Delhi High Court
Union Of India And Anr vs Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd on 26 May, 2026
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 15.05.2026
% Judgment delivered on: 26.05.2026
+ LPA 336/2026 & CM APPLs. 30157-59/2026
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR ....Appellants
Through: Mr.Chetan Sharma, ASG with
Mr.Ashish K. Dixit, CGSC, Mr.Umar
Hashmi, Mr.R.V.Prabhat,
Mr.Shubham Sharma, Mr.Yash
Wardhan Sharma, Mr.Naman, Ms.Iqra
Sheikh, Mr.Gaurav, Advs, Mr.Bipin
Bhatt, S.O.
versus
DELHI RACE CLUB (1940) LTD .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Sr. Adv. with
Mr.Azhar Alam, Mr. Sankalp
Goswami, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
JUDGMENT
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, C.J.
CHALLENGE
1. This intra-court appeal assails the order dated 24.04.2026 passed by
learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 5608/2026 instituted by the respondent
whereby a direction has been issued by learned Single Judge that the
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appellant no.2 shall not proceed further with the show cause notice dated
17.04.2026 till the next date of hearing.
2. The respondent, by instituting the writ petition before the learned
Single Judge, sought a writ of certiorari quashing, setting aside and
cancelling the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 issued by appellant no.2
under Section 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as the „P.P.
Act’]. A further prayer has also been made in the writ petition to quash, set
aside and cancel the proceedings initiated by issuing the said notice dated
17.04.2026.
FACTS
3. The show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 has been issued by the
appellant no.2 to the respondent in terms of the provisions contained in
Section 4 of the P.P. Act, calling upon it as to why the order of eviction
should not be made. The notice further requires the respondent to appear in
person or through an authorised representative along with evidence, which
the respondent intends to provide in support of the show cause and also for a
personal hearing. It further stipulates that if the respondent fails to appear on
the date fixed, the matter shall be proceeded ex-parte.
4. The show cause notice has been issued in respect of a lease granted by
the appellant no.1 in favour of the respondent on 08.03.1926, pertaining to a
plot of land admeasuring 84.484 acres, which is more explicitly described in
the schedule appended to the Lease Deed dated 08.03.1926. The lease was
granted for the use of the land as “Race Course” for a period of 25 years.
Clause 6 of the lease provides that the term of the lease can be extended for a
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further period of 25 years from the expiration of the term of the lease. The
lease was extended from time to time and stood determined, as per the show
cause notice on 31.12.1994 by afflux on time on expiry of the last extension.
It is also to be noticed that on 25.06.1985, a substantial area of the land in
question was resumed by the appellant and allotted for certain public
purposes, including allotment to the Ministry of Defence. However, the
respondent has continued to be in occupation of the remaining portion of the
land.
5. On 25.10.1999, treating the occupation of the respondent as
unauthorised on expiry of the last extension of the term of lease on
31.12.1994, a show cause notice was issued to the respondent under Section
4 of the P.P. Act, calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why an
order of eviction and recovery of dues, including damages for unauthorised
occupation, may not be passed.
6. The said show cause notice dated 25.10.1999 was, however,
challenged by the respondent by instituting the proceeding of W.P.(C)
7822/1999 before this Court and in these proceedings initially this Court had
granted a stay on further proceedings before the Estate Officer. During the
pendency of the said writ petition, the respondent is said to have submitted a
representation dated 19.12.2011 seeking extension/renewal of the lease in
respect of the land in question.
7. W.P.(C) 7822/1999 was finally disposed of by a learned Single Judge
of this Court vide his order dated 09.07.2012, whereby the show cause notice
dated 25.10.1999 was quashed and a liberty was given to the appellant to
decide the representation dated 19.12.2011 preferred by the respondent. It
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was also provided that in the event of rejection of the representation dated
19.12.2011, the appellant would be free to determine the lease and re-enter
the subject premises as the respondent was said to be in arrears of ground
rent, etc. Pursuant to the order dated 09.07.2012 passed by this Court in
W.P.(C) 7822/1999, the representation of the respondent, dated 19.12.2011
was processed and a letter of demand dated 22.07.2013 was issued to the
respondent in respect of the outstanding dues whereby total amount
recoverable from the respondent was shown to be Rs.3,48,82,723/-. The
respondent deposited the said amount of Rs.3,48,82,723/- on 23.08.2013 and
26.08.2013, which was received by the appellant towards dues as mentioned
in the letter of demand dated 22.07.2013.
8. As per the appellant, the request of the respondent for
extension/renewal of the lease was examined; however, it was not acceded to
in view of the requirement of the subject land for government/public
purposes, including defence and security considerations, and accordingly, no
further extension/renewal of the lease was granted in favour of the
respondent. It is also stated on behalf of the appellant that a notice was
issued on 13.11.2017 to the respondent calling upon it to show cause as to
why proceedings for eviction should not be initiated in accordance with law.
Another notice is said to have been issued by the appellant to the respondent
on 09.03.2022 for alleged breaches of terms and conditions governing the
subject premises, including misuse of the land and alleged unauthorised
construction.
