Kerala High Court
The Indian Pentecostal Church Of God … vs Binu V. George on 10 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU
FRIDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL 2026 / 20TH CHAITHRA, 1948
FAO NO. 100 OF 2025
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 28.07.2025 IN IA 4/2025 IN
OP(Society) NO.30 OF 2025 OF DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA
APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS 1 & 2:
1 THE INDIAN PENTECOSTAL CHURCH OF GOD (IPC)
A SOCIETY HAVING REGISTRATION NO.9/1935-36,
ELURU,
WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH, AND
HAVING CENTRAL WORKING OFFICE AT HEBRONPURAM,
KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA, KERALA, PIN - 689547,
REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY,
PRESENTLY PR.DR.BABY VARGHESE,
2 IPC GENERAL COUNCIL
HAVING CENTRAL WORKING OFFICE AT HEBRONPURAM,
KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA, KERALA REPRESENTED BY
ITS GENERAL SECRETARY, PRESENTLY PR. DR. BABY
VARGHESE., PIN - 689547
BY ADVS.
SRI.JACOB P.ALEX
SRI.JOSEPH P.ALEX
SRI.MANU SANKAR P.
SRI.AMAL AMIR ALI
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RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS & RESPONDENTS 3 - 5 :
1 BINU V. GEORGE
AGED 54 YEARS
S/O. LATE V. GEORGE, RESIDING AT AALILYETH HOUSE,
TC 14/1308(6), MALANCHIRA POST, ULLOOR VILLAGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
DISTRICT., PIN - 695015
2 JOBY ABRAHAM
AGED 40 YEARS
S/O. T.E. ABRAHAM, RESIDING AT THONDATTIL HOUSE,
KADAVOOR P.O., MANIPPARA, KADAVOOR VILLAGE,
KOTHAMANGALAM TALUK, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT., PIN -
686671
3 DAVID SAM A.M.
AGED 49 YEARS
S/O. LATE ARTHER SAM,RESIDING AT THENGUVILAKATHU
HOUSE, ARAMADA P.O., KONKALAM, THIRUMALA VILLAGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 695032
4 JOJI IYPE MATHEWS
S/O. LATE IYPE M. ABRAHAM, RESIDING AT MANAKKU
PUTHEPURAYIL HOUSE, MEPRAL P.O., PERINGARA
VILLAGE, THIRUVALLA TALUK, PATHANAMTHITTA
DISTRICT., PIN - 689591
5 INDIAN PENTECOSTAL CHURCH OF GOD,
IPC KERALA STATE COUNCIL HEBRONPURAM, KUMBANAD,
PATHANAMTHITTA, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
PIN - 689547.
6 STATE BANK OF INDIA
KUMBANAD BRANCH, PB NO. 1, THOMSON BUILDINGS,
KUMBANAD P.O., PATHANAMTHITTA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER, PIN - 689547.
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7 BANK OF INDIA
KUMBANAD BRANCH, BLISS CENTRE,
KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER, PIN - 689547
ADDL.R8: DANIEL KONNANILKUNNATHIL JACOB
AGED 52 YEARS, SON OF K.C. CHACKO, SECRETARY,
INDIAN PENTECOSTAL CHURCH OF GOD, KERALA STATE
COUNCIL, HEBRON PURAM, KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA
689 547, RESIDING AT KONNANILKUNNATHIL, EBENZER
GARDENS, KUDAPPANAKUNNE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-
695043.
* ADDL.R8 IS IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED
03/12/2025 IN I.A.4/2025 IN FAO NO.100/2025.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.BHARATH MURALI
SHRI.GEORGE VARGHESE(PERUMPALLIKUTTIYIL)
SRI.B.ASHOK SHENOY
SHRI.MANU NAIR G.
SRI.MANU SRINATH
SHRI.LIJO JOHN THAMPY
SMT.NIVEDITA MUCHILOTE
SHRI.RIYAS M.B.
SHRI.JINSU M. JAIS
SRI.P.S.GIREESH
SHRI.UMASANKER U.U.
SHRI.ADITYA A. SHENOY
OTHER PRESENT:
ADV G SREEKUMAR CHELUR- R1
THIS FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDERS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 24.03.2026, THE COURT ON 10.04.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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[CR]
S.MANU, J.
--------------------------------------------------
F.A.O.No.100 of 2025
-------------------------------------------------
Dated this the 10th day of April, 2026
JUDGMENT
Order dated 28.7.2025 passed by the learned District
Judge, Pathanamthitta in I.A.No.4/2025 in O.P.
(Society)No.30/2025 is under challenge in this appeal.
Appellants are the respondents 1 and 2 in the I.A. Respondents
1 to 4 herein are the petitioners in the I.A. The remaining
respondents are the respondents 3 to 5 in the I.A. respectively.
2. The I.A. was filed seeking temporary prohibitory
injunction restraining the 2nd appellant from implementing and
establishing the operation of IPC Malabar State, Kerala and also
from forming further States by dividing the existing Kerala State
Council. By the impugned order, the learned District Judge
restrained the 2nd appellant herein from forming any ‘sub state
within the Kerala State Council of Indian Pentecostal Church of
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God and also from proceeding with the functions of the IPC
Malabar State Council until further orders.
3. According to the appellants, the 1 st appellant is the
largest indigenous Pentecostal Church in India with more than
10,000 churches in India and abroad with several lakhs of
believers. The 1st respondent was registered under the Societies
Registration Act of 1860. The registered office is situated at
Eluru, West Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh. Currently the IPC
is governed by the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Societies
Registration Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as “the Andhra
Act”). The central working office is situated at Kumbanadu in
Pathanamthitta District.
4. The main dispute which led to filing of the O.P.
(Society) is the formation of ‘IPC Malabar State’ carving out 513
local churches and 34 District/Centres from IPC Kerala State.
Respondents 1 to 4 alleged that the decision to form a separate
State was taken without any authority of law and without
following the procedures contemplated in the Memorandum of
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Association and constitution of IPC. Invoking Section 23 of the
Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, the Original
Petition was filed in the District Court, Pathanamthitta.
5. First and foremost contention raised by the appellant
in this appeal is regarding the maintainability of the original
petition before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. As all counsel
appearing for various parties elaborately addressed arguments
on this issue, it is appropriate to deal with the said contention
before addressing the matter on merits.
6. The 1st appellant obtained registration initially under
the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central Act 21 of 1860)
from Eluru in Andhra Pradesh. In 2001, the legislative assembly
of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh
Societies Registration Act, 2001. The object of the Act is to
consolidate and amend the law relating to the registration of
societies situated in Andhra Pradesh promoting art, fine arts,
charity, crafts, religion, sport, literature, culture, science,
philosophy, political education or any other public purpose and
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for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
7. Section 23 of the Andhra Act deals with disputes
arising among the Committee or the members of the Society, in
respect of any matter relating to the affairs of the Society. Two
remedies are provided under the provision. The aggrieved can
proceed under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 or file an application in the District Court concerned.
Upon filing of an application in the District Court, the said Court
shall, after necessary enquiry, pass such order as it may deem
fit.
