Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Tasleem Ahmed vs State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi on 22 May, 2026
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.____________ /2026
@ SLP (CRL) NO.2867/2026
TASLEEM AHMED ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. /2026
@ SLP (CRL) NO.3867/2026
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. During the course of hearing, learned counsel
appearing for the State submitted that in cases dealing with
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEHA GUPTA
Date: 2026.05.22
1
18:43:11 IST
Reason:
grant of bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, there appears to be a perceived divergence in
the manner in which the decision of the three-Judge Bench
in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713
(hereinafter referred to as “K.A. Najeeb”) , is being
understood and applied by different Benches of this Court.
Considering the above divergence of views, he seeks
reference of the matter to an appropriate bench to settle the
issues.
4. Shri S.V. Raju, Learned ASG, in support of his plea
for reference drew our attention to various judgements
dealing with the contours of grant of bail under special
statutes when juxtaposed with the liberty enshrined under
Article 21. He placed reliance inter alia, on Kartar Singh
v. State of Punjab1, Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of
India2, P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka 3 and
1 (1994) 3 SCC 569.
2 (1996) 2 SCC 616.
3 (2002) 4 SCC 578.
2
others. He further at the outset submitted that the ratio laid
down in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi)4 has taken into consideration the ratios laid down in
Kartar Singh and Shaheen Welfare and has rightly
differentiated the roles of the accused persons while
dealing with the grant of bail.
5. The issue, as projected before us, is not a narrow
one concerning the bail prayer of the present appellants
alone. It concerns the proper constitutional approach to be
adopted where prolonged incarceration and delay in
conclusion of trial are pressed as grounds for bail
notwithstanding the statutory restraint contained in Section
43D(5) of the UAPA.
6. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to record
that K.A. Najeeb (supra) is an authoritative
pronouncement of a three-Judge Bench of this Court. It
4 (2026 INSC 2)
3
preserves the constitutional force of Article 21, while at the
same time recognising the legislative policy underlying
special statutes such as the UAPA.
7. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), this Court held that the
presence of statutory restrictions such as Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA does not per se oust the power of constitutional
courts to grant bail where continued detention violates Part
III of the Constitution. At the same time, the three-Judge
Bench expressly recognised that at the commencement of
proceedings courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail; and that the rigour
of such provision may melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable
time and the period of incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.
8. The ratio of K.A. Najeeb (supra), therefore, is
neither a charter for indefinite incarceration under the
4
cover of Section 43D(5), nor a mathematical command
that the mere passage of time, divorced from all
surrounding circumstances, must automatically result in
bail.
9. It is in this background that the decision
in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
[hereinafter referred to as “Gulfisha Fatima”] requires
to be understood. The said judgment proceeded on the very
premise that K.A. Najeeb binds all Benches of lesser
strength. It expressly recognised that Article 21 occupies a
central place in the constitutional scheme; that the right to
speedy trial is a facet of personal liberty; and that pre-trial
incarceration cannot, by mere passage of time, assume the
character of punishment. It further recognised K.A. Najeeb
as a constitutional safeguard against unconscionable
detention and recorded that there can be no second opinion
on the proposition that statutory restrictions must yield in
5
an appropriate case. At this juncture, we deem it necessary
to reproduce certain portions of Gulfisha Fatima below:
“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb2,
this Court recognised a constitutional
safeguard that cannot be ignored:
statutory restrictions cannot be applied
so as to render the guarantee of
personal liberty illusory. It was held
that where the trial is not likely to
commence or conclude within a
reasonable period, constitutional courts
retain the jurisdiction to grant bail
notwithstanding statutory restraints.
The decision thus operates as a
protection against unconscionable
detention and there can be no second
opinion on the said principle.”“52. The consequence of the above is that
Najeeb(supra) must be understood as a
principled safeguard against
unconscionable detention. Prolonged
incarceration is a matter of serious
constitutional concern and carries great
weight. It is not, however, the sole
determinant. The Court must consider, in
totality, whether continued detention has
become constitutionally unjustifiable,
having regard to the role attributed, the
statutory context, the limited prima facie
material, the trajectory of the trial, the
causes of delay, and the availability of
intermediate remedies.
6
53. This approach does not dilute Article
21. It gives Article 21 structured content in
a field where the Constitution itself
recognises competing interests.
Nor does it render Section 43D(5)
absolute. It recognises that statutory
restraint must yield in an appropriate case
where detention becomes punitive by
reason of unreasonable and unjustified
delay. What it excludes is a mechanical
override based on time alone, divorced
from legal context.”