9. On 12.03.2026, an eviction/vacation notice was issued to the
respondent by the appellant to vacate the land in question and handover its
peaceful possession to the appellant. The said notice clearly stated that
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failure to comply would entail initiation of appropriate proceedings for
eviction and recovery of dues in accordance with law. A civil suit, being CS
(OS) 253/2026 was instituted by the respondent before this Court,
challenging the validity and legality of the notice dated 12.03.2026 and
seeking certain other reliefs in respect of the proposed action of eviction.
The said suit was disposed of by this Court on 09.04.2026. This Court, in its
order dated 09.04.2026, while disposing of the suit, has clearly recorded that
any action for dispossession of the respondent from the subject premises
would be taken only in accordance with due process of law. It is thereafter
that the notice impugned in the writ petition, dated 17.04.2026 has been
issued by the appellant no.2 to the respondent under Section 4(1) and
4(2)(b)(ii) of the P.P. Act. The notice dated 17.04.2026 has been challenged
by the respondent, as stated above, by instituting the W.P.(C) 5608/2026
before the learned Single Judge and it is in the proceeding of this writ petition
that the impugned order has been passed on 24.04.2026, whereby it has been
directed that proceedings pursuant to the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026
shall stand deferred. It is this order passed by learned Single Judge, which
has been assailed by the appellants by instituting the proceedings of the
instant intra-court appeal.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS
10. Mr. Chetan Sharma, learned Senior Advocate and Additional Solicitor
General of India, representing the appellants, has submitted that the writ
petition against the show cause notice issued under Section 4 of the P.P. Act
ought not to have been entertained by the learned Single Judge under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. He has further argued that all opportunity is
available to the respondent to reply to the show cause notice issued by the
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Estate Officer, wherein all pleas which may be available to the respondent
can be taken, including the challenge to the issuance of the show cause notice
itself and therefore, exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge in the
writ petition while passing the impugned order, is erroneous.
11. Referring to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Escorts
Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. v. DDA & Anr., 2007 SCC OnLine
Del 1180, Sh. Sharma has argued that in view of the definition of the
expression, “unauthorised occupation” occurring in Section 2(g) of the P.P.
Act, the respondent is an unauthorised occupant of the premises in question
and therefore, the appellant has taken recourse to appropriate process of law
seeking eviction of the respondent by invoking the jurisdiction of the Estate
Officer under Section 4 of the P.P. Act. His submission, thus, is that the
show cause notice, which is under challenge before learned Single Judge, is
lawful and accordingly, the respondent needs to submit a reply to the said
show cause notice and participate in the proceedings.
12. Sh. Sharma has also argued that ordinarily challenge to a show cause
notice issued by the competent authority under a statute cannot be made in
writ jurisdiction and since the show cause notice has been issued in
accordance with law and jurisdiction of the Estate Officer has rightly been
invoked by the appellant no.1, interference with the proceedings pursuant to
the said show cause notice by passing the impugned order, whereby the
proceedings have been deferred, is unwarranted and uncalled for. He has
further argued that Escorts Heart Institute (supra) has considered the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court‟s judgment in Express Newspapers Private
Limited v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133 and also a Five Judges Bench
Judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ashoka Marketing
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Limited v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1991 SC 855 and has held that the
expression “unauthorized occupation” as used in P.P. Act includes a person,
who is found to have occupied any public premises without lawful authority
as well as those whose occupation was permissive at the inception and
subsequently ceased to be authorised.
13. Submission on behalf of the appellant no.1 is that the definition of the
term “unauthorised occupation” as occurring in Section 2(g) of the P.P. Act
covers continuance of occupation by any person of any public premises after
the grant or transfer has expired or determined for any reason whatsoever. It
is the argument of Sh. Sharma that admittedly the term of the lease has
expired on 31.12.1994 and in absence of any extension of the term of the
lease or its renewal or grant of a fresh lease, the respondent is an
unauthorised occupant in terms of Section 2(g) of the P.P. Act and therefore,
the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer has rightly been invoked under Section 4
of the P.P. Act.
14. Reference has also been made on behalf of the appellants to a
judgment of this Court in Anant Raj Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi
Development Authority, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 6406. In Anant Raj
Agencies (supra), a suit was instituted before the civil court, which was
dismissed on a preliminary issue that the jurisdiction of the civil court was
barred under the provisions of the P.P. Act. In the said case, the plaintiff
claimed to have purchased the suit property under a compromise decree, and
it was pleaded that the defendant – Delhi Development Authority had
initiated the proceedings before the Estate Officer under the P.P. Act,
whereupon a show cause notice was issued calling upon the plaintiff to show
cause as to why the plaintiff should not be evicted from the suit premises. In
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these facts, the learned trial court held that the civil court does not have the
jurisdiction in view of Section 10 read with Section 15 of the P.P. Act, which
clearly stipulates that no courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or
proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised
occupation of any public premises.
15. The plaintiff in Anant Raj Agencies (supra) challenged the order of
the trial court whereby the suit was dismissed on the ground that it was not
maintainable. While dismissing the appeal, this Court inter alia observed
that the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred from entertaining any suit and
further that notice issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4 of the P.P. Act
is an order of taking cognizance of the matter. The Court further held that
once unauthorised occupant of any public premises is issued a notice under
Section 4 of the P.P. Act for showing cause and adducing evidence before the
Estate Officer, he is required to show his cause and produce the defence to
the Estate Officer, but he cannot come to the civil court for restraining the
Estate Officer from proceeding pursuant to the notice issued under Section 4
of the P.P. Act. Sh. Chetan Sharma, placing reliance on Anant Raj Agencies
(supra), has stated that once a notice is issued under Section 4 of the P.P. Act
by the Estate Officer, the only course open to the noticee is to respond to the
notice and therefore, according to Sh. Sharma, learned Single Judge has
completely ignored all these aspects of the matter and has proceeded to pass
the order deferring the proceedings before the Estate Officer pursuant to the
show cause notice.