8. Court has been defined under Section 2(d). The
expression shall be understood with respect to cities of
Hyderabad and Secunderabad as City Civil Courts and elsewhere
the same would mean the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction. The respondents 1 to 4 have approached the
District Court, Pathanamthitta in the O.P.(Society) indisputably
invoking Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration
Act, 2001. The moot question is as to whether a Principal Civil
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Court of original jurisdiction in the State of Kerala can entertain
an original petition filed under Section 23 of the Andhra Act.
9. The learned counsel for the appellants Sri.Jacob Alex
forcefully contended that the original petition is not
maintainable before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. The
learned counsel submitted that in view of Article 245 of the
Constitution of India, legislature of a State can enact laws
applicable only to the State concerned. Such laws cannot have
any application beyond the territories of the State. He argued
that the Andhra Act has no application beyond the State of
Andhra Pradesh. He contended that the definition of ‘Court’ in
Section 2(d) cannot be understood to mean that every Principal
Civil Courts of original jurisdiction in the country can exercise
the jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. He
submitted that the expression ‘elsewhere’ employed in Section
2(d) denotes the Principal Civil Courts of original jurisdiction
situated within the State of Andhra Pradesh other than in
Hyderabad and Secunderabad. He further submitted that no
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Principal Civil Courts of original jurisdiction beyond the State of
Andhra Pradesh can exercise the powers under Section 23 of the
Andhra Act. He argued that jurisdiction can be conferred on a
court only by a law. No court can assume jurisdiction. He
submitted that in the instant case, the District Court,
Pathanamthitta has erred in entertaining the O.P.(Society) as it
inherently lacks jurisdiction to deal with the same. He further
contended that the inherent lack of jurisdiction being a question
of law can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and
therefore the appellants are entitled to contend that the said
issue be decided in this appeal. The learned counsel relied on
the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
support of his contention regarding jurisdiction of the District
Court:-
1) Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) v. Ajmer Vidyut
Virtan Nigam Limited [(2019) 17 SCC 82].
2) Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa
Ambasa Dharmadas (Dead) by Lrs. and
others [(2007) 13 SCC 650].
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3) Asma Lateef and another v. Shabbir Ahmad
and others [(2024) 4 SCC 696].
10. The learned counsel referred to the following
paragraph in Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) (Supra):-
“17. We are of the view that it is settled law that if
there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the plea can
be taken up at any stage and also in collateral
proceedings. This was held by this Court in Kiran
Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1955) 1 SCR 117 : AIR
1954 SC 340] as follows : (SCR p. 121 : AIR p. 342,
para 6)
“6. … It is a fundamental principle well-
established that a decree passed by a court
without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its
invalidity could be set up whenever and
wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied
upon, even at the stage of execution and even
in collateral proceedings. A defect of
jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or
territorial, or whether it is in respect of the
subject-matter of the action, strikes at the
very authority of the Court to pass any
decree, and such a defect cannot be cured
even by consent of parties. If the question
now under consideration fell to be determined
only on the application of general principles
governing the matter, there can be no doubt
that the District Court of Monghyr was coram
non judice, and that its judgment and decree
would be nullities.”
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11. The learned counsel relied on the following
paragraphs of the judgment in Subhash Mahadevasa
Habib(Supra):-
“33.What is relevant in this context is the legal effect
of the so-called finding in OS No. 4 of 1972 that the
decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court
which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that
decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a
distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and
objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary
jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction
may make a decree passed by that court one without
jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court
lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction
does not automatically become void. At best it is
voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in
appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section
21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied.
………………………………………………………………..
35. Though Section 21-A of the Code speaks of a suit
not being maintainable for challenging the validity of
a prior decree between the same parties on a ground
based on an objection as to “the place of suing”,
there is no reason to restrict its operation only to an
objection based on territorial jurisdiction and
excluding from its purview a defect based on
pecuniary jurisdiction. In the sense in which the
expression “place of suing” has been used in the
Code it could be understood as taking within it both
territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction.
36. Section 15 of the Code deals with pecuniary
jurisdiction and, Sections 15 to 20 of the Code deal
with “place of suing”. The heading “place of suing”
covers Section 15 also. This Court in Bahrein
Petroleum Co. Ltd.v.P.J. Pappu [AIR 1966 SC 634 :
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Section 15 on the one hand and Sections 16 to 20 on
the other, in the context of Section 21 of the Code.
Even otherwise, considering the interpretation placed
by this Court on Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act
and treating it as equivalent in effect to Section 21 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed prior to the
amendment in 1976, it is possible to say, especially
in the context of the amendment brought about in
Section 21 of the Code by Amendment Act 104 of
1976, that Section 21-A was intended to cover a
challenge to a prior decree as regards lack of
jurisdiction, both territorial and pecuniary, with
reference to the place of suing, meaning thereby the
court in which the suit was instituted.
………………………………………………………………..
40. The entire question was considered by this Court
in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC
340 : (1955) 1 SCR 117]. Since in the present case,
the objection is based on the valuation of the suit or
the pecuniary jurisdiction, we think it proper to refer
to that part of the judgment dealing with Section 11
of the Suits Valuation Act. Their Lordships held: (AIR
p. 342, para 7)
“7. … It provides that objections to the
jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation
or undervaluation shall not be entertained by
an appellate court except in the manner and to
the extent mentioned in the section. It is a
self-contained provision complete in itself, and
no objection to jurisdiction based on
overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised
otherwise than in accordance with it.
With reference to objections relating to
territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil
Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the
place of suing should be allowed by an
appellate or revisional court, unless there was
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a consequent failure of justice. It is the same
principle that has been adopted in Section 11
of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to
pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying
Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code
and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the
same, namely, that when a case had been
tried by a court on the merits and judgment
rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed
purely on technical grounds, unless it had
resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of
the legislature has been to treat objections to
jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as
technical and not open to consideration by an
appellate court, unless there has been a
prejudice on the merits.”
In Hiralal Patni v. Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199 :
(1962) 2 SCR 747] , it was held that: (AIR p. 201,
para 4)
“4. … It is well settled that the objection as
to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on
the same footing as an objection to the
competence of a court to try a case.
Competence of a court to try a case goes to the
very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is
lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of
jurisdiction. On the other hand an objection as
to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived
and this principle has been given a statutory
recognition by enactments like Section 21 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.”
In Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu [AIR
1966 SC 634 : (1966) 1 SCR 461], it was held
Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle
that the defect as to the place of suing under
Sections 15 to 20 of the Code may be waived and
that even independently of Section 21, a defendant
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may waive the objection and may be subsequently
precluded from taking it.”
12. He relied on the following paragraphs of the
judgment in Asma Lateef and another(Supra) :-
“43. What does “jurisdiction” mean? In the ensuing
discussion, we feel inclined to draw guidance from
certain decisions of ancient vintage which have stood
the test of time.
44. The wisdom of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, ACJ,
speaking for a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in
Hriday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barna Sarma [1920
SCC OnLine Cal 85 : ILR (1921) 48 Cal 138], more
than a century back, profitably assists us in
understanding what is meant by “jurisdiction”, “lack of
jurisdiction” and “error in the exercise of jurisdiction”.
