Punjab-Haryana High Court
Union Of India Others vs M/S Triveni Constructions on 1 August, 2026
Author: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
Bench: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
CWP-38566-2025 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
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CWP-38566-2025 (O&M)
Reserved on : 04.05.2026
Pronounced on : 01.08.2026
Uploaded on : 01.08.2026
Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced or the full
Judgment is pronounced: Full Judgment
Union of India and others ..... Petitioners
Versus
M/s Triveni Constructions ....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI
Present: Mr. Vishal Sharma, Senior Standing Counsel and
Mr. Manjit Singh, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. Jayant Puneet Bamal, Advocate,
for the respondent.
Mr. Akshay Bhan, Senior Advocate as Amicus Curiae with
Mr. Harsh Gupta, Advocate.
****
JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J. (ORAL)
1. Present is a Civil Writ Petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for
quashing the entire execution proceedings pending before learned Additional
District Judge, Chandigarh and also the order dated 23.10.2025 (Annexure P-1)
in Execution Petition No.237 of 2025 whereby the application for dismissal of
the execution petition for want of territorial jurisdiction has been dismissed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a dispute arose
between the parties with regard to Breach of the Contract and subsequent
thereto, an Arbitrator was appointed and the entire arbitral proceedings were
held in Patna (Bihar) including passing of the Arbitral Award dated 03.03.2025
(Annexure P-2) in the favour of the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioners had
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filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as ‘1996 Act’) challenging the aforesaid Award before
the learned District Court, Patna which is still pending adjudication.
3. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent instead of
seeking execution of the Arbitral Award by moving the competent Court in
Patna (Bihar) preferred an Execution Petition (Annexure P-4) before the
learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh to which the petitioners filed an
application (Annexure P-5) for dismissal of the aforesaid execution
proceedings on the ground of maintainability as no cause of action had arisen
in Chandigarh and also on the ground that the account of Ministry of Defence
and their allied office is located in Patna, which can be sought for attachment.
Thereafter, learned Executing Court vide order dated 23.10.2025 (Annexure P-
1), dismissed the aforesaid application by placing reliance on the judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Sundaram Finance Limited Vs. Abdul Samad
and another ” 2018 (3) SCC 622 to observe that the Court has jurisdiction to
execute the Award as execution can be filed anywhere in the country where
such decree can be executed and there is no requirement for obtaining a
transfer of decree, which would have jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the reliance on
the aforesaid judgment by learned Executing Court is misplaced and the
impugned order (Annexure P-1) has been passed without deciding substantial
questions of law whereby the petitioners’ account at Chandigarh branch has
been attached instead of Patna branch ignoring Section 42 of the 1996 Act and
law of territorial jurisdiction under various provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure and ignoring the act of forum convenience. In this regard, he
referred to a judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in “M/s Kusum
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Ingots & Alloys Limited Vs. Union of India” 2004 (6) SCC 254 and another
judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in W.P. (C) No.11553 of 2024 titled
as “Ruchita Kausik Vs. Indian Railway Welfare Organization”, decided on
21.08.2024 wherein it was so held that the cardinal duty imposed on the
Constitutional Courts is to prevent the abuse of the jurisdiction by the parties
and relegate back to the forum where a material, essential or integral part of
cause of action has arisen and not to support forum of convenience. He further
submitted that merely because the account branch of Ministry of Defence is
located in Chandigarh would not mean that the same can be attached for the
purpose of execution of an award which is passed in Patna where sufficient
assets of the petitioners are located for the purpose of execution.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the respondent filed the execution petition before learned Additional
District Judge, Chandigarh as the petitioner-Union of India through the
Ministry of Defence maintain the accounts and have assets within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Courts at Chandigarh. He further submitted that bank
accounts of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India are maintained
throughout the country and it cannot be said that the execution can be limited
to Patna as the same would amount to an artificial jurisdictional barrier.
