Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Indrani Datta (Chaudhuri) vs Vidyasagar University & Ors on 16 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION)
APPELLATE SIDE
Present :
The Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee
WPA 22091 of 2017
Indrani Datta (Chaudhuri)
Vs.
Vidyasagar University & Ors.
For the petitioner : Mr. Subir Sanyal, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Ratul Biswas,
Mr. Kaushik Chowdhury,
Ms. Soumoyadipa Kanu,
Mr. Sourojit Mukherjee,
Mr. Durlav De.
For the Vidyasagar University : Mr. Joydip Kar, Sr. Adv.,
Ms. Debjani Sengupta,
Ms. Koyel Bag,
Mr. Abhijit Chatterjee,
Ms. Shahina Haque.
Heard on : 12.03.2026
Judgment on : 16.04.2026
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Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.:-
Preface:
1. By filing the present writ petition, the petitioner prays for a declaration that
the disciplinary proceeding initiated against her vide charge-sheet dated 3rd
November, 2016 by the respondent no. 4, namely the Executive Council of the
University, is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. In addition, the
petitioner prays for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents not to proceed with the enquiry initiated on the basis of the said
charge-sheet and the enquiry report dated 28th April, 2017, as also a writ of
certiorari for quashing the said charge-sheet and the enquiry report.
Facts:
2. The dispute giving rise to present litigation began in or about June 2016,
when the Registrar of the University as per direction of the Vice-Chancellor of the
University (for short, VC) issued a notice dated June 14, 2016 containing certain
itemized queries regarding the petitioner’s conduct. The petitioner replied to the
said notice on June 28, 2016, categorically denying all allegations and contending
that the queries were vague, unsupported by any material particulars, and issued
without proper authority.
3. However, despite such reply, the University proceeded to issue a formal
charge-sheet dated 3rd November, 2016, pursuant to a decision of the Executive
Council of the University (for short, EC), containing nine charges. The essence of
the allegations is as follows:
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i) The petitioner undermined the authority of the Vice-Chancellor
and Registrar by impleading them by name with distorted address
in W.P. No. 23136 (W) of 2015 and sent emails to Executive Council
members intimating such impleadment;
ii) By RTI application dated 24th August, 2012, she sought details
of the VC’s foreign visits since 1st November, 2011 and subsequently
a news item was published on the same issue in the Dainik
Statesman on 3.11.2012 and the University authority had reason to
believe that such information was leaked by the petitioner.
iii) She made unauthorized and distorted statements to the press
on official matters, causing defamation;
iv) In 2013-2014, she lodged complaints against colleagues
without prior permission and taking name of the VC attempted to
malign him;
v) She disregarded the University calendar and attempted to
reschedule classes on holidays, questioning the Registrar’s
directions;
vi) She remained on unauthorized absence from 1st July, 2015 to
31st August, 2015 and later applied for earned leave;
vii) She developed a habit of disobeying official communication
protocols and sent emails to the personal email id of the VC.
viii) She developed a habit of making false allegations, including of
sexual harassment against her senior colleagues including Prof. Das
Purkayastha, affecting the University’s reputation;
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ix) She acted beyond her authority and showed in subordination by
sending email dated 12th October, 2015 at 5:23 P.M. to the VC and
forward to the members of the 7th Executive Council;
4. The petitioner submitted a detailed written statement of defence on 17th
November, 2016, disputing not only the allegations on merits but also raising a
specific objection to the jurisdiction of the EC to initiate and conclude
disciplinary proceedings against her. According to the petitioner, in view of the
deletion of the word ‘teachers’ wherever it occurs in Section 21(ix) of the
Vidyasagar University Act, 1981, as introduced by the West Bengal University
Laws (Amendment) Act, 2011, the power of the EC to suspend, discharge, or
otherwise punish teachers stands taken away. By the said letter, the petitioner
requested the supply of certain documents, including copies of the resolutions of
the EC dated 25.07.2016 and 19.10.2016, as well as copies of the documents listed
in Annexure-III to the charge-sheet.
5. However, by a letter dated 28.12.2016, the petitioner was informed that her
reply was found to be unsatisfactory, and the Disciplinary Authority (for short,
‘DA’) decided to hold a departmental enquiry against her. Accordingly, Prof.
Jayashree Roy of the Department of Economics, Jadavpur University was
appointed as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges, and Dr. Sukhen
Som, Deputy Registrar of the University, was appointed as the Presenting Officer.
6. In reply to the letter dated 28.12.2016, the petitioner, by her letter dated 9th
January, 2017, raised an apprehension of prejudice on the ground of violation of
the principles of natural justice. Firstly, she questioned the jurisdiction of the EC
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to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a teacher of a university. Secondly, she
objected to the appointment of Prof. Roy as the Enquiry Officer, contending that,
being a member of the 7th EC which had suspended her and a respondent in W.P.
No. 23136 (W) of 2015, Prof. Roy could not act impartially.
7. However, without addressing these objections, an enquiry was conducted by
Prof. Roy on 9th January, 2017. The petitioner alleges that no one other than
herself and the Enquiry Officer was permitted in the room, that the proceedings
were audio-visually recorded and simultaneously reduced into writing, and that
she was told a typed copy would be supplied later. She contends that neither the
recordings nor the transcript, nor the documents listed in Annexure-III or the
minutes of the proceedings, were ever furnished to her. In this backdrop, the
petitioner asserts that the enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of
natural justice.
