Madras High Court
T.K.Ramachari, (Died), vs T.V.Namperumal (Died), on 10 July, 2026
Author: M.Dhandapani
Bench: M.Dhandapani
S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
RESERVED ON : 10.06.2026
DELIVERED ON : 10.07.2026
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI
S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
and
C.M.P.(MD)No.1542 of 2021
T.K.Ramachari (Died)
1.Subadra
2.Janardanan
3.Muthulakshmi
4.Anusooya
5.Santhi
6.Varalakshmi
7.Ramesh Babu
8.S.Padmavathi ... Appellants
Vs.
T.V.Namperumal (Died)
1.N.Sulochana
2.N.Meerabai
3.N.Ranibai
4.N.Mohan Raj
5.N.Prabhakaran
6.N.Venkatraman
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
7.N.Ramesh
8.N.Sathyanarayanan
9.N.Muralidharan ... Respondents
PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code, praying to set aside the judgment and decree
dated 22.02.2019 in A.S.No.236 of 2007, on the file of the I
Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli, confirming the
judgment and decree dated 19.09.2006 passed in O.S.No.2451 of
1996, on the file of II Additional District Munsif Court,
Tiruchirappalli and allow the Second Appeal.
For Appellants : Mr.H.Lakshmi Shankar
For Respondents 1 to 3 : No appearance
For Respondent No.9 : Mr.M.R.Sreenivasan
JUDGMENT
The defendants, who suffered concurrently before the Trial
Court as well as the First Appellate Court are the appellants in the
present Second Appeal.
2.The Second Appeal has been admitted by this Court on
02.03.2021, on the following two substantial questions of law, both
of which relate to the law of limitation and the entitlement of the
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
plaintiffs to institute the suit:
“a) Are the Courts below justified in
decreeing the suit ignoring the admitted and
established facts, that from 10.07.1964, the
defendants are in possession and enjoyment of
the suit property in their own right and by
constructing a house (exhibit B2, exhibit B4 &
exhibit B5), openly in hostile manner to the
interest of the plaintiff or the alleged trust he
claims to represent, which clearly proves their
case of adverse possession and also bars the
present suit filed after 12 years?
b) Is the conclusion of the Courts below
that limitation will start to run only from the
disposal of the earlier suit by the Honourable
High Court in exhibit A5, sustainable in law, as
the earlier proceedings, was not for recovery of
possession and whether such a conclusion is
sustainable in view of the legal principle that
mere pendency of a suit or proceedings will not
arrest the mere running of limitation as
enunciated under Section 9 of the Limitation
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021Act?”
3.I have heard Mr.H.Lakshmi Shankar, learned Counsel
appearing for the appellants and Mr.M.R.Sreenivasan, learned
Counsel appearing for the ninth respondent.
4.The brief facts that are necessary for decision in the above
Second Appeal are as hereunder:
4.1.According to the plaintiff, the suit property belongs to
Parakalaramanujakoodam Paghalpathu Rappathu Trust and the
plaintiff is managing the properties belonging to the Trust. The first
defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit
property. The plaintiff, as Managing Trustee, filed a suit in O.S.No.
749 of 1973, on the file of the Sub Court, Tiruchirappalli and in the
said suit, the first defendant in the present proceedings was
arrayed as the 34th defendant. The suit was filed to declare the title
of the Trust. The present first defendant resisted the suit stating
that he is a bonafide purchaser for valid consideration as early as
on 10.07.1964. The Trial Court came to the conclusion in the
earlier proceedings that the property belongs to the Trust and the
first defendant herein is a trespasser.
4.2.The first defendant challenged the same by way of First
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021Appeal in A.S.No.1070 of 1975. The appeal along with a connected
appeal was dismissed on 02.09.1983. The first defendant
unsuccessfully challenged the findings in L.P.A.No.5 of 1984, before
this Court. The plaintiff therefore, claiming that the suit property
belongs to the Trust and the issue has become final, sought for
recovering possession of the suit property from the first defendant
and for mesne profits. The suit was resisted by the first defendant
disputing the claim of the plaintiff and contending that the first
defendant was entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City
Tenants Protection Act, 1921, since superstructure was put up by
him. He would also contend that the suit has been filed belatedly
and plaintiff is not entitled to the relief as prayed for. Pending trial,
the first defendant died and the defendants 2 to 8 were brought on
record as his legal representatives.
