Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
The State Of Rajasthan vs Madan Lal S/O Ramniwas on 23 July, 2026
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 229/2014
URN: CW / 393U / 2014
The State of Rajasthan through Tehsildar Jamwaramgarh,
District Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Madan Lal, S/o Ramniwas, R/o Andhi, Tehsil
Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
2. Laduram, S/o Moolchand, R/o Andhi, Tehsil
Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
3. Hanuman, S/o Moolchand, R/o Andhi, Tehsil
Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
4. Laxminarayan, S/o Moolchand, R/o Andhi, Tehsil
Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
5. Girraj Prasad, S/o Ram Kishore Sharma, R/o Andhi, Tehsil
Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
6. Radhey Shyam, S/o Ramji Lal Sharma, R/o Andhi, Tehsil
Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
7. Om Prakash S/o Sh. Ramjilal Sharma, R/o Bhagwanpura,
Tehsil Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
8. Smt. Gulabdevi, W/o Bhanwar Lal Sharma, (since
deceased) through her legal heir.
8/1. Jagdish S/o Bhanwar Lal Sharma, R/o Plot No. A-25
Laxminarainpuri, Jaipur.
9. Suresh Chandra S/o Sh. Harinarayan Sharma, R/o
Bhagwanpura, Tehsil Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur.
10. Choganlal Sharma (since deceased) through his legal heir-
Kajodmal, S/o Chougan Lal
Radhey Shyam, S/o Chougan Lal
Siyaram
All sons of Chougan Lal, R/o Nayabas Jamwaramgarh, District
Jaipur.
11. Board of Revenue Rajasthan, Ajmer.
12. Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur.
13. Gram Panchayat Phutalao, Tehsil Jamwaramgarh, District
Jaipur through its Sarpanch Shri Jitendra Sharma, S/o Shri Ram
Swaroop Sharma
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. G.S. Gill, AAG with
Mr. Manoj Choudhary,
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Mr. Yadvendra Patel and
Ms. Ritu Mishra
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, Sr. Adv. assisted
by Mr. Rakshit Jain,
Mr. Raghavendra Singh Khichi
Mr. Sandeep Pathak with
Mr. Utkarsh Meena
Mr. Arnav Singh
Mr. Jitendra Mishra with
Mr. Sanjay Sharma for
Mr. Himanshu Sogani
Mr. Sanjay Sharma
Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parashar
Mr. Krishan Sharma with
Mr. Pawan Sharma and
Mr. Vaibhav Pancholy
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
Date of conclusion of arguments :: 09.07.2026
Date on which judgment was reserved :: 09.07.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the
operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement :: 23.07.2026
1. By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner- State
of Rajasthan has challenged judgment dated 16.04.2013 passed
by the Board of Revenue, whereby appeal filed by the petitioner
against judgment dated 24.10.2002 passed by the Revenue
Appellate Authority, Ajmer has been dismissed. Petitioner has
further prayed for upholding order dated 22.05.2002 passed by
the Additional Collector-III, Jaipur for cancelling mutation Entry
No.25 dated 12.04.1961.
2. Facts in brief are that land bearing Khasra No.2 Rakba
7.02 Bigha, Khasra No.3 Rakba 4.10 Bigha, Khasra No.9 Rakba
4.18 Bigha, Khasra No.24 Rakba 08.18 Bigha, Khasra No.25 Rakba
8.13 Bigha, Khasra No.27 Rakba 10.08 Bigha, Khasra No.28 Rakba
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4.12 Bigha, Khasra No.39 Rakba 4.17 Bigha, Khasra No.30 Rakba
8.05 Bigha, Khasra No.46 Rakba 9.07 Bigha, Khasra No.47 Rakba
3.11 Bigha, Khasra No.48 Rakba 10.08 Bigha total Kita 12 Rakba
91 Bigha 05 Biswa is situated in Village Phutolao, Tehsil
Jamwaramgarh, District Jaipur. Khatedari rights in respect of
aforesaid land were granted in favour of respondent- Madan Lal on
12.04.1961. Allegations of the petitioner are i.e. on 12.04.1961,
the respondent- Madan Lal was a minor, ageing 10 years, and his
father was patwari in the Revenue Department.
3. A complaint was made in respect of several
irregularities committed in making different revenue
entries/allotments in Village Phutolao, Tehsil Jamwaramgarh,
District Jaipur. State Government constituted Justice B.P. Beri
Commission to conduct enquiry into the matter. After examining
the record, Beri Commission gave its report dated 28.01.1995
with the opinion that such allotments and khatedari rights were
illegal, and accordingly recommendation was made to cancel such
allotment by undertaking exercise under Rule 14(4) of the
Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment of Agricultural Land) Rules,
1970 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1970'), after
affording opportunity of hearing to the concerned person.
4. Petitioner has set up a case that in view of the
recommendation given by the Beri Commission, Case No.48/95
was registered by the Court of Additional District Collector-III,
Jaipur under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970. However, during the
proceedings, the Additional Collector-III noticed that it was not a
case of allotment under the Rules of 1970 and rather khatedari
rights were conferred upon Madan Lal by virtue of Section 15 of
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the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, hence, no action can be taken
against the concerned Khatedar under the allotment Rules of
1970; however, the Additional Collector-III came to the conclusion
that since at the time of conferment of khatedari rights,
respondent- Madan Lal was a minor, aging 10 years and his father
Ram Prasad was patwari in Revenue Department, therefore, the
Mutation Entry No.25 dated 12.04.1961 was cancelled.
5. Thereafter, the affected persons filed appeal before the
Revenue Appellate Authority under Section 75 of the Rajasthan
Land Revenue Act, 1956. The Revenue Appellate Authority allowed
the appeal and quashed order dated 22.05.2002 passed by the
Additional Collector-III.
6. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed second appeal
under Section 76 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 for
assailing the judgment dated 24.10.2002 passed by the Revenue
Appellate Authority. However, the second appeal filed by the
petitioner has been dismissed by the Board of Revenue vide
judgment dated 16.04.2013.