8. An enquiry report dated 18th April, 2017 was thereafter prepared and
subsequently accepted and approved by the 8th EC of the University in its
meeting held on 12th July, 2017. The said report was thereafter served upon the
petitioner under a covering letter dated 18th July, 2017, directing her to submit
her response within seven days from the date of receipt thereof.
9. From the enquiry report, the petitioner came to learn that the enquiry had
been held on 2nd March, 2017; however, no notice intimating the said date had
been served upon her. The petitioner, therefore, contends that the entire enquiry
proceeding, including the production of witnesses, recording of their depositions,
and the production and exhibition of documents, was conducted in her absence.
Consequently, she was not afforded an adequate opportunity to effectively
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participate in the proceedings or to cross-examine the witnesses, thereby
rendering the enquiry one-sided and procedurally irregular.
10. From the enquiry report, it further appears that the Enquiry Officer herself
put questions to the witnesses and, according to the petitioner, thereby assumed
the role of the Presenting Officer. The petitioner further contends that the
Enquiry Officer examined only 5 (five) out of 19 witnesses against whom the
petitioner had lodged specific complaints and initiated proceedings, and
proceeded to rely on the depositions of such selected witnesses, who are alleged
to be partisan in nature.
11. The petitioner contends that, in view of the amended provisions of Section 29
of the Vidyasagar University Act, 1981, the VC is the appointing authority and, as
such, the EC cannot act as the disciplinary authority in respect of a teacher of the
University. However, in the present case, the disciplinary proceeding was
initiated against the petitioner by the EC, which, according to the petitioner, is
bad in law. In light of the aforesaid, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ
petition.
12. The record reveals that, upon arriving at the conclusion that the writ petition
ought to be decided after exchange of affidavits between the parties, a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court, by an order dated 2nd August, 2017, called for
affidavits from the parties and further directed that any order that may be passed
by the disciplinary authority shall not be given effect to without leave of the
Court.
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Respondents’ case:
13. The specific defence taken by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition
is that, on 9th January, 2017, when the petitioner appeared before the Enquiry
Officer (for short, the EO), she questioned the appointment of the said EO and
informed her in writing that it would not be possible for her to participate in the
enquiry proceedings, which, according to the petitioner, were void ab initio. In
view thereof, the enquiry proceedings were conducted ex parte.
14. The EC approved the enquiry report in its meeting held on 12th July, 2017,
and a copy thereof was forwarded to the petitioner under cover of a letter dated
18th July, 2017. At that stage, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the
present writ petition and obtained an interim order.
15. The petitioner submitted her representation dated 13th August, 2017 in
response to the enquiry report. Upon due deliberation in its meeting held on
28.08.2017, the EC forwarded copies of the documents and statements recorded
during the enquiry proceedings to the petitioner and afforded her an opportunity
to file a supplementary reply, if any. By a letter dated 25th September, 2017, the
petitioner sought an extension of time to file such supplementary reply, and upon
receipt of the said request, the time for filing the supplementary reply was
extended till 17th October, 2017.
16. The respondents contended that the VC is the Chairperson of the EC and
that the said Council, being the higher authority of the University, is competent
to initiate such proceedings. It was further contended that, in the present case,
the EC was the appointing authority of the petitioner. According to the
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respondents, disciplinary proceedings may be initiated by a higher authority, and
the only requirement in law is that an employee should not be removed or
dismissed from service by an authority subordinate to the delinquent employee.
17. The respondents filed two supplementary affidavits: one to place on record
the resolution adopted by the EC in its meeting held on 28th August, 2017, and
the other to bring on record certain facts and documents which, according to the
respondents, have a bearing on the decision to be taken in the present writ
petition. In the supplementary affidavit affirmed on 11th February, 2026, it was,
inter alia, contended that the 7th EC of the University was constituted in 2012
and that Prof. Jayashree Roy was a member of the said 7th EC and not of the 8th
EC. It was further stated that the 7th EC, in its meeting held on 21st July, 2014,
decided to issue a charge-sheet against the petitioner, and accordingly, a charge-
sheet dated 23rd July, 2014 was issued, and the petitioner was placed under
suspension by a letter dated 21st July, 2014.
18. The show cause notice dated 16th June, 2014, the letter of suspension dated
21st July, 2014, and the charge-sheet dated 23rd July, 2014 were the subject
matter of challenge in W.P. No. 22850 (W) of 2014 preferred by the petitioner. In
the said writ petition, a similar issue was raised to the effect that the EC had no
authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner; however, a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, by an order dated 2nd September, 2014,
dismissed the writ petition. An intra-court appeal was preferred against the said
order, which was disposed of with a direction upon the disciplinary authority to
conclude the disciplinary proceedings, and the concerned Enquiry Officer was
also directed to submit his report.
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19. Upon conclusion of the said enquiry proceeding, an enquiry report dated
21st April, 2015 was submitted. The petitioner also submitted her response to the
said report. Upon consideration of the report, the relevant documents, and the
petitioner’s response, the EC, in its meeting held on 5th June, 2015, decided to
withdraw the suspension and impose punishment. The said decision was
communicated to the petitioner by a letter dated 29th June, 2015. However,
challenging the said order of punishment, the petitioner preferred another writ
petition, being WPA No. 23136 of 2015.