The relevant passage reads as under : (SCC OnLine
Cal)
“… An examination of the cases in the books
discloses numerous attempts to define the term
“jurisdiction”, which has been stated to be “the
power to hear and determine issues of law and
fact”; “the authority by which judicial officers
take cognizance of and decide causes”; “the
authority to hear and decide a legal
controversy”; “the power to hear and determine
the subject-matter in controversy between
parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise
any judicial power over them”; “the power to
hear, determine and pronounce judgment on the
issues before the Court”; “the power or authority
which is conferred upon a court by the
legislature to bear and determine causes
between parties and to carry the judgments into
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effect”; “the power to enquire into the facts, to
apply the law, to pronounce the judgment and to
carry it into execution.” … This jurisdiction of the
Court may be qualified or restricted by a variety
of circumstances. Thus, the jurisdiction may
have to be considered with reference to place,
value, and nature of the subject-matter. … This
classification into territorial jurisdiction,
pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the
subject-matter is obviously of a fundamental
character. Given such jurisdiction, we must be
careful to distinguish exercise of jurisdiction
from existence of jurisdiction; for fundamentally
different are the consequences of failure to
comply with statutory requirements in the
assumption and in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The authority to decide a cause at all and not
the decision rendered therein is what makes up
jurisdiction; and when there is jurisdiction of the
person and subject-matter, the decision of all
other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of that jurisdiction. The extent to which
the conditions essential for creating and raising
the jurisdiction of a court or the restraints
attaching to the mode of exercise of that
jurisdiction should be included in the conception
of jurisdiction itself is sometimes a question of
great nicety…But the distinction between
existence of jurisdiction and exercise of
jurisdiction has not always been borne in mind
and this has sometimes led to confusion. … We
must not thus overlook the cardinal position that
in order that jurisdiction may be exercised, there
must be a case legally before the Court and a
hearing as well as a determination. A judgment
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is
void, subject to the well-known reservation that
when the jurisdiction of a court is challenged,
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the Court is competent to determine the
question of jurisdiction, though the result of the
enquiry may be that it has no jurisdiction to deal
with the matter brought before it.
* * *
… Besides the cases mentioned therein,
reference may particularly be made to the
judgment of Srinivas Aiyangar, J., in Thuljaram
Row v. Gopala Aiyan [1916 SCC OnLine Mad
298], where the true rule was stated to be that if
a court has jurisdiction to try a suit and has
authority to pass orders of a particular kind, the
fact that it has passed an order which it should
not have made in the circumstances of that
litigation, does not indicate total want or loss of
jurisdiction so as to render the order a nullity.”
(emphasis supplied)
47. Moving on to decisions of not too distant an origin,
we notice that this Court in Rafique Bibi v. Waliuddin
[(2004) 1 SCC 287] whilst relying on Vasudev
Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, [(1970) 1
SCC 670] , has made valuable observations as to the
circumstances where an order passed could be regarded
as a nullity. The relevant observations made in Rafique
Bibi v. Waliuddin, [(2004) 1 SCC 287] read thus :
“6. What is “void” has to be clearly understood. A
decree can be said to be without jurisdiction, and
hence a nullity, if the court passing the decree
has usurped a jurisdiction which it did not have;
a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not
result in a nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the
court passing the decree must be patent on its
face in order to enable the executing court to
take cognizance of such a nullity based on want
of jurisdiction, else the normal rule that an
executing court cannot go behind the decree
must prevail.
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7. Two things must be clearly borne in mind.
Firstly, ‘the court will invalidate an order only if
the right remedy is sought by the right person in
the right proceedings and circumstances. The
order may be “a nullity” and “void” but these
terms have no absolute sense : their meaning is
relative, depending upon the court’s willingness
to grant relief in any particular situation. If this
principle of illegal relativity is borne in mind, the
law can be made to operate justly and
reasonably in cases where the doctrine of ultra
vires, rigidly applied, would produce
unacceptable results.’ (Administrative Law, Wade
and Forsyth, 8th Edn., 2000, p. 308.) …
8. A distinction exists between a decree passed
by a court having no jurisdiction and
consequently being a nullity and not executable
and a decree of the court which is merely illegal
or not passed in accordance with the procedure
laid down by law. A decree suffering from
illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be
termed inexecutable by the executing court; the
remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is
to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal
proceedings or by a superior court failing which
he must obey the command of the decree. A
decree passed by a court of competent
jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by
any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Sri.Jacob Alex placed reliance on a judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar
Ranibala and another [(2019) 20 SCC 143]. In the said
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judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no
provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra
territorial operation, similar to Article 245(ii) which expressly
saves Union laws with extra territorial operation, enacted by
Parliament. He contended that in view of the provisions of
Article 245 of the Constitution, the Andhra Act can have no
operation beyond the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
14. Advocate Sreekumar Chelur appearing for the
respondents 1 to 4 contended that the O.P.(Society) is perfectly
maintainable before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. He
submitted that the issue is no longer res integra. He relied on
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Terapalli
Dyvasahata Kumar v. S.M.Kantha Raju (Dead) through
legal representatives and another [(2018) 11 SCC 769]. He
submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the
provisions of Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies
Registration Act in the judgment cited and conclusively held that
the expression ‘District Court’ should be understood in the sense
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as it is used in the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore the
District Court having jurisdiction in view of Section 20 of the
Code of Civil Procedure would be the proper forum to entertain
original petitions under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. The
learned counsel submitted that the appellants herein challenged
the maintainability of the suit filed before the Principal District
Court, West Godavari, in Andhra Pradesh, on the ground that, in
view of a specific stipulation in the Memorandum of Association
and Constitution of the IPC providing that any proceedings
before a court of law against the IPC General Church shall be
filed within the local jurisdiction of the courts of Pathanamthitta
District, the suit was not maintainable. He referred to the order
passed by the Principal District Judge, West Godhavari on
21.6.2024 in I.A.No.315/2024 in SOP No.2/2023. He pointed
out that the contention of the appellants was accepted by the
learned Principal Judge and the petition was returned for filing
before the appropriate forum in accordance with the bylaws of
the IPC. He argued that having adopted a contention that only
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the courts in Pathanamthitta District shall have the jurisdiction
to entertain disputes regarding administration of IPC, it is not
open to the appellants to take a contrary plea in the
proceedings on hand. He therefore submitted that the
contention regarding maintainability of the O.P.(Society) is
without any merits.
15. Advocate Ashok Shenoy appearing for 8 th respondent
also submitted that the contention regarding maintainability of
the O.P.(Society) is bereft of merits. He submitted that though
the general proposition is that a legislation enacted by the
legislative assembly of a State can have operation only within
the territories of the State concerned, the same is not an
absolute rule. He pointed out that though the IPC is registered
under the Andhra Act and its registered office is situated in
Andhra Pradesh, the Society has operations across India and
also abroad. He therefore submitted that the remedy under
Section 23 of the Andhra Act can be invoked beyond the
territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh as the operations of
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the society is not confined within the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The learned counsel also submitted that the jurisdiction of the
court can be understood only as provided under Section 20 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. He relied on a judgment of a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rashtriya
Chemical & Fertilizers Limited, Mumbai and others v.
State of Maharashtra and another [2019 SCC OnLine Bom
765]. He made specific reference to the following paragraph of
the judgment:-
“38. To decide whether a State law has an
extraterritorial operation, the doctrine of territorial
nexus is invoked. The doctrine of territorial nexus is
applied to find out whether a particular State law has
extraterritorial operation. It signifies that the object to
which the law applies need not be physically located
within the territorial boundaries of the State, but what is
necessary is that it should have a sufficient territorial
connection with the State. If there is a territorial nexus
between the subject matter of the Act and the State
making the law, then the statute in question is not
regarded as having extraterritorial operation.”
