

    Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr., (1978) 1 SCC

    248 is required to be made. The relevant paragraph is being

    reproduced hereinbelow :-

    “221. It is well established that even where there is no specific

    provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause

    against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which

    affects the rights of that individual, the duty to give reasonable

    opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the

    function to be performed by the authority which has the power to

    take punitive or damaging action. This principle was laid down by

    this Court in the State of Orissa v. Dr (Miss) Binapani Dei [AIR

    1967 SC 1269, 1271] in the following words:

    “The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is
    intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike
    to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with
    authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil
    consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our
    constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against
    exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers.
    Duty to act judicially would, therefore arise from the very
    nature of the function intended to be performed: it need
    not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide
    and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act
    judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the
    essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the
    prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That
    is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof
    transcends the significance of a decision in any particular
    case.”

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    31. The fact of the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of

    India and Anr. (Supra) was that Section 10 of the Passport

    Act, 1967 was under challenge which pertains to impounding

    of the passport having not provided with a provision to provide

    for an opportunity before impounding the passport and on that

    ground the validity of Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967 was

    challenged.

    32. The Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to hold that

    provision to be invalid, however, has laid down that even

    though there is no reference to provide an opportunity to the

    party concerned who is going to be adversely affected leading

    to civil consequence even then the cardinal principle of natural

    justice will be said to be inbuilt in that provision.

    33. Herein also, what has been argued that there is no

    provision in the bylaws to provide for an opportunity of natural

    justice. Even though that is not available in the bylaws even

    then it is mandatorily required to provide an opportunity said

    to be sufficient and adequate.

    34. The said argument of the mangment/appellant is also

    misconceived for the reason that if bylaws does not contain a

    provision to provide principle of natural justice, then for what

    purpose the domestic enquiry was initiated. The purpose is to

    provide an opportunity to the delinquent and once it has been

    provided then it should be sufficient and adequate.

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    35. Adverting to the facts of the case, we are not much

    concerned on the issue of not allowing the delinquent to

    engage the Advocate, rather, we are much concerned with the

    entire case was based upon the evidence of one witness of the

    Management, namely, Shri S. Velu, M.W.-1. The M.W.-1, Shri

    S. Velu who has supported the alleged charge against the

    delinquent but he was not allowed to be cross-examined by the

    delinquent, being not brought before the Enquiry Officer in

    course of the domestic enquiry.

    36. It needs to refer herein that the meaning of adequate and

    sufficient opportunity impliedly means that at the time of

    serving the charge-sheet the documents in support thereof is

    mandatorily to be supplied.

    37. It requires to refer herein that in the case of State of

    Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010)

    2 SCC 772, wherein it has been laid down at paras-29 and 30

    that it is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice

    that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity to defend

    himself in any proceedings which may culminate in

    punishment being imposed on the employee. The rules of

    natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only

    that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The

    object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government

    servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate

    in imposition of punishment including dismissal /removal

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    from service. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of

    the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under:

    “28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority
    is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not
    supposed to be a representative of the
    department/disciplinary authority/Government. His
    function is to examine the evidence presented by the
    Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official
    to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient
    to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case
    the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no
    oral evidence has been examined the documents have not
    been proved, and could not have been taken into
    consideration to conclude that the charges have been
    proved against the respondents.

    29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the
    Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be
    conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice.
    It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that
    an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being
    heard in any proceedings which may culminate in
    punishment being imposed on the employee.

    30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the
    government servant it cannot be treated as a casual
    exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be
    conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to
    be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are
    required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is
    done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules
    of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant
    is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in
    imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal
    from service.

    31. In Shaughnessy v. United States [97 L Ed 956 : 345
    US 206 (1952)] (Jackson, J.), a Judge of the United States
    Supreme Court has said: (L Ed p. 969) “… Procedural

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    fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of
    liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are
    fairly and impartially applied.”