20. At the end of the term of the 7th EC, the 8th EC was constituted, and Prof.
Jayashree Roy was not a member thereof. The then VC issued a show cause
notice dated 14th June, 2016 to the petitioner on the basis of certain fresh
allegations, to which the petitioner replied by her letter dated 28th June, 2016.
Thereafter, the 8th EC, in its meeting held on 25th July, 2016, decided to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and accordingly, a charge-sheet
dated 3rd November, 2016 was issued to her. It was specifically contended that
the present writ petition has been preferred on a mere apprehension that the
petitioner might be punished, and that such apprehension does not constitute a
valid cause of action for invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
Contents of Affidavits-in-reply:
21. The record reveals that the petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply to the
affidavit-in-opposition, as well as a further affidavit-in-reply and a rejoinder to
the supplementary affidavits filed by the respondents. The sum and substance of
the affidavit-in-reply is that, by her letter dated 9th July, 2017, the petitioner
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stated that ‘as of now, it is not possible for me to progress with the enquiry
proceedings as it is already void ab initio as none can be judge of one’s own case
and unless an appropriate order is passed’. According to the petitioner, the said
letter cannot be construed as a complete refusal to participate in the enquiry
proceedings; rather, it was a request to the authority to review the decision
appointing Prof. Roy as the Enquiry Officer.
22. That in the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet dated 3rd
November, 2016, the members of the 7th EC were cited as witnesses and,
therefore, according to the petitioner, Prof. Roy was also a witness and, as such,
could not act as the Enquiry Officer. It was further contended by the petitioner
that, in the earlier writ petition, being W.P. No. 22850 (W) of 2014, no issue
regarding the authority of the EC to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the
petitioner had been raised.
23. The petitioner contends that Agenda 6(f)(a) of the resolution dated 28th
August, 2017 is a subsequently manufactured and fabricated document, intended
to cover up the alleged illegalities committed by the Enquiry Officer. It is further
alleged that the 8th EC approved the enquiry report before forwarding it to the
petitioner for her response, reflecting a pre-determined approach and rendering
such opportunity a mere formality.
24. The petitioner also submits that the Enquiry Officer independently examined
and questioned witnesses and not by the Presenting Officer, and recorded their
statements in the petitioner’s absence. Although the resolution proposed giving
the petitioner an opportunity to respond to those statements, she contends that
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the procedure adopted was fundamentally flawed, in breach of the principles of
natural justice, and vitiated by bias.
Arguments:
25. Mr. Sanyal, learned Senior Advocate, advanced arguments on behalf of the
petitioner. The arguments of Mr. Sanyal, as crystallized, are as follows:
i) That the entire disciplinary proceeding, from its very inception,
is vitiated by illegality, arbitrariness, and a complete failure to
adhere to the principles of natural justice, is tainted with bias, and
constitutes a colourable exercise of power undertaken with a pre-
determined objective of removing the petitioner from service.
ii) That, in view of the omission of the word ‘Teachers’ from sub-
section (21) of Section 2 and the substitution of the EC by the VC as
the appointing authority for a University Assistant Professor in
Section 29 of the Vidyasagar University Act, 1981, by virtue of the
amendment introduced through the West Bengal University Laws
(Amendment) Act, 2011 with effect from 2012, the VC alone is the
appointing authority and, therefore, being a designated authority,
alone has the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a
University Assistant Professor. However, in the present case, the
disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the EC and, as such, the
said proceeding stands vitiated.
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iii) A decision reported in (1993) 1 SCC 419 (P.V. Srinivasa Sastry
& Ors. vs. Comptroller and Auditor General & Ors.) was cited for
the proposition that, in the absence of a rule, any superior
authority, being the controlling authority, may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. It was, however, contended that, in the present case,
since the statute mandates that the VC is the appointing authority,
such power stands excluded in respect of any other authority,
including the EC, notwithstanding the fact that the Council is a
higher authority.
iv) Mr. Sanyal contended that where a statute designates a
particular authority to perform a duty, such duty must be
discharged by that authority alone. He further submitted that a
departure from this principle is permissible only in the context of
Article 311(1) of the Constitution. In support of this contention, he
placed reliance upon the decision reported in (2006) 4 SCC 348 (A.
Sudhakar vs. Postmaster General, Hyderabad &Anr.). A reliance
was also placed on the decision reported in (1994) 5 SCC 346 (Sahni
Silk Mills (P) Ltd. &Anr. v. Employees’ State Insurance
Corporation) in support of the contention that statutory power
must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been
vested.
v) He claimed that, on the one hand, the charge-sheet suffers
from vagueness and a lack of material particulars and, on the other
hand, the articles of charge contained therein do not disclose any
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misconduct. Referring to Charge No. I, which pertains to the
impleadment of the VC and the Registrar in a writ petition and the
sending of emails intimating such impleadment to the members of
the EC, it is contended that such acts do not constitute misconduct.
vi) Referring to Charge No. II, it was argued that seeking
information under the Right to Information Act cannot constitute
misconduct and that the latter part of the charge rests on mere
presumption. As regards Charge No. III, it was contended that the
allegation of making statements to the press lacks clarity and, in
any event, does not amount to a violation of the Official Secrets Act.
