The Manipur Conflict under International Law – Indian Blog of International Law

With regard to the “organisation” criterion, the Tribunal held that Trial Chambers have similarly relied on several indicative factors, none of which is independently determinative. These factors include “the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords.”(para 60)

Comparative Jurisprudence: Situations Recognised as NIACs

International tribunals have repeatedly applied the intensity and organisation tests to determine the existence of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). In Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski (2008), the ICTY found that a NIAC existed in Macedonia in 2001 between State security forces and the National Liberation Army, relying on factors such as frequent armed clashes, mobilisation of army and police forces, use of heavy weapons including tanks and helicopters, and the displacement of nearly 70,000 civilians (paras 177, 240).

Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. (2008) and Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., (2005) the Tribunal held that the conflict in Kosovo in 1998 amounted to a NIAC despite the Kosovo Liberation Army having a relatively weak command structure. The Tribunal concluded that the organised nature of the group and the intensity of the hostilities (paras 134, 170), including the use of firearms, mortars, and armoured vehicles (para 49), were sufficient to satisfy the threshold (paras 171-174).

Likewise, in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (2012), the ICC recognised the existence of a NIAC in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo on the basis of prolonged armed violence between organised armed groups, even without direct State involvement (paras 543-567).

These decisions show that a NIAC does not require formal declarations of war or large standing armies. What matters is whether there is prolonged and organised armed violence between identifiable parties, a standard that may be relevant in analysing the situation in Manipur.

Analysing the Manipur Conflict as an NIAC

The situation in Manipur also raises serious questions regarding whether the violence satisfies the intensity and organisation thresholds required to establish an NIAC under Common Article 3.

Analysis of the Intensity Criterion

In this regard, the violence has continued for more than three years, from May 2023 to May 2026, with repeated outbreaks rather than isolated incidents. The sustained period of conflict mirrors the prolonged nature recognized in Lubanga Dyilo (protracted armed violence over extended period). What initially began as ethnic clashes gradually evolved into prolonged armed confrontations involving sophisticated weaponry, organised attacks, and large-scale displacement.

Casualties and Displacement: Reports indicate that the conflict has caused approximately 217–260 deaths, injured more than 1,100 people, and displaced nearly 60,000 civilians, many of whom continue to reside in relief camps years after the violence began. Thousands of houses and hundreds of religious structures have also been destroyed or damaged. This scale of casualties and displacement is substantial and comparable to recognised NIACs. In Boškoski, displacement of 70,000 civilians was cited as evidence of intense conflict (para 248); the Manipur displacement figure is approximately equivalent. The continued displacement of thousands of persons and their prolonged dependence on relief camps long after the outbreak of violence reflects the enduring humanitarian consequences of the conflict and indicates that its effects have not been confined to isolated or short-lived incidents.

Material Destruction: Thousands of houses and hundreds of religious structures have been destroyed or damaged. In Haradinaj, the extent of material destruction was explicitly identified as a factor in assessing intensity (para 49). The scale of destruction in Manipur affecting residential areas, places of worship, and infrastructure across multiple districts represents material destruction consistent with armed conflict thresholds rather than communal violence

Nature and Sophistication of Weapons: The violence has evolved to involve sophisticated weaponry beyond typical communal riots. Thousands of firearms and large quantities of ammunition were reportedly looted from police armouries during the early stages of the conflict. Later incidents involved mortars, rocket-propelled projectiles, fortified bunkers, and reports of drones being used to deliver explosives. In Limaj (para 90) and Haradinaj (para 49), the use of firearms, mortars, and armoured vehicles was cited as indicative of NIAC-level intensity. The progression to mortar fire and improvised explosive devices in Manipur demonstrates comparable escalation.

Scale of State Response and Militarization: The Union Government responded by deploying more than 40,000 additional security personnel, including units of the Indian Army, Assam Rifles, and CRPF, while also imposing curfews, internet shutdowns, and heavily militarised buffer zones. The magnitude of this state response deployment of regular army units indicates official recognition of the severity of the conflict. Such militarisation mirrors state responses documented in recognised NIACs, where deployment of professional military units indicates official determination that law-and-order measures are insufficient.

