Chattisgarh High Court
The Union Of India vs M/S Orissa Concrete And Allied … on 1 July, 2026
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
1
2026:CGHC:27469-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ARBA No. 38 of 2022
The Union Of India Through Its Principal Chief Engineer (Engineering), South
East Central Railway, Gms Building, 3rd Floor Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner
versus
M/s Orissa Concrete And Allied Industries Ltd. Through Its Director, Mr. Navin
Agrawal, S/o Shri Cv Agrawal, Age 50 Years, At Plot No. 53, Bhanpuri
Industries Area, P. O. Birgaon Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant
(Cause title is taken from CIS system)
For Appellant : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Dy.S.G.
For Respondent : Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate with
Mr. Rishabh Garg (Through V.C.) &
Mr. Shahurun Siddiqui, Advocates
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
BALRAM
PRASAD Hon'ble Shri Sachin Singh Rajput, Judge
DEWANGAN
Digitally signed
by BALRAM
PRASAD Order On Board
DEWANGAN
(01.07.2026)
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J
1. Heard on I.A. No.1 & 4, application for condonation of 263 days delay
in filing this arbitration appeal.
2
2. Appellant has preferred this appeal U/s. 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’) read with Section 13
(2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (for short ‘the Act of 2015’)
questioning the legality and sustainability of the impugned order dated
01.12.2021, passed in Arb. MJC No.15 of 2019, by the Commercial
Court (District Level), Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Raipur, whereby
Commercial Court has allowed the application filed by respondent
U/s.34 of the Act of 1996 setting aside the award passed by the sole
arbitrator for the reasons assigned therein.
3. Learned counsel for appellant would submit that delay occurred in
filing of this appeal is on account of administrative reasons. He
contended that after passing of the impugned order by the Commercial
Court on 01.12.2021, after obtaining certified copy, opinion has been
sought from Advocate representing railways. After receipt of opinion
from the Advocate representing railways before Commercial Court,
appellant thought it proper to take opinion from Mr. R.K. Gupta,
Advocate representing the railway department at High Court (Ex-
standing Counsel). The concerned Advocate thereafter has instructed
to collect the information and to discuss the matter along with officers,
who is well versed with the facts of the case. On the date of
appointment, the officers of the department attended and discussed
the issue with Mr. Gupta and thereafter, opinion has been forwarded
by concerned Advocate through e-mail. He contended that in the
application, specific dates have also been mentioned as to why some
extra time took for taking administrative decision of filing of this appeal.
There was sufficient cause for not filing of appeal within limitation as
prescribed under law. He also contended that once the document and
3
Vakalatnama has been forwarded on 25.03.2022 for preparing the
appeal and thereafter again Vakalatnama and document has been
resend. He submits that as sufficient cause has been shown, delay in
filing of appeal be condoned. In support of his contention, the counsel
relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M/s.
SAB Industries Limited Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors,
in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 21111 of 2024, decided on
07.02.2025.
4. Learned counsel for respondent opposes the submission of learned
counsel for appellant and would submit that appeal has been filed with
inordinate delay. The period of limitation prescribed for filing of appeal
before the High Court is 60 days that will start from 01.12.2021. He
contended that when first opinion has been sought for and received on
27.12.2021, pleadings multiple dates showing process that they have
taken the other favourable opinion would not be a good and sufficient
ground for condoning inordinate delay. He also pointed out that object
of promulgation of the legislation of the Act of 2015 was to provide
speedy disposal of the high level commercial disputes, so that early
resolution of commercial dispute shall create a positive image. He also
contended that Coordinate Bench of this Court in case of State of
Chhattisgarh Vs. Cube Engitech Consultants (P) Limited, in ARBA
No. 53 of 2023, decided on 20.12.2024 has dismissed the application
for condonation of delay of 42 days and consequently the appeal was
also dismissed.
4
5. We have heard learned counsel for parties and also perused the
application I.A.No.1 and I.A. No.4 and the reply submitted by
respondent.
