Chattisgarh High Court
Umesh Kumar Dewangan vs Paramjeet Singh on 8 July, 2026
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CGHC010198662026 2026:CGHC:28346
SAGRIKA
AGRAWAL
NAFR
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
AGRAWAL
Date: 2026.07.14
10:29:17 +0530
WP227 No. 624 of 2026
1 - Umesh Kumar Dewangan S/o Harprasad Dewangan Aged About 30 Years
R/o Ward No. 06, Village- Lofandi, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Paramjeet Singh S/o Harnam Singh Aged About 62 Years R/o Adarsh
Colony, Behind Old High Court, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)
2 - Harjeet Kaur W/o Paramjeet Singh Aged About 61 Years R/o Adarsh
Colony, Behind Old High Court, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)
3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District-
Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(cause title taken from CIS)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate
For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate along
and 2 with Ms. Samidha Karambelkar and Ms. Anu
Mishra, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J
Order on Board
08.07.2026
1. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has
been preferred by the petitioner assailing the order dated 25.04.2026
passed by the learned 9th District Judge, Bilaspur, in Misc. Civil Appeal
2
No. 62/2025, whereby the miscellaneous appeal preferred by
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has been allowed and the order dated
24.07.2025 passed by the learned 9th Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 204-A/2025 has been set aside.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the plaintiff, while
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are defendant Nos. 1 and 2 before the
learned trial Court. The petitioner instituted Civil Suit No. 204-A/2025
seeking a declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the
suit property bearing Khasra No. 54/171, Diversion Sheet No. 9, Plot
No. 168, admeasuring 2400 sq. ft. (0.0220 hectare), situated at Village
Lingiadih, Tahsil and District Bilaspur. The case of the plaintiff is that
he purchased the suit property from its owner, Smt. Snehal Arora, by a
registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 and pursuant thereto, came into
possession of the suit property. In the plaint, the plaintiff has also
traced the chain of title by narrating the successive transfers of the
property from its earlier owners, culminating in the execution of the
registered sale deed in his favour. It is further pleaded that on
24.05.2025, upon being informed by the neighbouring residents that
defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had commenced construction of a boundary
wall over the suit land, he immediately approached the revenue
authorities and thereafter instituted the present suit on 01.07.2025.
Along with the plaint, the plaintiff also filed an application under Order
39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, seeking the grant of a temporary injunction
restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the
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suit property or raising any construction thereon during the pendency
of the suit.
3. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed their reply and contested the claim of the
plaintiff. It was pleaded that their son Gurvin Singh had purchased land
bearing Khasra No. 54/168, situated at Village Lingiadih, from its
owner, Shri B.P. Agrawal, by a registered sale deed dated 25.07.2007.
After the demise of Gurvin Singh, the names of defendant Nos. 1 and 2
were mutated in the revenue records as his legal heirs. It was further
pleaded that they have raised a boundary wall over the said land and
have been in peaceful possession thereof. The defendants further
pleaded that the property purchased by Gurvin Singh was described in
the sale deed with the following boundaries: road towards the east and
south, land of Nanak Gurunani towards the north, and land of Gulaba
Dewangan towards the west. According to them, the very same
boundaries have also been mentioned in the sale deed executed in
favour of the plaintiff. It was, therefore, pleaded that although the
plaintiff claims to have purchased land bearing Khasra No. 54/171, he
is, in fact, asserting possession over the land belonging to the
defendants, namely Khasra No. 54/168. It was also pleaded that the
defendants have remained in continuous possession of the land since
the year 2007 and that such possession had never been questioned by
any previous owner before the plaintiff purchased Khasra No. 54/171.
On these premises, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff has failed
to establish a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience
and the likelihood of irreparable injury are also in their favour.
Consequently, they prayed for dismissal of the application for
temporary injunction.