16. He submitted that though the IPC is registered under
the Andhra Act and has its registered office in the State of
Andhra Pradesh, its head office is situated in Pathanamthitta
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District and the dispute is regarding the bifurcation of the IPC
State of Kerala. Hence, he submitted that the District Court,
Pathanamthitta is the ‘court concerned’ as provided under
Section 23 of the Andhra Act. He also referred to the definition
of the ‘court’ in Section 2(d) of the Andhra Act and pointed out
that except for Hyderabad and Secunderabad, the expression
‘court’ shall be understood as the Principal Civil Court of original
civil jurisdiction of the district. He also pointed out that the
constitution of the IPC provides that courts within
Pathanamthitta District shall have jurisdiction to entertain
litigations pertaining to the IPC. He hence submitted that the
contention regarding maintainability is misconceived and hence
liable to be rejected.
17. Adv.George Varghese appearing for the 5 th
respondent submitted that the contention of the other
respondents that the proceedings are maintainable before the
District Court, Pathanamthitta is liable to be rejected as the
same is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 245 of the
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Constitution of India. He submitted that the O.P.(Society) is not
maintainable and if the respondents 1 to 4 had any genuine
grievance, their remedy was to file a proper suit for appropriate
reliefs before the lowest forum in the hierarchy of civil courts.
He submitted that O.P.(Society) is liable to be declared as not
maintainable.
18. In reply to the submissions of Advocate Sreekumar
Chelur, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that no
reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court relied on by him. Adv.Jacob Alex contended that in the
judgment cited, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a case
wherein the Division Bench of the High Court held that only the
District Court concerned where the Society is registered will
have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute under Section 23 of the
Andhra Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
conclusion of the High Court was erroneous. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in the context of the issue which arose for
consideration, held that the provisions applicable to District
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Courts generally would apply and that the expression ‘District
Court’ in Section 23 does not refer only to the principal court of
original jurisdiction of a particular place. The learned counsel
submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not confronted
with a case of dispute regarding jurisdiction of a District Court
situated outside the territorial limits of the State of Andhra
Pradesh. He therefore submitted that the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited cannot be applied
in the instant case.
19. I shall now refer to the relevant provisions of the
Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001. Section 2(d)
reads as under:-
“2(d)- ‘Court’ means in the cities of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad the City Civil Court, and elsewhere
the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.”
Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Society Registration
Act,2001 reads as under:-
“23. Dispute regarding management – In the event
of any dispute arising among the Committee or the
members of the society, in respect of any matter
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25relating to the affairs of the society, any member of
the society may proceed with the dispute under the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act1996 (Central Act 26 of 1996), or may file an
application in the District Court concerned and the
said court shall after necessary inquiry pass such
order as it may deem fit.”
20. Section 23 is included in Chapter IV of the Andhra Act
dealing with disputes, dissolution and winding up. Analytical
reading of Section 23 would show that it is a provision intended
to provide remedies in case of disputes arising among the
Committee or the members of the Society in respect of any
matter relating to the affairs of the Society. Two different
options are provided under Section 23. It is open to any
member of the Society to proceed with the dispute under the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Alternative option is to file an application in the District Court
concerned. On filing of such an application, the District Court
concerned shall, after necessary enquiry, pass such order as it
may deem fit. If the member/members having dispute is/are
not opting to proceed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
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a special remedy of filing an application directly in the District
Court concerned has been provided. It is to be noted that the
said remedy is obviously a special remedy. The same has been
provided as another option in addition to the proceedings under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Moreover, a special remedy
and a designated forum have been provided. If Section 23 was
absent in the Andhra Act, the course open to the aggrieved
would have been instituting civil suits. In such an event the suit
would lie only before the lowest civil court in the hierarchy of
civil courts. By incorporating the provision, an opportunity to
raise the grievance directly before the District Court has been
provided. Thus, Section 23 provides for a special forum for
considering the applications of the members of the Societies
registered under the Andhra Act in respect of matters relating to
the affairs of the Society by conferring a special jurisdiction on
an existing court. Thus Section 23 confers a special jurisdiction
on the District Courts concerned.
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21. Part XI of the Constitution of India encompasses
Articles dealing with the relations between the Union and the
States. Provisions under this Part are of paramount importance
in the federal system of Government. Article 245 is a highly
significant provision as it deals with the extent of the laws made
by Parliament and legislatures of State. It reads as under:-
“245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and
by the Legislatures of States.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,
Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part
of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a
State may make laws for the whole or any part of the
State.
(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to
be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-
territorial operation.”
The legislature of a State is competent to make laws for the
whole or any part of the State. It is pertinent to note that
Article 245(2) provides that laws made by the Parliament shall
not be deemed to be invalid on the ground that they have extra-
territorial operation. No such fortification is offered to the laws
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enacted by the legislatures of States.
22. As provided under Article 246(3), subject to clauses
(1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to
make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any
of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule,
referred to as the State List.
23. Entry 32 of the State List is extracted hereunder:-
“Incorporation, regulation and winding up of
corporation, other than those specified in List I, and
universities; unincorporated trading, literacy,
scientific, religious and other societies and
associations; co-operative societies.”
24. Hence the State legislature is competent to legislate
with regard to societies. The Andhra Pradesh Societies
Registration Act is obviously enacted exercising the authority
under Entry 32. There cannot be any quarrel regarding the
competence of the legislature and applicability of the Act to the
territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh. However, the
controversy in this case is as to whether the said Act can confer
jurisdiction on a District Court situated beyond the territories of
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the State of Andhra Pradesh to accept a petition filed under
Section 23 of the Andhra Act and to pass appropriate orders
after conducting necessary enquiry.
25. Sri.Sreekumar Chelur asserted during the arguments
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Terapalli Dyvasahata
Kumar[Supra] has held unequivocally regarding the scope of
Section 23 of the Andhra Act that for the purpose of determining
jurisdiction to exercise the power under Section 23, provisions
applicable to District Courts generally would apply and that
therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, would
apply to determine the Court having jurisdiction. He specifically
referred to Paragraph 13 of the judgment in this regard. A
careful reading of the judgment shows that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was considering an appeal arising from a
judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in which Section 23
was construed as referring only to the Principal District Court of
the place where the Society is registered. A preliminary
objection was raised before the District Court at
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Vishakapattanam that it had no jurisdiction to consider a
petition under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. The objection was
rejected by the learned District Judge who held that the
expression District Court was not defined in the Andhra Pradesh
Society Registration Act and hence the provisions of CPC can be
taken into consideration to decide the territorial jurisdiction of
the District Court concerned as envisaged under Section 23 of
the Andhra Act. Further it was held that as Section 20 of CPC
envisages that the proceedings can be instituted in a Court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action
wholly or in part arises. The said conclusion of the learned
District Judge was reversed by the High Court. It was held by
the High Court that only the District Court concerned, where the
Society is registered, has jurisdiction to entertain any dispute
under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
examined the scope of the provisions in this context. This is
clear from a careful reading of the judgment as a whole. In
other words, the dispute in the case was as to whether the
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proceeding under Section 23 of the Andhra Act could be
entertained by any District Court other than that having
jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the
Society was situated. Whether Section 23 of the Andhra Act can
have any application beyond the territorial limits of the State of
Andhra Pradesh was not a matter arising for decision in the said
case. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court shall be
understood in the factual frame work of the case. It is to be
borne in mind that a judgment is an authority for what is
actually decided in the case. Precedents cannot be read and
understood like statutes. Courts should not place reliance on
decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits
in with the factual situation of the decision on which reliance is
placed. Observations in a judgment must be read in the context
in which they appear to have been stated. As the question
considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision cited
being totally different, I am unable to accept the contention that
the issue arising for consideration in the instant case is covered
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by the judgment in Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar(Supra).
