Karnataka High Court
Union Of India vs Malu Sleepers Limited on 9 March, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO.233/2025
Digitally signed
by ARSHIFA BETWEEN:
BAHAR KHANAM
Location: HIGH UNION OF INDIA
COURT OF REP. BY THE
KARNATAKA SRI. PREM RANJAN KUMAR
CHIEF ENGINEER, SOUTH RAILWAY
PARK TOWN, CHENNAI 600003.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. B.S. VENKATANARAYANA, CGC)
AND:
MALU SLEEPERS LIMITED
(FORMERLY MALU SLEEPERS PVT. LTD.)
NO.8, II FLOOR, I MAIN ROAD
GANDHINAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 009
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR.
...RESPONDENT
THIS COMAP/COMMERCIAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 13 (1-A) OF COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, PRAYING TO
CALL FOR RECORDS IN COM.A.P.NO.56/2023 ON THE FILE OF
LXXXVII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE,
BENGALURU (CCH-88) (COMMERCIAL COURT) AND RECORDS
IN A.C.NO.94/2020 ON THE FILE OF LEARNED SOLE
ARBITRATOR, ARBITRATION CENTER, BENGALURU. SET ASIDE
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THE JUDGMENT DATED 04.07.2024 PASSED BY THE LXXXVII
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE, BENGALURU
(CCH-88) IN COM.AP NO.56/2023 & ETC.
THIS COMAP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
25.02.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL J., DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
This appeal is filed by the appellant-plaintiff under
Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), challenging the
judgment and decree dated 04.07.2024 passed in
Com.A.P.No.56/2023 by the LXXXVII Additional City Civil
and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-88) (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Commercial Court’).
2. The appellant filed an application before the
Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking to set aside the arbitral
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award passed by the Sole Arbitrator dated 23.06.2022 in
A.C.No.94/2020. The Commercial Court, after considering
the material on record, proceeded to dismiss the same.
Being aggrieved, the present appeal is filed along with an
application in I.A.No.1/2025 under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of 220
days in filing the appeal.
3. Sri.B.S.Venkatanarayana, learned Central
Government counsel appearing for the appellant submits
that one-S.Rathi, Deputy Chief Engineer, Southern Railway
has filed an affidavit and an additional affidavit on behalf
of the appellant along with an application seeking for
condonation of delay. It is submitted that the impugned
order is passed beyond the scope of jurisdiction and the
same is also in conflict with the public policy, which is
required to be considered on merits. It is further
submitted that the delay in filing this appeal is due to the
necessary administrative approvals that were to be
obtained by the appellant, which is bona fide in nature.
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Hence, he seeks to condone the delay of 220 days in filing
the application and seeks to hear the matter on merits.
4. We have heard the arguments of the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant and perused the
material available on record. We have given our anxious
consideration to the submissions advanced, judgments
relied and the material on record.
5. The point that arises for our consideration in
this appeal is
“Whether the appellant has shown “sufficient
cause” to condone the delay of 220 days in
filing the appeal?”
6. The answer to the above point is in the negative
for the following reasons:
a) Before considering the cause shown by the
appellant seeking for condonation of delay of 220 days, it
would be useful to refer to the decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court on the subject. In the case of JHARKAND
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URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. AND ANOTHER VS.
BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED1 at paragraphs
20 and 21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“20. xxxx
“19.xxxx
27. We shall next consider whether the delay of
301 days in filing this Commercial Appeal can be
condone in exercise of power conferred on this Court
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases falling under
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 fell for
consideration of the Supreme Court in Government
of Maharashtra (2 supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it’s judgment
in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed
the statement of objects and reasons behind
enacting of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and
held that period of limitation must always to some
extent be arbitrary and may result in some hardship,
but this is no reason as to why they should not be
strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be
seen in the context of the object of speedy resolution
of the dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the
object sought to be achieved under the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the
disputes, expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 910
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the Limitation Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to
cover long delays beyond the period provided by the
appeal provision itself; and that the expression
“sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the
ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that
in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 a delay beyond the period of 60 days from
the date on which the appeal could have been filed
can be condoned (i.e., below 120 days from the date
of pronouncement of the judgment) by invoking
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but where
there is negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides,
such power ought not to be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that merely
because the Government is involved, a different
yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid
down. (This rule would thus apply equally to
instrumentalities of Government like the applicants
herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient
cause has been made out in the facts of a given
case, there is no right in the applicants or the
appellants to have the delay condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of
speedy disposal sought to be achieved both
under the Arbitration An and the Commercial
Courts Act, for appeals pled under section 37
of the Arbitration Act that are governed by
Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or
Section 13(l-A) of the Commercial Courts
Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60
days. respectively, is to be condoned by way
of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit
case in which a party has otherwise acted
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bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a
short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, he condoned, always
bearing in mind that the other side of the
picture is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party’s inaction,
negligence or laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of
Maharashtra (2 supra) permitted condonation of
delay beyond 60 days in a case falling under the
Commercial Courts Act only by way of exception and
not by way of rule. If the applicants for condonation
of delay had not acted bona fide and had acted in a
negligent manner as in the instant case, the delay is
not liable to be condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the
appeal is 301 days – way beyond 60 days + 60 days
= 120 days permitted by the judgment of the
Supreme Court to be condoned in exercise of power
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Therefore, such inordinate delay caused by
negligence of the applicants is not liable to be
condoned.