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4. After hearing the parties and considering the material available on
record, the learned trial Court, by order dated 24.07.2025, allowed the
plaintiff’s application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, and granted a temporary injunction restraining
defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession
over land bearing Khasra No. 54/171 or raising any construction
thereon during the pendency of the suit. Aggrieved by the said order
dated 24.07.2025, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 preferred Misc. Civil Appeal
No. 62/2025 before the learned Appellate Court. Upon hearing the
parties, the learned Appellate Court, by the impugned order dated
25.04.2026, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of temporary
injunction passed by the learned trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
petitioner/plaintiff is in lawful possession of the suit property bearing
Khasra No. 54/171, whereas defendant Nos. 1 and 2 claim title and
possession over a different parcel of land, namely Khasra No. 54/168.
It is submitted that the plaintiff acquired title to the suit property through
a registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 executed by its recorded
owner and, pursuant thereto, was put in possession of the land. The
possession of the plaintiff had never been questioned by the
defendants until the present dispute arose. It is further submitted that
the learned trial Court, after a detailed consideration of the pleadings,
documents and the facts and circumstances, rightly recorded a finding
regarding the plaintiff’s possession and consequently granted
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temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with
the plaintiff’s possession over the suit property. It is argued that the
learned trial Court rightly observed that, in the absence of clear
identification of the boundaries and the exact location of the respective
lands, the controversy essentially relates to disputed questions of fact,
which can only be adjudicated upon after the parties adduce evidence
during the trial. He would further submit that the demarcation report
dated 26.06.2025 cannot be treated as conclusive, as it neither records
the actual physical measurements of the respective lands nor
establishes the physical possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 over the
suit property. According to him, the report is founded merely upon the
statements of adjoining landowners and is, therefore, insufficient to
displace the plaintiff’s prima facie case. It is lastly submitted that the
learned Appellate Court has mechanically interfered with a well-
reasoned discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court without
assigning cogent reasons for upsetting the findings on the three settled
ingredients governing the grant of temporary injunction. It is further
submitted that if defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are not restrained from
interfering with the plaintiff’s possession, the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable injury by being deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of the
property purchased by him under a valid registered sale deed. It is,
therefore, prayed that the impugned order dated 25.04.2026 passed by
the learned Appellate Court be set aside and the order dated
24.07.2025 passed by the learned trial Court granting temporary
injunction be restored.
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6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and
2/defendant Nos. 1 and 2 opposed the submissions advanced on
behalf of the petitioner and submitted that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are
in lawful possession of land bearing Khasra No. 54/168, the
boundaries whereof are specifically described in their registered sale
deed. It is submitted that the possession of the defendants over the
land comprised within the said boundaries has remained undisputed
since its purchase and has never been questioned by any of the
previous owners in the chain of title of the plaintiff’s land. It is further
submitted that, as per the plaint itself, the plaintiff claims title through a
registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 executed by Smt. Snehal Arora.
The said Smt. Snehal Arora had purchased the property from Smt.
Kanti Upadhyay by a registered sale deed dated 19.03.2021; Smt.
Kanti Upadhyay had purchased it from Shri Shyam Rao Shendey by a
registered sale deed dated 23.06.2020; Shri Shyam Rao Shendey had
acquired it from Shri K.K. Ganjiwale by a registered sale deed dated
12.05.1992; and Shri K.K. Ganjiwale had, in turn, purchased it from
Shri Balram Kashyap by a registered sale deed dated 17.04.1989. It is
submitted that none of the aforesaid sale deeds has been produced by
the plaintiff to establish the boundaries of the property conveyed under
those documents. It is further submitted that a comparison of the
registered sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff with the sale
deed of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 reveals that both documents describe
the property with identical boundaries, although they mention different
Khasra numbers. This clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff is
attempting to claim possession of the land belonging to the defendants
under the guise of Khasra No. 54/171. It is also submitted that the sale
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deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2
has never been challenged, their names have been duly mutated in the
revenue records, and they have remained in continuous possession of
the property. He also placed reliance upon the demarcation report
dated 26.06.2025, submitting that the said report records the
possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of information
furnished by the adjoining landholders and supports their claim of
possession. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Appellate Court,
upon a meticulous examination of the pleadings and documents
produced by the parties, rightly concluded that the defendants had a
stronger prima facie case and that the balance of convenience as well
as the likelihood of irreparable injury also lay in their favour. The
impugned order, being well reasoned and in accordance with law, does
not warrant interference in the limited supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, it is prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents annexed to the petition.