26. Under the Constitutional scheme, effect of a law
enacted by a State Legislature is confined to the territories of
the State concerned as stipulated under Article 245. In this
connection it is apposite to refer to the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar
and Others v. State of Gujarat and others [(1994) 5 SCC
459]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“7. It is no doubt correct that under Articles 245
and 246 of the Constitution of India the Legislature
of a State can make laws for the State or any part
thereof. It would be overstepping the limits of its
legislative field when it purports to affect men and
property outside the State. In other words the
State Legislature has no legislative competence to
make laws which have extraterritorial operation.
Meaning of the words “extraterritorial operation”
have been authoritatively laid down by this Court
in various judgments. A State Legislature has
plenary jurisdiction to enact laws in respect of
subjects in Lists II and III, Seventh Schedule,
Constitution of India. Such laws may be in respect
of persons within the territory, of property —
immovable or movable — situated within the State,
or of acts and events which occur within its
borders. So long as the law made by the State
Legislature is applicable to the persons residing
within its territory and to all things and acts within
its territory, it cannot be considered extraterritorial.
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This Court — over a period of three decades — has
evolved a principle called “doctrine of territorial
nexus” to find out whether the provisions of a
particular State law have extraterritorial operation.
The doctrine is well-established and there is no
dispute as to its principles. If there is a territorial
nexus between the persons/property subject-
matter of the Act and the State seeking to comply
with the provisions of the Act then the Statute
cannot be considered as having extraterritorial
operation. Sufficiency of the territorial connection
involves consideration of two elements, the
connection must be real and not illusory and the
liability sought to be imposed under the Act must
be relevant to that connection. The Act has to
satisfy the principles of territorial nexus which are
essentially discernible from the factual application
of the provisions of the Act.”
[ Emphasis added ]
27. The only ground to justify any extra territorial
operation of a State law is territorial nexus. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has explained the concept of territorial nexus as
under in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala and
Another [1957 SCC OnLine SC 12]:-
“23. The next point urged by the petitioners is that
under Articles 245 and 246 the Legislature of a
State can only make a law for the State or any
part thereof and consequently the Legislature
overstepped the limits of its legislative field when
by the impugned Act it purported to affect men
residing and carrying on business outside the
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34State. It is submitted that there is no sufficient
territorial nexus between the State and the
activities of the petitioners who are not in the
State. The doctrine of territorial nexus is well
established and there is no dispute as to the
principles. As enunciated by learned counsel for
the petitioners, if there is a territorial nexus
between the person sought to be charged and the
State seeking to tax him the taxing statute may be
upheld. Sufficiency of the territorial connection
involves a consideration of two elements, namely,
(a) the connection must be real and not illusory
and (b) the liability sought to be imposed must be
pertinent to that connection. It is conceded that it
is of no importance on the question of validity that
the liability imposed is or may be altogether
disproportionate to the territorial connection. In
other words, if the connection is sufficient in the
sense mentioned above, the extent of such
connection affects merely the policy and not the
validity of the legislation. Keeping these principles
in mind we have to ascertain if in the case before
us there was sufficient territorial nexus to entitle
the Bombay Legislature to make the impugned
law. The question whether in a given case there is
sufficient territorial nexus is essentially one of fact.
The trial court took the view that the territorial
nexus was not sufficient to uphold the validity of
the law under debate. The court of appeal took a
different view of the facts and upheld the law. We
find ourselves in agreement with the court of
appeal. The newspaper “Sporting Star” printed and
published in Bangalore is widely circulated in the
State of Bombay. The petitioners have set up
collection depots within the State to receive entry
forms and the fees. They have appointed local
collectors. Besides the circulation of the copies of
the “Sporting Star”, the petitioners print over
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40,000 extra coupons for distribution which no
doubt are available from their local collectors. The
most important circumstance in these competitions
is the alluring invitation to participate in the
competition where very large prizes amounting to
thousands of rupees and sometimes running into a
lakh of rupees may be won at and for a paltry
entrance fee of say 4 annas per entry. These
advertisements reach a large number of people
resident within the State. The gamblers,
euphemistically called the competitors, fill up the
entry forms and either leave it along with the
entry fees at the collection depots set up in the
State of Bombay or send the same by post from
Bombay. All the activities that the gambler is
ordinarily expected to undertake take place,
mostly if not entirely, in the State of Bombay and
after sending the entry forms and the fees the
gamblers hold their soul in patience in great
expectations that fortune may smile on them. In
our judgment the standing invitations, the filling
up of the forms and the payment of money take
place within the State which is seeking to tax only
the amount received by the petitioners from the
State of Bombay. The tax is on gambling although
collected from the promoters. All these, we think,
constitute sufficient territorial nexus which entitles
the State of Bombay to impose a tax on the
gambling that takes place within its boundaries
and the law cannot be struck down on the ground
of extra territoriality.”
28. In the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court in Rashtriya Chemical & Fertilizers Limited,
Mumbai and Others (Supra), relied on by the respondents,
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the principle of territorial nexus is explained as under:-
“36. The petitioners’ next contention is the extra-
territoriality of the impugned Rule. In that
context, we may refer to a couple of
constitutional provisions. Article 245(1) of the
Constitution empowers Parliament to make laws
for the whole or any part of the territory of India.
But the Legislature of a State may make laws for
the whole or any part of that State alone. No law
made by Parliament shall, however, be
questioned on the ground that it would have
extraterritorial operation. Yet, a State–as a
constituent of the Union, with no sovereignty–
has no such immunity.
37. In other words, a State Legislature has no
legislative competence to make laws having
extra-territorial operation; a State can legislate
effectively only for its own territory; a State law
can affect persons, properties, or things within
the State and not outside the State. Thus, a State
law is not immune from challenge in a Court on
the ground of extra-territorial operation. Put
differently, a State law having operation outside
the State is not valid.
38. To decide whether a State law has an extra-
territorial operation, the doctrine of territorial
nexus is invoked. The doctrine of territorial nexus
is applied to find out whether a particular State
law has extraterritorial operation. It signifies that
the object to which the law applies need not be
physically located within the territorial boundaries
of the State, but what is necessary is that it
should have a sufficient territorial connection with
the State. If there is a territorial nexus between
the subject matter of the Act and the State
making the law, then the statute in question is not
regarded as having extra-territorial operation.
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39. Durga Das Basu in his magnum opus
Constitution of India, has noted that though the
jurisdiction of a State Legislature is, prima facie,
confined to persons and objects within the
territorial limits of its State, this jurisdiction
extends, as it were, by the application of nexus.