(emphasis supplied)
32. We may also point out that the applicants were
represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by
counsel and the judgment was obviously pronounced
in the presence of the counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023
it appears that the application for issuance of
certified copy was made on 30.08.2024, it was made
ready on 07.09.2024, and the appeal was filed on
04.10.2024.
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If the Commercial Court had not communicated
the copy of its judgment to the applicants within the
reasonable time, it was incumbent on the part of the
counsel for the applicants or the employees in the
Legal Department of the applicants to apply for
issuance of certified copy from the Commercial
Court, but they have failed in their duty to apply for
it when they did not receive it within a reasonable
time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of
301 days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent
for not communicating to them about the disposal of
the appeal and for not making any demand of
payment in terms of the decree of the Commercial
Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the
negligence of the counsel engaged by them in not
informing the applicants about the judgment of the
Commercial Court. This is because the applicants
have a Legal Department and employees engaged by
the applicants in that department have a duty to
monitor what is happening in the cases to which the
applicants are parties, keep track of the progress of
the said cases and the decisions therein, and ensure
that applications for issuance of certified copy are
made to the concerned court so that the appeals, if
required, can be preferred within the period of
limitation prescribed by law.”
21. We are in complete agreement with the line of
reasoning assigned by the High Court.”
b) In the case of GOVERNMENT OF
MAHARASHTRA (WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT)
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REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE ENGINEER Vs. BORSE
BROTHERS ENGINEERS AND CONTRACTORS
PRIVATE LIMITED2 at paragraph Nos.58 to 63 it has
been held as under:
“58. Given the object sought to be achieved
under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of
disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not
elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
period provided by the appeal provision itself.
Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not
itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing
negligent and stale claims. This Court,
in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14
SCC 81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate”
or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
2
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation of
delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR
1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770]
, Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3
SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn.
of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3
SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good
cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that
every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can only
be that the requirement of good cause is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of
“sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only [Ed. : The
matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original.] so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to
the party concerned [Ed. : The matter between
two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] ,
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whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case
and no straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamlal,
(2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to
a particular party but the court has no choice but
to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law
is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a
situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on
public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse
of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws
of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The
courts have expressed at least three differing
reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2)
that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.’
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An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long
enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s
own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat &
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat &
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC
510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ)
907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri)
830] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and
would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented in
the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the
facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such
an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there
was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
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whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is
involved, a different yardstick for condonation of
delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously
stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
[“Postmaster General”], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-
74, paras 27-29)
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with the
issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing
a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot
claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with
competent persons familiar with court proceedings.
In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely
because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in
a matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack
of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
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impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable
degree of procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties
with diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under the
same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.”
60. The decision in Postmaster
General [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
has been followed in the following subsequent
judgments of this Court:
(i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan
Mathur [State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur,
(2014) 1 SCC 592] at paras 8-8.2;
(ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav [State of
U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422] at
paras 2-3;
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(iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of
T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721]
at paras 11-13; and
(iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1
SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1
SCC (L&S) 84] at paras 3-4.
61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade [State of
M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 111 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 120 :
(2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 87] , this Court referred
to Postmaster General [Postmaster General v.
Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , and held as follows :
(SCC pp. 668-69, paras 1-5)
“1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to
do the same thing again and again and the
conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave
petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days.
