Delhi High Court – Orders
Union Of India vs Brijendra Kumar Sharma And Anr on 13 April, 2026
$~39
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 251/2026 & CM APPL. 23731/2026, CM APPL. 23732/2026,
CM APPL. 23733/2026, CM APPL. 23734/2026
UNION OF INDIA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Puneet Dhawan, Sr. Panel
Counsel for UOI with Mr. Kush
Sharma, Adv.
versus
BRIJENDRA KUMAR SHARMA AND ANR .....Respondents
Through: Respondent in-person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
ORDER
% 13.04.2026
1. This appeal has been filed assailing the impugned judgment dated 26th
February 2026 passed by the Single Judge in W.P.(C) 23584/2005, by
which condonation of delay in filing the restoration application and seeking
restoration was rejected by the Single Judge.
2. The writ petition was filed by appellant assailing the ex-parte award
dated 15th September 2005 passed by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour
Court in I.D No.70/2003, granting reinstatement to workman [respondent
herein] along with full back wages and continuity of service.
3. The writ petition was initially dismissed for non-prosecution vide
order dated 13th December 2010. Thereafter, it was restored to its original
number vide order dated 1st November 2011, subject to payment of costs of
Rs.25,000/- payable to respondent/workman.
4. Even thereafter, due to continued non-appearance on behalf of
appellant/Director General of Works, Central Public Works Department
(‘Department’), the matter was once again dismissed in default by order
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dated 13th March 2013.
5. Yet again, a restoration application was filed by appellant and was
allowed by order dated 29th October 2014, subject to payment of cost of
Rs.15,000/-. By the same order, the writ petition was made ‘Rule’ and the
matter came to be listed thereafter before the Court on 16th January 2024.
6. On 16th January 2024, a Court Notice was issued to parties, returnable
on the date fixed, and the matter was listed for final hearing, considering
that it had been pending since 2005. The matter was again listed on 11 th
March 2024 and was adjourned to a subsequent date as no one had appeared
on behalf of parties; however, no adverse orders were passed.
7. The matter was again listed on 27th May 2024, when order was passed
dismissing the petition in default. Said order is extracted as under:
“None appeared on behalf of the petitioner when
the matter was called. None appeared on 11th
March, 2024 and 16th January, 2024. It seems that
the petitioner does not wish to pursue the matter
any further.
The petition is thus dismissed for non-
prosecution”.
8. Appellant moved an application seeking restoration along with
condonation of delay of 395 days. It was stated in the application that the
erstwhile counsel representing the Department was discontinued and, owing
to this change, the Department was unable to effectively track the status and
remained unrepresented when the matter was taken up by the Court.
9. It was further stated that appellant/Department became aware of the
position only upon making inquiries with the erstwhile counsel regarding the
status of the petition, and that the Department came to know about the
dismissal order only when the concerned officer approached the Litigation
Section of the Union of India at the Delhi High Court to engage a new
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counsel.
10. The Single Judge examined the nature of the delay and whether it
deserved to be condoned based on the grounds urged by appellant. Relying
on Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 [“Limitation Act“], and various
decisions in Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1969; Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3
SCC 563; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Kamla Mehndiratta, 2023 SCC OnLine
Del 4771; Rabi Shankar Sengupta v. ITDC 2007:DHC:5731-DB, the
Single Judge observed that “no preferential or lenient treatment” can be
accorded to the State or its instrumentalities and the rigour of law applies
equally to all. The only explanation offered, namely that the delay was due
to the discontinuation of the erstwhile counsel and that the matter was not
pursued was considered “vague and sketchy”. The Single Judge rightly
noted that:
“33……..petitioner should have been more vigilant at
least after October 2014 when its petition was restored
after second dismissal in default”.
11. The Court has examined the impugned judgment, and has also heard
counsel for appellant/Union of India, who reiterated the same set of
submissions, namely that there was a change of counsel and, therefore, the
matter could not be pursued after it came to be listed in 2014, having been in
the “Regular List” since 2014.
12. However, this Court approves of the decision taken by the Single
Judge in not allowing the condonation, for the following reasons:
i) Firstly, the petition had been dismissed in default on two previous
occasions and, on both occasions, it had been restored after paymentThis is a digitally signed order.
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of costs.
ii) Secondly, after the matter came up in 2024, not only was a Court
Notice issued, but the matter was also adjourned on one occasion
without any adverse orders being passed; even then, the Department
was not represented. Therefore, it was the third instance in which it
was dismissed for want of prosecution.
iii) Thirdly, the excuse that the blame has been placed at the door of the
erstwhile counsel is unacceptable, considering that the Union of India
is represented by various counsels who are on the panel, and it is the
duty of the Departments to pursue their matters diligently and not
leave them in a lurch depending on the availability or representation
of counsel.
iv) Fourthly, the writ petition was filed in 2005 and had been dismissed
in default thrice, in 2010, 2013 and again in 2024. It was reasonably
expected of appellant/Department, if they were pursuing an issue of
law as has been contended by counsel, that they would have been
duly diligent in pursuing and tracking this matter. However, no such
attempt was made and lapses were allowed to continue.
13. The Single Judge rightly noted that due to these defaults,
respondent/workman is locked in a “state of perpetual litigation” and,
despite an order of reinstatement with full back wages and consequential
benefits, has been unable to enjoy the fruits of the order. Respondent
appeared in-person and has also been heard.
