Bombay High Court
Union Of India Thr. Ministry Of Home … vs Kanwar Vilas Nath And Anr. on 18 April, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:19417
25 SA 197-2021(f).doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO. 197 OF 2021
Union of India,
Through Ministry of Home Affairs,
Rehabilitation Division,
Old Address: North Block, ND FFR Division,
Jaisalmar House, Mansing Road, New Delhi
New Address: Rehabilitation Wing, FFR Division,
NDCC Bldg. No.2,
Jaising Road No.1, New Delhi - 01 ... Appellant.
Versus
1. Kanwar Vilas Nath
2. Kanwar Virajan Nath
Both of Mumbai
Indian Inhabitants, R/at 21, Advent, J.
Bhosale Marg, Mumbai 400021
3. Syndicate Bank,
A Banking Corporation,
Constituted under the Banking Companies
(Acquisition & Transfer of Undertaking) Act,
1970, which is carrying on business at
Mumbai Zonal Office at Maker Towers,
Cuffe Parade, Mumbai 400 005.
... Respondents.
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Mr. Pranil Sonawane a/w. Ms. Janhavi Jadhav, Mr. Krishna Shukla for the
Appellant.
Mr. Darius Khambata, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Naval Agarwal, with Mr.
Sameer Tapia, Ms. Siddhi Doshi and Mr. Rohan Marathe i/by ALMT Legal
for Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
----------
Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.
Date : April 18, 2026
sa_mandawgad 1 of 22
25 SA 197-2021(f).doc
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. The present Second Appeal is at the instance of the original
Respondents challenging the concurrent findings of the Trial Court
and the First Appellate Court by which the suit came to be decreed
partly and the Plaintiff was held entitled to redemption of
mortgage as per the schedule of Indenture of Deed of Modification
and additional securities dated 8th September, 1972. For sake of
brevity, the parties are referred by their status before the Trial
Court.
2. Special Civil Suit No. 9 of 2000 was instituted by the Plaintiff
seeking redemption of the mortgage, for rendition of accounts, and
for discharge of the mortgage debt under the mortgage deed. It
was pleaded that the subject properties were acquired by Late Raj
Nath on 21st April, 1960 from the President of India through the
Department of Rehabilitation and evacuee property. On 21 st April,
1960, late Raj Nath executed a mortgage deed in favour of the
Government stating that in consideration of the agreement dated
14th August, 1957, which was the agreement for sale, and in
consideration of Rs.48,11,000/- owed by Late Raj Nath to the
Government of India as set out in the mortgage deed, he would
pay the said sum in the manner set out therein along with interest
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with liberty to Raj Nath to pay the sum at an earlier date. It was
pleaded that to secure the repayment of loan of Rs.48,11,000/- to
the Government of India, Raj Nath mortgaged the suit properties,
and the same were conveyed, transferred to and vested in the
Government of India subject to right to redemption set out therein.
3. By supplementary indenture of modification and additional
security dated 8th September, 1972 executed between Late Raj
Nath and the Government of India, time was given to pay the sum
of Rs 53,07,705/, the first of which was to be paid on or before 20 th
October, 1972 and the last to be paid on 20th October, 1976. There
was default in payment of the first installment and on 20 th June,
1975, and 7th February, 1981 the Government issued notices
demanding payment of entire amount payable under the Indenture
of mortgage and additional security dated 8th September, 1972. On
24th September, 1981, the Government took possession of the suit
properties.
4. The Government appointed Syndicate Bank as agent to sell
the mortgaged properties and public notice came to be issued
which described the Government as a mortgagee and as being in
possession and Late Raj Nath as mortgagor. By notice dated 9 th
March, 2001 and by a prior letter on 6th September, 1989 addressed
to the proprietary firm by Late Raj Nath, the Government through
sa_mandawgad 3 of 22
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the attorney invited the attention of late Raj Nath to the mortgage
deed calling upon him to pay the principal amount along with
interest failing which the mortgaged property would be sold. In the
year 2006, the Special Civil Suit No 99 of 2006 came to be filed
seeking redemption of mortgage and possession.
5. The suit came to be resisted by the Defendant No.1
contending that the Plaintiff is not entitled to redemption of
mortgage. It was contended that the Plaintiffs have not paid the
outstanding dues as per the conditions set out in the agreement-
cum-mortgage deed and the indenture of modification and they
have lost their right to institute any suit of such nature. It was
further contended that despite repeated notices served upon the
late Raj Nath calling upon him to pay the principal amount along
with interest in accordance with the provisions of Section 69 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, “T.P. Act“), the Plaintiffs
have failed to pay the said amount and that the possession of the
properties have been taken over by the Defendant, who is now
auctioning the suit properties. It was further contended that the
right of redemption subsisted till the possession of the property
was taken over.