16. On behalf of the appellants, it has also been argued that no reason
whatsoever, even for the namesake, has been assigned by learned Single
Judge while passing the impugned order except observing therein that,
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“looking at the chequered history of the previous litigation between the
parties as noted hereinbefore, and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the matter requires
consideration”. It has further been argued that in consonance with the
principles relating to the grant of an interim order determination of the issue
of a prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience has not
been made, which itself would suffice for this Court to set aside the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
17. Mr. Suhail Dutt, learned senior counsel representing the respondent,
while opposing the instant appeal, has made the following submissions:-
(i) that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, being
purely interlocutory in nature, is not amenable to challenge in the
proceedings of the instant intra-court appeal for the reason that under Clause
10 of the Letters Patent, the remedy of intra-court appeal is available only
against a judgment passed by learned Single Judge and not against an
interlocutory order. In this respect, reliance has been placed by the learned
counsel for the respondent on the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
(i) Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania (1981) 4 SCC 8 (ii)
Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC
399, and (iii) Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd.,
(2023) 1 SCC 634. Reference has also been made in support of this
submission to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in MCD v.
Krishan Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 316;
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(ii) It has also been argued on behalf of the respondent that there is no
absolute bar for this Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India challenging a show cause notice. In this respect, it has
been argued that ordinarily challenge to a show cause notice is not available
before this Court in writ jurisdiction, however, as laid down by Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in J. Sri Nisha v. Enforcement Directorate, 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 517, interference by this Court in proceeding under Article 226
of the Constitution of India at the stage of show cause notice is permissible in
certain circumstances such as, (i) where the notice suffers from patent lack of
jurisdiction, (ii) where it reflects non application of mind, (iii) show cause
notice is issued with a pre-determined or pre-meditated approach and (iv) in
case the show cause notice amounts to abuse of process of law or results in
violation of principles of natural justice. It has been argued that in such
situations, this Court would be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Drawing our attention to the order passed by learned Single Judge of
this Court on 09.07.2012 in W.P.(C) 7822/1999, which was instituted by the
respondent against an earlier show cause notice under Section 10 of the P.P.
Act, dated 25.10.1999 it has been stated by learned counsel for the
respondent that once the said show cause notice was quashed being patently
illegal in law, it was not open to the appellants to have taken recourse to
issuing the impugned show cause notice for eviction on the same grounds on
which the earlier notice dated 25.10.1999 was issued.
Learned counsel for the respondent has stated that the order dated
09.07.2012, while quashing the earlier notice dated 25.10.1999, has observed
that neither the lease was determined nor was there any re-entry and since the
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notice dated 25.10.1999 was not preceded by determination of the lease as
such, the said notice was illegal. His submission is that once a similar notice
has been found by this Court in its order dated 09.07.2012 to be bad in law,
the fresh notice which is impugned in the writ petition could not have been
issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4 of the P.P. Act and issuance of
such a notice is nothing but tantamount to abuse of the process of law and
also reflects pre-determined and pre-meditated approach by the appellant
no.1 in taking recourse to proceedings under Section 4 of the P.P. Act. It is
in this respect that reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on J.
Sri Nisha (supra).
(iii) Basis the law laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in J. Sri Nisha
(supra), it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that since the show
cause notice, which is under challenge before the learned Single Judge, has
been issued by the Estate Officer, who patently lacks the jurisdiction to issue
such a notice in view of the order of learned Single Judge dated 09.07.2012
and issuance of the notice reflects pre-meditated mind of the appellants, as
such the writ petition before learned Single Judge is maintainable and,
therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly passed the impugned order
deferring the proceedings pursuant to the show cause notice dated
17.04.2026.
ISSUES
18. On the basis of the pleadings available on record and the respective
submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the following issues
emerge for our consideration and adjudication:
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(a) As to whether, the instant intra-court appeal against the impugned
order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is maintainable
and as to whether, the impugned order is a “Judgment” for the purpose of
invoking remedy of intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
(b) As to whether, the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is
vitiated, as no reason has been assigned for deferring the proceedings
pursuant to the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026, and consequently, the
proceedings emanating from the show cause notice have been put to a halt by
the impugned order without any reflection in the impugned order of a prima
facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
19. For appropriately deciding issue (a) as culled out above, we need to
extract Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of
Judicature at Lahore dated 21.03.1919 which is applicable to this Court.
Clause 10 of the Letters Patent reads as under:
“10. Appeals to the High Court from Judges of the Court–
And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said
High Court of Judicature at Lahore from the judgment (not
being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the
Superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order
made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a
sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power
of Superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the
Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge
of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the
Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything
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Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or
one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant of Section 108 of the
Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of
February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order
made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject
to the Superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge
who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for
appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of
Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall
be to Us, Our heirs or Successors in our or their Privy Council,
as hereinafter provided.”
