Uttarakhand High Court
Udasin Karshni Narain Ashram vs Mahendra Taneja on 27 March, 2026
Author: Rakesh Thapliyal
Bench: Rakesh Thapliyal
2026:UHC:2169
Judgment reserved
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
Civil Revision No. 97 of 2022
Udasin Karshni Narain Ashram
and others. .......Revisionists.
Versus
Mahendra Taneja. .......Respondent.
Present:
Mr. Rakesh Khanna, learned Sr. Advocate, assisted by Mr. Aditya Khanna and Mr. Yogesh Sharma, learned
counsel for the revisionist.
Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for the respondent.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Thapliyal, J.
1. The instant civil revision has been preferred under
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887
against the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2022 passed by
learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Haridwar in SCC Suit
No. 05 of 2014 titled as “Udasin Karshni Narain Ashram Trust
(Regd.) and others Vs. Mahendra Taneja” whereby suit of the
plaintiffs / revisionists for recovery of rent, damages and
eviction has been dismissed.
2. Relevant facts of the case necessary for adjudication of the
issue involved in this revision are as follows:
3. Plaintiffs / revisionists preferred a suit for recovery of
arrears of rent, damages and eviction against the defendant /
respondent inter alia with the averments that plaintiff no. 1 is
the Trust, plaintiff no. 2 is Managing Trustee and plaintiff no. 3
is the Manager of the revisionist Trust. It is contended in the
plaint that respondent-defendant is the tenant of plaintiff Trust
in two shops i.e. shop no. 4 and 5 and rent was paid only upto
31.07.2012 and thereafter, for August and September, 2012 rent
was due but not paid and the shops in question are new
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construction and since the same is owned by plaintiffs it is used
for public religious and charitable purposes and as such, the
provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable. It
was further pleaded by the plaintiffs in the SCC Suit that since
there was default in payment of arrears of rent on the part of
the defendant respondent, as such, a notice was served upon
him on 22.09.2012 through the counsel of the defendant thereby
terminating the tenancy on expiry of one month notice from the
date of receipt of the notice but defendant respondent refused
to accept the notice and plaintiffs ultimately preferred the suit
with the following reliefs:
“i. To pass a decree for eviction in favour of the
plaintiff and against the defendant to the effect that the
defendant hands over actual possession of the suit
property within the time stipulated by the court to the
plaintiffs.
ii. To pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants to the effect that the defendants to
pay arrears of rent of Rs. 4110 to the defendant.
iii. To pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff and against
the defendant of the effect that the defendant pay the
mesne profits from 01.01.2012 to 05.01.2014 i.e. Rs.
86400/- and Rs. 200 from the date of filing of suit till the
date of actual possession towards unauthorized use and
occupation.”
4. In the aforesaid plaint, the defendant respondent filed the
written statement and denied all the averments, as made in the
plaint and questioned the maintainability of the suit as well as
locus standi of the plaintiff Trust in instituting the suit. In the
written statement, there is no denial with regard to landlord
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tenant relationship and in fact, defendant admitted such
relationship and he also stated that payment of rent upto
31.07.2012 was made, however, it was contended that rent for
subsequent months were remitted via money order due to
landlord’s refusal to accept the same and as such, denied
arrears of rents or default in paying the rent. Apart from this,
defendant – respondent took a specific plea questioning the title
and ownership of the Trust over the property in question and
specifically pleaded that property in question is not “Trust
Property” since the same belongs to “Udasin Karshni Narain
Ashram Trust”. A further averment was made that construction
of the structure was completed prior to 1984 and as such,
cannot be presumed to have a character of public religious
charitable institution and therefore, falls within the purview of
U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and therefore, respondent – defendant
is entitled to get benefit of statutory provision, as provided
under the Act. In addition to this, a further averment was made
with regard to non service of statutory notice dated 22.09.2012
and in absence of such notice, tenancy remained unterminated.
Respondent – defendant also questioned about over valuation
of the suit, lack of authorised representation and as such, suit
filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and is liable to be
dismissed.