Extent of Confrontations: Reports document numerous armed engagements between community groups and between communities and security forces across multiple districts and localities. These are not isolated clashes but part of a pattern of repeated, sustained confrontations. The frequency and geographic spread of violent incidents is consistent with the “number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations” factor from Haradinaj (para 49).

Analysis of the Organisation Criterion

Command Structures and Leadership: On the Meitei side, groups such as Arambai Tenggol and insurgent-linked organisations like the UNLF and PLA reportedly operate through identifiable command structures and coordinated operational units. Historical linkage of these latter groups to organised insurgent movements suggests established internal hierarchies. Similarly, on the Kuki-Zo side, organisations such as the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), United People’s Front (UPF), and Kuki National Army (KNA) reportedly function through established leadership structures and designated spokespersons. The existence of recognised spokespersons is, in itself, an indicator of organisational maturity, it presupposes internal decision-making processes and authority structures.

Coordination and Logistics: Reports of coordinated mobilisation, construction of bunkers, coordinated distribution of weapons, and establishment of checkpoints and armed patrols indicate logistical and operational coordination beyond spontaneous communal violence. In Haradinaj, the ability to coordinate operations and establish territorial presence was cited as evidence of organisation (para 60). The documented bunker construction and checkpoint systems in Manipur demonstrate comparable logistical capacity.

Territorial Control: Multiple groups reportedly control defined zones or localities, with enforcement of movement restrictions, armed patrols, and establishment of fortified positions (bunkers). This territorial control even if partial or contested reflects the factor identified in Haradinaj: “the fact that the group controls a certain territory” (para 60). Such control permits coordinated operations and logistical consolidation.

Weapons Access and Supply Chains: The coordinated distribution of looted weapons and the ongoing supply of weaponry to various groups indicates established logistical networks. In Haradinaj, “the ability of the group to gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military training” was cited as indicative of organisation (para 60). The capability to distribute and manage weapons across dispersed units in Manipur suggests pre-existing or newly-established supply mechanisms.

Pre-existing Organisational Structures: Several organisations involved in the Manipur conflict, particularly among Kuki-Zo groups, were already parties to Suspension of Operations (SOO) agreements with the Government of India prior to the present conflict. This indicates pre-existing organised armed structures with institutional memory, experience in coordination, and recognised standing with state authorities. The transition from SOO agreements to active armed engagement demonstrates continuation of organisational frameworks rather than spontaneous emergence.

Unified Political and Military Demands: Multiple sources document that communities and their armed representatives have articulated unified political demands, coordinated negotiating positions (or refused unified negotiation), and demonstrated ability to speak authoritatively on behalf of constituent groups. In Haradinaj, “its ability to speak with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire or peace accords” was identified as indicative of organisation (para 60). The capacity of Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities to articulate collective demands, even where disagreement exists on tactics, evidences organisational capacity.

Military Tactics and Strategy: Documentation of coordinated defence operations, construction of fortified positions (bunkers), establishment of buffer zones, and apparent strategic planning regarding territory and resources indicates capacity to define and execute military strategy. This reflects the factor from Haradinaj: “its ability to define a unified military strategy and use military tactics” (para 60).

Conclusion

The factual matrix of the Manipur crisis, characterized by its multi-year duration, the deployment of assault weaponry, widespread civilian displacement, and highly organized armed factions, demonstrates that the violence has decisively evolved beyond isolated or sporadic instances of unrest. It satisfies the dual thresholds of intensity and organization, constituting an NIAC under Common Article 3. Additionally, the comparative jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals shows that the determination of a NIAC depends upon the factual matrix of the conflict rather than the terminology used by the state. When assessed against these established standards, the continuing violence in Manipur appears to raise substantial grounds for classification as an NIAC under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

(This is a Guest Post by Rajbeer Singh Saluja who is an undergraduate student at the Gujarat National Law University.)