20. The jurisdiction of intra-court appeal available in Clause 10 of the
Letters Patent has been saved by Section 5 of Delhi High Court Act, 1966
[hereinafter referred to as the „Act, 1966′] which provides that this Court
shall have all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law
in force immediately before the appointed day was exercisable in respect of
territories by the High Court of Punjab. “Appointed Day” has been defined
under Section 2 of the Act, 1966 to mean the day appointed under Section 3.
21. Section 3 of the Act, 1966 provides that the Central Government, by
way of a notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a day and from such day
the High Court of Delhi shall come into existence. The notification under
Section 3 was issued on 31.10.1966 and, therefore, in view of the provisions
contained in Section 5 of the Act, 1966 this Court possess all such original,
appellate and other jurisdiction which was exercisable by the High Court of
Punjab; thus, this Court exercises the jurisdiction of intra-court appeal by a
Division Bench of this Court against the judgment of a learned Single Judge.
22. Section 10 of the Act, 1966 provides that where a Single Judge of this
Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction, an appeal shall lie from
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the judgment of the Single Judge to a Division Bench of this Court. Section
10 of the Act, 1966, reads as under:
“10. Powers of Judges. –(1) Where a single Judge of the High
Court of Delhi exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction
conferred by sub-section (2) of section 5 on that Court, an
appeal shall lie from the judgment of the single Judge to a
Division Court of that High Court.
(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), the law in force
immediately before the appointed day relating to the powers of
the Chief Justice, single Judges and Division Courts of the High
Court of Punjab and with respect to all matters ancillary to the
exercise of those powers shall, with the necessary
modifications, apply in relation to the High Court of Delhi.”
23. What is noticeable is that provisions contained in Clause 10 of the
Letters Patent, as also in Section 10 of the Act, 1966, provide for an intra-
court appeal which lies from the “Judgment” of the Single Judge to a
Division Bench of this Court. So far as intra-court appeal against a decision
of a learned Single Judge exercising ordinary civil jurisdiction is concerned,
the expression “Judgment” has to derive its meaning from the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as „CPC‘] [see University of Delhi
and Anr. V. Hafiz Mohd. Said & Ors, AIR 1972 Delhi 102, a five-bench
judgment of this Court].
24. The expression “Judgment” occurring in Letters Patent of different
High Courts has engaged the attention of Hon‟ble Supreme Court on more
than one occasions. In Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court considered the issue, as to when a decision of a Single Judge could be
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regarded as a “Judgment” within the meaning of the relevant Clause of
Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court.
25. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) laid
down certain principles and the first such principle laid down is that though
Letters Patent did not define the expression “Judgment”, since the Letters
Patent was a special law, it would not be appropriate to project the definition
of the expression “Judgment” occurring in Section 2(9) of the CPC into the
meaning of the said expression for the purposes of Letters Patent. The Apex
Court further held that the concept of the “Judgment” as defined in CPC is
rather narrow and while defining the expression “decree”, the limitation
which are maintained in Section 2(9) of the CPC cannot be imported into the
definition of the expression “Judgment” for the purposes of the Letters
Patent.
26. It has been held that the expression “Judgment” for the purposes of
Letters Patent would receive a wider and more liberal interpretation than the
expression “Judgment” occurring in the CPC. The Apex Court in Shah
Babulal Khimji (supra) has also held that a “Judgment” imports a concept of
finality in a broader and not in a narrower sense, and further that a
“Judgment” can be of three kinds: (i) final judgment, (ii) a preliminary
judgment and (iii) an intermediary or interlocutory judgment.
27. The relevant observations in this regard have been made in paragraph
113 of the report in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), which is extracted herein
below:
“113. Thus, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment
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follows as a matter of course that the judgment must be a
formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights
of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in
controversy. The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code
of Civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the
limitations engrafted by sub-section (2) of Section 2 cannot be
physically imported into the definition of the word “judgment”
as used in clause 15 of the letters patent because the letters
patent has advisedly not used the terms “order” or “decree”
anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the letters
patent was that the word “judgment” should receive a much
wider and more liberal interpretation than the word
“judgment” used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same
time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge
would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to
the number of orders which would be appealable under the
letters patent. It seems to us that the word “judgment” has
undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a
narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three
kinds:
(1) A final judgment. — A judgment which decides all the
questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial
Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided.
This would mean that by virtue of the judgment, the suit
or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed
in part or in full. Such an order passed by the trial Judge
indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the
meaning of the letters patent and even amounts to a
decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment
to a Division Bench.
(2) A preliminary judgment. –This kind of a judgment
may take two forms–(a) where the trial Judge by an
order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of
the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the
defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the
suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally
decided one way or the other, the order passed by the
trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the
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cause so far as the Trial Judge is concerned and
therefore appealable to the larger Bench. (b) Another
shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that
where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing the
preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to
maintainability of the suit, e.g., bar of jurisdiction, res
judicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice
under Section 80 and the like, and these objections are
decided by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit
is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on
merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the
objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of
the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled
to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus,
such an order even though it keeps the suit alive,
undoubtedly decides an important aspect of the trial
which affects a vital right of the defendant and must,
therefore be construed to be a judgment so as to be
appealable to a larger Bench.