    38. It needs to refer herein that in the case of State of U.P.

    v. Shatrughan Lal, (1998) 6 SCC 651 the Hon’ble Apex

    Court has observed that in departmental proceedings where

    charge-sheet is issued and the documents which are proposed

    to be utilised against that person are indicated in the charge-

    sheet but copies thereof are not supplied to him in spite of his

    request, and he is, at the same time, called upon to submit his

    reply, it cannot be said that an effective opportunity to defend

    was provided to him, for ready reference the relevant

    paragraph of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as

    under:

    “4.Now, one of the principles of natural justice is that a
    person against whom an action is proposed to be taken
    has to be given an opportunity of hearing. This
    opportunity has to be an effective opportunity and not a
    mere pretence. In departmental proceedings where
    charge-sheet is issued and the documents which are
    proposed to be utilised against that person are indicated
    in the charge-sheet but copies thereof are not supplied to
    him in spite of his request, and he is, at the same time,
    called upon to submit his reply, it cannot be said that an
    effective opportunity to defend was provided to him.
    (See: Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India [1987 Supp
    SCC 518 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 226 : (1987) 5 ATC 369 : AIR
    1988 SC 117] ; Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of
    India
    [(1986) 3 SCC 229 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 502 : (1986) 1
    ATC 176 : AIR 1986 SC 2118] ; State of U.P. v. Mohd.

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    Sharif [(1982) 2 SCC 376 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 253 : AIR 1982
    SC 937] .)

    5. In High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Amrik
    Singh
    [1995 Supp (1) SCC 321 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 471 :

    (1995) 29 ATC 311] it was indicated that the delinquent
    officer must be supplied copies of documents relied upon
    in support of the charges. It was further indicated that if
    the documents are voluminous and copies cannot be
    supplied, then such officer must be given an opportunity
    to inspect the same, or else, the principle of natural justice
    would be violated.”

    39. It is further evident that the copy of the enquiry report

    has also not been supplied to the delinquent.

    40. We are conscious that after the law laid down by the

    Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director ECIL,

    Hyderabad and Ors. Vrs. B. Karunakar and Ors., reported in

    (1993) 4 SCC 727 that non-supply of the copy of the enquiry

    report will not ipso facto vitiate the departmental proceeding

    as also the order of punishment. Rather, the delinquent

    employee will have to show the prejudice caused.

    41. The factual aspect of the Managing Director ECIL,

    Hydrabad Vs. B. Karunakar (supra) which was the

    consideration made by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex

    Court after having been referred for consideration of the

    judgment rendered in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vrs.

    Mohd. Ramzan Khan, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 has laid

    down the proposition, in which circumstances, due to non-

    supply of enquiry report and non-issuance of second show

    cause notice the departmental proceeding will be vitiated. The

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    relevant consideration has been made at paragraph 31 of the

    said judgment, which reads as under:

    “31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report
    is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the
    disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should
    cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the
    aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before
    coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an
    opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced
    because of the non- supply of the report. If after hearing
    the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion
    that the non-supply of the report would have made no
    difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment
    given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the
    order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not
    mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the
    ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably
    being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting
    to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will
    apply their judicial mind to the question and give their
    reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of
    punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional
    authority), there would be neither a breach of the
    principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable
    opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the
    furnishing of the report would have made a difference to
    the result in the case that it should set aside the order of
    punishment. Where after following the above procedure,
    the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment,
    the proper relief that should be granted is to direct
    reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the
    authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by
    placing the employee under suspension and continuing
    the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the
    report. The question whether the employee would be
    entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date
    of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if
    ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided

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    by the authority concerned according to law, after the
    culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final
    outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and
    is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at
    liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the
    period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and
    to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he
    will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the
    setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the
    report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the
    purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of
    furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh
    inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in
    law.”

