Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Tehsil And District Shopian… … vs 3. Senior Superintendent Of Police on 6 August, 2026
Serial No. 65
Suppl Cause List
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
LPA 289/2025 in HCP 323/2024
Reserved on: - 02/07/2026.
Pronounced on: - 06/08/2026
Uploaded on: - 07/08//2026
1. Abdul Basit Paul
S/o. Abdul Rashid Paul
R/o. Chotipora Shopian,
Tehsil and District Shopian... (Through his mother)
...Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s).
Through: Mr. B.A. Tak, Advocate with
Mr. Muzaffer Mohi Ud Din, Advocate
Vs.
1. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir
Through Principal Secretary, to Govt
Home Department, Civil Sectt.
Srinagar/Jammu
2. District Magistrate Shopian.
3. Senior Superintendent of Police, Shopian.
...Respondent(s).
Through: Mr. Bikramdeep Singh, Dy. AG
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE (ACTING)
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Mohd Yousuf Wani-(J)
1. Impugned in this Letters Patent Appeal is the judgment
dated 14-11-2025 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of this Court
[hereinafter referred to as the “Writ Court” for short] in Habeas
Corpus Petition No. 323/2024, titled “Abdul Basit Paul vs. UT of
J&K and Ors“, whereby the Ld. Writ Court has dismissed the same
as being meritless.
2. The impugned judgment has been assailed on the grounds,
inter alia, that the Ld. Writ Court did not appreciate the case of
the appellant/detenue as projected through the memo of writ
petition and the arguments advanced. That same is bad in law
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |1
and deserves to be set aside. That the respondent No. 2—District
Magistrate, Shopian [hereinafter referred to as the “Detaining
Authority” for short], did not apply his mind in the case brought
before him by the respondent No. 3—Senior Superintendent of
Police, Shopian, and hurried to pass the impugned detention order
without making some verification on his part, which material fact
has escaped the attention and consideration on the part of the Ld.
Writ Court. That the grounds of detention constitute the replica of
the dossier submitted by the respondent No. 3 to the Detaining
Authority, which makes the impugned detention order bereft of
application of mind.
That the respondents did not consider the representation
filed on behalf of the appellant/detenu, and the same was lately
shown to have been so considered and rejected on 14.10.2024,
without communicating the said fact to the appellant/detenu,
which aspect of the case was not appreciated by the Ld. Writ
Court. That the Ld. Writ Court also did not appreciate the fact, as
agitated in the petition before it, to the effect that the
appellant/detenue was not furnished with the copy of the
detention record in entirety, which prevented him from making an
effective representation at an earliest and to throw challenge to the
impugned detention order on all the grounds.
That the allegations levelled against the appellant/detenue,
as per the grounds of detention basing the impugned order, are
not backed by any sort of evidence, and the respondent No. 3
could not have levelled such heinous allegations in air, which
important aspect of the case again appears to have escaped the
attention and consideration by the Ld. Writ Court. That the
grounds of detention mainly accuse the appellant/detenue of
maintaining close association with active terrorists particularly
Abid Ramzan Sheikh and Shahid Yousuf Kuttay of Chotipora
Sedow and providing them with logistic support in the form of
transportation, food, shelter and communication facilities. That
the Ld. Writ Court also did not appreciate the fact that the
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |2 Detaining Authority had observed, in breach, the constitutional/statutory guarantees available to the
appellant/detenue in terms of provisions of Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India and Section 13 of the Jammu and Kashmir
Public Safety Act, 1978, [hereinafter referred to as the “PSA” for
short]. That the allegations made in the grounds of detention are
vague and far from facts to be believed by no prudent man without
any evidence.
3. The case of the appellant/detenue, in nutshell, is that he
was arrested without any justification or cause by the Police
Station Shopian, whereafter he came to be shifted to the District
Jail, Baramulla for undergoing preventive detention, pursuant to
the detention order No. 191/DMS/PSA/2024, dated 12-09-2024,
passed by the Detaining Authority, which was impugned before
the Ld. Writ court. That the accusations made against him, as per
the grounds of detention dated 12-09-2024, are totally baseless
and false, without being backed by any sort of evidence. That he
has never indulged in any unlawful activity by providing any
logistic support, as alleged, to the terrorists or by otherwise
working as an OGW. That he pursued his initial education from
Iqra Public School Chotipora upto 7th Standard and thereafter he
got admission in Darul-Uloom Sadiqiya, Matibugh, Yaripora for
Islamic Studies. That after some time he took admission in Darul-
Uloom Jamiat ul Sheikh, Saranpur, UP and was pursuing
Molviyat Course there. That in the year 2023, due to the health
issues of his father he returned back to Kashmir. That aggrieved
by the order of detention, he, through his mother, challenged the
same before this Court on justified grounds, but the Ld. Writ
Court dismissed his petition, which led to his continued detention
since his arrest by the Police Station, Shopian in September,
2024.