(3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment. — Most of
the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of
finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order
43 Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be
judgments within the meaning of the letters patent and,
therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory
orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule 1 but
which also possess the characteristics and trappings of
finality in that the orders may adversely affect a valuable
right of the party or decide an important aspect of the
trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before such an order
can be a judgment the adverse effect on the party
concerned must be direct and immediate rather than
indirect or remote. For instance, where the trial Judge in
a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure
refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order
directly affects the defendant because he loses a valuable
right to defend the suit and his remedy is confined only to
contest the plaintiff’s case on his own evidence without
being given a chance to rebut that evidence. As such an
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order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it
will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the
meaning of the letters patent so as to be appealable to a
larger Bench. Take the converse case in a similar suit
where the trial Judge allows the defendant to defend the
suit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely
affected but the damage or prejudice caused to him is not
direct or immediate but of a minimal nature and rather
too remote because the plaintiff still possesses his full
right to show that the defence is false and succeed in the
suit. Thus, such an order passed by the trial Judge would
not amount to a judgment within the meaning of clause
15 of the letters patent but will be purely an interlocutory
order. Similarly, suppose the trial Judge passes an order
setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant,
which is not appealable under any of the clauses of Order
43 Rule 1 though an order rejecting an application to set
aside the decree passed ex parte falls within Order 43
Rule 1 clause (d) and is appealable, the serious question
that arises is whether or not the order first mentioned is a
judgment within the meaning of letters patent. The fact,
however, remains that the order setting aside the ex parte
decree puts the defendant to a great advantage and works
serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence
of the order, the plaintiff has now to contest the suit and
is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour.
In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the
trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects
the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to
an interlocutory judgment and is therefore, appealable to
a larger Bench.”
28. What is relevant to note here is that the orders listed in Clauses (a) to
(w) in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC contain the attributes of finality and
would hence be judgments even for the purposes of the Letters Patent. We
may also observe that there may be interlocutory orders which are not listed
in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC, but may still have an attribute of finality.
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It is in this background that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shah Babulal
Khimji (supra), in paragraph 113 has held that there may be interlocutory
orders not listed in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC but still may have
trappings of finality, in the sense that such interlocutory orders may adversely
impact available rights of the parties or decide an important aspect of the trial
in an ancillary proceeding.
29. The Apex Court has further proceeded to observe that such an order
can be treated as a “Judgment” wherein the adverse impact on the party
concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. In
Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) it has also been held that during course of
proceedings of a case, the learned Single Judge may pass various orders
which are procedural or routine in nature and further, even if such orders
cause some inconvenience to a party, the same would probably be
interlocutory and would not be regarded as “Judgment”, so as to make such
orders passed by learned Single Judge amenable to challenge in an intra-
court appeal.
30. In paragraph 115 of the report in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), the
Apex Court has further held that every interlocutory order cannot be regarded
as a judgment; only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of
moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and cause serious
injustice to the parties concerned. Such observations in Shah Babulal Khimji
(supra) have been made in paragraph 115 of the report, which reads as under:
“115. Thus, in other words every interlocutory order cannot be
regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be
judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and
valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice
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Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a
document also cannot be treated as judgments because the
grievance on this score can be corrected by the appellate court
in appeal against the final judgment.”
31. Accordingly, based on the principle laid down in Shah Babulal Khimji
(supra), what we can safely observe is that an interlocutory order to be a
“Judgment” should contain trappings of finality, either when it decides the
questions in controversy in ancillary proceedings, main proceedings or in the
part of a proceeding.
32. As laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Central Mine Planning
and Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 588 to determine
the question if an interlocutory order falls within the meaning of “Judgment”
for the purposes of Letters Patent, the test which needs to be applied is as to
whether, the order is a final determination, affecting vital and valuable rights
and obligations of the parties concerned. The Court further proceeds to
observe that this needs to be ascertained on the facts of each case.
33. In Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra), the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court was examining Clause 10 of the Letters Patent applicable to
Patna High Court and has extensively referred to the judgment in Shah
Babulal Khimji (supra), and has also mentioned that relevant Clauses of
Letters Patent of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras are in iisdem terminis (in the
exact same words) with Clause 10 of Letters Patent of Allahabad, Patna,
Punjab and Haryana and Madhya Pradesh High Courts.
34. Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra) concludes that
to determine as to whether, an interlocutory order passed by learned Single
Judge can be regarded as a “Judgment” for the purposes of Letters Parent, the
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test to be applied will be as to whether, the order is a final determination
affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned
and this has to be ascertained from the facts of each case. Paragraph 14 of the
Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (supra) is extracted herein
below:
“14. In the instant case, we are concerned with the last
mentioned category. From the above discussion, it follows that
to determine the question whether an interlocutory order
passed by one Judge of a High Court falls within the meaning
of “judgment” for purposes of Letters Patent the test is:
Whether the order is a final determination affecting vital and
valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned. This
has to be ascertained on the facts of each case.”
35. Reference may also be had to the law laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Midnapore (supra), where paragraph 15 of the report reads as
under:
“15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the
pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following
categories:
(i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in
controversy in the main case.
(ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and
directly affects the final decision in the main case.
(iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question
which is not the subject-matter of the main case.
(iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress
of the case till its culmination in the final judgment.
(v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some
prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the
rights and obligations of the parties.