14. Aside from the decisions noted by the Single Judge, reference may
also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Odisha &
Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls’ High School, 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 191, wherein the Court holds that bureaucratic delay is not a
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ground for condonation. Though, the matter relates to a Special Leave
Petition [SLP] being dismissed as time-barred due to the inaction of the
State being “utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent”, as observed by the
Supreme Court, the principles would equally apply to the appeal herein.
15. In State of Odisha (supra), the matter arose from an order of the State
Education Tribunal dated 13th December 2013 which was carried in appeal
before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack on 16th October 2015. The appeal
was time-barred and, after a period of 8 years, the State of Orrisa had not
filed a certified copy of the impugned order. By order dated 26th April 2023,
the High Court dismissed the appeal. The State of Orissa filed an application
for recall with condonation of delay of 291 days. The application for
condonation of delay was dismissed by the Court on 21st February 2025,
against which an SLP was filed again with a delay of 123 days. For ease of
reference, relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:
“13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of
this Court propounding the law that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic
to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice and in view of
the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it
appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji, a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it is
not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy,
mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed
called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Justice
M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate BenchThis is a digitally signed order.
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in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer had
referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the
following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause
of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalise injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party
there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot
be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are
lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is
public interest. The decisions of Government are
collective and institutional decisions and do not
share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a
private citizen as for governmental authorities.
Government, like any other litigant must take
responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers.
But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to
the matter where Government makes out a case
where public interest was shown to have suffered
owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular
case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of
Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic
to exclude from the considerations that go into the
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judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to
and characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of latitude
is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that
those who bear responsibility of Government must
have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of
these limitations on governmental functioning — of
course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if
the judicial approach is not to be rendered
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put government and private parties on
the same footing in all respects in such matters.
Implicit in the very nature of governmental
functioning is procedural delay incidental to the
decision-making process. In the opinion of the High
Court, the conduct of the law officers of the
Government placed the Government in a
predicament and that it was one of those cases
where the mala fides of the officers should not be
imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted
its law officers. …
…………
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India authoring the judgment for a
coordinate Bench adopted the view taken
in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
decisions following the same while not interfering with an
order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought
to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’
that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be
adopted while this Court is considering an application for
condonation of delay in presentation of an
appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a
discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer
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for condonation of delay. In the case of the former,
whether to condone or not would be the only question
whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of
the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation and
consequent lament expressed by none other than Hon’ble
M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief
order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax,
Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and
admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of the
decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better
than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned
senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16,
1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in
the past, this Court has been making observations as
to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by
appeals brought on behalf of the Government being
lost on the point of limitation. Such observations
have been made for over a few years in the past. But
there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is
apparent in the present petition which is filed in
November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had
better be set out in petitioner’s own words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave
petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent
the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993
along with the case file. (h) The Board returned the
case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993
who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20,
1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved by
the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP
sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
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3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a
judicially acceptable ground for condonation of
delay. After the earlier observations of this Court
made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to be no visible
support for this optimism. There is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if
the litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having
regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in
the case of the former the decisions to present and
prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by
the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this
also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely serves to
aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue
in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is
again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it
susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not
seem to attach any importance to the need for
promptitude even where it affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is,
accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is,
therefore, dismissed as barred by time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down
in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with
much optimism that matters would improve. Their
Lordships, however, found no visible support for such
optimism and the Court’s patience having been tested to
the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which
even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
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labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference
is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High
Court but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its
appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court,
this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha
four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter
of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether
or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is
shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the
cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is
not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for
exercise of discretion has been set up.”
(emphasis added)
16. As noted by the Single Judge, the observations of the Supreme Court
in Shivamma (supra) reiterate that condonation of delay requires a
satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay and that courts must
not legitimize bureaucratic lethargy on the part of State authorities,
particularly where such delay defeats the finality of litigation and prejudices
a successful private litigant. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:
“115. However, as is manifest from the entire
discussion above, for the purpose of condonation of
delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
delay has to be explained by establishing the existence
of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from
when the limitation began till the actual date of filing.
In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days,
and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100 th day, then
explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days.
……….
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing
effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its
instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, ifThis is a digitally signed order.
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the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates for State
laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to
be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private
litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of
perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees
or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We
are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put
all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters
with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as
by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury,
more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of
the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to
questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is
the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to
contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate
and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations
deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold,
because, say if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation
of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens
the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such
litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is
our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent
from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to
misuse the process of law.”
(emphasis added)
17. Accordingly, in view of the repeated dismissals of the writ petition for
non-prosecution, the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the
inordinate delay of 395 days, and the settled legal position that bureaucratic
lapses cannot constitute “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation
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Act, this Court finds no infirmity in the exercise of discretion by the Single
Judge in declining condonation of delay and restoration of the petition. No
ground is made out for interference in the present appeal.
18. The appeal, accordingly, stands dismissed.
19. Pending applications, if any, are rendered infructuous.
20. Order be uploaded on the website of this Court.
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
ANISH DAYAL, J
APRIL 13, 2026/MK/tk
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