4. The Detaining Authority resisted the petition of the
appellant/detenue, before the Ld. Writ Court on the grounds, inter
alia, that he pursued his initial education from Iqra Public School
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |3 Chotipora up to 7th Standard and was presently pursuing
Molviyat Course in Darul-Uloom Jamiat ul Sheikh, Saranpur, UP;
that upon his return from there, he has developed contacts with
active terrorists namely Abid Ramzan Sheikh and Shahid Ahmad
Kuttay of Chotipora Sedow; that he is a hardcore over ground
worker (OGW), sympathizer and promoter of LeT Terrorist outfit in
the valley and is actively involved in providing logistic support like
transportation, internet, food and shelter to terrorists; that he, in
order to revive terrorism in District Shopian, is taking directions
from Pakistan based handlers; that he has been carrying his
nefarious activities in a secret manner so as to avoid his exposure,
thus leaving no timely occasion for the law enforcement agencies
to deal with him under the normal law; that the normal law of the
land shall not be sufficient for confining him for a long period; that
the copies of the detention record in full were furnished to him
under his acknowledgment; that he was informed vide
communication dated 12-09-2024 regarding the grounds of his
detention with further information that he has a right to make a
representation to the Detaining Authority as also to the
Government; that the Government, after examining the detention
order and the material placed on record, approved the detention
order in terms of Sub-section 4 of Section 8 of the PSA, vide order
bearing No. Home/PB-V/1822 of 2024, dated 21-09-2024; that
the grounds taken in the petition are denied as being false and
frivolous; that the detention order was passed by the Detaining
Authority after proper application of mind and on perusal of the
record brought before it; that the purpose of preventive detention
is to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
interests of the security of the State or of public order and, as
such, is not intended to punish him for something he has done
and that there is no parallel between the prosecution in a court of
law and a detention order under PSA.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on both
sides and considered their rival submissions.
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |4
6. We have perused the record of the instant Intra-Court
Appeal, especially the impugned judgment dated 14-11-2025, the
impugned detention order dated 12-09-2024, and the grounds of
detention dated 12-09-2024. The detention record made available
by the learned counsel for the respondents has also been gone
through.
7. The impugned detention order has been passed mainly on
the ground that the appellant/detenue was providing shelter and
logistic support to active terrorists of LeT/TRF namely Abid
Ramzan Sheikh and Shahid Yousuf Kuttay. It is also alleged, as
per the grounds of detention, that the appellant, was providing
every kind of logistic support like shelter, food, information, etc.,
to the aforesaid terrorists, besides being in touch with Pakistan-
based handlers.
8. The detention of the appellant on the said alleged grounds
has been considered by the Ld. Writ Court in the impugned
judgment. None of the aforesaid allegations appear to have been
backed by the registration of any case FIR against him or even by
making an entry in the relevant registers of any police station. It is
alleged in the grounds of detention dated 12-09-2024, basing the
impugned detention order that the role of the appellant/detenue
prominently surfaced in providing logistic support to terrorists
and brain washing the young people to work for them as OGWs of
banned LeT/TRF outfits. There is a mention on the part of the
Detaining Authority in the grounds of detention, on the basis of
the report of respondent No. 3, i.e., the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Shopian, that the appellant/detenue, prior to his detention,
was carrying his nefarious activities in a clandestine manner to
avoid his exposure, thus simultaneously leaving no timely
occasion for the law enforcement agencies to deal with him under
the substantive law.
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |5
Such heinous allegations are not believable in the absence of
any legal action against the appellant under the normal criminal
law.