4.3.Before the Trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself as
P.W.1 and Exhibits A.1 to A.11 were marked. The first defendant
examined himself as D.W.1 and Exhibits B.1 to B.6 were marked.
4.4.The Trial Court rejected the contention of the defendants
and decreed the suit as prayed for, as against which, the
defendants preferred A.S.No.236 of 2007, before the Sub Court,
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021Tiruchirappalli. Pending the appeal, sole plaintiff died and his legal
heirs were impleaded as respondents 2 to 10. The First Appellate
Court concurred with the findings of the Trial Court and held that
when the first defendant has suffered up to this Court in LPA
proceedings and the title of the Trust has been confirmed, the
plaintiff was entitled to seek recovery of possession. As regards
limitation, the First Appellate Court held that the suit was filed
within 12 years from the dismissal of the LPA by the High Court in
Ex.A.7 and therefore, it was very much in time and cannot be
thrown out on the ground of limitation.
5.Mr.H.Lakshmi Shankar, learned Counsel for the appellants
would state that the Courts below have wrongly calculated the
period of limitation and have also failed to notice that when the
first defendant was arrayed as a defendant even in the earlier suit
in O.S.No.749 of 1973, no relief having been sought against him,
there is a bar of Order II Rule 2 of CPC as well. The primordial
contention of Mr.H.Lakshmi Shankar, is that the limitation clock
once starts ticking cannot stop in the interregnum period and
merely because the first defendant was unsuccessful in collateral
proceedings up to this Court, it will not save limitation for the
plaintiff to seek recovery of possession. Though Mr.H.Lakshmi
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021Shankar has also raised various other contentions, considering the
fact that the appeal has been admitted only on the above two
substantial questions of law, which revolve on the aspect of
limitation, I am not delving further into the other arguments and
contentions put forth by Mr.H.Lakshmi Shankar.
6.In support of his submissions, Mr.H.Lakshmi Shankar, has
relied on the following four decisions:
1) Nazir Mohamed Vs. J.Kamala and others, reported in
(2020) 19 SCC 57;
2) N.S.Spance Vs. D.S.Kanagarajan and another,
reported in 2005 2 L.W. 470;
3) Rajender Singh and others Vs. Santa Singh and
others, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 705;
4) A.Rukumani and others Vs. Gopalaswamy and others,
reported in 1993 2 MLJ 598.
7.Per contra, Mr.M.R.Sreenivasan, learned Counsel for the
contesting ninth respondent would contend that the Courts below
have concurrently and rightly decreed the suit for recovery of
possession and such findings not being perverse, cannot be
interfered with under Section 100 of CPC. Insofar as the question
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
of limitation, Mr.M.R.Sreenivasan, would state that the suit was
filed on 07.12.1992 and when the LPA filed by the first defendant
was admittedly dismissed on 22.12.1989, the suit was clearly
within time and it is saved by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. He
would also state that limitation is to be calculated only from the
date of finality of decree in O.S.No.749 of 1973 and not from the
date of purchase made by the first defendant, who admittedly
entered into the property only as a tenant.
8.In support of his submissions, Mr.M.R.Sreenivasan, has
relied on the following decisions:
1) Charles (Died) Vs. Leela, reported in 2024 6 CTC 266;
2) M.Ganesa Reddiar & others Vs. C.Krishnasamy Raju,
reported in 2008 5 MLJ 144;
3) Saroop Singh Vs. Banto, reported in (2005) 8 SCC
330;
4) Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak Vs. Somnath Muljibjhai
Nayat, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 3761;
5) Briji Narayan Shukla (Died) through Lts. Vs. Sudesh
Kumar alias Suresh Kumar (Died) through Lrs. And others,
reported in (2024) 2 SCC 590;
6) Veeramuthu Vs. Puttalayee, reported in 1997 2 CTC
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021245.
9.I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by
the learned Counsel for the parties.