6. The Trial Court framed the necessary issues including the
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issue as to whether the suit is within limitation and whether the
Defendants prove that the Plaintiffs have lost their right to
institute this suit. The issues came to be answered in favour of the
Plaintiffs and the suit came to be partly decreed vide judgment
dated 30th April, 2012.
7. As against the judgment of the Trial Court, the Defendant
No.1 filed Regular Civil Appeal No.9 of 2016. The First Appellate
Court framed the necessary points for determination and noted
that there is no reference made in the deed that the deed of
mortgage is governed by the Government Grants Act and that the
deed of mortgage was executed separately. The Appellate Court
considered the pleadings in the written statement admitting the
case of mortgage and declined to accept the contention of
Defendant No.1 that there was no mortgage. On the aspect of
limitation, it was held that the right to redeem first accrued on the
date of last installment i.e. 20th October, 1976 and the suit is within
limitation as provided by Article 61 of Limitation Act.
8. Mr. Sonawane, Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant
would contend that the document executed on 21st April, 1960 was
not a mortgage deed in view of Section 2 of the Government Grants
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Act, 1895 (for short, “Act of 1895”). He submits that under the
provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 1895, the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 do not apply to any grants or other
transfer of lands made by on behalf of the Government. He submits
that in view thereof, the document in question cannot be construed
as mortgage deed under Section 58 of the T.P. Act. He has taken
this Court in detail through the findings of the Trial Court as well as
the First Appellate Court to contend that the Courts after having
accepted that the land was transferred under the Act of 1895 could
thereafter not hold that there existed mortgagor-mortgagee
relationship between the parties and that the mortgage could be
redeemed.
9. He would further submit that in the present case, the suit was
filed in the year 2006 wherein under the document of 21 st April,
1960 and the indenture of modification dated 8th September, 1972
read with the supplement to the indenture of mortgage dated 21 st
April, 1960, the first installment was required to be paid on or
before 20th October, 1976. He submits that the Courts while
construing the period of limitation under Article 61 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “Limitation Act“) has taken into
consideration the last date of repayment which was on 20 th
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October, 1976, whereas according to him, limitation would
commence from the date of first default. He submits that the Trial
Court as well as the First Appellate Court has failed to notice that
even if the pleadings referred to the mortgagor-mortgagee
relationship in view of Section 2 of the Act of 1895, the provisions
of T.P. Act does not apply and there is no estoppel against law.
10. Per contra, Mr. Khambata, learned Senior Advocate appearing
for Defendant No.1 would submit that the deed of conveyance was
executed on 21st April, 1960 which was a transfer for the purpose of
the Act of 1895. He submits that deed of mortgage which is also of
21st April, 1960 was a separate and independent transaction which
permitted redemption on its own terms. He submits that the
document expressly provides that the T.P. Act applies including the
power of sale without the intervention of the Court under Section
69 of the T.P. Act. He would further point out the written statement
as well as the various notices issued on behalf of the Defendant
No.1 admitting that the document in question was a mortgage
deed and calling upon the Plaintiffs to make the payment of
mortgage money. He submits that the Trial Court as well as the
First Appellate Court has taken note of these admissions in the
pleadings which constitute judicial admission and the Defendant
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No.1 cannot resile from the said admission.
11. He submits that even if it is accepted that the mortgage deed
is executed under the Act of 1895, the mortgage deed itself
provides for redemption of the mortgage. He would further submit
that even admitting that the mortgage deed was executed under
the Act of 1895, the terms of the mortgage deed would prevail over
other statute or law in view of the statement of object and reasons
of the Act of 1895. He submits that Section 2 and 3 of the Act of
1895 have to be read along with the statement of object and
reasons to understand the object of Section 2 of the Act of 1895.
He submits that Section 2 does not exclude the application of the
T.P. Act in its entirety, and only in the event of any inconsistency
between the grant or any condition imposed in the grant and the
T.P. Act, it is the condition which is imposed in the grant which
would prevail.
12. Insofar as the limitation is concerned, he submits that under
the provisions of Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, the right to
redeem a mortgage is 30 years from the date when the right to
redeem accrues. He submits that it is a settled position of law that
right to redeem first accrues on the date on which the last
installment falls due and in this case is 20 th October, 1976. He would
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further submit that in the alternative, a fresh period of limitation
would commence from the date of acknowledgment of a mortgage
by virtue of Section 18 of the Limitation Act and would point out to
the notices issued calling upon the Plaintiffs to make the payment
of the mortgage money. He submits that the contention raised in
the written statement that the transaction in question was availed
of by Raj Nath with the Government of India with a condition of
repurchase is contrary to the documents and evidence on record.