9. Invoking the preventive detention of any person by recourse
to the provisions of the preventive detention laws is no alternative
for an action demanding to be taken against him under the
criminal law for the alleged commissions and omissions
constituting offences under the penal laws. However, there is no
doubt as regards the well-settled legal position that preventive
detention is not parallel in the shape of double jeopardy, as the
aim and objective of preventive detention is to deter a criminal
from repeating his unlawful activities. In cases where preventive
detention is invoked in justified circumstances in the interest of
the security of the State or public order, in addition to the action
initiated or taken under the normal criminal law, the Detaining
Authority, as a rule of caution, needs to keep on record as to how
the normal criminal law is inadequate to tackle the detenue.
10. It appears that, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the preventive detention has been ordered while giving credence to
the vague allegations bereft of any supporting evidence.
11. In our opinion, we feel fortified with the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case titled “Rameshwar Shaw
versus District Magistrate, Burdwan and Another, AIR 1964
SC 334″, the relevant portion whereof is reproduced as under:
“In deciding the question as to whether it is necessary to detain
a person, the authority has to be satisfied that the said person if
not detained may act in a prejudicial manner and this conclusion
can be reasonably reached by the authority generally in light of
evidence about past prejudicial activities of the said person.
When evidence is placed, the Detaining Authority has to examine
the said evidence and decide whether it is necessary to detain
the said person in order to prevent him from acting in a
prejudicial manner. Thus, it was held that the past conduct or
antecedent history of a person can be taken into account in
making the detention order and it is largely from prior events
showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference
could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |6
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Further
the past conduct or history of the person on which the authority
purports to act should ordinarily be proximate in point of time
and should have the rational connection with the conclusion that
the detention of the person is necessary, that it would be
irrational to take into account the conduct of a person which took
the place years before the date of detention”.
12. The allegations of providing shelter and logistic support to
the terrorists, against the appellant/detenue appear to be general
and vague not only without any evidentiary basis, but also without
reference to the date and time. The Detaining Authority is required
under law to consider whether any alleged act is proximate to the
intended detention order. It is on record that one terrorist namely
Shahid Yousuf Kuttay, whom petitioner is alleged to had been
providing logistic support, was killed on 13.05.2025, that is, about
five months before the passing of the impugned judgment by the
ld. Writ Court. The Ld. Writ Court did not consider this aspect of
the case to appreciate that the proximity/live-link between the
alleged act of the appellant/detenue and the object of passing of
the detention order had got subsequently snapped.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in “Rajinder Arora
versus Union of India and Others, AIR (2006) 4 SCC 796″,
inter alia, observed:
“The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarized thus:
The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person
necessitating to pass an order of detention are proximate to the
time when the order is made or the live-link between the
prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard
and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be
applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines
can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of
proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting
number of months between the offending acts and the order of
detention. However, when there is undue and long delay
between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention
order, the court has to scrutinize whether the detaining authority
has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable
and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has
occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |7
has to investigate whether the causal connection has been
broken in the circumstances of each case.
Similarly, when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay
between the date of order of detention and the date of securing
the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable
doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the
detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as
regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to
preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner.”
14. We are however conscious of the law as already laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Naresh Kumar Goyal vs. Union of
India (2005) 8 SCC 276″ an0d “Haradhan Saha vs. State of
W.B. (1975) 3 SCC”, to the effect that an order of detention is not
a curative or reformative or punitive action, but a preventive
action, avowed object of which being to prevent the anti-national,
anti-social and subversive elements from imperiling the welfare of
the country or the security of the nation or from disturbing the
public tranquility or from indulging in smuggling activities or from
engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances etc.
“The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power
exercised in reasonable anticipation. It is not a parallel
proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on
certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have
been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made
before or during the prosecution. An order of preventive detention
may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or
after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of the prosecution
is no bar to an order of preventive detention. The order of
preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution”.
“Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and
prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The
authorities are different. The nature of the proceedings is different.
In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past
act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |8
inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part
of the detenue”.
15. We are also of the opinion that it is not the number of acts
that are determined for detention of an individual but it is the
impact of the act which is material and determinative.
As hereinbefore mentioned, the impugned detention order
appears to have been passed on vague, unverifiable and bald
allegations unsupported with any evidence or material. It is unsafe
to consider such vague allegations as constituting a past act for
deriving any inference about the future course of probable
conduct on the part of detenue.