7. Mr. G.S. Gill, learned Additional Advocate General, at
the outset submitted that the Revenue Appellate Authority as well
as Board of Revenue have utterly failed to appreciate that order
dated 22.05.2002 was passed by the Additional Collector-III in the
capacity of Land Record Officer, therefore, such order could have
been challenged only before the Director, Land Records and not
before the Revenue Appellate Authority. Hence, judgment dated
24.10.2002 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority was
without jurisdiction, and this aspect was also not properly
appreciated by the Board of Revenue. Learned AAG submitted that
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the question of jurisdiction, although not raised by the petitioner
before the Revenue Appellate Authority, goes to the root of the
matter, it could have been raised by the petitioner at any stage.
Hence, it was rightly raised by the petitioner at the stage of
second appeal before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue
could not have avoided decision over the question of jurisdiction of
the First Appellate Authority. Consequently, the judgment dated
24.10.2002 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority as well as
judgment dated 16.04.2013 passed by the Board of Revenue,
Ajmer are suffering from serious error of law and jurisdiction.
Learned AAG placed reliance upon judgment of Supreme Court in
Harshad Chimanlal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr., AIR
2006 SC 646.
8. Learned AAG reiterated the pleadings that after inquiry,
Beri Commission recommended for cancellation of khatedari rights
of respondents on account of the fact that in the year 1961, when
mutation was opened, the beneficiary was a minor and his father
was patwari, who had used his influence to open the mutation in
favour of his minor son. Learned AAG submits that as such
apparent illegality have been committed by the Revenue
Authorities while opening mutation in favour of the respondents,
which was rightly cancelled by the Additional Collector-III, but
without properly examining the legal provisions order passed by
the Additional Collector has wrongly been quashed by Revenue
Appellate Authority and such illegal order of Revenue Appellate
Authority have been upheld by the Board of Revenue.
9. The writ petition was opposed by the respondents.
Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, appearing for the
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respondents submitted that learned Revenue Appellate Authority
as well as Board of Revenue have passed the impugned judgments
after duly appreciating facts of the case, material on record and
law prevailing at the relevant time, and there is no infirmity or
illegality in the impugned judgments. There are concurrent
findings of facts of two Courts against the petitioner, who has
utterly failed to point out any perversity in the impugned
judgments. Hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is liable
to be rejected.
10. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents
submitted that at this stage, the question of jurisdiction of
Revenue Appellate Authority to entertain appeal against order
dated 22.05.2002 passed by the Additional District Collector-III
cannot be raised by the petitioner- State, and even otherwise such
objection is totally misconceived and baseless. It is emphasized
that bare perusal of order dated 22.05.2002 would make it clear
that such order has been passed while exercising powers under
Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970.
11. The aforesaid order dated 22.05.2002 passed by the
Additional District Collector-III also refers to recommendation
made by Beri Commission to take legal action in the matter, and it
is also evident from the recommendation of Beri Commission
dated 28.01.1995, that the Commission specifically recommended
for taking action for cancellation of allotment/regularisation after
giving notice under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970. Learned
Senior counsel also submits that as per statutory scheme, remedy
of appeal against an order passed under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of
1970 admittedly lies before the Court of Revenue Appellate
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Authority and on filing appeal by the respondents before the
Revenue Appellate Authority, notices were issued to the petitioner-
State Government, which contested the matter on merits, without
raising any objection whatsoever with regard to lack of jurisdiction
by the Revenue Appellate Authority. Although, such objection was
later raised by the State Government in second appeal filed before
the Board of Revenue by the State Government, yet such
objection of the State Government has rightly been rejected by
the Board of Revenue with a cogent finding that the question with
regard to maintainability of appeal before the Revenue Appellate
Authority cannot be raised at this stage of second appeal,
especially since it was never raised by the petitioner before the
concerned Revenue Appellate Authority.
12. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that such
objection with regard to maintainability of appeal before the
Revenue Appellate Authority is being raised by the respondent-
State, solely on the ground that although the application was filed
by the State Government under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970
before the Additional District Collector-III, yet instead of
exercising powers under the aforesaid Rules, the Additional
District Collector on his own allegedly assumed jurisdiction under
Section 15 and order was passed by him in the capacity of Land
Record Officer.
13. Learned Senior counsel submitted that the moment, the
Additional District Collector realised that the application under
Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970 filed by the State Government was
not maintainable under the Rules, he could have rejected the
same by granting liberty to the State to move proper application
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under the relevant Rules. Once, the application was entertained by
the Additional Collector under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970 and
order was passed thereupon, the only remedy before the private
respondents was to approach the Appellate Authority established
for hearing appeals against order passed under Rule 14(4) of the
Rules of 1970. It has not been disputed by the State Government
that the appeal against an order passed under Rule 14(4) of the
Rules of 1970 is maintainable before the Revenue Appellate
Authority, which has got right to entertain and adjudicate such
appeals on merits. At the cost of repetition, it was submitted that
since, no objection with regard to maintainability of appeal before
the Revenue Appellate Authority was raised by the State
Government, hence, such appeal has rightly been decided by the
Revenue Appellate Authority on merits.
14. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that ground
for cancellation of mutation, as given in order dated 22.05.2002
by the Additional District Collector, is that at the relevant time,
Madan Lal, was a minor aging only ten years and his father since,
was holding the post of Patwari in the respondent- Revenue
Department, might have influenced the proceedings with regard to
opening of mutation No.25 dated 12.04.1961. Learned Senior
counsel further submits that the documents with regard to age of
Madan Lal were placed on record showing his date of birth as
31.10.1941 on the basis of certificate issued by the Head Master
of Government Middle School, Andhi, and in case, age of Madan
Lal is calculated on the basis of aforesaid date of birth, then as on
the date of opening of mutation entry, Madan Lal had completed
age of around 19 and half years. Thus, it is evident from the
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record that on the date of mutation entry, Madan Lal was not a
minor.
15. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that
assuming for a moment that as on the date of opening of
mutation, Madan Lal was minor and had not attained age of
majority, even then in the instant case, where mutation was
opened under Section 15 which is nothing but conferment of
khatedari rights by operation of law in favour of the tenants, and
under such provision or anywhere in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,
1955 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 1955’) there is no
prohibition whatsoever regarding conferment of khatedari rights
upon a minor. Hence, viewing it from any angle, the ground for
cancellation of mutation entry vide order dated 22.05.2002 was
totally misconceived and against the provisions of law.
16. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that so far as
allegation that father of Madan Lal was a Patwari is concerned, a
categorical statement was made by learned Senior Counsel that it
is not disputed that father of Madan Lal was holding the post of
Patwari, yet the correct facts are that he was not holding the
charge of concerned Patwar Halka (concerned area). Hence, he
was having no control whatsoever over the functioning of revenue
authorities of that particular revenue village in respect of which
mutation entry No.25 dated 12.04.1961 was made. Learned
Senior counsel further submits that no evidence whatsoever has
been placed on record so as to infer any kind of influence of father
of Madan Lal, which might have affected the mutation
proceedings. Merely, the fact that father of Khatedar was an
official in the Revenue Department, ipso facto, does not lead to
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any adverse inference on the basis of fake assumptions, and
otherwise also there is no prohibition under law in conferring
khatedari rights even to those persons, whose family members
are employed in respondent- Revenue Department.
17. Learned Senior counsel also submitted that the time
gap between opening of mutation entry dated 12.04.1961 and
cancellation thereof vide order dated 22.05.2002 is of more than
40 years, and assuming for a moment that there is no prescribed
limitation for cancelling the mutation entry under the Act of 1955,
yet such action even if, not directly affected by law of limitation,
can be permitted to be taken within a reasonable time and by no
stretch of imagination a gap of more than 40 years between the
sanction of mutation entry and cancellation thereof can be said to
be a reasonable time.
18. Mr. Sandeep Pathak, learned counsel appearing for
some of the contesting respondents while adopting the arguments
raised by Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, learned Senior counsel present for
co-respondents submitted that the entire exercise undertaken by
the Additional District Collector under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of
1970 in order to cancel a mutation entry opened by virtue of
Sections 15 of the Act of 1955, was without authority of law and
jurisdiction; hence, no illegality or infirmity whatsoever has been
committed by the Revenue Appellate Authority as well as the
Board of Revenue in quashing the order passed by the Additional
District Collector-III dated 22.05.2002.
19. It was also pointed out by learned counsel for the
respondents that at the relevant time there was no process in the
then State of Jaipur for maintaining jamabandis and making
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entries therein. For the purpose of record, Khasra Girdawari used
to be regularly maintained, and in the Khasra Girdawari prepared
for the period prior to mutation entry dated 12.04.1961 name of
Madan Lal was there as tenant of land in question, hence, in view
of Section 15 of the Act of 1955 read with Section 19, no mistake
whatsoever has been committed in opening mutation in favour of
Madan Lal, who was in cultivatory possession before the
commencement of the Act of 1955.
20. Learned Senior counsel for the respondents relied upon
the judgments of Surajmal Vs. State of Rajasthan (1959 RRD
173), Abdul Hameed Khan Vs. Board of Revenue (2006 (1)
RLW (RJ) 52), Mor Mukut Singh Vs. Board of Revenue
(2015 0 Supreme (Raj.) 374), Deepa Vs. State of Rajasthan
& Ors. (1996 RRD 535), State of Rajasthan Vs. Prem
Shankar (2001 (1) DNJ 248), Niranjan Singh Vs. State of
Rajasthan (AIR 1975 Raj. 93), Brij Lal Vs. Board of Revenue
(1994 AIR (SC) 1128), Radha Kishan Vs. State of Rajasthan
(2016 (2) WLC 96), Tara & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan &
Anr. (2015 SCC OnLine Raj. 1332) and Santoshkumar
Shivgonda Patil and Ors. Vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale &
Ors.
20. Final arguments advanced by learned counsel for both
the parties, were heard by this Court on 09.07.2026, and after
conclusion of arguments, the matter was closed and judgment
was reserved on that day itself.
21. Thereafter, photocopy of an application under Article
226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 151 CPC for
taking additional documents on record was supplied to the office
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of this Court and on enquiry, it was found that although the
arguments were concluded by both the parties on 09.07.2026 and
in their presence the judgment was reserved, without seeking
prior permission of this Court, the said application has been filed
by the petitioner in Registry on 13.07.2026. It is settled
proposition of law that after conclusion of the arguments and
moreso, when judgment has been reserved, rights of both the
parties with regard to filing of any additional documents of
pleadings also stand closed and the Court is required to deliver the
judgment on the basis of pleadings, documents and material
already on record as well as on the basis of arguments advanced
by both the parties. The reason behind such proposition is that the
proceedings of the case cannot be allowed to continue for an
uncertain period and must come to an end, insofar as filing of
pleadings and documents are concerned, as soon as the judgment
is reserved by the Court.
22. This Court finds that even otherwise the said
application dated 13.07.2026 filed by the petitioner- State
Government is malicious in nature, for the reason that on perusal
of different order-sheets of this case, it would reveal that earlier
on so many occasions, last opportunity was granted to the
petitioner place documents on record and to argue the matter. On
07.08.2025, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court passed the
following order:-
“Again a request has been made by the counsel for
the petitioner to defer the matter for some other day.
Counsel for the respondents opposed the prayer
and submitted that every time, the same request is made
whenever the matter is listed before this Court.
By way of last opportunity, list on 18.08.2025.
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (13 of 30) [CW-229/2014]It is made clear that no further request for
adjournment would be entertained on the next date.”
23. When despite the order dated 07.08.2025 making it
clear that no request for adjournment would be entertained in
future, again on 18.08.2025, a similar request was made
thereupon, whereby the Court passed the following order:-
“Counsel for the petitioner seeks time to argue the
matter.
Counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer.
By way of last opportunity, list this matter on
26.08.2025.