He would submit that as the questions sought to be raised in the
present case, even if they are questions of law, are squarely
covered by the judicial pronouncement, the Second Appeal cannot
be said to raise any substantial question of law. In support, he relies
upon the following decisions.
(ii) Collector of Bombay vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri
and Ors.2
(iii) Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (decesed) by
Lrs.3
(v) Bibijan and Others vs. Murlidhar and Ors.5
1 (1973) 2 SCC 547
2 1955 SCC OnLine SC 49
3 (2001) 3 SCC 179
4 A.I.R.1932 Privy Council 207
5 (1995) 1 SCC 187sa_mandawgad 9 of 22
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13. In rejoinder, it is submitted that when the possession has
been taken over on 24th September, 1981, the right to redeem has
been lost.
14. I have considered the submissions and perused the record.
15. Second Appeal has been preferred against the concurrent
findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court against the
Plaintiff on the issues of limitation and the right of redemption.
Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions, it would be
appropriate to deal with the contention of Mr. Sonawane that as
the land was transferred under the Government Grants Act, 1895
the provisions of T.P. Act are excluded and the document executed
on 21st April, 1960 is not a deed of mortgage. Section 2 of the Act of
1895 excludes the provisions of the T.P. Act to the government
grants. It would be appropriate to note the Statement of Object
and Reasons of the Act of 1895, which reads as under:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons. – The Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, sections 10-12 invalidate with certain
exceptions all conditions for the forfeiture of the
transferred property on alienation by the transferee and
all limitations over consequent upon any such alienation
or any insolvency of or attempted alienation by him. The
Crown is not specifically mentioned in the Act, and it may
be assumed that it was not designed to impose fetters ofsa_mandawgad 10 of 22
25 SA 197-2021(f).docthis description upon the discretion of the Crown,
especially as to the creation of inalienable jahgirs in
grants made for public services; but it has been thought
better to set the question at rest by express legislation.
Upon a late occasion the Government of India were
advised that it is not competent for the Crown to create
an inalienable and impartible estate in the land
comprised in any Crown grant, unless such land has
heretofore descended by custom as an impartible Raj.
The second sub-section of the Bill is intended to obviate
this inconvenience by providing that all Crown grants are
to be construed according to their tenor,
notwithstanding any rule of law which might otherwise
affect their operation.”
16. It is therefore clear from the Statement of Object and
Reasons of the Act of 1895 that the legislation was crucial for
affirming the Government’s right to impose conditions on land
transfer and for the same to override the statutory provisions
which would affect such right, as the statement of object and
reasons makes a specific reference to the provisions of the T.P. Act
which invalidates all conditions of forfeiture in transfers of
property. It is in the light of the statement of object and reasons
that the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 1895 is required to be
construed and when are so construed, evidences that there is no
sa_mandawgad 11 of 22
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fetters on the power of the Government to execute the mortgage
deed even in respect of the land granted under the Act of 1895. In
case of The State of U.P. Vs Zahoor Ahmad and Anr (supra), the
Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraph 15 and 16 as under:
“15. In the present case the High Court correctly found
on the facts that the respondent after the determination
of the lease held over. Even if the Government Grants Act
applied Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act was
not rendered inapplicable. The effect of Section 2 of the
Government Grants Act is that in the construction of an
instrument governed by the Government Grants Act the
court shall construe such grant irrespective of the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It does not
mean that all the provisions of the Transfer of Property
Act are inapplicable. To illustrate, in the case of a grant
under the Government Grants Act, Section 14 of the
Transfer of Property Act will not apply because Section 14
which provides what is known as the rule against
perpetuity will not apply by reason of the provisions in the
Government Grants Act. The grant shall be construed to
take effect as if the Transfer of Property Act does not
apply.
16. Section 3 of the Government Grants Act declares
the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose
such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter
what the general law of the land be. The meaning of
Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act is that the
scope of that Act is not limited to affecting the provisions
of the Transfer of Property Act only. The Government has
unfettered discretion to impose any conditions,
limitations, or restrictions in its grants, and the rights,
privileges and obligations of the grantee would besa_mandawgad 12 of 22
25 SA 197-2021(f).docregulated according to the terms of the grant,
notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory or
common law.”
17. In Collector of Bombay vs Nusserwanji (supra), the Hon’ble
Apex Court held that Section 3 of Act of 1895 saves provisions/
restrictions/conditions in the agreement which would be bad or
inconsistent with T.P. Act.