16. The grounds of detention basing the impugned detention
apparently look as a “ditto” or “verbatim” of the police dossier,
which speaks of the non-application of mind on the part of the
Detaining Authority. No doubt, the police dossier has to be the
basic input and information to the Detaining Authority for
consideration of the powers vested in it under the provisions of the
PSA. Yet, the application of mind on the part of the Detaining
Authority is sine qua non for the passing of the detention order.
The Detaining Authority is required under law to make some
verification at its own level too by setting into motion its own
machinery for its subjective satisfaction before proceeding to
curtail one’s liberty which is only permitted in accordance with the
law.
All the grounds of detention framed by the detaining
authority and basing the impugned detention order start by
reference to the police dossier. The dossier of the respondent No.
3 submitted to the detaining authority and the grounds of
detention framed by the latter, when both are kept and perused in
juxtaposition, clearly reveal that the detaining authority has
followed the police dossier in its entirety. Thus, there is reason to
believe that the impugned detention order is bereft of subjective
satisfaction and non-application of mind on the part of the
detaining authority.
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 Page |9
17. In “Jai Singh and Others v. State of J&K, AIR 1985 SC
764, decided on 24.01.1985”, the Hon’ble Apex Court, inter
alia, observed:
“First taking up the case of Jai Singh, the first of the petitioners
before us, a perusal of the grounds of detention shows that it is
a verbatim reproduction of the dossier submitted by the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Udhampur, to the District Magistrate
requesting that a detention order may kindly be issued. At the
top of the dossier, the name is mentioned as Sardar Jai Singh,
father’s name is mentioned as Sardar Ram Singh and the
address is given as village Bharakh, Tehsil Reasi. Thereafter it
is recited “The subject is an important member of ……”
Thereafter follow various allegations against Jai Singh,
paragraph by paragraph. In the grounds of detention, all that the
District Magistrate has done is to change the first three words
“the subject is” into “you Jai Singh, S/o Ram Singh, resident of
village Bharakh, Tehsil Reasi”. Thereafter word for word the
police dossier is repeated and the word “he” wherever it occurs
referring to Jai Singh in the dossier is changed into “you” in the
grounds of detention. We are afraid it is difficult to find greater
proof of non-application of mind. The liberty of a subject is a
serious matter and is not to be trifled with in this casual,
indifferent and routine manner.”
18. A Division Bench of this Court, in similar facts and
circumstances, in “Showkat Ali versus Union Territory of
Jammu and Kashmir and Ors, LPA No. 19 of 2024, decided
on 26-07-2024″, while deliberating upon the necessity of
subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority on the basis of
supporting material, has, in paras 10 to 14, made the following
observations:
“10. There is a plethora of judgements of the Supreme Court and
the various high Courts of the country on the aspect of
“subjective satisfaction” to be arrived at by the detaining
authority which would reflect the application of mind on its part.
The main grounds for setting aside an order of preventive
detention are the non-application of mind of the detaining
authority or the denial of opportunity or material to the detenue
to enable him to make an effective representation against his
detention. That brings this court to the question as to whether
subjective satisfaction can be arrived at by the detaining
authority only based on bald allegations in the police dossier,
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 P a g e | 10
without there being any facts/material in support of those
allegations?
11. Before proceeding further, certain questions come to the mind
of this Court. (a) Firstly, is there any difference between an
“Allegation” and “Charge”? and (b) secondly, if there is a
difference between the two, is there a variation in their
application qua a criminal trial and in proceedings under the
preventive detention laws? And (c) thirdly, what is required in
the grounds of detention, an allegation or a charge?
12. An allegation is an imputation. It need not be verifiable.
Charge on the other hand is also an imputation, albeit verifiable.
An imputation without material in support is an allegation and
an imputation with supporting material is a charge which prima
facie reflects that what is imputed, maybe true. Thus, allegation
is the genus and charge its species. By analogy, the concept can
be understood at the stage of framing charge in a criminal trial.
The chargesheet filed by the police may level several allegations
against the accused in the chargesheet but, the Trial Court
frames charge for only those allegations for which prima facie
evidence exists in the chargesheet. While an allegation may be
generalised, non-specific and broad based, a charge must be
specific, precise and accord a reasonable opportunity to the
person so charged to conduct his defence or proffer an
explanation. Thus, a verifiable allegation/imputation is a charge.