10.As already stated hereinabove, the only question that begs
an answer is as to whether the suit has been instituted within the
period of limitation. The title of the plaintiff Trust has been upheld
in the earlier proceedings upto LPA proceedings before this Court
and therefore, the issue of entitlement of the plaintiff to recover
possession, save the issue of limitation is not in dispute. As already
referred, the suit was filed on 07.12.1992. It is contended by the
learned Counsel for the respondent / plaintiff that the LPA filed by
the first defendant ended against the first defendant with a
dismissal only on 22.12.1988. It is therefore, his contention that
even in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which permits
filing of the suit for recovery of possession within 12 years, the
present suit is well within time. It is however, the argument of
Mr.H.Lakshmi Shankar that the pendency of the appeal or LPA
proceedings will not save limitation and atleast after the decree in
O.S.No.749 of 1773, on 23.09.1973, the suit ought to have been
filed, in time.
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11. A few further facts may be relevant to adjudicate the
issue of limitation. The plaint in O.S.No.749 of 1773, has been
exhibited before the trial Court as Ex.A.1. Admittedly, the first
defendant has been arrayed in the said suit as the 34 th defendant.
On a reading of the plaint, it is seen that the first defendant was
impleaded pursuant to an order in I.A.No.309 of 1976 dated
14.06.1976 and curiously, no relief was prayed for against the 34 th
defendant. In the suit, the reliefs sought for were to declare that
the suit property belongs to the private family Trust of
Parakalaramanujakoodam Paghalpathu Rappathu Charities, for a
permanent injunction restraining the fifth defendant from
interfering with the management of the suit properties by the
plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4 and also significantly, for a decree
for recovery of possession of the ‘C’ schedule property from the
fifth defendant. At paragraph No.13-A, after amendment and
impleadment of the 34th defendant, the plaintiff has stated as
follows:
“13A) On account of the newly impleaded
34th defendant claiming title to a portion of the
suit property bearing Door No.23 under the sale
deed dated 10.07.64 to bring about a binding
adjudication of the matters in controversy in the
suit he is impleaded as a party10/19
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021herein” (amended as per order in I.A.301/76)”
12.Therefore, even on the date on which the first defendant
was impleaded as a defendant in the suit, the plaintiff was
conscious of the fact that the 34th defendant was claiming title to
property bearing Door No.33 under a sale deed dated 10.07.1964.
Despite the same, the plaintiff has not chosen to seek any relief
against the 34th defendant, having chosen to implead the 34th
defendant and also make such allegations against him in the plaint.
It is not as if the plaintiff did not have a cause of action for seeking
the relief of recovery of possession on the said date. As already
referred to, the plaintiff was wise enough to seek for recovery of
possession from the fifth defendant, apart from other reliefs. The
interest of the 34th defendant in the said suit and the first defendant
herein was clearly adverse to the interest of the plaintiff, even in
the year 1976. However, for reasons best known to the plaintiff, no
relief was sought for against the 34th defendant ie.,first defendant
in the present suit. In such circumstances, merely because the said
decree was challenged by the first defendant herein by preferring
an appeal and also an LPA in L.P.A.No.5 of 1984, I do not see how
the plaintiff’s hands were in any manner tied from initiating
appropriate proceedings for recovery of possession from the first
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
defendant.
13.Coming to the case law on the subject, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Nazir Mohamed‘s case held that decree of
possession does not automatically follow a decree of declaration of
title and ownership over property and if a plaintiff deserves to
establish that the defendant’s possession was permissive and he
fails in such attempt, then it can be presumed that the possession
was adverse, unless there is evidence available to the contrary. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the maxim ‘possession
follows title’ is at best limited to cases where the defendant does
not admit to actual and exclusive occupation of the plaintiff, like
cases where the disputed properties in open space is accessible to
all and presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title
arises only where there is definite proof of possession by any one
else. However, when it is the admitted case of the plaintiff that the
defendant is in possession, then suit for recovery of possession
would be governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 3 bars
the institution of any suit after the expiry of the period of limitation
prescribed in the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that
the Court is obliged to dismiss a suit filed after the expiry of the
period of limitation, even if the plea of limitation has not been
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
taken in defence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further referred
to Articles 64 & 65 of Part-V of the Limitation Act, pertaining to
suits relating to immovable property and held that when the
defendant was in possession for over 28 years on the date of
institution of the suit, the High Court was in error in reversing the
finding of the First Appellate Court in holding that the suit was not
barred by limitation.
14.This Court in N.S.Spance‘s case, held that mere
pendency of a suit would not have the power of stopping the period
of limitation.