    42. Herein also, in the backdrop of the fact that the principle

    of natural justice has not been followed properly, the M.W.-1

    the sole witness who has been examined on behalf of the

    Management leaving aside the other three witness, has also

    not been allowed to be cross-examined by the delinquent, as

    such, in this pretext, non-supply of enquiry report has

    certainly cause serious prejudice.

    43. We, after going through the order of termination and the

    reference thereof made in the judgment passed by the learned

    Tribunal, has found that the learned Tribunal has elaborately

    dealt with the bearing of the evidence of M.W.-1 and since he

    has not been allowed to be cross-examined, that has been

    taken to be a serious lapse in the domestic enquiry.

    44. The matter would have been different if no reliance would

    have been placed by the Enquiry Officer on the evidence of

    M.W.-1 but that was not possible, since, the entire memo of

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    charge was found to be substantiated on the basis of

    statement so recorded of M.W.-1.

    45. Since we have already dealt with herein that as per the

    mandate as referred hereinabove, the adequate and sufficient

    opportunity is to be provided and not allowing the delinquent

    to cross-examine M.W.-1, the sole witness, in support of the

    Management, a serious prejudice has been caused to the

    delinquent and, therefore, this Court is not hesitant in holding

    that the principle of natural justice has seriously been flouted.

    46. The learned Tribunal has taken into consideration the

    aforesaid aspect of the matter and has held that serious

    prejudice has been caused due to non-allowing the delinquent

    to cross-examine M.W.-1 Shri S.Velu, as would be evident from

    paragraph 24 of the judgment passed by the learned Tribunal.

    This Court, therefore, is of the view that if the Tribunal has

    taken into consideration that serious prejudice has been

    caused due to non-examination of M.W.-1 which has been

    made one of the basis to interfere with the order of

    termination, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error.

    47. The domestic enquiry since has been found to be unjust

    and improper which is the basis of order of termination and

    once the domestic enquiry itself has been held to be unjust

    and improper then any consequence based upon the said

    enquiry report will also be unjustified. Keeping the aforesaid

    fact into consideration, the learned Tribunal since has

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    interfered with the order of termination which has been upheld

    by the learned Single Judge on deliberating upon the issues,

    the same requires no interference.

    48. The question of remand is another argument on the

    pretext of the fact that even accepting that there is violation of

    principle of natural justice then it should have been remitted

    from the stage of enquiry.

    49. So far as this ground is concerned, we are conscious that

    if on technicalities any final outcome by a decision taken by

    the competent authority is being quashed and set aside, then

    generally it is to be remanded before the authority from the

    stage to meet out the aforesaid technicality on the principle

    that on technicality no one can be allowed to take advantage,

    therefore, we are not adverse to the proposition laid down by

    Hon’ble Apex Court upon which reliance has been placed i.e.,

    the judgment rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh

    & Ors. V. Rajit Singh, (supra). But the order of remand is to

    be passed depending upon the facts and circumstances of the

    case.

    50. This Court, therefore, is proceeding to examine the

    applicability of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court

    having been relied in support of his argument by the appellant.

    51. The factual aspect of the said case i.e. State of Uttar

    Pradesh & Ors. V. Rajit Singh, (supra) needs to be referred

    herein which has been discussed at paragraph-2 wherein the

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    employee was serving as a Junior Engineer. An enquiry was

    conducted and it was found that he had committed financial

    irregularities causing loss to the Government. The disciplinary

    proceedings were initiated against the respondent and others.

    The enquiry officer held the charges alleged against the

    respondent employee as proved. The disciplinary authority

    concurred with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer

    and passed an order of recovery of government loss of Rs

    22,48,964.42 as per the rules from the salary. The matter went

    to the Tribunal wherein the order of recovery has been

    quashed and set aside which was affirmed by the High Court

    and thereby the matter travelled to the Hon’ble Apex Court.

    52. The respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh has taken the

    ground therein that if there is violation of principles of natural

    justice based upon the aforesaid ground if the Tribunal has

    quashed and set aside the order then the enquiry ought to

    have been remanded to initiate from the stage of the enquiry.