13. To answer the second question that this Court has posed to
itself, this Court is of the opinion that there is a marked
difference in the operation of “charge” in a criminal trial and in
proceedings under the preventive detention laws. In a criminal
trial, the one who imputes i.e., the prosecution, bears the onus
probandi of proving every single charge against the accused
which if not proved beyond reasonable doubt, may result in the
acquittal of the accused. While, in proceedings under the
preventive detention laws, the onus probandi of giving a
convincing explanation to the imputations levelled by the
detaining authority, is on the detenue and if the same satisfies
the detaining authority or the advisory board, his detention may
be revoked.
14. As regards the third question as to what is required to be
stated in the grounds of detention viz., allegations or charge, this
Courtis of the view that the grounds of detention must lay down
the charge against the detenue. It must be precise, unequivocal
and unambiguous. The detenue must be in a position for give a
specific reply/rebuttal to the charge and that is only possible
where charge is specific and precise. Else, the detenue is only
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 P a g e | 11
able to give a bare denial by stating that the allegation is false.
However, if the charge is specific regarding the date, time and
the specific act of the detenue which requires him to be taken
into preventive detention then, the detenue is able to give a
specific response of denial rather than a bare denial. Thus, this
Court is of the view that the grounds of detention must lay down
the specific charge against the detenue rather than
unsubstantiated and unverifiable allegations. If the grounds of
detention are based on unsubstantiated allegations, the same,
along with the order of detention can be quashed as the detenue
has not been given an opportunity to make a viable
representation either to the detaining authority or to the advisory
board. The opportunity to represent to the abovementioned
authorities is not a hollow formality. To detain a person only
based on allegations without there being any material to
substantiate those allegations would imperil the fundamental
right of the individual enshrined in article 21 of the Constitution.
19. It has been averred in the instant LPA and was also pleaded
in the learned Writ Court petition that the Detaining Authority did
not furnish to the appellant/detenue the copies of the detention
record in full at the time of his arrest pursuant to the impugned
detention order, which prevented him from making an effective
and meaningful representation at the earliest.
20. It is the case of the appellant/detenue that the result of the
representation made by him through his mother was not
communicated to him.
A careful perusal of the detention order dated 12-09-2024 as
also of the following communication order, conjointly reveals that
the appellant/detenue has not been informed in clear and
unambiguous terms regarding his right to make a representation
at an earliest to the detaining authority as also to the
Government.
21. Non-supply of the entire set of documents basing and
referred to in the detention order at an earliest contravenes
the provisions of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. The
Constitutional mandate regarding information to the
petitioner/detenu that he has a right to make representation
to the detaining authority or to the Government in respect of
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 P a g e | 12
his preventive detention is not to be taken as a mere
formality by making mention of the words, “the detenu was
also informed that he can make a representation to the
detaining authority or to the government in respect of his
preventive detention” in the previously cyclostyled/
computerized receipts but is meant to be followed with
utmost fairness, responsibility and accountability having
regard to the fact that detenu’s fundamental right to life and
personal liberty is being curtailed on account of his
apprehended conduct. The detaining authority and the
government in case of making any representation by the
detenu to them as regards his detention are under a
constitutional obligation to accord due consideration under
law to the same and to intimate the result of the
consideration to the detenu through the concerned jail
authority or through his home people.
22. The relevant portion of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in case titled “Shalini Soni Vs. Union of
India (1980) 4 SCC 544″, deserves a needful mention as under: –
“The Article 22 (5) has two facets (1) communication of the
grounds on which the order of detention has been made; (2)
opportunity of making a representation against the order of
detention. Communication of the grounds pre-supposes the
formulation of the grounds and formulation of the grounds
requires and ensures the application of the mind of the detaining
authority to the facts and materials before it, that is to say to
pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual
case and excludes the elements of arbitrariness and automatism
(if one may be permitted to use the word to describe a
mechanical reaction without a conscious application of the mind).