5. In response to the written statement, plaintiffs –
revisionists filed a replica by reiterating the averments that
shops, in question, belong to the Trust and the construction was
raised after sanction of the map and the same is new
construction and same is recorded in the Municipal record in
April, 2001 and therefore, the property, in question, is outside
the purview of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.
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6. The SCC Court framed as many as 7 issues and dismissed
the suit filed by the plaintiffs – revisionists by judgment and
decree dated 31.08.2022 and being aggrieved with the same,
now the instant revision has been preferred.
7. Mr. Rakesh Khanna, learned Sr. Advocate for the
revisionists argued that SCC Suit was filed by the revisionists –
plaintiffs with a specific plea that two shops i.e. shops no. 4 and
5 are in fact newly constructed building, which were
constructed after sanction of the map by the Development
Authority and thereafter, newly constructed building was
reassessed by the Municipal Corporation in 2001 and monthly
rent as shown in the Assessment Register is Rs. 1370 per month
for two shops and in the Assessment Register, defendant –
respondent is shown as tenant. Mr. Khanna, further submits
that relevant copy of the Assessment Register was filed before
the SCC Court and it was marked as Exhibit. In addition to this,
Original Trust Deed was also filed and he pointed out that
there is no specific denial with regard to the new construction
and only this much averment was made by defendant that
structure was old one and constructed prior to 1980.
8. Mr. Khanna, learned Sr. Advocate further submits that
the SCC Court totally on the wrong premises dismissed the suit
by holding that Trust Deed was not proved, though as a matter
of fact Original Trust Deed was placed on record, which is a
legal and valid document in terms of Section 90 of the Indian
Evidence Act. He further argued that defendant himself
admitted that “Ambadutt Pant” was receiving the rent on
behalf of the Trust, therefore, in terms of Section 116 of the
Indian Evidence Act, defendant – respondent cannot take a plea
that “Ambadutt Pant” is the actual owner or landlord of the
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shops in question. Mr. Khanna, learned Sr. Advocate further
argued that the SCC Court has wrongly dismissed the suit of
plaintiffs – revisionists since the suit was filed on the basis of
assessment made by Municipal Corporation in the year 2001
but the SCC court completely on wrong premises proceeded
with the assessment made in the year 1971 – 1987. He further
argued that it was a specific case of the plaintiffs before the SCC
court that after sanction of the map, new construction was
raised for which assessment was made by the Municipal
Corporation in the year 2001, therefore, the shops in question
are completely outside the purview of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972
and as such, the judgment and decree passed by the SCC Court
is completely illegal, unsustainable and liable to be set aside. In
reference to the submissions, as above Mr. Khanna, further
submits that admittedly, Trust Deed was placed before the SCC
Court and not only this, even the plaintiff Trust was
reconstituted on 06.01.1988 and Board of Trustees decided that
the Trust will function in the name and style of “Udasin
Karshni Narain Ashram Trust” and the management of the
trust property will be managed by the Board of Trustees, which
was reconstituted in 1988 and the reconstitution of Board of
Trustees was primarily contained in the gift deed dated
13.07.1930 executed by Lala Narayan Das and how the property
of the Trust will be managed and utilised it is clearly
mentioned in reconstitution deed. He also pointed out that
reconstitution deed also makes provision for appointment of
new trustees and also clearly set forth aims and objects of the
Trust which is charitable one. He further submits that
respondent – defendant paid rent to Ambadutt Pant, who was
admittedly the Manager of the plaintiff Trust and there is an
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admission of the respondent defendant in paragraph 3 of the
additional plea of written statement. Para 3 is read as under:
“यह की प्र�गतसंपि� ट�� संपि� नहीं है ब�� प्र�गत
संपि� श्री उदासीन िक्र�ी नारायण आश्रम के नाम से
चली आती है और अ�ाद�पंत बतौर ल�डलॉड�
िकरायेदारों से िकराया वसूल करते चले आते है |
इसकेिव�� कुल कथन वादीगण गलत , िम�ा,
िनराधारहै ।”
9. By referring the aforesaid of the respondent defendant
made in addition plea, Mr. Khanna, learned Sr. Advocate
submits that the defendant – respondent clearly admits that the
property, in question, continues to be in the name of Trust
namely “Udasin Karshni Narain Ashram Trust” and therefore,
the contention that property in question is not Trust Property is
thoroughly misconceived and misleading one. He further
submits that the SCC Court did not examine the recital of the
reconstitution deed as well as admission of defendant –
respondent in paragraph 3 of the additional plea and as such,
the finding as drawn by the SCC Court that the property in
question is not a Trust Property is completely unsustainable.