    53. The Hon’ble Apex Court while discussing the factual

    aspect as under pargraph-10 has made an observation that

    the order of punishment could not have been set aside by the

    Tribunal and the High Court reason being that the doctrine of

    equality ought not to have been applied when the enquiry

    officer and the disciplinary authority held the charges proved

    against the delinquent officer. The Tribunal and the High

    Court have interfered with the order of punishment by taking

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    into consideration the fact that other officer involved in the

    incident were exonerated, the Hon’ble Apex Court in that

    pretext has observed in the said paragraph that merely

    because some other officers involved in the incident are

    exonerated and/or no action is taken against other officers

    cannot be a ground to set aside the order of punishment when

    the charges against the individual concerned – delinquent

    officer are held to be proved in a departmental enquiry. There

    cannot be any claim of negative equality in such cases. The

    Hon’ble Apex Court in that pretext, has quashed and set aside

    the order passed by the Tribunal and the High Court as also

    the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority,

    however, as the enquiry is found to be vitiated and is found to

    be in violation of the principles of natural justice in as much

    as it is alleged that the relevant documents mentioned in the

    charge-sheet were not supplied to the delinquent officer, the

    Hon’ble Apex Court remanded the matter to the disciplinary

    authority to conduct a fresh enquiry from the stage it stood

    vitiated i.e. after the issuance of the charge-sheet and to

    proceed further with the enquiry after furnishing all the

    necessary documents mentioned in the charge-sheet and after

    following due principles of natural justice.

    54. From the aforesaid paragraph it is evident that the said

    judgment cannot be made applicable herein in the fact and

    circumstances of the present case because herein there is

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    apparent that opportunity was denied to the

    respondent/delinquent and sole Management witness (MW.1)

    has not been cross examined by the delinquent and further

    from date of the serving of charge about 16 years has already

    been lapsed, therefore if matter is remanded back it will not be

    subservient in the ends of justice.

    55. The fact of the present case is that the memo of charge

    was issued on 12.11.2009 which culminated into final order

    of termination vide order dated 08.06.2010 and thus, after

    lapse of almost 16 years, the question of remand is being

    raised that too by the appellant who has committed the error

    in conducting the domestic enquiry.

    56. The law is well settled that a wrong doer cannot be

    allowed to take advantage of its own wrong but even accepting

    that on technicalities no advantage is to be given to the

    delinquent but whether after lapse of 16 years will it be proper

    for this Court to remit the matter before the Management for

    de novo enquiry, that is the question.

    57. This Court is of the view that at this juncture the

    judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

    Punjab National Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra

    reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 wherein while dealing with the

    issue of remand as under paragraph 21 in a backdrop of the

    case that enquiry was not conducted as per the statutory rule

    and in such circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been

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    pleased to hold that after lapse of substantial period it will not

    be proper to remit the matter for fresh enquiry or for taking

    fresh decision, for ready reference, paragraph 21 of the

    aforesaid judgment is being referred herein :-

    “21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31-12-
    1983. During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died
    on 6-1-1995 and his legal representatives were brought
    on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the
    delinquent officers had superannuated. It will,
    therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at this
    stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary
    authority for the start of another innings. We, therefore,
    do not issue any such directions and while dismissing
    these appeals, we affirm the decisions of the High Court
    which had set aside the orders imposing penalty and
    had directed the appellants to release the retirement
    benefits to the respondents. There will, however, be no
    order as to costs.”

    58. Adverting to the facts of the present case also that after

    lapse of 16 years it will not be proper for this Court to remit

    the matter for passing fresh order after initiating de novo

    enquiry to too in a case where consciously the irregularity has

    been committed in the domestic enquiry by not allowing the

    sole witness M.W.-1 for his cross-examination in the domestic

    enquiry, rather, it has been found from the record that his

    statement was also recorded secretly. That shows the conduct

    of the Management in holding the enquiry that is nothing but

    with the biased and pre-decided mind to terminate the services

    of the delinquent.