It was further submitted that no notice alleging defamation has
been issued to the petitioner.
vii) Referring to Charge No. IV, it was argued that lodging a diary or
filing a complaint before the jurisdictional police authorities cannot
amount to misconduct. As regards Charge No. V, it was contended
that questioning the authority of the University or raising
grievances before appropriate authorities is permissible in law, and
that taking additional classes on holidays, in any event, does not
constitute misconduct.
viii) With regard to Charge No. VI, which alleges that the petitioner
remained absent for a specified period, it was contended that the
petitioner had availed of earned leave upon submission of a proper
application. With regard to Charges No. VII and VIII, it was argued
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that both charges are vague, and with regard to Charge No. IX, it
was contended that the same does not constitute misconduct.
ix) The second limb of argument advanced on behalf of the
petitioner is that the appointment of the EO is vitiated by bias and,
therefore, violates the principles of natural justice. Referring to
pages 26 and 33, particularly paragraph 5(i) of the affidavit-in-
opposition, it was contended that the EO, namely, Professor
Jayashree Roy, was a member of the 7th ECwhich had framed the
charges against the petitioner. In such capacity, she participated in
and deliberated at the meeting of the EC held on 21.07.2014,
wherein decisions were taken regarding the steps to be initiated
against the petitioner.
x) Drawing the attention of the Court to the charge-sheet,
particularly Charge No. IV and the imputation of conduct relating
thereto, it was further contended that the said charge was founded
upon a letter dated 26.06.2014 issued by the petitioner. Since the
7th EC had deliberated upon the said letter, it was urged that the
EO had been involved in the initiation of the disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner, thereby giving rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias.
xi) It was contended that all the members of the 7th Executive
Council (EC) were cited as witnesses in the charge-sheet issued
against the petitioner, and Professor Roy was one of such witnesses.
It was, therefore, urged that by acting as the Enquiry Officer, she
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effectively became a judge in her own cause, which constitutes a
violation of the principles of natural justice.
xii) A decision, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 541 (Union of India & Ors.
vs. Prakash Kumar Tandon) was relied upon on behalf of the
petitioner and contended that in this case, raid was conducted by
the Vigilance Department and Chief of Vigilance Department was
appointed as EO, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such
appointment was not fair.A decision, reported in (2000) 8 SCC 295
(Badrinath vs. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors.) was cited for
the proposition that if the person involved in decision making
process of initiating disciplinary proceeding is appointed as EO,
there would be a strong case of likelihood of biasness. He asserted
that element of bias is apparent when the individual who issued the
charge sheet also participates in the decision-making process for
initiating disciplinary proceedings or acts as a witness.
xiii) Another decision reported in (2002) 2 SCC 290 (Amar Nath
Chowdhury vs. Braithwaite and Co. ltd. and Ors.) was referred to
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appellate
proceedings were vitiated by bias because the same individual who
acted as the disciplinary authority also presided over the Board
meeting that decided the appeal violating the maxim nemo debet
esse judex in propria causa (no one should be a judge in their own
cause).
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xiv) Reliance was placed on the decision, reported in (2006) 4 SCC
348 (A. Sudhakar vs. Postmaster General, Hyderabad and Anr.)
for the proposition that a major penalty can only be imposed by an
officer who is either the actual appointing authority or a statutory
designated authority of higher rank, and that even if a lower-
ranking official is the “disciplinary authority”, they cannot override
the constitutional protection (Article 311) that prevents a
government servant from being dismissed by an authority
subordinate to the one who appointed them.
xv) The decision, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 474 (Surjit Ghosh vs.
Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and
ors.) was referred to for the proposition that that if a higher
authority passes a dismissal order instead of the designated
disciplinary authority, the order is legally defective. Another
decision reported in (1994) 5 SCC 346 (Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd and
anr. Vs. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation) was cited
wherein it was held that the principle of delegatus non protest
delegare establishes that a statutory authority cannot sub-delegate
its power to another unless the law explicitly permits it and in
disciplinary matters, a “strong presumption” exists that only the
specifically named officer and no one else must exercise the power.
Another decision (1993) 1 SCC 419 (P.V. Srinivasa Sastry and ors.
vs. Comptroller and Auditor General and ors.) was cited wherein it
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was held that Article 311 (1) strictly mandates that only the
appointing authority can dismiss or remove a civil servant, but it
does not require the same authority to initiate the disciplinary
proceedings. Unless specific service rules state otherwise, any
superior controlling authority can legally initiate an inquiry without
violating constitutional guarantees.
xvi) A decision, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 484 (Moni Shankar vs.
Union of India and Anr.) was referred to wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court ruled that while the Evidence Act does not strictly
apply to the departmental inquiries, the principles of natural justice
and proportionality do. Reliance was placed on a decision, reported
in (2018) 7 SCC 670 (Union of India and ors. vs. Ram Lakhan
Sharma) for the proposition that the essential standard of natural
justice is to provide the concerned person a reasonable opportunity
of presenting their cases and the quasi-judicial inquiries must be
conducted in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or
unreasonably to prevent the miscarriage of justice.
26. Mr. Kar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the University, respondent
no. 1, argued on behalf of the University. Crux of that argument is as follows:
i) The petitioner preferred almost six writ petitions
challenging various actions of the University authorities
including the legality of the disciplinary proceedings initiated
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against her. He claimed that the petitioner has developed a habit
in creating a disturb to the authorities of the University in
smooth functioning of the day-to-day affairs of the University.
ii) The petitioner was appointed by the EC of the University
vide. appointment letter dated 29th September, 2004 and as
such, EC is the appointing authority of the petitioner and the
amendment introduced in 2011 cannot have any retrospective
effect. Use of the words ‘shall be substituted’ in the W.B.