18. It would also be pertinent to note that the statement of
object and reasons provides that government grants are to be
construed according to their tenor, and in the present case, the
mortgage deed executed on 21st April, 1960 itself recognises the
right of the Plaintiffs to redeem the mortgage as under:
“PROVIDED ALWAYS AND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND
DECLARED that if the mortgagor shall pursuant to the
covenant in that behalf herein before contained pay to the
Government the said principal sum and interest for the same
at the rate and in the manner hereinbefore mentioned and
also all other moneys (if any) by these presents or by law
payable by the mortgagor to the Government (hereinafter
referred to as the “The Mortgage Debt”) then in such case
the Government shall at any time thereafter upon the
request and at the cost of the mortgagor reconvey and re-
assign the said mills, the said vacant plots, the said three
plots, the said factories and the said plant (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “the mortgaged premises”) herebysa_mandawgad 13 of 22
25 SA 197-2021(f).docgranted and assigned or expressed so as to be unto and to
the use of the mortgagor or as he shall direct freed and
discharged from the security hereby created.”
19. The terms of the mortgage deed itself permits redemption
and even accepting that the mortgage deed was executed under
the Act of 1895, the grant is required to be construed according to
its tenor. The terms of the grant under Act of 1895 would override
any statutory inconsistency and in the present case, the grant
makes applicable the provisions of Transfer of Property Act
including the power to sell under Section 69 of T.P. Act to the
transfer in favour of Raj Nath.
20. The argument raised that the document is not deed of
mortgage is also unacceptable in light of the admissions of the
Defendant No.1 not only in the pleadings but also in the
correspondence exchanged between the parties that the deed is
deed of mortgage. The mortgage deed speaks of creation of
English Mortgage of the subject properties for the sum owed by
the Plaintiff to the Defendant No.1. The Defendant No.1 has
repeatedly admitted the jural relationship of Mortgagor-Mortgagee
in the written statement, in the legal notices, in the public auction
notice and made categorical references to the provisions of T.P. Act
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to bolster its defence. The admissions in the written statement
constitute judicial admissions and the Defendant No.1 is estopped
from claiming otherwise. [See Nagindas Ramdas Vs Dalpatram
Iccharam (1974) 1 SCC 242].
21. Coming to the issue of limitation, the Trial Court has held that
the term of the mortgage fixed in the modification deed expired on
20th October, 1976 and hence, the suit is within time. The Indenture
of Modification and additional security was executed on 8 th
September, 1972 providing for the payment of first installment on
20th October, 1972 and the last installment on 20 th October, 1976.
The suit has been filed in the year 2006. Article 61 (a) of the
Limitation Act provides that a suit by a mortgage to redeem or
recover possession of immovable property mortgaged is thirty
years from the accrual of right to redeem or to recover possession
arises. Section 60 of T.P. Act governing the right of mortgagor to
redeem provides that at any time after the principal money has
become due. The mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a
proper time and place, of the mortgage money to require the
mortgage to deliver the mortgage deed and all documents relating
to the mortgaged property. There is nothing in the mortgage deed
which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 60 of T.P. Act.
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The right to redeem would accrue for purpose of limitation upon
the expiry of full term of the mortgage.
22. The issue as to whether the period of limitation would begin
to run from the expiry of the time set out in the contract
notwithstanding any earlier default by the mortgagor and exercise
of option by the mortgagee has been considered by the Privy
Council in the decision of Lasa Din vs. Gulab Kunwar, Musammat
and Ors. (supra), has held as under:
“…. If on the default of the mortgagor – in other words, by
the breach of his contract – the mortgage money becomes
immediately “due,” it is clear that the intention of the
parties is defeated, and that what was agreed to by them as
an option in the mortgagees is, in effect, converted into an
option in the mortgagor. For if the latter, after the deed has
been duly executed and registered, finds that he can make a
better bargain elsewhere, he has only to break his contract
by refusing to pay the interest, and “eo instanti,” as Lord
Blanesburgh says, he is entitled to redeem. If the principal
money is “due,” and the stipulated term has gone out of the
contract, it follows, in their Lordships’ opinion, that the
mortgagor can claim to repay it, as was recognised by Wazir
Hasan J, in his judgment in the Chief Court. Their Lordships
think that this is an impossible result. They are not prepared
to hold that the mortgagor could in this way take advantage
of his own default: they do not think that upon such defaultsa_mandawgad 16 of 22
25 SA 197-2021(f).doche would have the right to redeem, and in their opinion the
mortgage money does not “become due” within the
meaning of Art. 132 of the Limitation Act until both the
mortgagor’s right to redeem and the mortgagee’s right to
enforce his security have accrued. This would, of course, also
be the position if the mortgagee exercised the option
reserved to him.”