6. Learned counsel further submitted that so far as the contention
raised by learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to applicability of
Section 42 of the 1996 Act in execution proceedings is concerned, the same is
misplaced because the aforesaid provision applies only to the applications
arising out of the agreement and arbitral proceedings under Part-I of the 1996
Act, but does not restrict the filing of execution petitions, which are governed
by Code of Civil Procedure as per Section 36 of the 1996 Act. In this regard, he
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also referred to the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sundaram Finance Limited‘s Case (supra) to state that while an award passed
by the Arbitral Tribunal is deemed to be a decree under Section 36 of the 1996
Act, there is no deeming fiction anywhere to hold that the Court within whose
jurisdiction the arbitral award has been passed should be taken to be the Court,
which passed the decree. He also submitted that the balance of convenience
lies in favour of the respondent and the petitioners being the Union of India
will not suffer any irreparable loss if the execution of the Award proceeds,
whereas the respondent is suffering financial loss due to the delay in realizing
the fruits of the award.
7. Learned counsel also referred to another judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5256 of 2022 titled as “National Highways
Authority of India Vs. Sheetal Jaidev Vade and others” decided on
24.08.2022 wherein it has been re-iterated that execution of an arbitral award
cannot be thwarted on hyper technical objections regarding territorial
jurisdiction once attachable assets are shown to exist within the jurisdiction of
the executing court and the legislative intent of the act is to ensure expeditious
and effective enforcement of the award. He further referred to a judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.1582 of 1988 titled as “Madhao
Deshpande Vs. Dharma Adhikari” decided on 22.04.1988 to substantiate his
aforesaid argument.
8. Learned counsel further submitted that Public Fund Account
No.20840210000168, G.E. (AF), MC, Chandigarh pertaining to the Garrison
Engineer under the Ministry of Defense has been attached by the Executing
Court and the judgment debtors own and possess properties and the main bank
accounts across various States of India and with the advent of technology and
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digital banking, the bank accounts are operable on a pan-India basis and in the
present case, the property account is very well situated in Union Territory,
Chandigarh and therefore, the present petition is liable to be dismissed.
9. Before adjudicating on the merits of the case, it is apposite to
mention that an important issue of law had arisen before this Court, as to
whether in cases where there is a provision of internet/digital banking across
India, execution can be filed at any place in India or not, in view of the
aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance
Limited‘s case (supra) and this Court vide order dated 17.02.2026 appointed
Mr. Akshay Bhan, Senior Advocate as Amicus Curiae to assist on the aforesaid
issue.
10. Mr. Akshay Bhan, learned Amicus Curiae while assisting the
Court, submitted that it is first necessary to advert to the statutory scheme
governing execution i.e. Section 36 of the 1996 Act, which provides that an
arbitral award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. He
further submitted that the said provision introduces a legal fiction only for the
limited purpose of enforcement and it does not obliterate the conditions and
limitations contained in the Code concerning execution. He also submitted that
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited‘s Case (supra) only
clarified that an award holder is not required to first file execution before a
Court which passed the decree and then seek transfer and that an arbitral award
may be executed directly before the competent Court where the assets of the
judgment-debtor are located thereby avoiding unnecessary procedural
duplication and time consumption. However, the said judgment cannot be read
to be creating a universal forum for execution anywhere across India. The
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relaxation granted by Hon’ble Supreme Court is limited only to the procedural
formality of filing execution first before a Court which passed the decree. He
submitted that neither does it amount to a waiver of territorial jurisdiction nor
does it authorize the Executing Court to proceed against property outside its
jurisdiction merely because the funds of the judgment-debtor can be accessed
electronically across different branches of a bank.
11. Learned Amicus Curiae also submitted that if the contrary
proposition of law is accepted, the same would mean that any Court in India
could entertain execution proceedings merely because the judgment-debtor
maintains a bank account in a nationalized or private bank having branches
throughout India. He further submitted that such a reading would render the
territorial limitations under the Code of Civil Procedure practically
meaningless.