10. What Gulfisha Fatima (supra) declined to accept
was a mechanical or solitary application of delay. The
judgment held that the inquiry into delay is contextual and
must take into account the nature of allegations, the
statutory field, the stage of proceedings, the realistic
trajectory of trial, the causes contributing to delay, the role
attributed to the accused, the prima facie material, the
availability of intermediate safeguards and the risks
attendant upon release.
11. The said approach, in our considered view, does
7
not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21 structured content
in a field where the Constitution requires the Court to
accommodate personal liberty, fair trial, societal security
and the legislative judgment underlying a special
statute. The judgment in Gulfisha Fatima understood the
findings and ratio in K.A. Najeeb as a principled
safeguard against unconscionable detention, and not as a
mathematical formula of universal application.
12. In Gulfisha Fatima, bail was granted to five of the
seven appellants before the Court. Bail was declined to
two appellants not because Article 21 was treated as
subordinate to Section 43D(5), but because, upon an
accused-specific evaluation, the Court found that their role,
the prima facie material attributed to them, and the
attendant concerns of trial integrity did not, at that stage,
justify overriding the statutory embargo. Even in respect of
those two appellants, liberty was reserved to renew the
8
prayer for bail upon completion of examination of
protected witnesses or upon expiry of one year, whichever
was earlier. That course itself shows that the judgment
treated Article 21 as a continuing constitutional check and
not as a spent or excluded consideration.
13. One circumstance in the present batch deserves
particular notice. The present appellants themselves have
placed reliance upon Gulfisha Fatima in support of their
prayer for bail. This circumstance is not without
significance. If Gulfisha Fatima had proceeded on the
basis that Section 43D(5) eclipses Article 21, or that
prolonged incarceration has no constitutional bearing in
UAPA prosecutions, it could hardly have been invoked by
accused persons seeking enlargement on bail. The very
reliance placed upon it demonstrates that the said decision
cannot be placed in a rigid or one-sided frame.
14. In a later decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v.
9
National Investigation Agency, Jammu5 another
coordinate Bench has expressed serious reservations on
certain aspects of Gulfisha Fatima, including the manner
in which K.A. Najeeb was applied. The later decision has
observed, inter alia, that Gulfisha Fatima adopts a
narrower reading of K.A. Najeeb and that such reasoning
amounts to a hollowing out of the constitutional force of
the three-Judge Bench decision.
15. We do not propose to enter into any adjudication on
the correctness of observations made by a coordinate
Bench. Judgments of this Court are not to be answered by
counter-observations from another Bench of equal
strength. The discipline of precedent demands a higher
institutional method.
16. However, where a coordinate Bench entertains
reservations about the reasoning of an earlier coordinate
5 (2026 INSC 503)
10
Bench, particularly on the application of a binding three-
Judge Bench decision, the proper course is well settled.
The matter must ordinarily be placed before Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate
Bench. A coordinate Bench cannot, by strong observations,
effectively unsettle the ratio of an earlier coordinate Bench
while continuing to sit in equal strength.
17. We deem it necessary to observe that disagreement
between coordinate Benches, by itself, is neither unusual
nor undesirable. The law has often grown through
reasoned difference. What the discipline of precedent does
not countenance, however, is a course by which an earlier
coordinate Bench is subjected to reservations of a
fundamental character, particularly on the alleged
misapplication of a larger Bench decision, without the
matter being placed before a Bench competent in strength
to resolve the perceived conflict. A coordinate Bench may
11
distinguish an earlier decision, may explain its own
understanding of the law, and may, in an appropriate case,
express doubt. But where the doubt goes to the root of the
legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the
stage of criticism. A doubt expressed in emphatic terms is
still a doubt; it is not a declaration of law. Unless resolved
by a Bench of appropriate strength, it only introduces
uncertainty in the administration of justice.
18. The obligation of judicial discipline is, therefore,
not discharged by merely stating it. It lies in adopting the
course which the institution requires. A Bench of equal
strength cannot achieve, by language of reservation, what
it cannot achieve by declaration of law. If the earlier view
is thought to be inconsistent with a larger Bench decision,
the proper course is reference. That course protects not
merely the judgment doubted, but the authority of this
Court itself. In matters touching personal liberty, national
12
security, statutory restrictions on bail and prolonged
incarceration, uncertainty in the law is itself an
institutional cost. We, therefore, consider it our duty not to
add another competing formulation to the field, but to
place the perceived conflict before a Bench of appropriate
strength so that the law may speak with the clarity and
authority expected of this Court.
19. It is possible for Benches of this Court to differ in
emphasis. It is equally possible that two decisions may
proceed on the same constitutional foundation but apply it
differently to distinct factual settings. But where the
difference is projected as one concerning the binding force
of a three-Judge Bench decision, and where such
difference is likely to affect pending trials under special
statutes across the country, the matter cannot be left to
uncertain application by courts.