University Laws (Amendment) Act, 2011 indicates that the 2011
Act is prospective in nature. A decision, reported at (2006) 8
SCC 702 (MRF Ltd. Kottayam v. Asstt. Commissioner
(Assessment) Sales Tax and ors.) was cited for the proposition
that statutory provisions and notifications are presumed to be
prospective in operation and do not affect accrued rights unless
the express language or necessary implication specifically
mandated a retrospective effect, and an amending notification
cannot take away benefits from units established prior to its
commencement if its language indicates it only applied to those
set up after the certain date. Another decision (2013) 5 SCC 111
(State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. vs. Gandhi) was referred to
for the proposition that the amendments of service rules are
presumed to be prospective and cannot be applied
retrospectively to take away vested rights or impose penalties for
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past conduct unless specifically mandated by express statutory
language.
iii) It was contended that even assuming that the VC is the
appointing authority by virtue of the amendment, EC is higher
authority than the VC and as such, the disciplinary initiated by
the authority higher than the appointing authority is legal and
sustainable. To lend support to such contention, reliance was
placed on the decision, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 708 (Director
General, ESI and Anr. Vs. T. Abdul Razak) wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court ruled that while statutory powers generally
cannot be sub-delegated unless expressly authorized,
disciplinary proceedings are valid if initiated by an authority
specifically empowered through valid regulations or legislative
delegation. Another decision, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 332
(Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 vs. A. Radha Krishna
Moorthy) was cited for the proposition that the initiation of a
disciplinary enquiry by an officer subordinate to the appointing
authority is legally unobjectionable; only the final order of
dismissal or removal is strictly required to be passed by the
appointing authority or a superior.
iv) Relying on a decision reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565
(Secretary, Ministry of Defence and ors. Vs. Prabhash Chandra
Mirdha), it was contended that a disciplinary proceeding or a
charge-sheet generally cannot be quashed at initial stage unless
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issued by an authority lacking jurisdiction, as they do not
adversely affect a party’s rights unless a final order is passed.
While a subordinate authority may legally initiate an inquiry or
issue a charge-sheet, the ultimate penalty of dismissal or
removal must only be imposed by the appointing authority or
higher.
v) It was further contended that in 2014, another charge-
sheet dated 23.07.2014 was challenged by the petitioner on the
similar ground by preferring a writ petition, W.P. 22850 (W) of
2014; however, a Co-ordinate Bench dismissed by the writ
petition by an order dated 2.9.2014 which was challenged in an
intra-court appeal, MAT 1871 of 2014 but by an order dated 25 th
November, 2014, the appeal was dismissed and the disciplinary
authority was directed to conclude the disciplinary proceeding
against the petitioner on the basis of that charge-sheet.
vi) It was argued that Prof. Jayashree Roy was a member of
7th EC whereas the charge sheet forming the basis of the present
writ petition was issued by the 8th EC of which she was not a
member and therefore, there cannot be any conflict of interest
and bias. Placing reliance upon the decision, reported in (2012)
4 SCC 653 (N.K. Bajpai vs. Union of India &Anr.), it was argued
that there is a difference between mere suspicion of bias and
likelihood of bias and possibility of bias must be shown to be
present to vitiate an action.
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vii) It was claimed that the petitioner has preferred the present
writ petition on mere apprehension that she may be punished
without waiting for the final decision of the DA. He submitted
that the DA may exonerate the petitioner also. Accordingly, he
claimed that the present writ petition is pre-mature.
Analysis and conclusion:
27. Therefore, upon considering the pleadings and the submissions advanced by
the parties, the following three points arise for consideration and determination:
(i) whether the disciplinary proceeding initiated by the Executive
Council is sustainable in view of the amendments to Sections 2(21)
and 29 of the Vidyasagar University Act, 1981;
(ii) whether the enquiry proceeding stands vitiated on account of
the appointment of Prof. Roy as the Enquiry Officer and for alleged
violation of the principles of natural justice; and
(iii) whether the charge-sheet is liable to be quashed on the ground
that the allegations against the petitioner do not constitute
misconduct.
Point no. (i):
28. Article 311 of the Constitution of India does not stipulate that only the
appointing authority is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Its
mandate is confined to ensuring that no employee is dismissed or removed from
22service by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. It is well settled
that disciplinary proceedings may be initiated either by the appointing authority
or by an authority superior to it, as such initiation does not infringe the
constitutional safeguard embodied in Article 311.
29. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh, reported in (1970) 1 SCC 108,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that Article 311(1) does not in terms require
that the authority empowered by that provision to dismiss or remove an officer
should initiate or conduct the inquiry. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
follows:
“8. Insofar as initiation of enquiry by an officer subordinate to
the appointing authority is concerned, it is well settled now
that it is unobjectionable. The initiation can be by an officer
subordinate to the appointing authority. Only the
dismissal/removal shall not be by an authority subordinate to
the appointing authority. Accordingly, it is held that this was
not a permissible ground for quashing the charges by the
Tribunal”.
30. In P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor General, 1993 1 SCC
419 where the Hon’ble Court reiterated that a departmental proceeding need not
be initiated only by the appointing authority and that initiation by a subordinate
authority, in the absence of rules, is not vitiated. In this decision, it was ruled as
follows:
“Article 311(1) says that no person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds civil post
under the Union or a State “shall be dismissed or removed by an authority
23subordinate to that by which he was appointed”. Whether this guarantee
includes within itself the guarantee that even the disciplinary proceeding
should be initiated only by the appointing authority? It is well known that
departmental proceeding consists of several stages: the initiation of the
proceeding, the inquiry in respect of the charges levelled against that
delinquent officer and the final order which is passed after the conclusion
of the inquiry. Article 311(1) guarantees that no person who is a member of
a civil service of the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. But Article 311(1)
does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only
by the appointing authority….”