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36. For appropriately ascertaining the correct meaning of the expression
“Judgment” occurring in the Letters Patent, we may also refer to the
observations made by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of
Midnapore (supra), which is extracted here in below:
“16. The term “judgment” occurring in clause 15 of the Letters
Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined
in Section 2(9) CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1
CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and
conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all
or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to
some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable
rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which
fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore,
“judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters
Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv)
and (v) are not “judgments” for the purpose of filing appeals
provided under the Letters Patent.
37. Midnapore (supra) has reiterated what was already laid down in Shah
Babulal Khimji (supra) that the expression “Judgment” occurring in Letters
Patent will cover not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9) of the
CPC and orders enlisted in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC but also other
interlocutory orders which though, may not finally and conclusively
determine the rights of the parties but may have finality in regard to some co-
lateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations
of the parties.
38. It has been held that the order which finally decides a question or issue
in the main case, orders which finally decide an issue which materially and
directly affects the final decision in the main case and orders which finally
decide a co-lateral issue or question, which is not the subject matter of the
main case will be “Judgments” for the purposes of filing appeals under the
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Letters Patent, however, the routine orders passed to facilitate the progress of
the case and orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice
but do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties will not
be “Judgment” for the purposes of Letters Patent.
39. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. (supra) has
summed up as to which decision of a learned Single Judge will amount to
“Judgment” so as to invoke the jurisdiction of intra-court appeal by a
Division Bench. Referring to Shah Babulal Khimji (supra), the Shyam Sel
& Power Ltd. (supra) arrives at the same conclusion that there may be
interlocutory orders, which are not covered by Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC but if
such orders possess the characteristics and trappings of finality inasmuch as
such orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an
important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding, such decision will be
“Judgment” for the purpose of letters patent. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Shyam
Sel & Power Ltd. (supra) are extracted hereinbelow:-
“18. It could thus be seen that though this Court in Shah
Babulal Khimji [Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania,
(1981) 4 SCC 8] has held that the term “judgment” used in
letters patent could not be given a narrower meaning as is
given to the term “judgment” used in CPC and that it should
receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation, however,
at the same time, each and every order passed by the trial
Judge could not be construed to be a “judgment” inasmuch as
there will be no end to the number of orders which would be
appealable under the letters patent. It has been held that the
word “judgment” has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a
broader and not in a narrower sense. It has been held that
where an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendants,
it will undoubtedly be treated as a “judgment” within the
meaning of letters patent so as to be appealable to a larger
Bench.
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19. It has been held in Shah Babulal Khimji [Shah Babulal
Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8] that most of the
interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are
clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43 Rule 1CPC
and would be “judgments” within the meaning of the letters
patent and, therefore, appealable. However, there may be
interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule
1CPC but which also possess the characteristics and trappings
of finality inasmuch as such orders may adversely affect a
valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the
trial in an ancillary proceeding. It has further been held that
however, for such an order to be a “judgment”, an adverse
effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate
rather than indirect or remote. Various illustrations of
interlocutory orders have been given by this Court in Shah
Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania [Shah Babulal
Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8] , para 120, which
could be held to be appealable. This Court in Shah Babulal
Khimji [Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4
SCC 8] held that though any discretion exercised or routine
orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit may
cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice to one
party or the other, they cannot be treated as a “judgment”
unless they contain the traits and trappings of finality. This
Court has expressed in para 122 of Shah Babulal Khimji [Shah
Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, (1981) 4 SCC 8] that
though it had, by way of sample, laid down various illustrative
examples of an order which may amount to a judgment, it would
not be possible to give such an exhaustive list as may cover all
possible areas. This Court, in the facts of the said case, held
that an order of the Single Judge refusing appointment of a
Receiver and grant of an ad interim injunction was undoubtedly
a “judgment” within the meaning of letters patent, both because
Order 43 Rule 1CPC applies to internal appeals in the High
Court and that such an order even on merits contains the
quality of finality and would therefore be a “judgment” within
the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.”
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40. In view of the principle of law in respect of a decision passed by
learned Single Judge being “Judgment” for the purpose of Letters Patent, as
discussed above, we now need to examine as to whether the impugned order
dated 24.04.2026 has to be regarded as “Judgment” so as to maintain this
intra-court appeal.
41. Learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order has discussed
in nutshell the case of the appellant as also that of the respondent, and has
simply observed that “looking to the chequered history of the previous
litigation and in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the matter
requires consideration and after calling upon the parties to complete their
pleadings, has further directed that Estate Officer shall not proceed any
further with the show cause notice dated 17.04.2026. The question for our
determination, thus, is as to whether the impugned order directing the Estate
Officer not to proceed with the impugned show-cause notice causes prejudice
and effects any valuable rights of the appellant, though it is an order, which is
interlocutory in nature.
42. As already discussed above, the law as laid down by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court is that the expression “Judgment” occurring in letters patent
has to be given a wider meaning, and it should not be limited to the meaning
of the said expression within the confines of the CPC. It is also noted that
such orders to be a “Judgment” for the purpose of Letters Patent, should not
be confined to the orders enlisted in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the CPC. The
law, thus, is that an intra-court appeal under the Letters Patent would be
maintainable even against an interlocutory order if it impacts valuable rights
of the parties even in ancillary proceedings.