20. We are also conscious that an unqualified reading
13
of the proposition that lapse of time by itself must compel
bail in every case under the UAPA may have serious
consequences. Such an approach may leave little room for
courts to examine the nature of allegations, centrality of
role, protected witnesses, risk of intimidation, possibility
of reactivation of networks, nature of delay and whether
such delay is attributable to the accused himself/herself,
public order concerns and national security implications.
On the other hand, an equally unqualified insistence on
Section 43D(5) without regard to prolonged incarceration
would imperil Article 21. The Constitution does not
command either extreme. It is this precise issue that may
warrant attention of the appropriate bench dealing with the
issues.
21. The question, therefore, is not whether Article 21
survives Section 43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true
question is how Article 21 is to be applied in a statutory
14
field where Parliament has consciously imposed
restrictions on bail in respect of offences alleged to affect
the security of the State and the stability of civic life.
22. We clarify that nothing in this order is intended to
whittle down, dilute, read narrowly, or detract from the
authority of K.A. Najeeb. On the contrary, the present
reference is necessitated because K.A. Najeeb deserves
application with the clarity, consistency and institutional
fidelity which a binding three-Judge Bench decision
commands. If a coordinate Bench has expressed
reservations on the manner in which another coordinate
Bench has applied K.A. Najeeb, the proper answer is not
further reservation. The proper answer is authoritative
resolution.
23. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the
issue requires consideration by Bench to be constituted by
the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India. This is necessary not
15
merely for the present batch of matters, but to settle the
correct approach to bail under special statutes where
Article 21, prolonged incarceration and statutory
restrictions intersect.
24. Having regard to the importance of the issue, we
are of the view that the questions requiring consideration
need not be confined to the correctness of any one
decision. The controversy raises a broader question
concerning the manner in which constitutional courts are
to approach bail where prolonged incarceration is asserted
in prosecutions governed by special statutes imposing
restrictive bail conditions. In this background it would be
imperative or in other words necessary for the appropriate
bench that may be constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice
of India, to clarify or expound the position of law laid
down in K.A. Najeeb’s case, particularly in the backdrop
of the rigour of 43D (5) which imposes restriction
16
consciously and has received the assent of the Parliament,
which obviously was brought in keeping in mind the
valuable right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
25. Registry is directed to place the papers before
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an
appropriate Bench to resolve the aforesaid issues.
26. We clarify that the present reference shall not be
understood as an expression of final opinion on the merits
of the prosecution case or on the guilt or innocence of the
appellants. Nor shall the present order be read as affirming
or disapproving any factual finding recorded in any earlier
bail order. The reference is confined to the legal questions
noticed above.
27. Having said so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that
the present appellants have undergone substantial
17
incarceration; that the trial is not likely to conclude
immediately; that the appellants themselves have invoked
the principle of calibrated constitutional discretion
recognised in Gulfisha Fatima; and that the determination
of the issues may consume further time. The appellants
cannot be made to suffer continued incarceration merely
because an important question of law has arisen for
authoritative settlement. Without expressing any opinion
on merits, and subject to stringent safeguards, we are
inclined to grant interim bail to the appellants pending
further orders.
28. Accordingly, the appellants are directed to be
released on interim bail for six (6) months, subject to the
following conditions:
a. Each petitioner shall execute a personal bond in the
sum of Rs. 2,00,000 with two local sureties of the
like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
18
b. The appellants shall surrender their passports, ifany, before the Trial Court. If any petitioner does
not hold a passport, an affidavit to that effect shall
be filed before the Trial Court.
c. The appellants shall not leave the National Capital
Territory of Delhi without prior permission of the
Trial Court. Any application seeking permission to
travel shall disclose the destination, duration,
purpose of travel and complete contact details
during such travel.
d. The appellants shall furnish their current
residential addresses, mobile numbers and e-mail
addresses to the Investigating Officer and to the
Trial Court. They shall not change their residence
or contact particulars without giving at least seven
days’ prior intimation to the Investigating Officer
and the Trial Court.
19
e. The appellants shall appear before the Trial Courton each date of hearing, unless exempted by the
Trial Court for reasons to be recorded.
f. The appellants shall not contact, influence, threaten
or communicate with any prosecution witness,
protected witness, complainant or person
acquainted with the facts of the case, directly or
indirectly.
g. The appellants shall not tamper with evidence,
electronic material, records, devices or documents
relating to the case.
h. The appellants shall not make any public
statement, including through print, electronic
media or social media, touching upon the merits of
the case, the evidence, the witnesses or the pending
trial.
i. The appellants shall not participate in any activity
20
which may prejudice public order or the integrityof the trial.
j. The appellants shall report to the Investigating
Officer once every fortnight, or at such interval as
may be directed by the Trial Court.
k. In the event of breach of any condition, it shall be
open to the State to seek cancellation of interim
bail before the appropriate court.