He submits that since the property in question is a Trust
Property and therefore, the same is exempted from the
operation of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in terms of Section 2 (1)
(bb) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.
10. Mr. Khanna, further argued that the suit in question was
preferred under the provisions of the Provincial Small Causes
Act and therefore, the SCC Court was not required to examine
the title and ownership of the property in question, since is
only the subject matter of the regular suit. He further submits
that in this particular case, there is an admission of the
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defendant – respondent that property in question is the
property of the Trust and as such, the question of ownership
need not require further adjudication, even is not germane to
the issue as raised in the SCC suit. With regard to existence of
landlord and tenant relationship, it is argued that in the plaint
there was specific averment that respondent – defendant is
tenant of the Trust and his tenancy was terminated by issuing
notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and
this fact has been admitted by the respondent – defendant in
paragraph 2 of the written statement that he is tenant of shops
in question and not only this, even in paragraph 4 of the
written statement defendant – respondent admits that he paid
rent till 31.07.2012 through receipts and property, in question,
continues to be in the name of Trust “Udasin Karshni Narain
Ashram Trust” and in fact, Ambadutt Pant received the rent
from tenants.
11. It is argued that Ambadutt Pant was the sole witness of
the plaintiffs, who reiterated the contents of the plaint and
during his cross examination, defendant – respondent could
not controvert the assertions made in the plaint. Moreover, the
recital of the written statement were not proved by adducing
any defence witness and since, as per the case of the defendant
-respondent, Ambadutt Pant used to realise the rent from the
tenants is more than sufficient to establish the relationship of
landlord and tenant between the parties. It is further argued
that defendant neither led any oral evidence nor documentary
evidence in support of his defence and there is nothing to
disapprove the version of the plaintiffs rather admission of the
defendant – respondent goes against him. He further argued
that even the rate of rent was not disputed by the defendant –
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respondent and therefore, there was existence of tenant and
landlord relationship between the parties.
12. Learned Sr. Advocate for the revisionist has placed
reliance of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Chowdamma (D) by LR and another Vs. Vankatappa (D)
by LRs 2025 INSC 1038 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held as under:
“59.A Court of law cannot offer refuge to studied silence
where a duty to disclose exists. The plaintiffs anchored
their claim in measured and unwavering testimony of
P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), an account rooted in personal
knowledge and long-standing familiarity, which
withstood the rigours of cross-examination. His evidence,
unshaken and consistent, found further corroboration in
the genealogical chart presented by the plaintiffs. It,
therefore, stands established that the plaintiffs have
discharged the evidentiary burden imposed upon them by
law. In contrast, the defendants, bereft of probative
material or candour, resorted solely to denials. When
measured against the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities, the scales unambiguously tilt in favour of
the plaintiffs”
13. Learned Sr. Advocate further submits that the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the afore-mentioned judgment has also placed
reliance upon judgment in the case of “Vidhyadhar v.
Manikrao and Anr. reported as under AIR 1999 SC 1441″
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the
witness box and states his own case on oath and does not
offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a8
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presumption would arise that the case set up by him is
not correct”
14. By referring the aforesaid judgments, Mr. Khanna,
learned Sr. Advocate, argued that respondent – defendant
could not substantiate his case with regard to applicability of
U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and even his version is not supported
by any evidence. On the contrary, plaintiffs placed on record
the reconstitution deed to establish that property in question is
a trust property. He further argued that respondent –
defendant also fails to even prima facie show his bona fide with
regard to compliance of Section 20 (4) of the Act and has
miserably failed to show that he deposited any rent or admitted
rent along with other heads as envisaged under Section 20 (4) of
the Act in the trial court, as it was incumbent upon for the
defendant – respondent to pay rent on the first date of hearing
and as such, there is no compliance of Section 20 (4) of the U.P.