6. In the facts of the case, where appellant has pleaded the dates and
events to show sufficient cause, is relevant therefore, I find it
appropriate to extract those paragraphs, which reads as under :-
“2. That, the Ld. Commercial Court has passed the
order dated 01.12.2021 and set aside the Sole
Arbitrator Shri Biplav Kumar’s award dated 25.02.2019
and the certified copy of instant order dated 01.12.2021
alongwith opinion of the contesting Railway Advocate
Shri Rajesh Kumar Dubey dated 22.12.2021 received in
the office of PCE/SECR/BSP on 27.12.2021.
Thereafter, on 28.12.2021, the opinion given by the
Railway Advocate Shri Rajesh Kumar Dubey on order
dated 01.12.2021 wherein it was opined that the
chances of success in the Hon’ble High Court were
less. Therefore, opinion was again obtained from
Railway Advocate of HC/CG Shri R.K.Gupta. Shri
R.K.Gupta Ex. Standing Counsel for Railway has
informed that he want to discuss in the matter.
3. That, a note was put up by the concerned CLA who
deals the office of PCE/SECR/BSP on 31.12.2021 for
taking administrative decision.
4. It is further submitted that, on 04.01.2022, the
XEN/TS endorse the note and forwarded to concerned
dealer to put up detailed note with remarks. Thereafter,
on dealer put up detailed note with remarks. Thereafter
on 07.01.2022, concerned dealer put up a detailed note
for further administrative decision and obtaining candid
opinion from Sr. LO/SECR/HQ. The Sr. LO/HQ/SECR
has informed vide 11.01.2022 for arranging arranging
5to depute a well conversant official alongwith desired
information to the chamber of Ld. Ex Standing Counsel
for Railway Shri R.K. Gupta for discussion vide his
email dated 28.12.2021.
5. That, on 12.01.2022, the Competent Authority has
deputed a competent official, Shri Imran, SSE/Estimate,
for discussion with Ex. Standing Counsel Shri
R.K.Gupta. The Ex Standing Counsel, Shri R.K. Gupta
has given appointment on 21.01.2022 for discussion in
the matter. The competent official has attended the
chamber of Shri R.K.Gupta on 21.02.2022. Due to busy
schedule of Shri R.K. Gupta, Ex. Standing Counsel, for
Railway he sent his candid opinion through email on
05.02.2022.
6. The case file was returned by Shri R.K.Gupta Ex
Standing Counsel for Railway on 18.02.2022.
Thereafter, after obtaining legal opinion from Ex.
Standing Counsel Shri R.K. Gupta, the file was further
put up on 21.02.2022 through XEN/TS, Dy.CE/TS &
CTE/SECR/BSP to Sr. LO/HQ/SECR/BSP.
7. That, on 21.02.2022, the Sr. LO/HQ has opined that
Ld. Standing Counsel of Hon’ble High Court/CG
appears to be in order. On 28.02.2022, the file was
further put up to CTE/SECR/BSP. Further, on
03.03.2022, the official PCE/SECR/BSP office further
put up a note for taking approval of PCE/SECR/BSP.
Thereafter, the note was forwarded through
CTE/SECR/BSP for approval of PCE/SECR/BSP on
04.03.2022.
8. The PCE/SECR/BSP has approved the proposal on
05.03.2022 for challenging the order of Ld. Commercial
Court/Raipur’s order dated 01.12.2021. Thereafter, on
10.03.2022, with the approval of PCE/SECR/BSP, the
6matter was sent to FA&CAO/SECR/BSP for
concurrence.
9. The Finance has provided concurrence on
11.03.2022. Due to change of policy for appointment of
Central Government Advocate in lieu of Railway
Advocate, a detailed note was further put up to
22.03.2022.
10.That, on 25.03.2022 all the relevant documents and
Vakalatnama was sent to the office of Dy. SG/HC/CG
for preparing appeal on behalf of Railway Administration
and all the documents and Vakalatnama were again
sent on 19.07.2022. Draft appeal was received from
Dy.SG/HC/CG by the office of PCE/SECR/BSP
necessary correction and signature of Competent
Authority and the same was sent to the office of Dy.
S.G./HC/CG on 09.09.2022 after signature of
Competent authority.”