It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and
administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is
entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory
functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to
pertinent and proximate matters only eschewing the irrelevant
and the remote. Where there is further an express statutory
obligation to communicate not merely the decision but the
grounds on which the decision is founded. It is a necessary
corollary that the grounds communicated, that is, the grounds so
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 P a g e | 13
made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and
proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent facts
and materials that went in to make up the mind of the statutory
functionary and not merely the inferential conclusions. Now, the
decision to detain a person depends on the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority. The Constitution and the
statute cast a duty on the detaining authority to communicate
the grounds of detention to the detenu. From what we have said
above, it follows that the grounds communicated to the detenu
must reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the
detaining authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived
at by the detaining authority. The matter may also be looked at
from the point of view of the second facet of Article 22(5). An
opportunity to make representation against the order of
detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all
that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the
decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed
not merely, as we said, of the inferences of fact but of all the
factual material which have led to the inferences of fact. If the
detenu is not to be so informed the opportunity so solemnly
guaranteed by the Constitution becomes reduced to an exercise
in futility. Whatever angle from which the question is looked at, it
is dear that “grounds” in Article 22(5) do not mean mere factual
inferences but mean factual inferences plus factual material
which led to such factual inferences. The ‘grounds’ must self-
sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view copies documents to
which reference is made in the ‘grounds’ may be supplied to the
detenu as part of the ‘grounds’.”
23. In “Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1999
(1) SCC 417″, it has been held that:
“It is a constitutional obligation of the Government to consider the
representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay.
Though no period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution
for the decision to be taken on the representation, the words “as
soon as may be in clause (5) of Article 22 convey the message
that the representation. should be considered and disposed of at
the earliest.”
24. In “K. M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Unio of India (1991) 1 SCC
476″, it has been held as follows:
“…. it is settled law that there should not be supine indifference,
slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation.
Any unexplained delay in the disposal of the representation
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 P a g e | 14
would be breach of the constitutional imperative and it would
render the continued detention impermissible and illegal.”
25. 28. In “A.K. Roy Vs. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271″, it
was held at para 70 of the judgment as under: –
“70. We have the authority of the decisions in… for saying that
the fundamental rights conferred by the different articles of Part
III of the Constitution are not mutually exclusive and that
therefore, a law of preventive detention which falls within Article
22 must also meet the requirements of Articles 14, 19 and 21.”
26. The preventive detentions need to be passed with great
care and caution keeping in mind that a citizens most
valuable and inherent human right is being curtailed. The
arrests in general and the preventive detentions in particular
are an exception to the most cherished fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
preventive detentions are made on the basis of subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority in relation to an
apprehended conduct of the detenu by considering his past
activities without being backed by an immediate complaint as
in the case of the registration of the FIR and, as such, is a
valuable trust in the hands of the trustees. The provisions of
Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 of our Constitution are not
applicable in the case of preventive detentions. So, the
provisions of Clause (5) of the Article 22 of our Constitution,
with just exception as mentioned in Clause (6), together with
the relevant provisions of the Section 8 of PSA requiring for
application of mind, subjective satisfaction, inevitability of
the detention order, proper and prompt communication of the
grounds of detention and the information of liberty to make a
representation against the detention order, are the imperative
and inevitable conditions rather mandatory requirements for
passing of a detention order.
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 P a g e | 15
27. The appellant/detenue, whose preventive detention was
ordered by the Ld. Detaining Authority pursuant to the Order No.
191/DMS/PSA/2024 dated 12.09.2024 on the ground of security
of the State in exercise of its powers vested under Section 8 of the
PSA, has almost undergone his period of detention, less by one
month.
28. In the backdrop of the foregoing facto legal scenario of the
case, we allow the instant LPA and set aside the impugned
judgment dated 14-11-2025 of the Ld. Writ Court passed in HCP
No. 323/2024. Consequently, the impugned detention order
bearing No. 191/DMS/PSA/2024 dated 12-09-2024 passed by
respondent No. 2, i.e., District Magistrate, Shopian, in respect of
the appellant, also stands quashed.
29. As a result, the appellant/detenue, Abdul Basit Paul, S/o.
Abdul Rashid Paul, R/o. Chotipora, Shopian, Tehsil and District
Shopian, is directed to be released from his preventive detention in
this case, provided he is not involved in any other case.
30. Disposed of.
(MOHD YOUSUF WANI) (SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE (ACTING)
SRINAGAR
06/08/2026
"Shahid Manzoor"
1. Whether the judgment is speaking Yes
2. Whether approved for reporting in
Law Journal/Reporter (print/electronic) Yes
3. Whether approved for reporting in Press/Media No
————————————————
LPA 281/2025 in HCP 322/2024 P a g e | 16