It is made clear that no further request for
adjournment would be entertained on the next date.”
24. Thereafter on 09.09.2025, while observing the conduct
of the petitioner, following order was passed by the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court:-
“Again a request has been by counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner to defer the matter for some other
day.
Counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer and
submitted that this petition is lying pending for
adjudication before this Court since 2014 and every time,
time has been sought.
Counsel submits that on last occasion also last
opportunity was granted to the counsel for the petitioner
to argue the matter. Counsel submits that looking to the
issue involved in this matter, the matter requires urgent
hearing.
In the interest of justice, last and final opportunity
is granted to the counsel for the petitioner to argue the
matter.
List this matter in next week.
In case, similar request is made on the next date,
appropriate orders would be passed.”
25. Thereafter, when the matter was listed on 19.09.2025,
learned counsel for the petitioner- State sought time to file
relevant documents and such prayer was seriously opposed by
learned Senior counsel for the respondents, still in the interest of
justice by way of granting last opportunity, the matter was posted
on 14.10.2025 with clear instructions that no further request for
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adjournment would be entertained. On 19.09.2025, following
order was passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court:-
“Counsel for the State-petitioner again needs some
time to produce relevant documents on the record.
Counsel submits that while preparing the matter, some
facts have come into notice, which are required to be
taken on record by way of filing appropriate application.
Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
opposed the prayer and submitted that concurrent finding
has been recorded against the petitioner. This petition is
lying pending before this Court since 2014 and the case
has been deferred from one date to another. Counsel
submits that looking to the issue involved in the matter,
the case requires urgent hearing, therefore the case be
not deferred.
By way of last opportunity, list this matter again on
14.10.2025.
It is made clear that no further request for
adjournment would be entertained on the next date.”
26. The aforesaid orders clearly show that despite granting
so many opportunities, referring the same to be last opportunities,
petitioner- State always avoided to argue the matter, and in order
to cause delay even a request was made to produce relevant
documents, which allegedly came to notice of learned counsel for
the petitioner during preparation of the case. Accordingly, on
19.09.2025, last opportunity was given to the petitioner- State.
27. Thereafter, even after a lapse of long time period of
more than four months, no document whatsoever was filed by the
petitioner- State, then on 03.02.2026 after recording the earlier
orders, following order dated 03.02.2026 was passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court:-
“Attention of this Court has been drawn to the
order dated 07.08.2025, vide which a last opportunity
was granted to the petitioner to argue the matter with a
further observation that no request for adjournment
would be made thereafter.
Again on 18.08.2025, a last opportunity was
granted to the petitioner with the direction that no further
adjournment would be entertained, yet again on
09.09.2025, a last and final opportunity was granted to
the petitioner to argue the matter.
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (15 of 30) [CW-229/2014]Further, even on 19.09.2025, on the pretext of the
State requiring to file certain documents, a last
opportunity was granted with the further mandate that no
further adjournment would be entertained.
Today again, time is being sought for filing
documents.
In the facts obtained, there is no occasion
whatsoever for granting any further time to file any
document.
List the matter on 17.02.2026, on the assurance
made learned counsel for the petitioner that he will be
arguing the matter on the next date.”
28. Bare perusal of the order dated 03.02.2026 would
reveal that since despite granting so many opportunities,
documents, if any, were not filed by the petitioner- State,
therefore, by way of passing specific order dated 03.02.2026, the
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court closed the opportunity of the
petitioner- State to file any further document, and the matter was
posted on 17.02.2026 on the assurance of learned counsel for the
petitioner to argue the matter on the next date. After so many
adjournments in between on 07.07.2026, the matter was listed
before this Court, and in quite surprising manner on 07.07.2026
also, adjournment was sought by the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner- State. Thereupon, following order was passed
by this Court on 07.07.2026:-
“Last opportunity is granted to learned counsel for
the petitioner to argue the matter and, in case, learned
counsel for the petitioner does not choose to argue the
matter on the next date, the matter shall be decided after
hearing learned counsel for the respondents.
Let the matter be listed on 9th July, 2026.”
29. The matter was posted for hearing on 09.07.2026.
Thereafter, on 09.07.2026 both the counsels advanced their
arguments in detail and after conclusion of their arguments, the
judgment was reserved. Thus, it is clear that so many
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opportunities earlier granted to the petitioner were not availed and
despite the fact that this petition was filed away back in the year
20.12.2013 and all opportunities to file any further documents
were also closed by this Court by way of passing specific order,
after conclusion of arguments and when the judgment was
reserved on 09.07.2026, in quite shocking and surprising manner,
one application dated 13.07.2026 has been filed seeking
permission to place additional documents on record.
30. In the case of Arjun Singh Vs. Mohinder Kumar &
Ors., AIR 1964 SC 993, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
dealing with a situation where after closure of arguments and
reserving the judgment, an application under Order 9 Rule 7 CPC
was filed by one of the defendant, it was observed that where the
parties have completed arguments and judgment is reserved,
there remains no further rights and privileges of the parties to file
any further application. It is only for the convenience of the Court
that Order XX Rule 1 CPC permits judgment to be delivered after
an interval after the hearing is completed. The Apex Court further
observed that there is no hiatus between the two stages of
reservation of judgment and pronouncing the judgment.
31. Following the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme
Court, Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pujya Sindhi
Panchayat Vs. C.L. Mishra, MANU/RH/0293/2002, which
deals with a similar situation has held that after the judgment was
reserved then any further application would have no effect and it
would be treated as if no such application was filed. Relevant part
of the judgment is being quoted as under:-
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (17 of 30) [CW-229/2014]“Where hearing is completed the parties have no further
rights or privileges in the matter and it is only for the
convenience of the Court that Order 20 Rule 1 permits
Judgment to be delivered after an interval after the
hearing is completed. It would, therefore, follow that after
the judgment is re served there remains no stage in any
case. Thus, there is no hiatus (break) between the two
stages of reservation of Judgment and pronouncing it. For
that, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar MANU/SC/0013/1963: AIR 1964
SC 993 may he referred t to.