12. Learned Amicus Curiae further pointed out that the correct
position as laid down in Sundaram Finance Limited‘s case (Supra) is that the
said judgment only relaxes the procedural requirement of first filing execution
petition before a Court which passed the decree and then obtaining transfer of
the same, but the same does not authorize the execution to be filed at any place
in India merely because banking is now digital and funds can be transferred or
accessed anywhere across the country. In this regard, he referred to a judgment
of Himachal High Court in Exe. Pt. No.28 of 2023 titled as “M/s Esteem
Industries Vs. Chhattisgarh Medical Services Corp. Ltd. and another“,
Decided on 31.10.2025 to state that execution petition cannot be filed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Court executing the award where neither any
movable nor any immovable property of the award exists and merely because
the bank in which the judgment debtor has its account also has its branches at a
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particular place would not mean that execution can be done anywhere where
the said branch exists.
13. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and learned Amicus
Curiae.
14. In the present case, the dispute between the parties is pertaining to
Breach of the Contract and an Arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate upon the
said dispute. The arbitration proceedings commenced in Patna (Bihar) and the
Arbitral Award dated 03.03.2025 was passed in favour of the respondent-
Company vide Annexure P-2. Aggrieved thereby the petitioners-Union of India
had filed objections under Section 34 of the 1996 Act challenging the said
Award before the learned District Court, Patna, which is pending adjudication.
Thereafter, the respondent preferred an Execution Petition before the learned
Additional District Judge, Chandigarh to which the petitioners filed their
objections vide Annexure P-5 and the said Objections filed by the petitioners-
Union of India was dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh
vide order dated 23.10.2025 (Annexure P-1).
15. Learned counsel for the petitioners had submitted that the
impugned order by the Executing Court is misconceived and the entire
execution proceedings deserves to be quashed on the ground that the account of
Ministry of Defence and their allied office is located in Patna. However,
learned counsel for the respondent/Company has submitted that with the advent
of technology and digital banking the access to bank accounts are operable on a
pan-India basis and in the present case, the account and property of Union of
India in Ministry of Defence are very well situated in Union Territory,
Chandigarh.
16. Although the issue of whether in cases where there is a provision
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of internet/digital banking across India, execution can be filed at any place in
India had arisen but as per the aforesaid submission made by learned counsel
for the respondent whereby he has so stated that Public Account
No.20840210000168, G.E. (AF), MC, Chandigarh which is pertaining to the
Garrison Engineer under the Ministry of Defence is very well situated in Union
Territory, Chandigarh and the judgment debtors own and possess properties
and the maintain bank accounts across various States of India and the same has
also been mentioned in the application bearing CM-2239-CWP-2026 filed by
the petitioner-Union of India.
17. After perusing the record, this Court is of the considered view that
the issue of whether execution can be filed at any place in India due to digital
banking or not, requires no further adjudication as in the present case, the
properties and bank accounts of the petitioners are well situated in U.T.,
Chandigarh. Therefore, the reliance placed by learned Additional District
Judge, Chandigarh in Sundaram Finance Limited‘s case (supra) is well
placed. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
“18. It is in the aforesaid context that the view adopted by
the Delhi High Court in Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. v.
Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. records that Section 42 of the
Act would not apply to an execution application, which is
not an arbitral proceeding and that Section 38 of the
Code would apply to a decree passed by the Court, while
in the case of an award no court has passed the decree.
19. The Madras High Court in Kotak Mahindra Bank
Ltd. v. Sivakama Sundari referred to Section 46 of the
said Code, which spoke of precepts but stopped at that. In
the context of the Code, thus, the view adopted is that the
decree of a civil court is liable to be executed primarily
by the Court, which passes the decree where an execution
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application has to be filed at the first instance. An award
under Section 36 of the said Act, is equated to a decree of
the Court for the purposes of execution and only for that
purpose. Thus, it was rightly observed that while an
award passed by the arbitral tribunal is deemed to be a
decree under Section 36 of the said Act, there was no
deeming fiction anywhere to hold that the Court within
whose jurisdiction the arbitral award was passed should
be taken to be the Court, which passed the decree. The
said Act actually transcends all territorial barriers.