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    2026:JHHC:7564-DB

    59. This Court, therefore, is of the view that it is not a case

    for remand for de novo enquiry.

    60. The next issue as was raised of the issue of 50% back

    wages.

    61. The back wages are to be given in the background of the

    fact that if the delinquent employee has forcibly been deprived

    from discharging his or her duty since there is no normal rule

    of ‘no work no pay’ rather, it depends upon the case on fact to

    fact basis. The reference of paragraph 25 of the judgment

    rendered in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. K.V.

    Jankiraman & Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 109, wherein it has been

    held that although no work no pay is the normal rule, but it

    has got an exception and it will not be applicable in a case

    where the employee was willing to work but had not been

    allowed to discharge the duty and if such a condition would be

    there, the principle of no work no pay will not be applicable.

    Suppose, in a case where the delinquent employee was ready

    to discharge the duty then in such circumstances the principle

    of ‘no work no pay’ will not be applicable but if the employee

    has willingly not discharged the duty, then in such

    circumstances, the principle of ‘no work no pay’ will be

    applicable, for ready reference, paragraph 25 of the aforesaid

    judgment is being referred herein :-

    “25. We are not much impressed by the contentions
    advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule
    of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as

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    the present one where the employee although he is
    willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities
    for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee
    remains away from work for his own reasons, although
    the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R.
    17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.”

    62. Similarly, in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka

    Housing Board Vs. C. Muddaiah reported in (2007) 7 SCC

    689 it has been held at paragraph 34 thereof which reads

    hereunder as:-

    “34. We are conscious and mindful that even in
    absence of statutory provision, normal rule is ‘no work
    no pay’. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of law
    may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their
    entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance
    with law. The court, in a given case, may hold that the
    person was willing to work but was illegally and
    unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court may in the
    circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all
    benefits considering ‘as if he had worked’. It, therefore,
    cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law
    that no direction of payment of consequential benefits
    can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions
    are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them
    even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex
    Court of the country (as has been done in the present
    case). The bald contention of the appellant-Board,
    therefore, has no substance and must be rejected.”

    63. Subsequent thereto, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case

    of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

    Mahavidyalaya (D.ED) and Others [(2013) 10 SCC 324] has

    been pleased to hold at paragraph 38 laying down the

    guidelines on the issue of back wages.

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    “38. The propositions which can be culled out from the
    aforementioned judgments are:

    38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service,
    reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages
    is the normal rule.

    38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while
    deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating
    authority or the court may take into consideration the
    length of service of the employee/workman, the nature
    of misconduct, if any, found proved against the
    employee/workman, the financial condition of the
    employer and similar other factors.

    38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose
    services are terminated and who is desirous of getting
    back wages is required to either plead or at least make
    a statement before the adjudicating authority or the
    court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully
    employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the
    employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages,
    then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to
    prove that the employee/workman was gainfully
    employed and was getting wages equal to the wages
    he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service.

    This is so because it is settled law that the burden of
    proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the
    person who makes a positive averment about its
    existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than
    to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee
    shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the
    employer to specifically plead and prove that the
    employee was gainfully employed and was getting the
    same or substantially similar emoluments.
    38.4. The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial
    Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the
    Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even
    though the enquiry held against the
    employee/workman is consistent with the rules of
    natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if any,
    but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to

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    the misconduct found proved, then it will have the
    discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the
    Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the
    employee or workman is not at all guilty of any
    misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false
    charge, then there will be ample justification for award
    of full back wages.

    38.5. The cases in which the competent court or
    tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross
    violation of the statutory provisions and/or the
    principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the
    employee or workman, then the court or tribunal
    concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of
    full back wages. In such cases, the superior courts
    should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of
    the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by
    the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a
    possibility of forming a different opinion on the
    entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back
    wages or the employer’s obligation to pay the same. The
    courts must always keep in view that in the cases of
    wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is
    the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman
    and there is no justification to give a premium to the
    employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the
    burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the
    form of full back wages.