Since in the present case, the judgment was reserved by
the division Bench of this Court on 16-3-2000 and the
application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
read with Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was filed on 22-3-2000 i.e.
after the judgment was reserved, therefore, the said
application would have no effect and it would be treated
as if no such application was filed before the Division
Bench of this Court.”
32. In the light of aforesaid facts and circumstances and
different orders passed by the Co-ordinate Benches of this Court
as well as by this Court, it is clear that there were no
extraordinary circumstances, which prevented the petitioner from
filing the additional documents during the course of proceedings of
this case, this Court does not find it just and proper to permit the
petitioner- State to file application even after the judgment is
reserved. Hence, the application filed by the petitioner dated
13.07.2026 for placing the additional documents on record is
hereby dismissed.
While dismissing the application, this Court is constrained to
deprecate the actions of officers of petitioner- State Government,
who ought to have acted in a more responsible and vigilant
manner, yet by way of filing the present application on 13.07.2026
despite the fact that on 09.07.2026 after completion of argument
the judgment was reserved, is nothing but a sheer attempt to
interfere in the process of dispensation of justice.
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33. Coming to merits of this case, this Court finds that the
issue involved in this writ petition revolves around Section 15 of
the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 as well as Rule 14 of the
Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment of Land for Agricultural
Purposes) Rules, 1970. Hence, the aforesaid provisions are
reproduced as under:-
“15. Khatedar tenants – (1) Subject to the provisions of
section 16 and clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section
180 every person who, at the commencement of this Act,
is a tenant of land otherwise than as a sub-tenant or a
tenant of Khudkasht or who is, after the commencement
of this Act, admitted as a tenant otherwise than a sub-
tenant or tenant of Khudkasht or an allottee of land
under, and in accordance with, rules made under section
101 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan
Act 15 of 1956) or who acquries Khatedari rights in
accordance with provisions of this Act or of the Rajasthan
Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952
(Rajasthan Act VI of 1952) or of any other law for the
time being in force shall be a Khatedar tenant and shall,
subject to the provision of this Act be entitled to all the
rights conferred; and be subject to all the liabilities
imposed on Khatedar tenants by this Act:
Provided that no Khatedari rights shall accrue under this
section to any tenant, to whom land is or has been let out
temporarily in Gang Canal, Bhakra, Chambal or Jawai
project area or any other area notified in this behalf by
the State Government.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
Khatedari rights shall not accrue there under to any
person to whom land had been let out before the
commencement of this Act by the State Government in
furtherance of the Grow More Food Campaign or under
some special order subject to some specified conditions or
in pursuance of some statutory or non-statutory rules and
who shall have, before such commencement, made a
default in securing the objective of such campaign or a
breach of any such order, condition or rule.
(3) Any person referred to in sub-section (2) may, within
three years from the date of commencement of this Act
and on payment of a court-fee of twenty five naye paise
apply to the Assistant Collector having jurisdiction praying
for a declaration that acquired Khatedari right under sub-
section (1) in the land held by him.
(4) Such application may be made on any of the following
grounds, namely:
(a) that the land held by him was let out to him after the
commencement of this Act.
(b) that it was not let out to him in any of the
circumstances specified in sub-section (2).
(c) that when the land was so let out to him he was not
apprised of such circumstances.
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(d) that he had, before such commence ment made no
default or breach of the nature specified in sub-section
(2).
(5) The Assistant Collector shall, upon the presentation of
an application under sub-section (3), make inquiry in the
prescribed manner and afford reasonable opportunity to
the applicant of being heard and shall, if he does not
reject the application, declare the applicant to have
become Khatedar tenant of his holding in accordance with
and subject to the provisions of the sub-section (1).
Rule 14. Condition of Allotment. – (i) The allotment of
land under these rules shall be on a Gair Khatedari
tenancy with a right to ultimate conferment of Khatedari
rights after the expiry of [3 years] provided the allottee
fulfill during this period the terms and conditions of
allotment until Khatedari rights are conferred. The allottee
shall have all the rights and be subjected to all liabilities
of a Gair Khatedar tenant under the Tenancy Act:
[Provided also that the allotment of land may be
cancelled at any stage by the Collector before the expiry
of a period [3 years], if the land is required for public
purpose:
Provided further that no such order to the prejudice
of such person shall be passed without giving him an
opportunity of being heard.]
[xxx]
[(1-a) In case where allotment of land is made to a
married agriculturist, the allotment shall be made in the
joint names of husband and wife and the allottees, in such
case, shall be deemed to be joint allottees.]
(2) Rent at the sanctioned rent rate applicable to
the land, or if the land applied for and allotted is
unassessed, at the lowest class of Barani land in the
village for irrigated land at the Chahi or Nehri rates, as
the case may be, for Chahi or Nehri irrigated lands of the
village shall be payable from the first year of allotment.
[(3) The allottee shall have to bring the land under
cultivation and shall utilise it properly.]
Provided that this period may be extended by the
Tehsildar by one year if, due to unforeseen causes over
which the allottee had no control, he was unable to
cultivate the land within the stipulated period.
(4) The Collector shall have the power to cancel
any allotment made by a Sub-Divisional Officer [or a
Tehsildar under the rules repealed by Rule 21 of the
rules] either suo moto or on the application of any person
in case the allotment has been secured through fraud or
misrepresentation or has been made against rules or in
case the allottee has committed breach of any of the
conditions of allotment:
Provided that no such order to the prejudice of any
person shall be passed without giving such person an
opportunity of being heard.
(5) The allottee shall pay to the State Government
the price of the wells and permanent structures if any,
existing on the land, as also the price of trees standing on
the land at rates prescribed by rules made under Section
80 and 81 of the Tenancy Act.
(6) Before acquisition of Khatedari rights the
allottee shall not construct any permanent structures or
buildings other than a tank, well or dwelling a house
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (20 of 30) [CW-229/2014]
within the meaning of an “improvement” as defined by
clause (19) of Section 5 of the Tenancy Act.
