Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Rameshwar Singh on 9 July, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 490 of 2025
With
I.A. No. 7136 of 2025
------
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation,
Nepal House, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S. Doranda,
District Ranchi.
3. The Engineer-in-Chief, Department of Drinking Water and
Sanitation, Nepal House, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S.
Doranda, District Ranchi.
4. The Deputy Secretary, Department of Drinking Water and
Sanitation, Nepal House, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S.
Doranda, District-Ranchi.
.... .... Appellants/ Respondents
Versus
Rameshwar Singh, aged about 59 years, son of Late Khublal Singh,
resident of Shil Kothi, Bompass Town, Khoradah Road, P.O.
Devasangh, P.S. Deoghar, Sadar, District-Deoghar, Jharkhand.
... ... Respondent/Petitioner
-----
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
------
For the Appellants : Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III
------
th
Order No.03/Dated: 09 July, 2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters
Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 13.03.2024
passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 618 of
2019 by which the writ petition has been allowed.
I.A. No. 7136 of 2025:
2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since as per
the office note dated 28.11.2024, there is delay of 197 days in
preferring the appeal, therefore, an application being I.A. No.7136
of 2025 has been filed for condoning such delay.
3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant
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intra-court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 197 days,
deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation
application before going into the legality and propriety of the
impugned order on merit.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted that
delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the
Interlocutory Application on the basis of grounds shown therein
treating the same to be sufficient.
5. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as
has been mentioned in the interlocutory application is that the
judgment in W.P.(S) No. 618 of 2019 was passed on 13.03.2024
and in the meantime the Parliamentary Election was notified and
the officials of the Department was involved in the said process.
Thereafter, the impugned judgment came to the knowledge of the
appellant/respondent, thereafter on 29.05.2024, the same was put
up before the Under Secretary for further action.
Thereafter, the Under Secretary placed the file before the
Special Secretary for the needful and on 30.05.2024 the Special
Secretary immediately placed the file before the Secretary with the
aforesaid order. Thereafter, Secretary desired various inputs in the
matter and opined for holding a meeting and on 12.06.2024,
Section Officer submitted the details sought in the matter.
Thereafter on 13.06.2024 it was desired to place the file
along with the Grounds of Appeal. Thereafter on 20.06.2024,
Assistant Section Officer placed the file before the Section Officer
with respect to taking opinion for filing an appeal and on
09.07.2024, Section Officer placed the file before the Under
Secretary for taking opinion from the Learned Advocate General.
Thereafter on 10.07.2024 Under Secretary put up the file
before the Special Secretary for the needful and thereafter on
10.07.2024, Special Secretary placed the file before the Secretary
for the needful and thereafter, the file was placed before the
Learned Advocate General for opinion against the judgment dated
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[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]
13.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No.618 of 2019. Thereafter, it was
opined to file an appeal against the judgment dated 13.03.2024
passed in W.P. (S) No. 618 of 2019 and the same was received on
12.07.2024. Thereafter, the file was returned to the department for
needful.
Thereafter, on 16.07.2024 the file was put up before the
Section Officer with the opinion for needful and the Section Officer
put up the file before the Secretary with the opinion and for sending
the file to the retainer for preparation of Grounds of Appeal.
Thereafter, on 25.07.2024 Grounds of Appeal was
submitted by the retainer and was placed for approval. Thereafter,
on 31.07.2024, Assistant Section Officer put up the file before the
Section Officer for approval of Grounds of Appeal. Thereafter, on
05.08.2024, Section Officer put up the file before the Under
Secretary for approval of Grounds of Appeal and on 06.08.2024,
Under Secretary put up the file before the Special Secretary for
approval of Grounds of Appeal. Thereafter, on 06.08.2024, Special
Secretary put up the file before the Secretary for approval of
Grounds of Appeal and on 10.08.2024 Grounds of appeal was
approved.
Thereafter, authorization letter was prepared and the same
was issued on 12.08.2024. and the file was forwarded to the
concerned law officer to prepare the memo of appeal against the
Judgment dated 13.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 618 of 2019 and
thereafter, the entire file was handed over to the concerned law
officer for doing needful for filing of LPA and thereafter the appeal
was drafted and the entire writ court pleadings were required, as
such, the same was accordingly arranged and handed over but some
documents was missing in the matter. The same were thereafter
arranged and handed over and the appeal was filed on 12.09.2024
without any further delay.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on delay
condonation application and before considering the same, this
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Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as
has been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to
the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.
7. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be
rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the
filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the
Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before
entering into the merit of the lis.
8. It needs to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the
legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather
the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs.
State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40)
67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law
Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate
harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides
for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to
a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds,
enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or
introduce exceptions not recognized by law.”
In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC
556, the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of
delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable
or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been
given, held at paragraph-6 as under:
“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds.”
While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha
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Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC
649, wherein, it has been held as under:
“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot
be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to
be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of
balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal
approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.”
9. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with
bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches
on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires,
such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the
vital factors which should be taken into consideration while
considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division
Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through
Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online
Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that “Law
having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for
preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions
of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the
legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when
the Government is the appellant.”
In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living
Media India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held
by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 27 to 29 as under:
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved including
the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter
by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They
cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with competent personsPage | 5
[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party before
us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession
has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that
they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used
as an anticipated benefit for the government departments.
The law shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC 667],
after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited
& Anr. (supra,) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder:
“1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing
again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The
special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We
had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of
the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of
M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654]
in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see
no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to
record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought
to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government
Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on
13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC
OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the
SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law
Department took almost about 17 months’ time to decide whether
the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of
incompetence would there be for the Legal Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the
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[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the
Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to
file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within
limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the
aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment
in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster
General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012)
2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S)
649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the
cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue.
The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default.
We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action
is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which
the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time
involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to
be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project
Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The
amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay
in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the
said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of
time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for
any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going
up.”
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held
that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts
of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay
condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of
a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If
sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or
its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the
enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as
the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as
to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it.
In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona
fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the
court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is
called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations
which have been expressly made material and relevant by thePage | 7
[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the
same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall
to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section
14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the
discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because
apart from the general criticism made against the appellant’s lack
of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been
adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the
learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant’s
application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it
was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within
the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid
ground.”
Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider
the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach
of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after
expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the
other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide
motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and
laches on its part.
It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of
‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient
cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land
Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held
by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not
be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient”
is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient”
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in
the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In
this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or
it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the
court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device
to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building
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Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 :
AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it
can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with
on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot
be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular
case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC
100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 :
AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision
may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard
but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have expressed
at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of
statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have
more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might
have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that
persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own
inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha
Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537]
and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17
SCC 448]
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14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law
laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the
party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances
of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted
deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable
the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that
whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was
prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and
Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR
1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC
770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and
Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation
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to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the
party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be
made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram
Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors.,
(2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
“12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause”
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of
the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would
constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts
of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting
or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking
steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed
with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and
refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or
want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the
other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not
lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time
prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which
should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-
like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical
view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be
rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and
law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates,
either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such
a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the
matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of
the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”
10. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein,
expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was
a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has
“not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
11. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to
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condone the inordinate delay of 197 days, is proceeding to examine
as to whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient
explanation for condoning the delay.
12. As would appear from the explanation furnished, wherein, it has
been stated in the interlocutory application that the judgment in
W.P.(S) No. 618 of 2019 was passed on 13.03.2024 and in the
meantime the Parliamentary Election was notified and the officials
of the Department was involved in the said process. Thereafter, the
impugned judgment came to the knowledge of the
appellant/respondent, thereafter on 29.05.2024, the same was put
up before the Under Secretary for further action.
Thereafter, the Under Secretary placed the file before the
Special Secretary for the needful and on 30.05.2024 the Special
Secretary immediately placed the file before the Secretary with the
aforesaid order. Thereafter, Secretary desired various inputs in the
matter and opined for holding a meeting and on 12.06.2024,
Section Officer submitted the details sought in the matter.
Thereafter on 13.06.2024 it was desired to place the file
along with the Grounds of Appeal. Thereafter on 20.06.2024,
Assistant Section Officer placed the file before the Section Officer
with respect to taking opinion for filing an appeal and on
09.07.2024, Section Officer placed the file before the Under
Secretary for taking opinion from the Learned Advocate General.