Conclusion:
20. We are, thus, unhesitatingly of the view that the
enforcement of an award through its execution can be
filed anywhere in the country where such decree can be
executed and there is no requirement for obtaining a
transfer of the decree from the Court, which would have
jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.
18. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of “Cheran Properties
Limited v. Kasturi and Sons Limited and others” (2018) 16 SCC 413 had the
occasion to consider the issues in the light of another judgment of “State of
West Bengal and others Vs. Associated Contractors” 2015 (1) SCC 32 as well
as the judgment of Sundaram Finance Limited‘s case (Supra) and held as
under:
“39. The reliance which has been sought to be placed on
the provisions of Section 42 of the 1996 Act is inapposite.
Dr. Singhvi relied on the decision in State of W.B. v.
Associated Contractors. The principle which was
enunciated in the judgment of this Court was as follows :
(SCC p. 46, para 24)
“24. If an application were to be preferred to a
court which is not a Principal Civil Court ofBHUMIKA BHATI
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Original Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court
exercising original jurisdiction to decide questions
forming the subject-matter of an arbitration if the
same had been the subject-matter of a suit, then
obviously such application would be outside the
four corners of Section 42. If, for example, an
application were to be filed in a court inferior to a
Principal Civil Court, or to a High Court which
has no original jurisdiction, or if an application
were to be made to a court which has no subject-
matter jurisdiction, such application would be
outside Section 42 and would not debar subsequent
applications from being filed in a court other than
such court.”
The conclusion of the Court is in the following terms :
(SCC pp. 46-47, para 25)
“25. … (a) Section 2(1)(e) contains an exhaustive
definition marking out only the Principal Civil
Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district or a
High Court having original civil jurisdiction in the
State, and no other court as “court” for the purpose
of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
(b) The expression “with respect to an arbitration
agreement” makes it clear that Section 42 will
apply to all applications made whether before or
during arbitral proceedings or after an award is
pronounced under Part I of the 1996 Act.
(c) However, Section 42 only applies to
applications made under Part I if they are made to
a court as defined. Since applications made under
Section 8 are made to judicial authorities and since
applications under Section 11 are made to the
Chief Justice or his designate, the judicial
authority and the Chief Justice or his designate not
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being court as defined, such applications would be
outside Section 42.
(d) Section 9 applications being applications made
to a court and Section 34 applications to set aside
arbitral awards are applications which are within
Section 42.
(e) In no circumstances can the Supreme Court be
“court” for the purposes of Section 2(1)(e), and
whether the Supreme Court does or does not retain
seisin after appointing an arbitrator, applications
will follow the first application made before either
a High Court having original jurisdiction in the
State or a Principal Civil Court having original
jurisdiction in the district, as the case may be.
(f) Section 42 will apply to applications made after
the arbitral proceedings have come to an end
provided they are made under Part I.
(g) If a first application is made to a court which is
neither a Principal Court of Original Jurisdiction
in a district or a High Court exercising original
jurisdiction in a State, such application not being
to a court as defined would be outside Section 42.
Also, an application made to a court without
subject-matter jurisdiction would be outside
Section 42.”
40. More recently in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Abdul
Samad, this Court considered the divergence of legal
opinion in the High Courts on the question as to whether
an award under the 1996 Act is required to be first filed
in the court having jurisdiction over the arbitral
proceedings for execution, to be followed by a transfer of
the decree or whether the award could be filed and
executed straightaway in the court where the assets are
located. Dealing with the provisions of Section 36, Sanjay
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Kishan Kaul, J. observed thus : (SCC p. 632, para 14)
“14. … The aforesaid provision would show that an
award is to be enforced in accordance with the
provisions of the said code in the same manner as
if it were a decree. It is, thus, the enforcement
mechanism, which is akin to the enforcement of a
decree but the award itself is not a decree of the
civil court as no decree whatsoever is passed by
the civil court. It is the Arbitral Tribunal, which
renders an award and the tribunal does not have
the power of execution of a decree. For the
purposes of execution of a decree the award is to
be enforced in the same manner as if it was a
decree under the said Code.”