This means, once a State Legislature, competent
to legislate regarding a particular subject, has
some connection with a person, object, or activity
within its territorial limits, the application or
operation of the Act may extend to persons,
objects or activities (as the case may be) outside
the State. If there is a territorial nexus between
the person/property, subject matter of the Act and
the State seeking to comply with the provisions of
the Act, then the state cannot be considered as
having extraterritorial operation. Sufficiency of
territorial connection involves consideration of two
elements: the connection must be real and not
illusory, and the liability sought to be imposed
under the Act must be relevant to that connection.
The Act has to satisfy the principles of territorial
nexus which are essentially discernible from the
factual application of the provisions of the Act.
40. The learned author has further observed that
“whether in a given case there is sufficient
territorial nexus is a question of fact and it is for
the Courts of decide whether the ‘territorial nexus’
being put forward as the basis of the application of
the law is ‘sufficient or not’. It is of no importance
on the question of validity that the liability imposed
is or may be altogether disproportionate to the
territorial connection.” In other words, if the
connection is sufficient as satisfying the two
elements mentioned above, the extent of such
connection affects merely the policy and not the
validity of the legislation.
41. As held in Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar v.
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38State of Gujarat, [(1994) 5 SCC 459] there is no
general formula defining what territorial connection
or nexus is sufficient or necessary for applying a
State law to a particular object. Sufficiency of the
territorial connection involves consideration of two
elements: (a) the connection must be real and not
illusory; and (b) the liability sought to be imposed
under the Act must be pertinent or relevant to that
connection.
42. In relation to a taxing statute, the Supreme
Court, in the early constitutional days, has held the
sale or purchase need not take place within the
territorial limits of the State. Broadly speaking,
local activities of buying or selling carried in the
State in relation to local goods would be sufficient
basis to sustain the taxing power of the State,
provided, of course, such activities ultimately result
in concluded sale or purchase to be taxed.
43. In Bengal Immunity v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955
SC 661 a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
has held that the words “extra-territorial operation”
are used in two different senses: first, laws
regarding acts or events which take place inside the
State but have operation outside; second, laws with
reference to the nationals of a State in respect of
their acts outside. In its former sense, the laws are
strictly speaking intra-territorial though loosely
termed ‘extraterritorial’. Thus, under article 245(1),
it is within the competence of the State Legislatures
to enact laws with extra-territorial operation in that
sense. The words “laws with extra-territorial
operation” in Article 245(2) must be understood.
Bengal Immunity holds, in their second and strict
sense as having reference to the laws of a State for
their nationals in respect of acts done outside the
State. Otherwise, the provision would be
inconsistent as regards laws enacted by States.”
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29. Learned Counsel Shri Sreekumar Chelur and Shri.
Ashok Shenoy have contended that the IPC is having its
registered office in the State of Andhra Pradesh and majority of
its members are living outside the territories of the said State.
The headquarters is situated within Pathanamthitta District of
State of Kerala. Subject matter of the dispute between the
parties is regarding bifurcation of the IPC State of Kerala and
formation of Malabar State. They hence submitted that the
dispute is between its members mostly residing within the State
of Kerala regarding the management of the affairs of the IPC.
They further submitted that the principles of territorial nexus
will definitely apply in the instant case and the dispute would be
governed by Section 23 of the Andhra Act. Hence, according to
them, the District Court, Pathanamthitta is well justified in
entertaining the OP filed under Section 23. Moreover, in view of
the specific provisions in the Constitution and Bylaws of IPC,
which provide that jurisdiction shall lie with the courts in
Pathanamthitta District for all disputes pertaining to the IPC
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General Church, they contend that they are perfectly justified in
approaching the District Court, Pathanamthitta, with the petition
filed under Section 23.
30. Nevertheless, I find that the vital issue that requires
addressing in this case is not whether the principles of territorial
nexus would apply to the contentious subject matter, but rather
whether the District Courts of one State can exercise the special
jurisdiction granted by a statute passed by another State.
31. As observed above, Section 23 of the Andhra Act
indisputably provides a special remedy of approaching the
District Court. However, the operation of the Act is
unquestionably controlled by Article 245 of the Constitution.
Viewed from such an angle, it can be reckoned only as a
provision conferring a special jurisdiction on the District Courts
situated within the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The respondents, however, contend that in view of the principles
of territorial nexus, read in conjunction with the provisions of
the Constitution of the IPC, which provide that jurisdiction in
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case of disputes shall lie with the courts in Pathanamthitta
District, the original petition filed under Section 23 is perfectly
maintainable before the District Court, Pathanamthitta.
However, it is to be noted that the provision in the constitution
of IPC does not specify that the disputes are to be adjudicated
by the District Court, Pathanamthitta. Moreover, a provision in
the bylaws or constitution of a society cannot confer jurisdiction
on a particular court of law, that it does not enjoy under law.
The same can be conferred only by a statute. Therefore, unless
Section 23 of the Andhra Act can be held to operate beyond the
territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh in conferring
jurisdiction on the District Court, the respondents’ argument
cannot be accepted. In my opinion, it is inconceivable under our
Constitutional scheme for an Act of a State to confer special
jurisdiction on a court located beyond the territories of that
State. Principles of territorial nexus, which is related primarily to
the subject matter, cannot be raised as a ground to seek
extension of operation of a provision of a State Act conferring
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jurisdiction on courts, beyond its territorial limits as it would
definitely affront Art.245 of the Constitution.
32. With regard to the federal system, Article 245 of the
Constitution is among the most significant provisions. The
legislative powers of the Union, as well as those of the States,
shall be construed primarily in terms of Article 245. Otherwise,
the result would be anarchy.
33. The legislative competence of State Legislatures to
enact laws under Article 245 has been noted by acclaimed author
Durga Das Basu in his crowning work “Constitution of India” as
under:-
“A State law is not valid if it purports to affect men
and property outside the State. A State law may
apply to persons within its territory, to property-
movable and immovable-situated within the state or
to acts and events which occur within the borders. A
State Legislature has no legislative competence to
make laws having extra-territorial operation. A State
can legislate effectively only for its own territory. A
State law can affect persons, properties or things
within the State and not outside the State. A State
law is not immune from challenge in a Court on the
ground of extra-territorial operation. A State law is
not immune from challenge in a Court on the ground
of extra-territorial operation. A State law having
operation outside the State is not valid.”
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34. Even if the contention of the respondents that the
actions of the IPC and its members in the State of Kerala have a
territorial nexus, on the ground that the registered office of the
IPC is situated in the State of Andhra Pradesh and that its
registration is under the Andhra Act, is assumed to be correct
for the sake of argument, at the risk of repetition, it should be
noted that the fundamental issue concerns the invocation of the
special jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Andhra Act by a
District Court in Kerala. If it is assumed that a State Legislature
can enact a law conferring jurisdiction on courts situated within
the territories of another State or regulating the functioning of
such courts, the state of affairs would be chaotic and violative of
the basic principles of the federal structure. Therefore, I am of
the view that the proposition canvassed by the respondents that
Section 23 of the Andhra Act has extra territorial application if
the dispute has territorial nexus and hence the special
jurisdiction can be invoked by a District Court in the State of
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Kerala is contradictory to the provisions of Article 245. Such a
proposition, if accepted, would violate the basic tenets of the
federal structure.