(7) In case of land situated within a radius of 10
miles of Jaipur City, the allottee shall also pay the price of
trees at rate of Fifteen rupees and 25 paisa per bigha:
Provided that no such price shall be charged if the
number of trees standing in a bigha of land is less than
five.
(8) The land shall be liable to be resumed by the
State Government without payment of compensation if-
(a) it is not brought under cultivation strictly in
accordance with the condition of allotment and it is not
properly utilised;
(b) it is sub-let or transferred in contravention of
the provisions of Tenancy Act applicable to Gair Khatedar
tenants;
(c) it is found that the allottee was not a
[landless agriculturist];
(d) the allottee makes default in the timely
payment of the price referredto in clause 5 of the rule
and/or the annual rent; or (e) the allottee makes
construction on the land in contravention of the allotment
rules.
[(9) In case the land allotted is grass land or
subject to erosion, the allottee shall have to undertake
the work of soil conservation as and when directed by an
Officer of the Agriculture Department authorised in this
behalf.]”
34. It is undisputed that the mutation entries were opened
in favour of the respondent- Madan Lal on 12.04.1961. The
petitioner has come out with the case that to ascertain
irregularities in allotment of land pointed out in so many cases,
the petitioner- State Government appointed Beri Commission to
examine the alleged irregularities and to give it’s report. As per
the petitioner, report was given by the Commission on
28.01.1995, wherein two irregularities were pointed out; first, at
the time of mutation entry dated 12.04.1961, respondent- Madan
Lal was minor, aging only ten years and second, his father was
holding the post of Patwari in Revenue Department.
35. Bare perusal of order dated 16.04.2013 passed by the
Board of Revenue, Ajmer would reveal that after examining the
documents placed on record on behalf of the respondents, a
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categorical finding has been given that date of birth of
respondent- Madan Lal was 31.10.1941, which shows that as on
12.04.1961 i.e. the date of opening mutation entry in his favour,
evidently he had attained the age of majority. Thus, the first
irregularity pointed out by the Commission, which is the basis of
order of cancellation of mutation entry, is against the record and is
not tenable.
36. As regards, the second irregularity pointed out by the
petitioner- State on the basis of report of Beri Commission is that
at the relevant time father of the respondent- Madan Lal was
working as Patwari in the Revenue Department, and he could have
influenced the proceedings of recording mutation entry in favour
of respondent- Madan Lal. This Court finds that nothing has been
placed on record by the petitioner- State to show that father of
respondent- Madan Lal was Patwari of the concerned Patwar Halka
(revenue village), where the land in question was situated and in
respect of which disputed mutation entry was opened in favour of
respondent- Madan Lal. Whereas, a categorical statement has
been extended by learned Senior Counsel for respondents that
father of respondent- Madan Lal, although holding the post of
Patwari, yet was never posted in the concerned Patwar Halka
(revenue village).
37. In addition to above, no iota of evidence of any kind
whatsoever has been placed on record to infer any kind of
influence of father of the respondent in opening mutation entry in
favour of the respondent- Madan Lal. Even otherwise, admittedly
such mutation entries are entered in the Revenue Record after
approval of the same by higher officers.
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38. It is quite significant to mention here that the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came into force on 14.03.1955,
which lays down the provisions for conferment of khatedari rights.
As per Section 15 of the Act of 1955, every person who was a
tenant at the commencement of the Act, shall be admitted as
tenant as under the Act of 1955.
39. Section 19 of the Act of 1955 also provides for the
eventualities under which khatedari rights can be conferred and
one of such provision is that every person, whose name at the
commencement of the Act of 1955 was entered in annual register
as sub-tenant or Khudkasht, then khatedari rights can be
conferred upon him.
40. The land in question, admittedly, is situated in District
Jaipur. Learned Senior counsel for the respondents emphasized
the fact that prior to enforcement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,
1955 and during the erstwhile State regime, jamabandis were not
maintained in State of Jaipur, and instead thereof Khasra
Girdawari was considered to be record of rights. By relying upon
Khasra Girdawari for the relevant period in respect of land in
question, learned Senior counsel for the respondents pointed out
that name of respondent- Madan Lal was existing as tenant of the
land in question much prior to enforcement of the Act of 1955,
therefore, under such circumstances, it can be held that by virtue
of and in the light of Section 15 and 19 of the Act of 1955, the
khatedari rights would be conferred automatically upon
respondent- Madan Lal by operation of law.
41. In the case of Surajmal (supra), while considering
question of annual register maintained in former Jaipur State, this
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Court has observed that Khasra Girdawari maintained in former
Jaipur State was an annual register and creates a presumption
that the entries made therein were true. Para-7 of the above
judgment is relevant and is quoted as under:-
“It was next contended that the existence of the entry in
the Girdawari is not proof of its correctness. The point
came up for decision in Mala vs Board of Revenue (D. B. C
Writ Petition No. 185 of 1953, decided on 1st February,
1956). The case came up from Jaipur, and by reference to
the revenue laws of the former Jaipur State, which were
then in force, it was held that Khasra Girdawari was an
annual register, and the law laid down a presumption that
the entries made therein were true.”
42. Similarly, in the case of Abdul Hameed Khan
(supra), ‘Khasra Girdawari’ was considered to be an annual
register and in Para-4 following observations were given:-
“The point as to whether entry in the khasra girdawari
under revenue laws of former Jaipur State was a proof of
its correctness or not?, came up for consideration in Mala
vs. Board of Revenue (DBC Writ Petition No. 185/1953,
decided on February 1,1955). It was held that Khasra
Girdawari was an annual register as per the revenue laws
of former Jaipur State which were then in force, and the
law down a presumption that the entries made therein
were true.”