31. Very recently, in the decision, reported in AIR 2025 SC 1656 (State of
Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Rukma Kesh Mishra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated such view, which have stood the test by time, with approval.
32. In the present case, following the amendments introduced to the Vidyasagar
University Act, 1981 by the West Bengal University Laws (Amendment) Act, 2011,
the Vice-Chancellor is presently the appointing authority of the petitioner;
however, it is undisputed that the Executive Council is a higher authority.
Although the amendment has altered the appointing authority of the petitioner,
neither the statutory provisions nor any other legislation confers exclusive
authority upon the Vice-Chancellor to initiate disciplinary proceedings, to the
exclusion of a superior authority. In such circumstances, the petitioner’s reliance
on decisions propounding that where a statute designates a particular authority
24
to perform a duty, such duty must be performed by that authority alone, is
misplaced. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Executive Council,
being an authority higher than the appointing authority, cannot be said to be
vitiated on that ground.The point no. (i) is thus determined in favour of the
respondents.
Point no. (ii):
33. Admittedly, Prof. Jayashree Roy was a member of the 7th Executive Council,
as is evident from the resolution adopted in its 25th meeting, appearing at page
26 of the affidavit-in-reply. Resolution No. 5(i) indicates that, in relation to the
lodging of a General Diary and FIR by the petitioner with the Inspector-in-
Charge, Kotwali P.S., Midnapore, and the Superintendent of Police, Paschim
Medinipur, as well as her letter dated 26.06.2014, the 7th Executive Council
resolved to take necessary action against the petitioner in accordance with the
extant University rules.
34. Article IV of the charge-sheet further reflects that, by lodging such
complaints in 2013 and 2014 against certain senior colleagues, the petitioner was
alleged to have committed misconduct in violation of Ordinances 150, 151, 155,
and 158, and 159(c) and (e) of the Vidyasagar University First Ordinances, 1985.
Thus, it is evident that Prof. Roy, being a member of the 7th Executive Council,
was a party to the decision to initiate departmental actions against the petitioner.
It is also an admitted position that Annexure IV to the charge-sheet, containing
the list of witnesses, includes all members of the 7th EC. Consequently, Prof.
25
Jayashree Roy was also cited as a witness. Furthermore, the petitioner claimed
that Prof. Roy was one of the respondents in a writ petition preferred by her.
35. The petitioner raised an objection to the appointment of Prof. Roy as the
Enquiry Officer; however, such objection was not heeded, and the enquiry
proceeded. The first page of the enquiry report indicates that the list of witnesses
to be examined and the documents to be produced on behalf of the University
were finalized by the EO herself. The petitioner contended that certain
colleagues, against whom she had earlier lodged complaints, were selected to
depose against her, thereby suggesting that the EO effectively assumed the role of
the Presenting Officer.
36. The report further reflects that on 09.01.2017, being the first date of
enquiry, only two persons were permitted to remain present at a time–either the
EO and the petitioner, or the EO and one of the witnesses. This clearly indicates
that the witnesses were examined in the absence of the petitioner. It is also
recorded in the enquiry report that the EO independently prepared
questionnaires and utilized the same during the examination of each witness.
37. The enquiry report indicates that, after recording the depositions, draft
copies were furnished to the witnesses for corrections, modifications, and
clarifications, and were thereafter finalized. It further reveals that the Enquiry
Officer framed three issues, with the second, according to Mr. Sanyal, amounting
to the introduction of a fresh charge. The report also records that the Presenting
Officer produced documents as required by the Enquiry Officer, who, from a long
list of witnesses, prepared a shortlist and called upon the petitioner to depose.
Although copies of the depositions were not supplied to the petitioner, her letter
26
dated 17.11.2016 was treated as her evidence on the ground that she declined to
participate in the enquiry proceedings.
38. Furthermore, the EO did not undertake an analysis of the evidence on an
article-wise basis, but instead proceeded to decide the issues framed by her. It is
well settled that even in an ex parte proceeding, it must be examined whether the
evidence on record is sufficient to substantiate the charges.
39. When an officer is appointed as the Inquiring Authority or Disciplinary
Authority, he assumes the role of an impartial adjudicator. In this capacity, it is
incumbent upon him to independently assess whether the management has
successfully established the charges of misconduct, without being influenced by
any preconceived notions or biases. Indisputably, the purpose of an inquiry is not
tosomehow establish the charges against the delinquent, but to uncover the truth.
40. The basic concept of fair play in action is squarely applicable in
administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial field. When an authority assumes
jurisdiction to discharge quasi-judicial function, then such authority must act
fairly, impartially and without any bias or pre-determined mind. If the court finds
that authority has acted arbitrarily with closed mind and in violation of rules of
natural justice and in derogation of the statutory rules, the Court can extend the
compass of judicial review to render justice.
41. In a departmental enquiry entailing adverse or penal consequences, there
must be fair play in action and investigations into the charges in accordance with
the principles of natural justice and the rules and/or regulations in vogue.
Procedural fairness is as much as an essence of right and liberty as the
substantive law itself.