35. In Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala
and another [(2019) 20 SCC 143] cited by the learned counsel
for the appellant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the
validity of Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act,
2011 that provided appeal against orders of the Rent Control
Tribunal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Apex Court held as
under:-
“36. Parliament and the State Legislatures derive
their power to make laws from Article 245(1) of
the Constitution of India and such power is subject
to and/or limited by the provisions of the
Constitution. While Parliament can make law for
the whole or any part of the territory of India, the
State Legislature can only make laws for the State
or any part thereof, subject to the restrictions in
the Constitution of India.
37. Article 246, which distributes legislative
powers between the Union Legislature and the
State Legislature, confers exclusive power to
Parliament to make laws in respect of the matters
specified in List I in the Seventh Schedule, that is,
the Union List. The Union Parliament also has,
subject to clause (3) of Article 246, the power to
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make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule,
that is, the Concurrent List.
38. While Parliament has exclusive power under
Article 246(1) of the Constitution to make laws
with respect to the matters enumerated in the
Union List, the State Legislature has exclusive
power to make laws with respect to matters
enumerated in the State List, subject to clauses
(1) and (2) of Article 246. Along with the Union
Legislature, the State Legislature is also competent
to enact laws in respect of the matters enumerated
in the Concurrent List, subject to the provisions of
Article 246(1).
………………………………………………………………
49. Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act,
providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court
from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, is
not ancillary or incidental to the power of the
Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent
Control Act, which provides for appellate
adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy and
rent by a Tribunal. In enacting Section 13(2) of the
Rent Control Act, the Chhattisgarh State
Legislature has overtly transgressed the limits of
its legislative power, as reiterated and discussed
hereinafter.
………………………………………………………………
51. As observed above, both the Union legislature
and the State Legislature derive their power to
legislate from Article 245 of the Constitution of
India. It is axiomatic that the legislature of a State
may only make laws for the whole or any part of
the State, while Parliament may make laws for the
whole or any part of the territory of India. There is
no provision in the Constitution which saves State
laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to
Article 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws
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46
with extra-territorial operation, enacted by
Parliament. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature,
thus, patently lacks competence to enact any law
which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh.”
[ Emphasis added ]
36. The Apex Court finally held that the State Legislature
lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2), and the
provision was declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, null
and void, and of no effect.
37. It is interesting to refer to some judgments rendered
by various High Courts during the pre-Constitutional era, in the
light of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act.
In Commissioner of Wakf Bengal v. Narasingh Chandra
[1939 SCC OnLine Cal 7] the Calcutta High Court considered the
question as to whether Section 70 of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934
has application outside the province of Bengal. In the said case
a wakf was created by a resident of Dacca with respect to
properties situated partly in Bengal and partly in Assam. A suit
was filed in a Munsiff Court situated in the State of Assam under
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47
Section 70(5) of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934. The learned
Munsiff dismissed the application holding that the Bengal Wakf
Act does not apply to Assam. The Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court considered the issue in the light of Section 80A of
the Government of India Act and held that local legislature is
not authorized to make laws regulating subjects lying outside
the province. It was contended in the said case that Section
70(2) of the Act refers to a suit or proceeding in respect of any
wakf property and therefore if the property is situated outside
the province the court having jurisdiction over it can exercise
the power under Section 70(2). The said contention was
negatived by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
accepting the rival submission that such an interpretation would
inevitably lead to conflict of jurisdiction.
38. In M.K.Khanna v. Raja Ram [1953 SCC OnLine Pat
75 ] a Division Bench of the Patna High Court considered a case
in which a judgment debtor objected to the execution of the
decree passed by Special Judge of Benares appointed under the
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48
United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act by the Subordinate
Judge of Purnea. The objection of the judgment debtor was
overruled by the learned Subordinate Judge. The Division
Bench held that the general principle is that exercise of civil
jurisdiction is conditioned by territorial limits. Further it was
held that the principle applies not merely to the jurisdiction of a
judicial tribunal but to exercise of legislative jurisdiction. The
Division Bench referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court of
America in St. Louis v. The Ferry Co.[(1870) 11 Wall. 423,
430]. In the light of the principle laid down therein and also in
view of Section 80A of the Government of India Act, 1919 it was
held that the Legislature of the United Provinces has no power
to make laws which would have extra-territorial application or
which would affect person or property outside its jurisdiction.
Under the relevant enactment of the United Provinces, the Local
Government of the United Provinces was authorised under
Section 3 of the Act to appoint any civil judicial officer as a
“Special Judge,” who would have jurisdiction within the area
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F.A.O.No.100 of 2025
49
specified. The Advocate General contended that the decree of
the Special Judge had the force of a decree passed by a civil
court of competent jurisdiction, and that the same could be
validly transferred for execution to the court at Purnea. The
Division Bench rejected the contention. It was held that if the
Legislature of the United Provinces cannot legislate directly for
property outside its territorial limit, the Legislature cannot by a
process of fiction treat the decree of the Special Judge as a
decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction and make it
executable against immovable property outside its territorial
limits by recourse to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.
It was held that in view of the provisions of the Act, the decree
of the Special Judge will be deemed to be a decree of the civil
court only within the territory of the United Provinces.
39. Hence the judicial pronouncements, even of the pre-
Constitutional era regarding extra territorial application of state
laws pertaining to jurisdiction of courts, support the conclusions
given above.
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40. The inevitable conclusion of the above discussion is
that the special jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Andhra Act
can be exercised only by the District Courts located within the
territorial limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh. I therefore
hold that O.P.(Society)No.30/2025 pending before the District
Court Pathanamthitta filed under Section 23 of the Andhra
Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 is not maintainable.
Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide any of the
other contentions raised by the parties during the course of
hearing. They are left open.
41. In fine I hold that the impugned order is not legally
sustainable and it is accordingly set aside. I.A.No.4/2025 shall
stand dismissed.
The FAO is allowed as above. No costs.
Sd/-
S.MANU
JUDGE
skj
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APPENDIX OF FAO NO. 100 OF 2025
APPELLANTS’ ANNEXURES
Annexure 1 TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION AND
CONSTITUTION OF IPC (REVISED IN 2022)
Annexure 2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 31-01-2023 PASSED
BY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT
AMARAVATI IN WRIT PETITION NO. 1851/2023
Annexure 3 TRUE COPY OF THE APTC FORM – 10 DATED 09-02-
2023 EVIDENCING THE PAYMENT OF REQUISITE FEES
FOR AMENDMENT OF BYE-LAWS
Annexure 4 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE BEARING NO.
IPCGC/115/2024 DATED 24-01-2025
Annexure 5 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDENDUM BEARING NO.
IPCGC/235/2025 DATED 24-02-2025
Annexure 6 TRUE COPY OF THE DIRECTIVE BEARING NO.
IPCGC/242/2025 DATED 14-03-2025
Annexure 7 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION BEARING NO.
IPCGC/245/2025 DATED 20-03-2025
Annexure 8 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO.