43. In a subsequent judgment delivered by this Court in the
case of Mor Mukut Singh (supra), after considering Division
Bench judgment of this Court, again the similar proposition was
reiterated that Khasra Girdawari at the relevant time was
considered as an annual register, raising presumption of
correctness of entries made therein. Para-25 of the above
judgment is quoted as hereunder:-
“A division bench of this court in Mala Vs. Board of
Revenue – Writ Petition No. 185/1953, decided vide
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (24 of 30) [CW-229/2014]laws of the former Jaipur State, which were then in force,
held that ‘khasra girdawari’ was an annual register, and
the law raised a presumption that the entries made
therein were true. A coordinate bench of this court in
Suraj MÃ¥l, supra, held that the girdawari is relevant under
Section 35 of the Evidence Act and no formal proof is
required by production of the Officer who prepared it. A
presumption would arise as to correctness of the
document.”
44. Similar is the decision laid down by this Court in the
case of Deepa (supra), wherein in Para-4 following observations
have been made:-
“Shri Sharma, appearing for the appellant, contended,
and rightly. that respondent himself having accepted the
appellant as tenant in the first proceeding, a stand
different from that could not be taken in the present
proceeding. He then urged that Khasra Gridawari, which
has now been put on record, clearly shows that the name
of the appellant had been recorded as cultivator by
Samvat 2012, because of which the land could not be
regarded as khudkasht of the Jagirdar which would make
Sec. 10 of the Jagirs Act inopera-tive, and so, the
respondent’s name could not be recorded as khatedar
tenant. As to this submission, the learned counsel for this
respondent submitted that though the land was shown in
the Khasra Gridawari under appellant’s cultiva-tion, that
was not as a tenant but as an employee of the
respondent. This stand is untenable because from the
impugned judgment of the Board of Revenue in the
present proceeding it appears that the case of this
respondent was that Deepa’s father had been given the
land for cultivation on “Panti Basis”, that is, on share
basis, which would clearly show that the land was
tenanted to Deepa’s father and in lieu of cash he was to
pay in kind.”
45. In the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Prem Shankar
(supra), Division Bench of this Court has held that being sub-
tenant on the date of commencement of the Act of 1955, the
petitioners automatically acquired khatedari rights. Para-7 of the
judgment is relevant, which is laid down as under:-
“Section 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides the
procedure for acquiring khatedari rights. Section 19(1A)
was added to remove the difficulties. This is one of the
major land reform introduced by the Act to confer
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (25 of 30) [CW-229/2014]persons falling in this category acquire the khatedari
rights automatically without any step being taken by
them. In view of this, the learned Single Judge has
committed error in relegating the respondents-writ
petitioners to alternate remedy before the competent
court. The contention of the appellant for extinguishment
of the rights of holding under Section 63 of the Act is
wholly misconceived. It has no application to the facts of
the case. In view of the continuous possession over the
subject land of the writ petitioners prior to year 1946 and
they being sub-tenant on the date of commencement of
the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, have automatically
acquired khatedari rights.”
46. In another judgment, in the case of Niranjan Singh
(supra), while considering the fact of Section 15 of the Act of
1955, this Court has held that, in case, name of any person was
shown as tenant in the Revenue Records prior to enforcement of
the Act of 1955, then conferment of khatedari rights under the Act
of 1955 are automatic by operation of law. Para-31 of the above
judgment is relevant and is reproduced hereunder:-
“1 am unable to agree with the above contention of the
learned counsel as Section 15 of the Rajas than Tenancy
Act itself makes a distinction between the two classes of
persons – one consisting of persons who were tenants of
land on the date of the commencement of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act namely, October 15, 1955 and upon whom
Khatedari rights are automatically conferred by the
aforesaid provision and the other consisting of persons
who are to be admitted as tenants after the aforesaid
date or who acquire Khatedari rights in accordance with
the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or the
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act or
any other law for the time being in force. In the case of
the first category of persons mentioned above they
automatically became Khatedar tenants on the coming
into force of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act on October 15,
1955 but in the case of the othe r category of persons
they have to acquire Khatedari rights on being admitted
as tenants after the said date in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the aforesaid Act or they have to
acquire Khatedari rights in accordance with any other law
as mentioned in Section 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
In this view of the matter, such persons form two distinct
and well-demarcated classes and while the persons in
possession of land as tenants on October 15, 1955 have
nothing else to do but they automatically become
Khatedar tenants with effect from the aforesaid date yet
the other class of persons have to acquire Khatedari
rights by following certain procedure and in some
cases by making certain payments according to the(Uploaded on 23/07/2026 at 12:01:38 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (26 of 30) [CW-229/2014]Rajasthan Tenancy Act or the Rajasthan Land Revenue
Act or the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of
Jagirs Act or any other law. Thus it cannot be said that
there is no basis for distinction between the aforesaid two
classes of persons, rather there is a reasonable basis for
the classification of temporary tenants into the aforesaid
two different categories and to deal with them differently
in the matter of extent of allotment of land as well as the
payment of price of land so allotted to them.”
47. In the instant case, the mutation entries opened in the
year 1961 were cancelled by initiating proceedings in the year
1995, which culminated vide order dated 22.05.2002, while
dealing with a matter of cancellation of allotment in the case of
Brij Lal (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has observed as
under:-
“It is not disputed before us that the appellant is in
cultivating possession of the land since 1970. It would be
travesty of justice to dispossess the appellant from the
land which he is nourishing for over a period of two
decades.”