29. The Trial Court shall be at liberty to impose any
further condition as may be considered necessary in the
facts of each case.
30. The Trial Court shall proceed with the trial with
utmost expedition. The prosecution shall take all necessary
steps to ensure production and examination of witnesses
without avoidable adjournments. The accused shall also
cooperate with the expeditious conduct of the proceedings.
Any attempt to delay the trial after release on interim bail
21
shall be viewed seriously and may constitute a ground for
cancellation of bail.
31. The Trial Court shall not be influenced by any
observation made herein while considering any application
that may arise independently in accordance with law.
32. List the matters after orders are passed by Hon’ble
the Chief Justice of India on the administrative side.
……………………………………..J.
(ARAVIND KUMAR)
……………………………………..J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 22, 2026.
22
ITEM NO.66 COURT NO.14 SECTION II-D
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)
No(s).2867/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order
dated 02-09-2025 in CRA No.1207/2024 passed by the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi]
TASLEEM AHMED Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI Respondent(s)
IA No. 39423/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF
THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
IA No. 39424/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
WITH
SLP(Crl) No. 3867/2026 (II-D)
IA No. 47111/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF
THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
IA No. 47112/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 47109/2026 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
Date : 22-05-2026 These matters were called on for
hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE
For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Rebecca John, sr. aDv.
Mr. Rajat Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Yash S. Vijay, AOR
Ms. Anushka Baruah, Adv.
Mr. Shikhar Aggarwal, Adv.
23
Ms. Joshua Tom Thomas, Adv.
Mr. Mehmood Pracha, Adv.
Mr. R. H. A. Sikander, AOR
Mr. Jatin Bhatt, Adv.
Mr. Sanawar, Adv.
Mr. Kshitij Singh, Adv.
Mr. Sikander Raza, Adv.
Ms. Nujhat Naseem, Adv.
Mr. Kumail Abbas, Adv.
Mr. Chirag Verma, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :
Mr. Suryaprakash V Raju, A.S.G.
Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR
Mr. Kanu Aggarwal, Adv.
Mr. Rajat Nair, Adv.
Mr. Annam Venkatesh, Adv.
Mr. Samrat Goswami, Adv.
Mr. Alok Dubey, Adv.
Mr. Dhruv Pande, Adv.
Ms. Sairica Raju, Adv.
Akshaja Singh, Adv.
Mr. Aryansh Shukla, Adv.
Mr. Satyarth Singh, Adv.
Mr. Shikhar Yadav, Adv.
Mr. S.N. Terdal (aor), Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the
following
O R D E RLeave granted.
Accordingly, the appellants are directed to be released on
interim bail for six (6) months, subject to the following
conditions:
24
a. Each petitioner shall execute a
personal bond in the sum of Rs. 2,00,000
with two local sureties of the like amount to
the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
b. The appellants shall surrender their
passports, if any, before the Trial Court. If
any petitioner does not hold a passport, an
affidavit to that effect shall be filed before
the Trial Court.
c. The appellants shall not leave the
National Capital Territory of Delhi without
prior permission of the Trial Court. Any
application seeking permission to travel
shall disclose the destination, duration,
purpose of travel and complete contact
details during such travel.
d. The appellants shall furnish their
25
current residential addresses, mobilenumbers and e-mail addresses to the
Investigating Officer and to the Trial Court.
They shall not change their residence or
contact particulars without giving at least
seven days’ prior intimation to the
Investigating Officer and the Trial Court.
e. The appellants shall appear before the
Trial Court on each date of hearing, unless
exempted by the Trial Court for reasons to
be recorded.
f. The appellants shall not contact,
influence, threaten or communicate with any
prosecution witness, protected witness,
complainant or person acquainted with the
facts of the case, directly or indirectly.
g. The appellants shall not tamper with
26
evidence, electronic material, records,devices or documents relating to the case.
h. The appellants shall not make any
public statement, including through print,
electronic media or social media, touching
upon the merits of the case, the evidence, the
witnesses or the pending trial.
i. The appellants shall not participate in
any activity which may prejudice public
order or the integrity of the trial.
j. The appellants shall report to the
Investigating Officer once every fortnight, or
at such interval as may be directed by the
Trial Court.
k. In the event of breach of any
condition, it shall be open to the State to
seek cancellation of interim bail before the
27
appropriate court.
. The Trial Court shall be at liberty to impose any further
condition as may be considered necessary in the facts of each
case.
List the matters after orders are passed by Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India on the administrative side.
(NEHA GUPTA) (AVGV RAMU)
COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed order is placed on the file)
28