IPCKL/8487/2025 DATED 06-03-2025
Annexure 9 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO. IPCKL /8874
/2025 DATED 09-04-2025 ISSUED BY THE IPC KERALA
TO OFFICE BEARERS OF IPC
Annexure 10 TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL PETITION IN OP
(SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA
Annexure 11 TRUE COPY OF THE IA NO. 2 OF 2025 IN OP
(SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA
Annexure 12 TRUE COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF
OBJECTION FILED IN IA NO. 2 OF 2025 IN OP
(SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA
Annexure 13 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 09-06-2025 IN
OPC NO. 1076 OF 2025 OF THIS HON’BLE COURT
Annexure 14 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27-06-2025 IN RP
NO. 764 OF 2025 OF THIS HON’BLE COURT
Annexure 15 TRUE COPY OF THE IA NO. 4 OF 2025 IN OP
(SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA
Annexure 16 TRUE COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF
OBJECTION FILED IN IA NO. 4 OF 2025 IN OP
(SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT
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52
COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA
Annexure 17 TRUE COPY OF THE IPCGC/50/25-26
DATED 02-07-2025
RESPONDENTS’ ANNEXURES
Annexure R1(a) THE TRUE COPY OF THE PREVAILING REGISTERED
MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT
OBTAINED FROM THE REGISTRAR OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Annexure R1(b) A TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT FILED BY THE
DISTRICT REGISTRAR IN IN I.A. NO. 1337 IN O.P.
NO. 2 OF 2023, ON THE FILE OF THE HON’BLE
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST GODAVARI
DISTRICT
Annexure R1(c) A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE HON’BLE
DISTRICT COURT, WEST GODAVARI,ELURU DATED
21/6/2024 IN IA NO.315/2024 IN S.O.P NO.2/2023
Annexure R1(d) A TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF WRIT PETITION
FILED BY THE 2NDAPPELLANT AGAINST THE DISTRICT
REGISTRAR, ANDHRA PRADESH
Annexure R1(e) A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
31.01.2023 PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT ANDHRA
PRADESH
Annexure R1(f) A TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO DATED 25.02.2023 PASSED
BY THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR, IN REFERENCE TO W.P.
NO. 1851 OF 2023
Annexure R1(g) THE TRUE COPY OF THE PRESS REPORT BEARING
NO.IPCGC/240/2025 DATED 12.03.2025
Annexure R1(h) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 24.01.2025
STATING AGENDA ISSUED FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
MEETING OF 26.02.2025
Annexure R1(i) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 24.03.2025
ISSUED BY THE 2ND APPELLANT
Annexure R1(j) A TRUE COPY OF THE SAID COMPLAINT DATED
08.07.2025, SUBMITTED BY MULTIPLE MEMBERS OF
THE 2NDAPPELLANT
Annexure R1(k) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 14.03.2025
Annexure R1(l) A TRUE COPY OF THE SAID NOTICE DATED 21.04.2025
ISSUED BY THE 2ND APPELLANT
Annexure R1(m) A TRUE COPY OF THE I.A NO. 4 OF 2025 FILED BY
THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Annexure R1(n) A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.07.2025 IN
I.A. NO. 4 OF 2025 IN O.P. (SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF
2025 OF THE DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA
Annexure R1(o) A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
27.08.2025 IN THE ABOVE APPEAL
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Annexure R1(p) A TRUE COPY OF THE RECORD OF THE INAUGURAL
FUNCTION OF IPC MALABAR STATE
Annexure R1(q) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 02.07.2025
Annexure R1(r) ORDER APPOINTING AN INTERIM COMMITTEE IN PLACE
AD-HOC COMMITTEE FOR MONITORING THE 5TH
RESPONDENT VIDE NOTICE DATED 15.09.2025
PETITIONERS’ ANNEXURES
Annexure 18 True copy of the IPCKL/7654/2024
dated 09-02-2024
Annexure 19 True copy of the covering letter
dated 29-05-2023 (without annexures) submitted
by the General President of IPC to the District
Registrar, Eluru
Annexure 20 True copy of the Order dated 08-05-2023 in IA
No. 5 of 2023 in IA No. 16 of 2023 in OS No …..
of 2023 of the District Court, Pathanamthitta
Annexure 22 True copy of the Judgment dated 24-05-2023 in
FAO No. 42 of 2023
Annexure 23 True copy of the judgment dated12-04-2023 in
WPC 12495 of 2023
Annexure 24 True copy of the relevant portion of the
newspaper (Malayala Manorama) report dated 23-
10-2025
Annexure 21 True copy of the Order dated 16-05-2023 in IA
No. 1 of 2023 in FAO No. 42 of 2023 of this
Hon’ble Court
RESPONDENTS’ ANNEXURES
Annexure R7(a) A true copy of order No. IPCGC/93/25-26
dated 20.09.2025 issued by the 1st respondent
Annexure R7(b) True copy of the transfer order issued by the
Secretary to Pastor Baburaj C.K. as per letter
No. IPCKL/9009/2025 dated 09.10.2025
Annexure R7(c) A true copy of order No. IPCKL/9008/2025 dated
22.09.2025
Annexure R7(d) A true copy of Order No. IPCKL/9021/2025 dated
29.10.2025
Annexure R7(e) A true copy of Order No. IPCKL/9015/2025 dated
16.10.2025
Annexure R7(f) A true copy of Order No. IPCKL/9022/2025 dated
29.10.2025
Annexure R7(g) A true copy of the relevant page of the
Passbook of the 7th respondent with A/c No.
0384053000007032 in South Indian Bank, Kumbanad
Branch
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Annexure R8(a) True copy of letter No. IPCGC/85/25-56 dated
15.09.2025 issued by 1st respondent
Annexure R8(b) True copy of commission report dated 26.9.2025
in O.P (Society) No. 32 of 2025 filed by
Advocate Commissioner before the District
Court, Pathanamthitta
PETITIONERS’ ANNEXURES
Annexure 25 TRUE COPY OF THE IPCGC/248/2025
DATED 27-03-2025 ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF 1ST
APPLICANT HEREIN
Annexure 26 TRUE COPY OF THE DECISION DATED IPCGC/85/25-26
DATED 15.09.2025
Annexure 27 TRUE PHOTOGRAPHS (6 NUMBERS) OF THE IPC GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS CAMPUS
Annexure 27 (a) TRUE COPY OF THE LAND TAX RECEIPT
DATED 26-11-2025 OF KOIPRUM VILLAGE IN THE NAME
OF INDIAN PENTACOSTAL CHURCH
Annexure 28 TRUE COPY OF THE FIR NO. 1256 OF 2025 BEFORE
THE KOIPURAM POLICE STATION
Annexure 29 TRUE COPY OF THE IPCGC/122/25-26 DATED
21.11.2025
Annexure 30 TRUE COPY OF THE PURPORTED ELECTION
NOTIFICATION DATED 20.11.2025
Annexure 31 TRUE COPY OF THE NEWS ITEM PUBLISHED IN THE
MANGALAM DAILY ON 21.11.2025
Annexure 32 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 25.11.2025 ISSUED
TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
Annexure 33 TRUE COPY OF EMAIL DATED 28.11.2025 ALONG WITH
LETTER BEARING NO. IPCGC/125/25-26
DATED 28.11.2025 (MISTAKENLY TYPED AS
29.11.2025)
Annexure 34 TRUE PHOTOGRAPHS (3 NUMBERS) THAT WAS CAPTURED
FROM CCTV FOOTAGE ON 28.11.2025