We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately
delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya
Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of
M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1
SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1
SCC (L&S) 84] in terms of our order dated 15-10-
2020.
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2. We have penned down a detailed order in
that case and we see no purpose in repeating the
same reasoning again except to record what are
stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought
to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the
Government Advocate was approached in respect
of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018
[Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC
OnLine MP 1632] and the Law Department
permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned
order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department
took almost about 17 months’ time to decide
whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What
greater certificate of incompetence would there be
for the Legal Department!
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief
Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look
into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department
as it appears that the Department is unable to file
appeals within any reasonable period of time much
less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as
already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no
more admissible in view of the judgment
in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that
these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases”
to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the
Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The
object is to save the skin of officers who may be in
default. We have also recorded the irony of the
situation where no action is taken against the
officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been worded,
the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose
costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be
deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation
Project Committee. The amount be deposited
within four weeks. The amount be recovered from
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the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and
sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the
said amount be also filed in this Court within the
said period of time. We have put to Deputy
Advocate General to caution that for any
successive matters of this kind the costs will keep
on going up.”
62. Also, it must be remembered that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the
facts of a given case, there is no right in the
appellant to have delay condoned. This was
felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd. [Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR
762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] as follows : (SCR p. 771 :
AIR p. 365, para 12)
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise
that even after sufficient cause has been shown a
party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not
proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause
is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in
its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the
consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this
stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides
may fall for consideration; but the scope of the
enquiry while exercising the discretionary power
after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the Court may regard
as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why
the party was sitting idle during all the time
available to it. In this connection we may point out
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that considerations of bona fides or due diligence
are always material and relevant when the Court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the Court is called upon to consider
the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5
and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations
which have been expressly made material and
relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to
the same extent and in the same manner be
invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be
decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14.”
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60
days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of
exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in
which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and
not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond
such period can, in the discretion of the court, be
condoned, always bearing in mind that the other
side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may
now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence
or laches.”
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c) The Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering the
object of the Act, has held that the object of the Act is
speedy resolution of disputes, expression “sufficient cause”
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not elastic
enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided
by the appeal provision itself, and that the expression
“sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims. In commercial
matters, the condonation of delay should not be done in a
routine manner, and it should be an exception on showing
sufficient cause for the delay. In a fit case, in which a
party otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent
manner, a short delay beyond such period can in the
discretion of the Court be condoned, always bearing in
mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite
party may have acquired both equity and justice what may
now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence, or
latches.
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d) Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that scope
for condoning the delay under the Act is very limited. In
the instant case, the affidavit filed along with the
application for condonation of delay clearly mentions that
the appellant received the certified copy of the impugned
judgment on 07.08.2024 and it is also noticed that the
current appeal is filed on 18.04.2025. The affidavit
indicates that on receipt of the certified copy of the
impugned order, the same was sent for legal opinion and
also obtained necessary administrative approvals. The
said statement in the affidavit is a casual statement and
without any supporting material. The affidavit is not
forthcoming as to what were the necessary approvals
required to be obtained before filing the appeal or any
other aspect to explain the delay caused in filing the
appeal. The appellant has also filed an additional affidavit
to explain the delay in filing the appeal. A perusal of the
said additional affidavit claims to present the order of
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sequence of the movement of file within the administration
due to which the delay was caused. However, the said
affidavit omits as to what were the specific details of the
opinion of the counsel and the specific dates of approvals
of the concerned Officers within the Department.
Furthermore, there is no material on record with regard to
the movement of file between the Officers till the decision
is taken to file the appeal. In the absence of any such
material particulars, the vague assertion that the opinion
was sought and the Competent Authority took the decision
to file the appeal, cannot be taken as sufficient cause to
condone the delay in filing the commercial appeal. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid decisions has held
that the delay cannot be condoned in a routine manner, if
the dispute is arising out of the Act as the object of the Act
is speedy resolution of the commercial disputes.
7. Therefore, on considering the cause shown by the
appellant in the affidavit filed along with the application,
the same does not show any sufficient cause to condone
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the delay of 220 days in filing the appeal. Hence, we are
of the considered view that the application in
I.A.No.1/2025 filed seeking condonation of delay is devoid
of merits and accordingly, the same is rejected.
Consequently, the appeal stands rejected.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
RV
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 9