Act No. 13 of 1972. Neither the defendant led any evidence to
show that he has complied with the requirement of the law nor
deposited the rent due with arrears. He further submits that
burden to prove that he continuously deposited the rent since
the date of institution of the suit was on the defendant but he
could not prove the same and furthermore, it is not clear
whether any deposit since the date of institution of the suit i.e.
from 01.04.2015 till 30.11.2015 was made and in what manner or
mode rent was deposited.
15. In reference to Order XV Rule 5 of CPC, reliance has been
placed by Mr. Khanna, of one of the judgment of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Asha Rani Gupta Vs. Vineet Kumar
(2023) 20 SCC 273 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in
paragraph 40 and 41 has held as under:
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“40. In a suit of the present nature, where the defendant
otherwise has not denied his status as being the lessee, it
was rather imperative for him to have scrupulously
complied with the requirements of law and to have
deposited the arrears of rent due together with interest on
or before the first date of hearing and in any case, as per
the second part of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 Order 15CPC,
he was under the specific obligation to make regular
deposit of the monthly amount due, whether he was
admitting any such dues or not.
41. In the context of the proposition of denial of title of
the plaintiff and denial of relationship of landlord and
tenant between the plaintiff and defendant, we may also
observe that such a denial simpliciter does not and
cannot absolve the lessee/tenant to deposit the due
amount of rent/damages for use and occupation, unless
he could show having made such payment in a lawful
and bona fide manner. Of course, the question of bona
fide is a question of fact, to be determined in every case
with reference to its facts but, it cannot be laid down as a
general proposition that by merely denying the title of the
plaintiff or relationship of landlord-tenant/lessor-lessee, a
defendant of the suit of the present nature could enjoy the
property during the pendency of the suit without
depositing the amount of rent/damages.”
16. On the other side, Mr. Piyush Garg, learned counsel for
the respondent – defendant has seriously opposed the
submissions of the learned Sr. Advocate by submitting that
property in question does not belong to the Trust and as such,
respondent defendant is not tenant of the Trust and also denied
that the fact about new construction since property was
constructed much prior to 1984 and therefore, U.P. Act No. 13
of 1972 is fully applicable. Apart from this, he submits that no
notice with regard to termination of tenancy was served. He
further submits that PW1 / plaintiff no. 3 Ambadutt Pant
himself admit that construction was old and the plaintiffs failed
to prove that construction was raised after 1985 rather it was
categorical case of the plaintiffs that it was old construction and
first assessment was made in the year 1971, which is evident
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from the admission of PW 1 – Ambadutt Pant, who admitted
that it was old construction and first assessment was made in
the year 1971.
17. Apart from this, Mr. Garg, submits that no document has
been produced to prove that the Trust, in question, is a
religious and charitable trust and plaintiffs did not lead any
evidence of religious and charitable work.
18. Mr. Garg also submits that even the plaintiffs failed to
lead evidence to establish the landlord and tenant relationship
and plaintiffs also failed to prove that plaintiff Trust is landlord
or owner of the property, in question and no further document
has been relied upon by the plaintiffs to show document for
transfer of property, as the trust deed is the deed of
appointment of trustees and the property cannot be transferred
by such deed and deed of appointment of new trustees cannot
be considered as document of transfer of property and
document remained unproved.
19. In reference to the arguments, as advanced by Mr.
Khanna, with regard to Section 90 of the Evidence Act Mr.
Garg submits that the said presumption regarding execution
only and has not contained authority to execute the document,
therefore, no document for transfer of property was proved in
this regard.
20. Mr. Garg further submits that evidence cannot be re-
appreciated at the stage of revision and as such, the finding of
facts cannot be disturbed under Section 25 of the Provincial
Small Cause Courts Act. In support of his contention, he has
placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Union of India Vs. Ibrahimuddin (2012) 8 SCC 148. In
addition to this, Mr. Garg further placed reliance on another
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judgment in the case of Sanjay Agarwal Vs. DJ, Haridwar
(2017) Supreme UK 80.
21. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
22. Undisputedly, by way of registered Trust Deed dated
06.01.1988, the trustees reconstituted the trust as public,
religious and charitable trust under Section 73 of the Trust Act
in the name of “Udasin Karshni Narain Ashram Trust” and the
property has been vested in it, which had been gifted by
registered deed dated 13.07.1930 under Section 75 of the Indian
Trust Act. After the reconstitution deed, the trust got the map
sanctioned from Municipal Corporation for reconstruction on
23.10.1989 and thereafter, the trust constructed 13 shops, which
were rented including two shops rented to respondent
defendant.
23. This is also undisputed fact that after reconstruction first
assessment of property tax was made in the name of “Udasin
Karshni Narain Ashram Trust” on 01.04.2001 wherein in
column 4 name of the Trust is shown. Moreover, the defendant
is also recorded as tenant of two shops which was subject
matter of the suti. Furthermore, there is no denial on the part of
the respondent that respondent defendant was paying rent of
the shops in question to Ambadutt Pant – plaintiff no. 3 and
rent was paid upto 31.07.2012. Thereafter, rent was sent by
money order which was purportedly was not taken by
plaintiffs and in written statement, respondent – defendant
admits that the property, in question, belongs to Udasin
Karshni Narain Ashram Trust. Plaintiffs no. 3 Ambadutt Pant
in his examination in chief prove exhibit deed 06.01.1988, notice
of termination of tenancy, postal receipt and acknowledgment
of refusing to accept the notice, certified copy of the first
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assessment of the property tax after reconstruction as well as
original trust deed.
24. Undisputedly, defendant did not lead any oral or
documentary evidence nor came into witness box and failed to
produce certified copy of the first tax assessment from the year
1971 to 1987 in the name of Udasin Karshni Narain Ashram
Trust, though as a matter of fact, after sanction of the map
shops were reconstructed and first assessment was made in the
year 2001. The SCC Court totally overlooked all these aspects
that after reconstruction assessment was made in the year 2001.
The plaintiffs in support of their case filed documentary
evidence but surprisingly the defendant never came forward to
come in the witness box despite this, the SCC Court dismissed
the suit, particularly, when the respondent defendant admits
that he was paying rent to plaintiff no. 3 – Ambadutt Pant, who
was admittedly the Manager of the Trust and being Manager of
the Trust, he received rent on behalf of the plaintiffs Trust.
25. Arguments as advanced by Mr. Piyush Garg are totally
untenable that it was an old construction based on old
assessment by ignoring this fact that property was reassessed in
2001 after reconstruction and as such, old assessment has no
relevance.
26. On perusal of the judgment of the trial court / SCC Court
it reveals that the trial court / SCC court has failed to apply it’s
judicial mind and dismissed the suit in a very cursory manner.
The SCC Court has also completely failed to consider this
aspect that Original Trust Deed is legal and valid document in
terms of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act and furthermore,
there is admission on behalf of the respondent defendant that
Ambadutt Pant was receiving the rent on behalf of the Trust
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and as such, in terms of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act,
respondent defendant cannot take a plea that property is not
owned by the Trust but owned by Ambadutt Pant, though as a
matter of fact, Ambadutt Pant was receiving rent on behalf of
Trust since he was Manager.
27. The stand of the respondent / defendant that
construction was old one appears to be misconceived and this
aspect has been totally overlooked by the trial Court / SCC
court that in fact, when the new construction was raised
reassessment was done by the Municipal Corporation in the
year 2001 and the finding of the SCC Court that it was old
construction cannot susutain.
28. In view of the discussion and observation as above, this
Court is of the view that judgment and decree passed by the
SCC Court is unsustainable since the provisions of the U.P. Act
No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable in the present case and as such,
present civil revision is allowed and the judgment and decree
passed by the trial court is set aside.
29. No order as costs.
(Rakesh Thapliyal, J.)
27.03.2026
SKS
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