23. Mr. Khambata is right in submitting that it cannot be that the
right to redeem would arise upon a default being committed, as it
would amount to taking advantage of one’s own default in making
the payment. The trigger point for the commencement of period of
limitation is the last date of the payment which was on 20 th
October, 1976. The suit having been filed within 30 years from the
date is within limitation.
24. Apart from this, the notices which have been pointed by
Mr. Khambata addressed by the Defendant No.1 to the Plaintiffs as
late as 9th March, 2001 called for the Plaintiffs to make the payment
of the mortgage money. This constitutes an acknowledgment that
the mortgage could still be redeemed by the payment of the
amounts due. In light of the demands for mortgage money, it
cannot be said that the right to redeem the mortgage was lost
when possession was taken over by the Government on 24 th
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September, 1981. The mortgage deed gives the right to the
Government to require the mortgagor to discharge his liability in
full by written notice in event of default committed by the
mortgagor. The issuance of notices to the Plaintiff acknowledges
the subsisting right of the Plaintiff to redeem the mortgage.
25. The Trial Court has rightly taken into consideration the issue
of limitation in accordance with the statutory provisions and upon
interpretation of the documents which shows the subsistence of
the jural relationship. Each document constituted an
acknowledgment within the Limitation Act and the Trial Court has
rightly held that the dispute is not barred by limitation.
26. In the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari
(deceased) by LRs. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in
paragraph 12 and 14 as under:
“12. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in
the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word
substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means – of having
substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or
considerable. It is to be understood as something in
contradistinction with – technical, of no substance or
consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the
Legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial
question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance”
sa_mandawgad 18 of 22
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as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109
of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The
substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be
heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of
general importance. In Guran Ditta Vs. T. Ram Ditta, AIR 1928
PC 172, the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was
employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110
C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for
consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a
substantial question of general importance but a substantial
question of law which was involved in the case as between the
parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. and
Mfg. Co., Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, the Constitution Bench
expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full
Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs.
Noony Veeraju, ILR 1952 Mad 264:-
“When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is
room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought
it necessary to deal with that question at some length and
discuss alternative views, then the question would be a
substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question
was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or
if the general principles to be applied in determining the
question are well settled and the only question was of applying
those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not
be a substantial question of law.”
and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining
whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:-
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The proper test for determining whether a question of law
raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be
whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly
and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so
whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not
finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the
Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion
of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest
Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the
question are well settled and there is a mere question of
applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably
absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.
14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a
proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law.
To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not
previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent,
and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if
answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties
before it are concerned. To be a question of law “involving in
the case” there must be first a foundation for it laid in the
pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable
findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be
necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper
decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first
time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case
unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore,
depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a
question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or
not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for
sa_mandawgad 20 of 22
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striking a judicious balance between the indispensable
obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of
avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.”
27. It is further held that the pure findings of facts cannot be
challenged before the High Court in Second Appeal, and it is only
when the question of law which is based is not covered by judicial
pronouncement that it can be said that a substantial question of
law arises. In the present case, the decisions relied upon by
Mr. Khambata on the aspect of limitation clearly covered the issue
of limitation for redemption of mortgage. The Trial Court has
rightly taken into consideration the admission in the written
statement as well as the notices to hold that the document of 1960
was in fact the mortgage and has been so admitted by the
Defendant no.1 in various documents.
28. As far as the subsistence of right to redeem the mortgage is
concerned, in paragraphs 56 of the judgment of the Trial Court, the
Trial Court has noted the admission of the Defendant No.1’s
witness that the mortgage is in existence and has also taken into
consideration the notices issued by the Government clearly
asserting the subsisting mortgage and the purported exercise of
rights under the mortgage. The Trial Court and the First Appellate
sa_mandawgad 21 of 22
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Court on the basis of the statutory provisions and the evidence on
record has rightly held that the Plaintiffs have proved that the
transactions are in the nature of mortgage which are subsisting and
that the Plaintiffs are entitled to redemption of mortgage and
recovery of possession by payment the mortgage debt.
29. In light of above discussions, no substantial question of law
arises in the present case. Second Appeal stands dismissed.
30. In view of the dismissal of the Appeal, pending Civil/Interim
Application, if any, does not survive for consideration and same
stands dismissed.
[Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.]
sa_mandawgad 22 of 22
Signed by: Sanjay A. Mandawgad
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 23/04/2026 20:47:13