27
42. Mr. Kar heavily relied on the decision of N.K. Bajpai(supra) to contend that
there is a difference between suspicion of bias and likelihood of bias. He claimed
that there was a suspicion of bias in the mind of the petitioner. In this decision, it
was also held that likelihood of bias would be the possibility of bias and bias
which can be shown to be present and the correct test would be to examine
whether there appears to be a real danger of bias or whether there is only a
probability or even a preponderance of probability of such bias. The test of bias is
whether a reasonable man, fully aware of the facts, would have a reasonable
apprehension that the inquiry officer would not act impartially.
43. It is a well-settled principle of law that a person cannot simultaneously act
as a disciplinary authority and a witness in the same proceeding. Where the
Enquiry Officer was involved in the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings
and is also cited as a witness, it gives rise to a real likelihood of bias, in violation
of the principles of natural justice, thereby vitiating the enquiry. The governing
maxim is nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own
cause).In support of this proposition, reliance may be placed on the decisions in
Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education)
Higher Secondary School and Others, (1993) 4 SCC 10, and Mohd. Yunus Khan
v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 539. Bias is evident where
the authority issuing the charge-sheet also participates in the decision-making
process or appears as a witness; in such circumstances, prejudice to the
delinquent employee is inherent, rendering the proceeding void.
28
44. The legal maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (no man shall be a
judge in his own cause) is required to be observed by all judicial and quasi-
judicial authorities as non-observance thereof is treated as a violation of the
principles of natural justice. (See, the judgments delivered in cases of Secy. to
Govt., Transport Deptt. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar [1988 Supp SCC 651 : AIR
1988 SC 2232] , Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen [AIR 1963 SC 1719] and
Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar [AIR 1960 SC 468].
45. In A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat, (2009) 11 SCC 84, Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that no person should adjudicate a dispute which he or she
has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this principle creates an
apprehension of bias on the part of the said person. Therefore, law requires that a
person should not decide a case wherein he is interested. The question is not
whether the person is actually biased but whether the circumstances are such as
to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of others that there is a
likelihood of bias affecting the decision and it is undeniable that the existence of
an element of bias renders the entire disciplinary proceedings void.
46. In the present case, admittedly, 7th EC took decision to take departmental
against the petitioner. Therefore, Prof. Roy being a member of the 7 th EC was a
party to that decision, in the charge-sheet, she was cited as a witness and she was
subsequently appointed as EO. For this reason alone, the enquiry proceeding
stood vitiated.
47. In the present case, it was EO herself, who short-listed the witnesses to be
examined. The PO presented the documents as desired by her. She independently
29
prepared the questionnaires. Therefore, she acted as presenting officer. Needless
to state that if the EO acts as a prosecutor, the proceedings are vitiated. In a
decision, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1623 (State of M.P. v. Chintaman Sadashiva
Waishampayan), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the inquiry is vitiated if
the Inquiry Officer assumes the role of a prosecutor.
48. Therefore, applying the propositions laid down in those decisions, I am of
the view that enquiry proceeding stood vitiated as the principles of natural justice
had been completely disregarded by the DA and the EO. Thus, the point no. (ii)
stands determined.
Point no. (iii):
49. As noted previously, in the present case, the petitioner seeks quashing of
the charge-sheet on the grounds that the allegations contained therein do not
constitute misconduct, that the proceeding was initiated with malice and a pre-
determined objective, and that the entire enquiry has been conducted in
derogation of the principles of natural justice.In rebuttal, Mr. Kar citing the
decision of Secretary, Ministry of Defence and ors. Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha
(supra), contended that a writ petition does not lie against a charge-sheet or
show cause notice, as the same does not give rise to a cause of action. A writ
remedy becomes available only upon infringement of a legal right. A charge-
sheet, by itself, does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of a
person. It is only upon the passing of a final order, imposing punishment or
otherwise prejudicially affecting the employee, that a cause of action may arise
warranting judicial review.
30
50. A charge-sheet constitutes the foundational document in a departmental
enquiry, setting out the allegations of misconduct against the delinquent
employee. It ordinarily marks the commencement of the disciplinary process,
wherein the employee is called upon to submit a response, followed by an
enquiry, and culminating in a final decision by the competent authority.
51. Admittedly, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, a writ court does not
ordinarily interfere with or quash a charge-sheet or show cause notice.However,
that does not mean that a charge-sheet cannot be quashed and/or set aside in
exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is well-settled that a charge sheet can be quashed if
the alleged acts do not constitute misconduct, or if the charge-sheet are
completely illegal, without jurisdiction, or violate fundamental rights or when
there was a massive delay in initiating the proceeding and the delinquent
employee has been prejudice to defend himself.In the decision, reported at
(2006) 6 SCC 28 (Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana), it was held that
charge-sheet can be quashed only in rare and exceptional cases, such as where
the charge-sheet is issued wholly without jurisdiction or is otherwise patently
illegal.On the ground of misconduct, a charge-sheet can be quashed if the
allegations, even if taken to be true at their face value, do not constitute
misconduct.
52. In the decision, reported at (1984) 3 SCC 316 (A.L. Kalra vs. Project and
Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.), it was held that what in a given context
would constitute conduct unbecoming of a public servant to be treated as
misconduct would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation.
Where misconduct when proved entails penal consequences, it is obligatory on
31
the employer to specify and if necessary, define it with precision and accuracy so
that any ex post facto interpretation of some incident may not be camouflaged
as misconduct.