Thereafter on 10.07.2024 Under Secretary put up the file
before the Special Secretary for the needful and thereafter on
10.07.2024, Special Secretary placed the file before the Secretary
for the needful and thereafter, the file was placed before the
Learned Advocate General for opinion against the judgment dated
13.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No.618 of 2019. Thereafter, it was
opined to file an appeal against the judgment dated 13.03.2024
passed in W.P. (S) No. 618 of 2019 and the same was received on
12.07.2024. Thereafter, the file was returned to the department for
needful.
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[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]
Thereafter, on 16.07.2024 the file was put up before the
Section Officer with the opinion for needful and the Section Officer
put up the file before the Secretary with the opinion and for sending
the file to the retainer for preparation of Grounds of Appeal.
Thereafter, on 25.07.2024 Grounds of Appeal was
submitted by the retainer and was placed for approval. Thereafter,
on 31.07.2024, Assistant Section Officer put up the file before the
Section Officer for approval of Grounds of Appeal. Thereafter, on
05.08.2024, Section Officer put up the file before the Under
Secretary for approval of Grounds of Appeal and on 06.08.2024,
Under Secretary put up the file before the Special Secretary for
approval of Grounds of Appeal. Thereafter, on 06.08.2024, Special
Secretary put up the file before the Secretary for approval of
Grounds of Appeal and on 10.08.2024 Grounds of appeal was
approved.
Thereafter, authorization letter was prepared and the same
was issued on 12.08.2024. and the file was forwarded to the
concerned law officer to prepare the memo of appeal against the
Judgment dated 13.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 618 of 2019 and
thereafter, the entire file was handed over to the concerned law
officer for doing needful for filing of LPA and thereafter the appeal
was drafted and the entire writ court pleadings were required, as
such, the same was accordingly arranged and handed over but some
documents was missing in the matter. The same were thereafter
arranged and handed over and the appeal was filed on 12.09.2024
without any further delay. Therefore, the delay of 197 days has
occurred in filing the appeal.
13. It appears from the stated grounds in the delay condonation
application that the cause has been tried to be shown of engagement
of the concerned officials of the department in the Parliamentary
Election and movement of file from one department to another and
no sufficient cause has been explained to condone the delay of 197
days occurred in preferring the appeal.
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[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]
14. This Court, even if will accept the ground, as has been taken in the
instant interlocutory application, of engagement of the concerned
officials of the department in the Parliamentary Election, as per the
statement made in the interlocutory application, the fate of the
judgment dated 13.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 618 of 2019
came to the knowledge and the file was put up before the Under
Secretary on 29.05.2024, hence, this Court is of the view that the
time taken in placing the file before the concerned official is about
two and a half months and if the said ground will be accepted, then
also, the other grounds for the further delay has been shown only of
movement of file from one department to another and from table to
table, which shows the lackadaisical approach of the appellant-
State.
15. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such circumstances as
per the reference made hereinabove about the conduct of the State-
appellant, the same cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone
the delay of 197 days.
16. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order in L.P.A.
No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting the delay condonation
application since the appeal was filed after delay of about 687 days
without any sufficient cause to condone the delay.
17. The reference of another case is required to be made herein of an
order passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A.
No.835 of 2019, wherein, the issue of condoning the delay of 568
days was under consideration.
The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the
reason furnished by the State appellants therein to be sufficient
cause on the ground of movement of file from one table to another
by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex as referred hereinabove.
18. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon’ble Apex Court by
filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022 and has challenged the
order passed in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019 but the said SLP No.7755 of
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[2026:JHHC:20422-DB]
2022 has been dismissed as would appear from the order dated
13.05.2022.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has also dismissed one Special
Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on 28th April, 2023 filed
by the State of Jharkhand which was filed against the order passed
by this Court in L.P.A. No.99 of 2021, wherein the coordinate
Bench of this Court dismissed the said appeal on the basis of delay
of 534 days in filing of the appeal.
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also dismissed S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S)
No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by the State of Jharkhand
against the order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in L.P.A.
No.401 of 2022, wherein, the delay of 259 days was not condoned.
20. This Court, after taking into consideration the ratio laid by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove as also
the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application, is
of the view that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone
inordinate delay of 197 days in filing the appeal.
21. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No.7136
of 2025 is hereby dismissed.
22. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also stands dismissed.
23. In consequence of dismissal of appeal, pending interlocutory
application(s), if any, also stand dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
09th July, 2026
Saurabh/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 13.07.2026
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