Explaining the provisions of Section 42 the Court held
that : (SCC pp. 632-33, paras 16-17)
“16. … The aforesaid provision, however, applies
with respect to an application being filed in court
under Part I. The jurisdiction is over the arbitral
proceedings. The subsequent application arising
from that agreement and the arbitral proceedings
are to be made in that court alone.
17. However, what has been lost sight of is Section
32 of the said Act, which reads as under:
’32. Termination of proceedings.-(1) The arbitral
proceedings shall be terminated by the final
arbitral award or by an order of the Arbitral
Tribunal under sub-section (2).
(2) The Arbitral Tribunal shall issue an order for
the termination of the arbitral proceedings where-
(a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless
the respondent objects to the order and the
Arbitral Tribunal recognises a legitimate
interest on his part in obtaining a finalBHUMIKA BHATI
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(b) the parties agree on the termination of
the proceedings, or
(c) the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the
continuation of the proceedings has for any
other reason become unnecessary or
impossible.
(3) Subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of
Section 34, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral
proceedings.’ ”
The aforesaid provision provides for arbitral
proceedings to be terminated by the final arbitral award.
Thus, when an award is already made, of which
execution is sought, the arbitral proceedings already
stand terminated on the making of the final award. Thus,
it is not appreciated how Section 42 of the said Act,
which deals with the jurisdiction issue in respect of
arbitral proceedings, would have any relevance. …”
Consequently, in the view of the Court, the
enforcement of an award through its execution can be
initiated anywhere in the country where the decree can be
executed and there is no requirement of obtaining a
transfer of the decree from the court which would have
jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.”
19. A similar controversy came up before the Allahabad High Court in
the case of “Madhyanchal Vidhut Vitral Nigam Limited Vs. M/s Shashi
Cable”, 2023 SCC Online All 2013 wherein it was reiterated that the
Executing Court having jurisdiction to execute the award can be any Court
anywhere in the country, where the decree can be executed. The relevant
portion of the same is reproduced as under:-
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“12. From the judgments delivered by the Counsel
for the parties and referred above, the Executing Court
having jurisdiction to execute the award can be any court
anywhere in the Country, where the decree can be
executed and thus in view of the law expounded in the
case of Cheran Properties Limited (Supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the objection of the petitioner
that the Court at Lucknow had no jurisdiction loses its
relevance and is worthy of rejection. Thus, on the ground
of jurisdiction, the argument of the Counsel for the
petitioner cannot be sustained as there is no error or
infirmity in the order impugned dated 10.03.2023 passed
by the Commercial Court, Lucknow and the same is
upheld.”
20. So far as the judgment of M/s Esteem Industries‘s case (Supra)
referred to by learned Amicus Curiae is concerned, the same would not be
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as in that case the
judgment debtor did not have any movable or immovable asset located within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Himachal Pradesh where execution was filed
and only the Bank Branch was located. However, in the present case, the
properties and bank accounts are well situated in U.T., Chandigarh.
21. In view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sundaram Finance Limited‘s Case (supra) and Cheran Properties Limited’s
case (Supra) as aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that it is not the
case where there are no assets of the petitioners located in Chandigarh and just
because an award is passed in Patna (Bihar) would not mean that execution
would also lie only at Patna because once the award is passed, the mandate of
the arbitrator terminates and the award is not a decree of a particular Court and
is only by way of a legal fiction. Hence, the award can be filed for execution
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before any Court anywhere in the country where such decree can be executed.
22. In view of the above, finding no merit in the present writ petition,
the same is hereby dismissed.
23. Since the present writ petition has been dismissed, interim order dated
22.12.2025 shall stand vacated.
01.08.2026 (JASGURPREET SINGH PURI)
Bhumika JUDGE
1. Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
2. Whether reportable: Yes/No
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