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43. The impugned order in the instant case as has been passed by learned
Single Judge while calling upon the parties to complete their pleadings. So
far as the direction issued for completion of pleadings is concerned, such an
order cannot be regarded to be a “Judgment” for the purpose of invoking
appellate jurisdiction under Letters Patent for the reason that such an order is
not only interlocutory but is generally passed to facilitate progression of the
proceedings before learned Single Judge.
44. However, as far as the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in
the impugned order directing the Estate Officer not to proceed with the
proceedings emanating from the show-cause notice, we may note that on
account of the term of the lease having come to an end way back in the year
1994, the term of the lease stood determined and, therefore, it is a statutory
right of the appellant no.1 to invoke the provision of Section 4 of the PP Act.
We may also note that as laid down by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. (supra), the expression
“unauthorised occupation” occurring in Section 2(g) has not to be confined to
only a person who is found to have occupied any public premises without
lawful authority, but it needs to be extended to those occupants whose
occupation was initially permissible at the inception, but subsequently ceased
to be authorised. Thus, on the basis of the lease, the respondent was validly in
occupation and possession of the subject land; however, once the term of the
lease had expired way back in the year 1994, such occupation ceased to be
authorised in terms of the provisions of the PP Act.
45. Section 4 of the PP Act vests a statutory right which provides that if
the Estate Officer has information that any person is in unauthorised
occupation of any public premises and that such a person should be evicted,
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he shall issue a notice in writing regarding unauthorised occupation calling
upon the person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not
be made. Thus, remedy of Section 4 seeking eviction of any unauthorised
occupant from public premises is a statutory vested right available to the
appellant no.1 and if such a course of action is resorted by the appellant
taking recourse to the provision of Section 4, any order, may be interlocutory
in nature, passed by learned Single Judge restraining the Estate Officer from
proceedings any further in the matter, in our opinion, impacts the available
statutory right of the appellant and, therefore, for this reason alone the
impugned order, as per our opinion, would be a “Judgment” for the limited
purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a Division Bench of this Court under
Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
46. We are also unable to subscribe to the argument made by learned
counsel for the respondent that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
notice dated 17.04.2026 is pre-meditated or amounts to an abuse of the
process of law. Section 4 vests a right to seek eviction of an unauthorised
occupant, which has statutorily been provided in respect of public premises
and if any authority resorts to such statutory recourse, it cannot be said that
such recourse would amount to misuse or abuse of the process of law or it is
pre-meditated.
47. So far as reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on the
order passed by learned Single Judge dated 09.07.2012 passed in W.P.(C)
7822/1999 which was instituted by the respondent against an earlier show-
cause notice dated 25.10.1999, is concerned, we may note that said Writ
Petition was finally disposed of by the Court quashing the notice and
directing the appellant to decide the representation said to have been
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preferred by the respondent on 19.12.2011, where a prayer was made for
extension/renewal of the lease. Pursuant to the said representation dated
19.12.2011, the prayer is said to have been processed by the appellant,
however the same was not acceded to, and therefore, a fresh notice under
Section 4 of the PP Act has now been issued. It is also noticeable that in the
proceedings instituted under Section 4 of the PP Act, the respondent will
have the amplest opportunity to explain as to why an eviction order may not
be passed. All the grounds and pleas available to the respondent under the
law will be permissible to be taken by it, including the ground that the notice
is not lawful.
48. We may also note that prior to institution of the underlying Writ
Petition namely W.P.(C) 5608/2026, the respondent had instituted a suit
being CS (OS) 253/2026, which has been disposed of by a learned Single
Judge of this Court on 09.04.2026, where it has clearly been recorded that
any action for dispossession of the respondent from the subject premises
would be taken in accordance with due process of law. Prima facie, the
subject premises is a public premises and the respondent is unauthorised
occupant within the meaning of the said expression occurring in PP Act,
however in view of the observations made while disposing of the aforesaid
suit vide order dated 09.04.2026, if for dispossession of the respondent
recourse under Section 4 of the PP Act has been taken by the appellant, it
cannot be said that such process is not in accordance with due process of law.
49. Much emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the appellants on
Express Newspapers Private Limited (supra), however the Division Bench
of this Court in Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. (supra)
referring to the Express Newspapers Private Limited (supra), has
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unambiguously held that the expression “unauthorised occupation” occurring
in PP Act would include a person, who is found to have occupied any public
premises without lawful authority as well as those whose occupation was
initially permissible at the inception but subsequently ceased to be
authorised. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in
Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre Ltd. (supra), even if initially the
respondent was in permissible occupation/possession of the subject land, on
expiry of the term of the lease way back in the year 1994 he would cease to
be an authorised occupant.
50. We may also refer to the judgment of this Court in Anant Raj
Agencies (supra), where it has clearly been held that once a notice was
issued under Section 4 of the PP Act by the Estate Officer, the only course
open to the noticee is to respond to the notice.
51. Accordingly, in view of the discussions made above, we opine that the
impugned order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is to be
regarded as a “Judgment” for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction of intra-
court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, the instant
appeal is maintainable.