48. In the case of Radha Kishan (supra), the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court was dealing with cancellation of allotment
under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970, where the allotments were
cancelled after lapse of 24 years. The Court observed that
although, there is no limitation provided for initiating cancellation
provided under the Rules of 1970, yet the power is required to be
exercised within a reasonable time and a delay of 24 years in the
said case was treated to be an inordinate delay. In the present
case in hand, the delay in initiating the proceedings is of around
34 years, therefore, the judgment of Radha Kishan (supra), is
also applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
where in under Para-15, 17 and 18, following observations have
been made:-
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (27 of 30) [CW-229/2014]“15. Although it is true that in subsequent division bench
judgement of this Court in Sohan Kanwar v. Board of
Revenue & Ors., 2002 (1) WLC (Raj) 415 and Mangla
Son of Hema v. State & Ors., 2007 (1) WLC (Raj)
234, it has been held that if any allotment has been
made on the strength of fraud or misrepresentation,
notwithstanding conferment of khatedari rights on
completing ten years, the allotment can be cancelled, but
here in the present case, it has not been shown as to
what fraud was played by the petitioner in securing the
allotment. It is not in dispute that the allotment has been
made on the recommendation of the Land Advisory
Committee, which is headed by SDO and consequential
order has been passed by the Tehsildar. The Tehsildar
and the Land Advisory Committee were satisfied that land
in dispute was in cultivatory possession of the petitioner
for almost eight years prior to the date of allotment. They
also concluded that on ground no “Nadi” was present and
it was a plain land, which was being cultivated by the
petitioner. In these facts, this Court does not find any
justification for the Collector to entertain the application
of cancellation of allotment at the instance of strangers
i.e. respondent nos.4 to 6, filed 24 years after the
allotment.
17. The Larger Bench has also relied on Joint Collector
Ranga Reddy District & Anr. v. D. Narsing Rao &
Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 695 wherein it has been held that
when no time limit has been prescribed under the Statute
for invocation of certain power, such power must be
exercised within a reasonable time. If the power is
allowed to be exercised after decades, it would lead to
anomalous position leading to uncertainty and
complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties
over immovable properties. Absence of any period of
limitation does not mean that the power can be exercised
at any time, which will make the exercise of power
arbitrary and opposed to the concept of Rule of Law. What
however shall be the reasonable period, would depend
upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities
thereunder and other relevant factors. The Larger Bench
even went to the extent of holding that “even if the fraud
is alleged, the power must not be exercised after
unreasonable period, such as, several decades claiming
rights over the land.”
18. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v.
Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union
Ltd., supra dealing with a question of delay held that
although no period of limitation has been prescribed by
Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, but
the same would not mean that suo motu power can be
exercised by the competent authority at any time. It is
trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed,
statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a
reasonable period. What, however, shall be the
reasonable period, would depend upon the nature of the
statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other
relevant factors.”
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49. In a judgment delivered by the Full Bench of this Court
in Tara (supra), in Para-48 while answering to the reference with
regard to limitation of taking action under Section 82 of the
Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and Section 232 of the
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, it was observed by Full Bench that
although, there is no limitation prescribed under the law, yet the
action cannot be taken after a lapse of unreasonable period.
50. It has been informed to this Court, that although the
judgment of Full Bench in the case of Tara (supra), is under
challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, yet the operation of
the judgment has not been stayed and only order of status quo
has been passed.
51. In a similar matter, arising out of revenue laws of the
State of Maharashtra in the cases, where no limitation for taking
action is provided, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil (supra), has held that power
even in such cases, where no time limit is prescribed, is to be
exercised within a reasonable period, which was held to be period
of three years.
52. In the light of aforesaid consistent judgments, the
action of the petitioners cannot be said to be reasonable and
justified. There is one another angle as to whether the Khatedari
rights, which were conferred automatically by operation of law by
virtue of Section 15 and 19 of the Act of 1955, can be cancelled in
exercise of Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970. This Court finds that
the Rules of 1970 are applicable only in respect of allotment,
which are governed either by the Rules of 1970 or the repealed
Rules of 1957 in the cases, where allotment has been made for
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (29 of 30) [CW-229/2014]
gair-khatedari rights. In the cases like the present one, where
respondent- Madan Lal was already entered as tenant in the
Khasra Girdawari of former Jaipur State, prior to enforcement of
the Act of 1955, this Court finds that Rules of 1970 including Rule
14(4) of the said Rules are not applicable. Therefore, mutation
entry in order to confer khatedari rights upon respondent- Madan
Lal under Section 15 could not have been cancelled, after so many
decades, while exercising powers under the Rules of 1970 vide
order dated 22.05.2002.
53. As regards, contention of learned counsel for the
petitioner that at the relevant time, Additional District Collector-III
while passing order dated 22.05.2002 exercised powers of Land
Record Officer, therefore, appeal could not have been maintained
by the respondent- Madan Lal before the Revenue Appellate
Authority, as it was otherwise maintainable before Divisional
Commissioner, this Court finds that such contention is totally
misconceived and unfounded. It has not been disputed that order
dated 22.05.2002 was passed by the Additional District Collector
in a case registered under Rule 14(4) of the Rules of 1970, and
appeals in ordinary course against an order passed under Rule
14(4) of the Rules of 1970, are very much maintainable before the
Revenue Appellate Authority, hence, no infirmity or illegality has
been committed by entertaining appeal by the Revenue Appellate
Authority.
54. This Court also finds that no such objection whatsoever
was raised by the petitioner before the Revenue Appellate
Authority. Rather without raising any objection, the petitioner-
State consciously participated in the appeal proceedings before
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[2026:RJ-JP:26139] (30 of 30) [CW-229/2014]
the Revenue Appellate Authority, hence, at this stage or even at
the stage of appeal before the Board of Revenue, such plea could
not have been raised. Judgment in the case of Harshad
Chimanlal Modi (supra), as relied upon by learned AAG, deals
with altogether different question relating to lack of territorial
jurisdiction and the facts are also entirely different, hence, is not
applicable in the present case.
55. This Court also finds that without applying any
independent mind, the State Authorities have acted upon dotted
lines drawn by the recommendation of Beri Commission. It is
settled proposition of law that anything observed by the
Commission, unless backed by statutory provisions, is considered
to be only a recommendation in nature, and such
recommendations are required to be examined by the competent
authority strictly in accordance with law. In the instant case, this
Court finds that the procedure provisions of law have not been
properly exercised by the State Authorities.
56. Viewing from any angle, on the basis of aforesaid
discussion, and examination of record, this Court finds that the
Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue have not
committed any manifest jurisdictional error or illegality, therefore,
there is no scope of interference in the instant writ petition filed by
the petitioner, and the same is hereby dismissed.
57. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
145/DIVYA
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