By: Yash Agarwal and Arjun Singh
INTRODUCTION
The Air India flight AI-171 crash in June was unfortunate in terms of the lives lost and even for the aviation industry. However, it marked a significant turning point in the Indian accountability system related to aviation issues, with the focus shifting to legal provisions for investigating air disasters. A writ petition by the pilot’s relatives alleging lapses in procedure and non-compliance with international norms prompted a response from the Indian Supreme Court, which sought replies and cautioned against jumping to conclusions. This accident highlighted the significance of Annex 13 of International Civil Aviation Organisation (hereinafter ‘ICAO’), emphasising the importance of independence and credibility in aviation investigations.
The Ministry of Civil Aviation has recently notified the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2025 (hereinafter ‘Aviation Rules’). These rules aim to avoid future aviation casualties. Emphasis on investigating the cause of such incidents and preventing them, rather than finding fault and assigning liability has been a pivotal feature of Aviation Rules. These rules vest primary investigation powers in the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (hereinafter ‘AAIB’). However, within this otherwise structured regime lie various concerns regarding Rule 11.
Rule 11 empowers the Director General (hereinafter ‘DG’) of the AAIB to appoint an Investigator-in-Charge. Additionally, the supporting investigators are endowed with the same extensive powers as those provided under Rule 10. However, the provision fails on the aspect of promoting transparency, neutrality, and even the perception of fairness. The article will discuss the problem in detail and then touch upon these questions through a comparative analysis of various jurisdictions like USA, Canada, and Australia and suggest potential solutions to tackle the lacuna.
BEYOND THE MANDATE: UNCHECKED AUTHORITY AND THE ABSENCE OF OPERATIONAL STANDARDS
Rules 10 and 11 define who investigates and how they conduct their investigations. While they were to strengthen investigative competence and ensure efficiency, they also raised critical legal and policy vulnerabilities. Rule 10 gives the investigator in charge a broad authority. He may secure the site of the wreckage, collect evidence, obtain access to documents, record statements, perform a detailed examination of flight recorders, check maintenance records, and require the cooperation of the persons or entities concerned. Furthermore, it provides a statutory framework for technical investigation, thereby conforming to ICAO enunciations, which require investigators to have access to information, sites, and evidence without hindrance.
The breadth of these powers gives rise to two main obstacles: The absence of procedural safeguards and the risk of confidentiality. As rule 10 grants coercive authority without defining the limits of power regarding interviews, evidence preservation, or oversight, this makes the framework power heavy but oversight light. The investigation scheme compounds this issue by operating in private, raising concerns about impartiality and risking the perception of opacity and unilateral control.
Rule 11 vest the power to appoint an Investigator-in-Charge and other investigators in the DG, AAIB, whose power is specified in Rule 10. As per this rule, the investigations are to be conducted in private. Additionally, the rule does not require that the appointed investigators meet specific independence criteria, nor does it outline any mandatory qualifications.
ICAO Annex 13 sets the international benchmark. It requires the state to establish an investigation authority that is independent from the state aviation authorities. Independence is meant to be both structural and functional meaning thereby the investigating authority should be free from any regulatory, commercial, or political influences. However, Rule 11 permits an in-house body within the Ministry to exercise broad discretion. By allowing the selection of the investigating body from the same environment that licenses and regulates without the use of public criteria, this system is characterised by a loss of independence, which is promoted by international norms.
Rule 12 of the Civil Aviation Rules further exacerbates the issue by designating the institutions as a “Formal Investigation”. The Central Government may, if it finds it expedient, direct a formal investigation to be held, along with a Court and assessors. There is no set criterion or mandate under which the investigation is required to be constituted even in cases that may be highly controversial. This means that the best hope for a genuine inquiry is instead reliant on the whims of the administration, which can then determine whether a case is to be put before a less fettered body.
Both Rule 11 and Rule 12 of the Civil Aviation Rules give the administration a grip on crucial decisions, including who conducts the investigation, how it is conducted, and how it is convened. This centralisation inherently threatens not only the occurrence of actual conflicts of interest but also the perception of such conflicts. Furthermore, it weakens transparency, as it does not provide a definite way to an independent forum if the public trust so requires. Hence, to understand the problem with clarity, it is crucial to dissect the framework in other robust jurisdictions.
(Yash Agarwal is a second-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. Arjun Singh is a second-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. The authors may be contacted via mail at agarwalyash1256@gmail.com and arjunsingh.rmlnlu@gmail.com, respectively.)
