The inquiry into whether there is “no legal evidence” or
evidence “manifestly inconsistent” with the accusation is not an exercise in weighing credibility,
reliability, or sufficiency of evidence. It is a threshold, objective
screening of what is placed on the record — distinct from trial adjudication.
The court asks only whether any evidence touching the offence exists at all, or
whether the material on record is irreconcilably self-contradictory — never
whether existing evidence is convincing or likely to result in conviction.
R.P. Kapur
v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC
OnLine SC 21, laid down three categories warranting quashing under the inherent
power (then Section 561-A):
1.
Where there
is a legal bar against institution or continuance of the proceedings;
2.
Where the
allegations in the FIR/complaint, even taken at face value, do not disclose an
offence; and
3.
Where there
is no legal evidence adduced in
support of the charge, or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
The judgment itself draws the operative distinction: “It is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly
inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence
which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In
exercising its jurisdiction… the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry
as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not.”
This was carried forward as Category
(iii) in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, and reaffirmed for its narrow, exceptional
scope in State of A.P. v. Vangaveeti
Nagaiah, (2009) 12 SCC 466 — confined strictly to total absence of evidence
or evidence irreconcilable with the accusation, never to evidence that is
merely weak or debatable.
III. Steps to Ascertain “No Legal
Evidence” or “Manifest Inconsistency”
1.
Confine review to the record as it stands — FIR/complaint, Section 200/202 statements, annexed documents —
taken at face value, without probing truth or credibility.
2.
Check for existence, not sufficiency, of evidence — does any evidence connecting the accused to the essential
ingredients of the offence exist at all?
3.
Test for irreconcilable inconsistency — does evidence on record directly and manifestly contradict the
accusation (e.g., a document negating dishonest intention at inception in a
cheating case)?
4.
Avoid assessing reliability or credibility — that determination belongs exclusively to the trial judge after
cross-examination.
5.
Apply caution and restraint — short of total absence or clear contradiction, the process
order must stand; this power is used sparingly, in rare cases.
6.
Screen for legal ingredients independently — even if the material is wholly true, does it satisfy every
statutory ingredient? Failure supports quashing under Bhajan Lal Category
(i)/(ii) as well.
IV. Distinguishing the Two Situations
|
Aspect |
No legal evidence / manifestly inconsistent (quashable) |
Legal evidence, debatable on appreciation (not quashable) |
|
Nature of evidentiary gap |
Complete absence, or evidence directly contradicts the |
Some material exists that touches the accusation |
|
Court’s role |
Limited, objective screening |
Declines the exercise; leaves it to trial |
|
Outcome |
Process/proceedings quashed |
Process sustained; matter proceeds to trial |
|
Applicable stage |
Issuance of process, quashing petition, revision against |
Post-evidence, at trial after full appreciation |
Scope of
the revisional court’s examination: Once revision is correctly understood as maintainable, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9
SCC 460, confirms that Section 397 jurisdiction is confined to examining the correctness, legality, or propriety of
the order — not re-appreciating evidence. Interference is warranted only where
the finding is based on no evidence, relevant material is ignored, or
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely — precisely the substantive
content supplied by the “no legal evidence/manifest inconsistency”
test.
VI. Illustrative Fact Situations for a Session
Judge Hearing Criminal Revision
1. Total
absence of legal evidence — accused not connected to the alleged act. Where the record implicates a named accused generally but is
silent on any act, document, or statement against a specific co-accused, that
co-accused’s summoning suffers total absence of legal evidence qua him and must
be quashed even if the case proceeds against others. Scan the record person by
person — omnibus allegations against “all accused” are no legal
evidence against any specific individual.
2. Manifest
inconsistency — contemporaneous documents contradicting the FIR. A civil plaint filed the same date as the FIR, describing the
transaction in materially different terms (lawful possession vs. forcible
dispossession), directly and irreconcilably contradicts the criminal
allegation. This is a legal, not factual, exercise since the contradiction is
visible on the Magistrate’s own record.
3.
Commercial/cheating disputes lacking evidence of dishonest intention. In cheating cases, if the record shows only breach of a business
arrangement with no evidence of false representation at the time of the transaction, the essential ingredient of
dishonest inducement at inception is unsupported by any legal evidence — mere
civil breach cannot be dressed as a criminal charge.
4.
Flagrant, root-level inconsistencies in the complainant’s own version. Irreconcilable contradictions across the FIR, supplementary
statement, and chargesheet (conflicting dates, missing corroborating medical
evidence despite specific claims) are self-defeating and manifestly
inconsistent — visible on the face of the pre-trial record without needing
cross-examination.
5.
Sufficient material exists — revision must fail. Where a supplementary chargesheet contains witness statements and
bank records linking an accused to an offence, that constitutes legal evidence
prima facie, even if he was not named in the original FIR. A revisional court
errs by re-appreciating such material — the case falls outside Category (iii)
entirely, and the summoning order must be restored.
VII. Practical Checklist for the Session Judge
|
Step |
What to examine |
Quash or uphold? |
|
1 |
Is there any material connecting this accused to any essential |
If none — quash (no legal evidence) |
|
2 |
Does any document/statement directly contradict the accusation |
If yes, and irreconcilable — quash (manifest inconsistency) |
|
3 |
Is the material present but merely thin, uncorroborated, or open |
Uphold — leave to trial court |
|
4 |
Has the Magistrate recorded at least brief reasons showing |
If reasons are ex facie incorrect or wholly absent — may justify |
|
5 |
Am I being asked to weigh credibility of witnesses or |
If yes — decline; that is the trial court’s function |
|
6 |
Is the summoning order interlocutory or |
It is intermediate/quasi-final — revision under Section 397 is |
VIII. Key Distinction to Apply at Each Step
An order issuing process, being intermediate/quasi-final rather
than interlocutory, is properly revisable under Section 397 CrPC (corresponding
BNSS provision). But that revisional jurisdiction is confined to testing the
order’s legality and propriety — not
re-appreciating evidence or substituting the Sessions Judge’s own view of
sufficiency. The moment the inquiry shifts from “does any legal evidence exist, or is it manifestly
contradicted” to “is the
existing evidence convincing enough,” the Sessions Judge has exceeded
Section 397’s scope — that question is barred at the revision stage and belongs
exclusively to the trial court after evidence is led and tested.