53. There can be no dispute in accepting the proposition that the term
‘misconduct’ is incapable of precise definition. Terms like ‘misconduct’ cannot be
exhaustively defined, and it is not possible to compile a comprehensive list of
actions or enumerate the specific actions in any Service Rule that would
constitute misconduct or misbehaviour. It may involve moral turpitude,
improper or wrongful behaviour, unlawful conduct, wilful actions, forbidden acts,
or a transgression of an established and definite rule of conduct or code of
behaviour.
54. However, in the present case, the petitioner was charged with filing W.P. No.
23136 (W) of 2015, impleading the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar by name
with distorted addresses, and circulating emails intimating such impleadment,
allegedly with the intent to cause disruption, show disregard to the authorities,
and destabilize the functioning of the University and its Executive Council under
the guise of the writ petition. It was further alleged that she sought information
under the Right to Information Act, which the Disciplinary Authority had reason
to believe was subsequently shared with the press, and that she lodged a General
Diary and a complaint before the jurisdictional police authorities against certain
colleagues without prior sanction of the EC. The charge-sheet also refers to an
email sent by the petitioner to the Vice-Chancellor requesting circulation of its
32
attachment among members of the Executive Council.The remaining charges are
vague and lack the necessary specificity and clarity.
55. It is difficult to discern how the filing of a writ petition, lodging of a General
Diary or complaint before the police authorities, or submission of an application
under the R.T.I. Act can constitute misconduct; and further, how an employee,
who has ultimately been granted earned leave, can be charged with unauthorised
absence; or how an Assistant Professor can be proceeded against for sending e-
mails to the personal e-mail address of the Vice-Chancellor; or how, on a mere
presumption that the petitioner had leaked certain information to the press, a
disciplinary proceeding can be initiated. In this context, the contention of Mr.
Sanyal that such allegations do not constitute misconduct cannot be completely
disregarded. Yet, without expressing any concluded opinion on these issues, it
can be held that the charge-sheet cannot be sustained and the disciplinary
proceeding cannot be permitted to continue for the reasons recorded hereinafter.
56. However, in the peculiar facts of the present case, it is significant to note
that in the meeting of the 7th EC, issues relating to the petitioner’s lodging of a
General Diary and complaints against certain colleagues were deliberated upon
and subsequently formed part of Article IV of the charges. In the charge-sheet, all
the members of the 7th EC have been cited as witnesses, and the persons against
whom the petitioner had lodged the General Diary and complaints have also been
cited as witnesses, who later deposed against her. Though Prof. Jayashree Roy
was a member of the 7th EC and a participant in the decision to initiate
departmental action against the petitioner, she was appointed as the Enquiry
Officer. During the enquiry proceeding, the Enquiry Officer shortlisted the
33
witnesses, directed the Presenting Officer to produce documents, and herself
prepared the questionnaires and examined the witnesses, particularly those
colleagues against whom the petitioner had made complaints. In doing so, the
Enquiry Officer effectively assumed the role of a prosecutor. The enquiry report
does not reflect an objective assessment of the evidence to ascertain the truth;
rather, it indicates a predisposition towards reaching a predetermined
conclusion.
57. After the enquiry report had been accepted and approved by the Executive
Council, the petitioner was called upon to submit her representation. These
circumstances, taken cumulatively, suggest a pre-determined mindset on the part
of the Disciplinary Authority. If the charge-sheet is allowed to stand, there
remains a real likelihood that the Enquiry Officer, along with individuals against
whom the petitioner had made allegations, would depose against her, giving rise
to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The conduct of the entire disciplinary
proceeding thus indicates that the Disciplinary Authority and the Enquiry Officer
failed to act as independent and impartial arbiters, as required under the
principles of natural justice. If such a composition of witnesses is retained in the
charge-sheet, the possibility of a fair proceeding would be seriously
compromised.
58. In disciplinary matters, a writ court does not ordinarily substitute its own
findings for those of the disciplinary authority. Where the enquiry or decision-
making process is found to be vitiated by procedural defects, such as violation of
the principles of natural justice, non-consideration of relevant materials, or
reliance on inadmissible evidence, the usual course is to remit the matter to the
34
competent authority from the stage at which the defect occurred for continuation
in accordance with law. However, in the present case, the very initiation and
conduct of the disciplinary proceeding standvitiated, inasmuch as the members
of the 7th Executive Council, who were parties to the decision to initiate
disciplinary action, have been cited as witnesses; one such member has been
appointed as the Enquiry Officer; and persons against whom the petitioner had
lodged complaints have been called upon to depose. In such circumstances,
relegating the matter for fresh consideration would be an exercise in futility and
would have a deleterious effect on the employee. Accordingly, the disciplinary
proceeding cannot be sustained.
59. Therefore, applying the propositions laid down in the decisions cited in the
preceding paragraphs and based on the discussion made in foregoing paragraphs,
in the present case, it would be apposite to quash the charge-sheet also.
Order:
60. In view of the above, the charge-sheet dated 3.11.2016, the decision of the DA
appointing Prof. Jayashree Roy as EO, the enquiry report dated 28.04.2017, the
decision of the 8th EC taken in its meeting dated 12.07.2017 in so far as it
accepted and/or approved the enquiry officer, are set aside.
61. With these observations and order, the writ petition is, thus, disposed of;
however, there shall be no order as to the costs.
(Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)