    38.6. In a number of cases, the superior courts have
    interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory
    authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation
    has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases
    the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of
    infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for
    delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants
    cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to
    grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is
    denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of
    time between the termination of his service and finality
    given to the order of reinstatement. The courts should

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    bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer
    is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or
    workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain
    for prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the employee
    or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury of spending
    money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame.
    Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt
    the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v.
    Employees [Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd.
    v. Employees,
    (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] .

    38.7. The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v.
    K.P. Agrawal
    [(2007) 2 SCC 433 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S)
    651] that on reinstatement the employee/workman
    cannot claim continuity of service as of right is contrary
    to the ratio of the judgments of three-Judge Benches
    [Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees
    , (1979) 2
    SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] , [Surendra Kumar Verma
    v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
    (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] referred to
    hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This
    part of the judgment is also against the very concept of
    reinstatement of an employee/workman.”

    64. From the aforesaid it is evident that one of the conditions

    was the certificate of no gainful employment. This ground has

    been taken although the same was not agitated before the

    original forum and for the first time it has been taken before

    the first appellate stage which is not permissible. The appellate

    court is to assess the legality and propriety of the order passed

    by the original forum based upon the record placed before it.

    If any foreign documents is placed at the first appellate stage,

    that cannot be a ground for consideration to give a finding of

    illegality of the judgment passed by the original forum,

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    2026:JHHC:7564-DB

    otherwise, it will lead to allowing the party to improve the case

    at the first appellate stage.

    65. This Court, being the Court of appeal, is of the view that

    if the fact has been raised then it is the bounden duty of this

    Court to consider the aforesaid fact and, therefore, it is being

    considered.

    66. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the

    case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior

    Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED) and Others (Supra) has

    observed in para 38.4 that ordinarily, an employee or

    workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous

    of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least

    make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the

    court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed

    or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to

    avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also

    lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was

    gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages

    he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service.

    67. Further in paragraph 38.5 it has been observed by the

    Hon’ble Apex Court that the cases in which the competent

    court or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross

    violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of

    natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or

    workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully

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    2026:JHHC:7564-DB

    justified in directing payment of full back wages. It has

    categorically observed that in such cases, the superior courts

    should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the

    Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the

    Labour Court merely because there is a possibility of forming

    a different opinion on the entitlement of the

    employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer’s

    obligation to pay the same.

    68. It has further been observed that the courts must always

    keep in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination

    of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is

    the employee/workman and there is no justification to give a

    premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him

    of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the

    form of full back wages.

    69. In the instant case the fact about shifting of onus has

    also been taken but there is no averment or ground at any time

    before the Tribunal or before the learned Single Judge that the

    delinquent was gainfully employed, rather, it has been argued

    that as of now the delinquent employee is working.

    70. This Court is of the view that there cannot be any denial

    in view of the fact that back wages is being paid to meet out

    the situation created due to termination/dismissal or removal

    from service causing trauma and destabilizing the entire

    family and on that count, the back wages is being paid as the

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    2026:JHHC:7564-DB

    consideration being given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the

    case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior

    Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED) and Others (Supra).

    71. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances as

    discussed hereinabove as also taking into consideration the

    fact that the learned Tribunal has considered the entire aspect

    of the matter, both in the facts and the law, and the law having

    been upheld by the learned Single Judge, therefore, this Court

    is of the view that no interference is to be given to the order

    passed by the learned Single Judge.

    72. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed.

    73. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands

    disposed of.

    (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

    (Sanjay Prasad, J.)

    Date : 18.03.2026
    Birendra./ A.F.R.

    Uploaded on 02.04.2026

    Page 46



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