7. Perusal of the application in which the pleadings have been made to
assign reasons for delay would show that the order of Commercial
Court was passed on 01.12.2021. Copy of order of Commercial Court
along with opinion of Advocate of department, who appeared before
the Commercial Court, received on 22.12.2021. From the pleadings it
is also apparent that Mr. R.K. Gupta, Advocate (Ex. Standing Counsel
for Railway) forwarded the opinion on 05.02.2022 and according to
pleadings the records kept were returned back on 18.02.2022. It is
also appearing that proposal for challenging the order of Commercial
Court is dated 05.03.2022. Even these pleading made, is not
supported by any documents. The respondent may have recorded a
proceeding in writing for events, which is pleaded in the application but
chose not to file any documents in support of the pleadings. In the
7
month of March, 2022, i.e. 10.03.2022 matter was sent for
concurrence to finance department. Appellant department is well
aware with regard to provisions of law and the limitation as provided
under the Act of 2015 of filing of appeal before High Court.
8. The object of promulgation of the Act of 1996 as also the Act of 2015 is
to decide the commercial dispute between the parties at the earliest.
The reasons assigned in the application seeking condonation of delay,
whether to be sufficient cause or not is to be considered keeping in
mind the object of the Act of 2015.
9. If the pleadings made in the application is to be considered along with
the provisions of the Act of 2015 and its object, we are of the view that
no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay of 263 days
in filing of this appeal. Perusal of the application would also show that
there is no sufficient cause for not filing the appeal immediately after
getting the opinion of filing of appeal in the month of February and
concurrence of Finance Department 25.03.2022. From the date as
mentioned in the memo of appeal it is apparent that appeal is filed only
on 21.10.2022 challenging the order dated 01.12.2021 of the
Commercial Court.
10. This appeal is filed under Section 13 (1) of the Act of 2015 read with
Section 37 of the Act of 1996. Limitation prescribed under Section 13
(1A) of the Act of 2015 for filing an appeal is 60 days from the date of
judgment or order.
11. Hon’ble Supreme Court In case of Government of Maharashtra
(Water Resources Department) Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers &
Contractors Private Limited, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 has
8
observed that sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of the Act of 2015
provides the forum for appeals as well as limitation period to be
followed. Section 13 of the Act of 2015 being a special law as
compared with the Limitation Act, which is a general law, which follows
from a reading of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Section 13 (1-A)
of the Act of 2015 lays down a period of limitation of 60 days uniformly
for all appeals that are preferred under Section 37 of the Act of 1996.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has also considered
as to whether delay can be condoned or not, if appeal under Section
13 (1-A) of the Act of 2015 is filed with delay, and observed thus:-
“34. The vexed question which faces us is whether,
first and foremost, the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is excluded by the scheme of the
Commercial Courts Act, as has been argued by Dr
George. The first important thing to note is that Section
13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not contain
any provision akin to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration
Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act only
provides for a limitation period of 60 days from the date
of the judgment or order appealed against, without
further going into whether delay beyond this period can
or cannot be condoned.
***
41. Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act was also
pressed into service stating that the non obstante
clause contained in the Commercial Courts Act would
override other Acts, including the Limitation Act, as a
result of which, the applicability of Section 5 thereof
would be excluded. This argument has been
addressed in the context of the IBC in B.K. Educational
Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates [B.K.
9Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta &
Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ)
528] , as follows : (SCC p. 664, para 41)“41. Shri Dholakia argued that the Code being
complete in itself, an intruder such as the
Limitation Act must be shut out also by
application of Section 238 of the Code which
provides that, ‘notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law
for the time being in force’, the provisions of the
Code would override such laws. In fact, Section
60(6) of the Code specifically states as follows:
’60. Adjudicating authority for corporate
persons.–(1)-(5)***(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) or in any other
law for the time being in force, in computing the
period of limitation specified for any suit or
application by or against a corporate debtor for
which an order of moratorium has been made
under this Part, the period during which such
moratorium is in place shall be excluded.’This provision would have been wholly unnecessary if
the Limitation Act was otherwise excluded either by
reason of the Code being complete in itself or by virtue
of Section 238 of the Code. Both, Section 433 of the
Companies Act as well as Section 238-A of the Code,
apply the provisions of the Limitation Act “as far as may
be”. Obviously, therefore, where periods of limitation
have been laid down in the Code, these periods will
apply notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in the Limitation Act. From this, it does not
follow that the baby must be thrown out with the
10bathwater. This argument, therefore, must also be
rejected.”