52. As regards issue “b” set out hereinabove, what we notice is that
learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order, after discussing the
respective cases of the parties, has only observed that looking at the
chequered history of the previous litigation and in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, the matter requires consideration and, thereafter
without giving any reason, even for the namesake, has directed that the Estate
Officer shall not proceed further with the show-cause notice dated
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17.04.2026. Such a course, in our opinion, was not available to the learned
Single Judge for passing the interim order, which has impacted the valuable
right of the appellants to invoke the statutory right under Section 4 of the PP
Act, without giving reasons and without giving a finding on the issue relating
to prima facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience.
53. It is settled law that this Court, while passing the interim orders even
while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, is under an obligation to conform to the legal principle
governing the grant of an interim order, which requires adjudication to be
made regarding a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable
loss. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Era Educational Trust,
(2000) 5 SCC 57, has observed that it may be that Order XXXIX of the CPC
may not be applicable at the stage of granting interim relief in a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but at the same time various
principles laid down under Order XXXIX for granting ad-interim relief are
required to be taken into consideration. Paragraph 6 of the judgment in Era
Educational Trust (supra) is quoted below:-
“6. It may be that Order XXXIX CPC would not be applicable at
the stage of granting interim relief in a petition under Article 226
or 227 of the Constitution, but at the same time various principles
laid down under Order XXXIX for granting ad interim or interim
reliefs are required to be taken into consideration. In the case of
Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das [(1994) 4 SCC 225]
after considering the various authorities this Court laid down the
guiding principles in relation to grant of an ad interim injunction
which are as under: (SCC pp. 241-42, para 36)
“36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only
under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should
weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are–
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(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the
plaintiff;
(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve
greater injustice than the grant of it would involve;
(c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff
first had notice of the act complained so that the making of
improper order against a party in his absence is prevented;
(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had
acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not
grant ex parte injunction;
(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte
injunction to show utmost good faith in making the
application;
(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a
limited period of time;
(g) general principles like prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered
by the court.”
54. We may also refer in this regard an order dated 07.08.2025 passed by a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P(C) 11876/2025, Mohmmed Javed v.
Union of India & Ors., wherein by placing reliance on Era Educational
Trust (supra), it has been held that “it is trite law that although the
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are, ipso facto, not applicable to the
proceedings of a Writ Petition before the High Court, however, principles
laid down for granting interim relief under Order XXXIX of the CPC should
be kept in mind by the High Court”.
55. When we analyse the impugned order passed by the learned Single
Judge on the touchstone of the aforesaid principle, what we find is that
nothing has been considered by the learned Single Judge in respect of a prima
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facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience while passing the
impugned order.
56. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4
SCC 697 (supra), has observed that in cases where withholding of an interim
relief would tantamount to disposal of the main petition itself; for by the time
the main matter comes up for hearing, there would be nothing left to be
allowed as relief to the petitioner, the availability of a very strong prima facie
case, which has to be of a standard much higher than just prima facie case,
consideration of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully
tilting the balance of case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the
Court to grant interim relief. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has further
observed that such would be rare and exceptional cases and also that such an
interim relief can be granted only if the Court is satisfied that withholding of
it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of
justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated and at the end the Court
would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. The Apex Court further
observed that such would be a rare case accompanied by compelling
circumstances where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and
would cause extreme hardship. Paragraph 12 of the judgment in Deoraj
(supra) is extracted herein below:-
“12. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief
would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there
may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would
tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; for, by the time
the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to
be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be
in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima
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the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury
forcefully tilting the balance of the case totally in favour of the
applicant may persuade the court to grant an interim relief though
it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would
be rare and exceptional cases. The court would grant such an
interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the
conscience of the court and do violence to the sense of justice,
resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and
at the end the court would not be able to vindicate the cause of
justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by
compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is
immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The
conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the court may
put the parties on such terms as may be prudent.”
57. Thus, what we need to examine is as to what would be the impact on
the proceedings of the main Writ Petition if the proceedings before the Estate
Officer pursuant to the show-cause notice had not been stayed by passing the
interim order. Even if it is presumed that the case of the respondent is that by
non-interference in the show-cause notice would render the Writ Petition
itself infructuous, the learned Single Judge ought to have taken into
consideration the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable
injury and further that such injury would tilt the balance of case and only on
recording finding on these aspects the interim relief of the nature which has
been granted vide the impugned order, could have been granted.
58. We may also notice that in such cases, the availability of a “very
strong prima facie case”, of a standard much higher than just a “prima facie
case”, is one of the requisite considerations for passing an order of interim
relief.
59. Accordingly, since the impugned order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the
learned Single Judge does not reflect upon any of the aforesaid aspects of the
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Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
Signing Date:26.05.2026
11:34:30
matter in as much as it does not even record any discussion, much less any
finding, on the aspects of a strong prima facie case, irreparable loss and
balance of convenience, in our opinion, such an order is not sustainable. The
issue “b” thus stands decided in these terms.
60. For the discussions made and reasons given above, the instant appeal is
allowed and the order dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge,
so far as it directs the Estate Officer to not proceed further with the show-
cause notice dated 17.04.2026 is hereby set aside.
61. The pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
62. The appeal along with pending applications stands disposed of.
63. There shall be no orders as to costs.
(DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA)
CHIEF JUSTICE
(TEJAS KARIA)
JUDGE
MAY 26, 2026
“shailndra”/MJ/S.Rawat
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Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
Signing Date:26.05.2026
11:34:30