8. From perusal of the registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 executed in
favour of the plaintiff (Annexure P/2) and the registered sale deed
dated 25.07.2007 executed in favour of late Gurvin Singh Chhabda,
the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (annexed at
page 62 of the petition), reveals that the plaintiff claims title over land
bearing Khasra No. 54/171, whereas defendant Nos. 1 and 2 claim title
over land bearing Khasra No. 54/168. Significantly, although the
Khasra numbers mentioned in the two sale deeds are different, the
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boundaries described therein are identical. It is also evident that the
predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 acquired the
property under the registered sale deed dated 25.07.2007, whereas
the plaintiff purchased Khasra No. 54/171 much later by the registered
sale deed dated 31.03.2022. Both parties thereafter sought
demarcation of their respective lands, and the demarcation reports,
annexed at pages 106 and 111 of the petition, along with the
corresponding demarcation panchnamas, prima facie indicate that both
parties are laying claim to the same parcel of land notwithstanding the
difference in the Khasra numbers. Further, the demarcation report
dated 26.06.2025, annexed at page 111 of the petition, which pertains
to the application for demarcation submitted by defendant Nos. 1 and
2, records that the adjoining landowners identified the disputed land as
being in the possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Taking into
consideration the rival sale deeds, the identical boundary descriptions
contained therein, as well as the material contained in the demarcation
reports, the learned Appellate Court arrived at a prima facie conclusion
that the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of a prima facie
case, balance of convenience, or likelihood of irreparable injury in his
favour. Accordingly, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal
preferred by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and set aside the order of
temporary injunction passed by the learned trial Court.
9. This Court also finds that the dispute between the parties is not merely
with respect to the Khasra numbers but relates to the identity and
location of the land claimed by them. While the plaintiff asserts title
over Khasra No. 54/171 on the strength of the registered sale deed
9
dated 31.03.2022, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 claim title and possession
over Khasra No. 54/168 through a registered sale deed dated
25.07.2007 executed in favour of their predecessor-in-interest.
Significantly, despite the difference in the Khasra numbers, both the
sale deeds describe the property with identical boundaries. The
demarcation reports placed on record, particularly the report dated
26.06.2025, also indicate that both parties are claiming the same
parcel of land and further record that the adjoining landholders
identified the possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 over the disputed
property. At the interlocutory stage, the Court is not expected to finally
adjudicate the question of title or identity of the property, as the same
can be determined only after the parties lead evidence. However, while
considering an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the Court is required to assess whether the
applicant has established a prima facie case, balance of convenience
and irreparable injury. In the present case, having regard to the earlier
registered sale deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of
defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the identical boundary descriptions contained
in the rival sale deeds, and the material reflected in the demarcation
report, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned
Appellate Court cannot be said to have committed any jurisdictional
error or patent perversity in holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case warranting grant of temporary injunction. The view
taken by the learned Appellate Court is a plausible one based on the
material available on record and does not call for interference in the
limited supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
10
10. With respect to the scope of interference under the jurisdiction of Article
227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil“
2010 (8) SCC 329 held that:
“40. Same principles have been followed by this Court
in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha
(deceased) through Lrs. & others vs. Phiroz N.
Bhatena and others etc. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141,
wherein it has been held that in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set
aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or tribunal
only in a case where there is no evidence or where no
reasonable person could possibly have come to the
conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to.
This Court made it clear that except to this `limited
extent’ the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere
with the findings of fact (see para 18, page 149-150).
In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its
previous decision rendered in the case of
Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram
reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447. The decision in
Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the
Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh
(supra) and Nagendra Nath (supra) discussed above.
41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in the
case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs.
11Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in (1995) 6
SCC 576. In paragraph 9, page 579 of the report, this
Court clearly reminded the High Court that under
Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative
to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions.
Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of
duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law
and justice.