42. For all these reasons we reject the argument made
by Shri George that the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is excluded given the scheme of the
Commercial Courts Act.
***
50. From this paragraph, what was sought to be
argued was that the limitation of power on a civil court
at the initial stage can be read as a limitation onto the
appellate court, as was done in the aforesaid
judgments. We are afraid that we are unable to agree.
This sentence was in the context of a decree passed in
a civil suit for a sum of rupees 3.09 lakhs with interest,
without taking into consideration the fact that an
amount of rupees 2.10 lakhs had already been
deposited by the appellant in criminal proceedings. The
Court relied upon Section 357(5) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 to hold that “the court” shall
take into account any sum paid or recovered as
compensation at the time of awarding compensation in
any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter.
“The court” would obviously include an appellate court
as well. It was only in this context that the aforesaid
observation of limitation of power on a civil court being
“borne in mind” by the appellate court, was made.
51. Shri George’s reliance upon the judgment of this
Court in P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar [P. Radha Bai
v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445 : (2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 773] (at paras 36.2-36.3) on the doctrine of
unbreakability when applied to Section 34(3) of the
Arbitration Act, also does not carry the matter much
further, as the question is whether this doctrine can be
bodily lifted and engrafted onto an appeal provision
11
that has no cut-off point beyond which delay cannot be
condoned.
52. For all these reasons, given the illuminating
arguments made in these appeals, we are of the view
that N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of
Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275]
has been wrongly decided and is therefore overruled.
53. However, the matter does not end here. The
question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a
uniform 60-day period of limitation. At one extreme, we
have the judgment in N.V. International [N.V.
International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] which does not allow
condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other
extreme, we have an open-ended provision in which
any amount of delay can be condoned, provided
sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two
extremes that we have to steer a middle course.”
12. In the aforementioned case Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the
law as to when delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 13
of the Act of 2015 can be condoned. It was observed as follows:-
“55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37
of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or
117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided
by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the
speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act
consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to
discover as to what the expression “sufficient cause”
12
means in the context of condoning delay in filing
appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
56. The expression “sufficient cause” contained in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield
different results depending upon the object and context
of a statute. Thus, in Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab
[Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 381] , this
Court, in the context of Section 11(5) of the Punjab
Land Reforms Act, 1972, held as follows : (SCC pp.
386-87, paras 10-11)
“10. Permitting an application under Section 11(5)
to be moved at any time would have disastrous
consequences. The State Government in which
the land vests on being declared as surplus, will
not be able to utilise the same. The State
Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely
before putting the land to use. Where the land is
utilised by the State Government, a consequence
of the order passed subsequently could be of
divesting it of the land. Taking the facts of the
present case by way of an illustration, it would
mean that the land which stood mutated in the
State Government in 1982 and which was allotted
by the State Government to third parties in 1983,
would as a result of reopening the settled
position, lead to third parties being asked to
restore back the land to the State Government
and the State Government in turn would have to
be divested of the land. The land will in turn be
restored to the landowner. This will be the result
of the land being declared by the Collector as not
surplus with the landowner. The effect of
permitting such a situation will be that the land
will remain in a situation of flux. There will be no
finality. The very purpose of the legislation will be
13
defeated. The allottee will not be able to utilise
the land for fear of being divested in the event of
deaths and births in the family of the landowners.
Deaths and births are events which are bound to
occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to read a time-
limit in sub-section (5) of Section 11. The concept
of reasonable time in the given facts would be
most appropriate. An application must be moved
within a reasonable time. The facts of the present
case demonstrate that redetermination under
sub-section (5) of Section 11 almost 5 years after
the death of Kartar Kaur and more than 6 years
after the order of the Collector declaring the land
as surplus had become final, has resulted in
grave injustice besides defeating the object of the
legislation which was envisaged as a socially
beneficial piece of legislation. Thus we hold that
the application for redetermination filed by Daya
Singh under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the
Act on 21-6-1985 was liable to be dismissed on
the ground of inordinate delay and the Collector
was wrong in reopening the issue declaring the
land as not surplus in the hands of Daya Singh
and Kartar Kaur.