42. Same views have been taken by this Court in
respect of the ambit of High Court’s power under
Article 227 in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand
Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and another,
reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page 222-
234 of the report) and the decision of this Court in
Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and others
reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench
ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) about the scope of
Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad
Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel
Ramnand and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898.
43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in
case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and
others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge
Bench of this Court discussed the principles of
interference by High Court under Article 227. Of
course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a
12
writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a
civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19,
page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio
was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in
Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and
others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the
Hon’ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench
is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the
principles on the scope of interference by the High
Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no
divergence of views.
44. In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695 of
the report, the following principles have been laid down
in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out:
“38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution is exercised for keeping the
subordinate courts within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has
assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or
has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does
have or the jurisdiction though available is being
exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted
by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has
occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to
exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.”
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45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on
the same lines and extracted below:
“38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct
mere errors of fact or of law unless the following
requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest
and apparent on the face of the proceedings such
as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter
disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave
injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned
thereby.
(6) xxx xxx
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the
supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised
sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the
judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to
act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice
should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection
need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid
two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the
pendency of any suit or proceedings in a
subordinate court and the error though calling for
correction is yet capable of being corrected at the
conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or
revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a
petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction
14of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow
and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings.
The High Court may feel inclined to intervene
where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that
very moment, may become incapable of correction
at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result
in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself
would result in prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a
Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or
evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing
inferences or correct errors of mere formal or
technical character.”
49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, the following principles on the exercise of High
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is
different from a petition under Article 227. The
mode of exercise of power by High Court under
these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot
be called a writ petition. The history of the
conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is
15substantially different from the history of conferment
of the power of Superintendence on the High
Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed
above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it,
in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal
over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it.
In cases where an alternative statutory mode of
redressal has been provided, that would also
operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power
by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts
in exercise of its power of superintendence have
been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this
regard the High Court must be guided by the
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the
principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been
repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution
Benches and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra),
followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can
16
interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and
Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their
authority’.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which
is vested in them and by not declining to exercise
the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f),
High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of
superintendence when there has been a patent
perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts
subordinate to it or where there has been a gross
and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles
of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High
Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law
or fact or just because another view than the one
taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is
a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has
to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court’s power of superintendence under
Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has
been declared a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India
17
& others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and
therefore abridgement by a Constitutional
amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a
rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the
Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code
(Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut
down the ambit of High Court’s power under Article
227. At the same time, it must be remembered that
such statutory amendment does not
correspondingly expand the High Court’s
jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be
exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate
case, the power can be exercised suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under Article
227, it transpires that the main object of this Article
is to keep strict administrative and judicial control
by the High Court on the administration of justice
within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency,
smooth and orderly functioning of the entire
machinery of justice in such a way as it does not
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bring it into any disrepute. The power of
interference under this Article is to be kept to the
minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does
not come to a halt and the fountain of justice
remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain
public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals
and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of
relief in individual cases but should be directed for
promotion of public confidence in the administration
of justice in the larger public interest whereas
Article 226 is meant for protection of individual
grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227
may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high
degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this
power will be counter-productive and will divest this
extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.”
11. In the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC
181, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-
“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are
clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to
law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but
primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the
19Constitution of India. The High Court exercising
supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first
appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts
upon which the determination under challenge is based.
Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of
fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified
or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute
its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the
inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in
the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave
dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of
fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under
Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases,
like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the
finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can
possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or
tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such
discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is
no miscarriage of justice.”
12. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shalini
Shyam Shetty (supra) and Garment Craft (supra) and also in view of
the fact of the respective sale deeds of the parties and claim of their
possession over the suit land, the demarcation report submitted by the
revenue authorities, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
petitioner could not demonstrate any pulpable infirmity or jurisdictional
error in passing the order by the learned Appellate Court, setting aside
the order passed by learned trial Court.
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13. Consequently, finding no infirmity in the exercise of discretion by the
learned appellate Court and no exceptional circumstance warranting
invocation of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, the present writ
petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby
dismissed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
sagrika