11. The above reasoning is in consonance with
the provision in sub-section (7) of Section 11 of
the Act. Sub-section (7) uses the words ‘where
succession has opened after the surplus area or
any part thereof has been determined by the
Collector…’. The words “determined by the
Collector” would mean that the order of the
Collector has attained finality. The provisions
regarding appeals, etc. contained in Sections 80-
82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as made
applicable to proceedings under the Punjab Land
14
Reforms Act, 1972, show that the maximum
period of limitation in case of appeal or review is
ninety days. The appeal against the final order of
the Collector dated 30-9-1976 whereby 3.12 ha of
land had been declared as surplus was
dismissed on 27-3-1979. The order was allowed
to become final as it was not challenged any
further. Thus the determination by the Collector
became final on 27-3-1979. The same could not
be reopened after a lapse of more than 6 years
by order dated 23-7-1985. The subsequent
proceedings before the Revenue Authorities did
not lie. The order dated 23-7-1985 is non est. All
the subsequent proceedings therefore fall
through. The issue could not have been
reopened.”
(emphasis supplied)
***
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both
the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that
is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long
delays beyond the period provided by the appeal
provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient
cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in
Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC
81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate”
or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the
word “sufficient” embraces no more than that
15
which provides a platitude, which when the act
done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended
in the facts and circumstances existing in a case,
duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation
of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR
1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770] ,
Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3
SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this
16
Court explained the difference between a “good
cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that
every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is
complied with on a lesser degree of proof than
that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only [Ed. : The
matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original.] so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed
to the party concerned [Ed. : The matter between
two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] ,
whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v.
Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao
v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.’ The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
17
which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,
stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is
not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse
of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s
Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts
have expressed at least three differing
reasons supporting the existence of statutes
of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3)
that persons with good causes of actions
should pursue them with reasonable
diligence.’An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of
what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have been
lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or
laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI
Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh
v. Santa Singh [Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh,
(1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v.
Jalgaon Medium Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v.
18
Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
[P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka,
(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this
Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in
the face of law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to
be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing
any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning
the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
19
***
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is
involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay
cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in
Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.
[Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2
SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] [“Postmaster
General”], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29)
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this Court.
They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with
court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was
no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various
earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
20
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file
was kept pending for several months/years due
to considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process. The government departments are
under a special obligation to ensure that they
perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an
anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.”
13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Borse Brothers (supra), has
considered unexplained delay of 75 days to be long delay and further
observing that reasons assigned in the application seeking
condonation of delay to be short of making out sufficient cause and the
delay condoned by High Court was set aside. Coordinate Bench of this
Court in case of Cube Engitech Consultants (P) Ltd. (supra) has
dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay of 42 days.
14. In case of Chief Engineer Public Works Department, National
Highway Zone Vs. Rohit Sidar and Ors. In Arb. No.75 of 2025,
decided on 23.02.2026, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court
dismissed the application seeking condonation of delay observing that
obtaining legal opinion, administrative approvals, superannuation of
21
the officer-in-charge and procedural delays did not constitute sufficient
cause.
15. In case of East Central Railway & Ors. Vs. Pratibha Royal (JV),
reported in MANU/BH/0146/2026, the High Court of Patna has refused
to condone the delay of 85 days observing that explanation based on
the file movement, inter-departmental deliberations, legal opinions and
multi-level administrative approvals were vague, routine and did not
constitute bonafide or sufficient cause.
16. In case of Postmaster General vs Living Media India Ltd., reported
in (2012) 3 SCC 563, Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that it is
right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red
tape in the process. The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be
used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The
law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few. The decision in Postmaster General (supra)
has been followed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in cases
of State of Rajasthan vs Balkishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592; State of
UP vs Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422; State of T.N. vs. N.
Suresh Rajan, (2014) SCC 11 709 and State of MP vs Bherulal, (2020)
10 SCC 654.
22
17. For the foregoing discussions in the facts of the case and also in view
of the law enunciated by Hon’ble Supreme Court as discussed above
we are of the considered view that appellant failed to make out a case
of sufficient cause to condone the delay of 263 days in filing of appeal.
18. Accordingly, I.A. No.1 and 4, application seeking condonation of delay
of 263 days is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal filed U/s. 37 of the
Act of 1996 read with Section 13 (2) of the Act of 2015 is also
dismissed as barred by limitation.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge Judge
Balram