15.In A.Rukmani‘s case, this Court held following the
Division Bench of this Court in Venkatasubramania Vs.
Sivagurunatha reported in AIR 1938 Mad.60, that adverse
possession of an alienee starts from the moment the alienee is
without lawful title, ie., the date of transfer, in a case of void
transfer.
16.In Rajender Singh‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that continued illegal possession would also ripen into a
legally enforceable right after the prescribed period of time has
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
lapsed and that it would mature into a right, due to inaction and
not due to the action of the injured party, who can approach a
Court of appropriate jurisdiction to redress, by a suit to regain
possession. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that such
relief against the wrong doer must be sought within the time
prescribed in the Limitation Act.
17.Coming to the decisions that have been relied on by
Mr.M.R.Sreenivasan, in Charles’s case, this Court held that when
plaintiffs sought for recovery of possession claiming title based on
prior judgment, the defendants are not entitled to assert title and
claim adverse possession. Though there is no quarrel with regard
to the ratio laid down in this case, in the present case, having had
clear and definite notice of an adverse interest claimed by the first
defendant even in the earlier suit proceedings in O.S.No.749 of
1973, the plaintiff has slept over his rights and in such
circumstances, the bar of limitation would stare at the face of the
plaintiff.
18.In Ganesa Reddiar‘s case, this Court held that a person
who takes a plea of ownership based on title cannot claim adverse
possession. Again, the ratio laid down in this decision is a well
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
settled legal principle, over which I cannot have any quarrel.
However, we are now concerned only with the issue of limitation
and not with the plea of adverse possession. Hence, this decision is
of no avail to the facts of the present case.
19.In Saroop Singh‘s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that Article 65 would apply to a case where the defendant resisted
the suit claiming adverse possession and that starting point of
limitation would not commence from the right of ownership but
only from the date of defendant’s right becoming adverse to the
interest of the plaintiff. Even applying this ratio, as already
discussed hereinabove, even in 1976, while amending the plaint,
the plaintiff was conscious of the adverse interest claimed by the
first defendant and hence, the suit filed after dismissal of the LPA
cannot be taken advantage of by the plaintiff to claim that the suit
is well within time.
20.In Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak’s case also the very
same ratio laid down in Saroop Singh‘s case was reiterated.
21. Briji Narayana Shukla’s case was relating to
entitlement of a tenant to plead adverse possession. As already
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
stated and at the risk of repetition, this Second Appeal is being
tested on the substantial question of law relating to law of
limitation alone and hence, this decision is of no value addition to
decide the present Second Appeal.
22.In Veeramuthu‘s case relating to the plea of adverse
possession, this Court held that a decree in a suit for declaration of
title and injunction would break the continuity of adverse
possession and would not entitle the person in possession to claim
perfection of title by adverse possession. This decision also is not
on the point of limitation with which, I am presently confined with.
23.For all the foregoing reasons, having found that the
plaintiff was put on notice about the adverse claims made by the
first defendant, having purchased the property in 1964, atleast in
the year 1976, when the plaintiff voluntarily chose to implead the
first defendant herein as 34th defendant in the said suit and also
amend the plaint, making allegations against the first defendant,
the limitation clock started ticking right then onwards and the
mere fact that the suit was decreed, no relief was claimed against
the 34th defendant / first defendant herein and that the appeal filed
by the first defendant challenging the findings though no relief was
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
granted against the first defendant unsuccessfully up to this Court,
will not save limitation for seeking recovery of possession from the
first defendant. Unfortunately, the Courts below have held that the
suit is not barred by limitation, merely because it has been filed
within a period of three years from the date of dismissal of the
L.P.A.No.5 of 1984, filed by the first defendant. The findings are
clearly perverse and against the well settled legal principles
relating to law of limitation. Hence, I am constrained to allow this
Second Appeal, answering the substantial questions of law both 1
& 2 in favour of the appellants.
24.In fine, this Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment
and decree of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.236 of 2007
dated 22.02.2019, on the file of the I Additional Subordinate Court,
Tiruchirappalli, confirming the judgment and decree in
O.S.No.2451 of 1996 dated 19.09.2006, on the file of the II
Additional District Munsif Court, Tiruchirappalli, are set aside and
the suit in O.S.No.2451 of 1996, stands dismissed. However, there
shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected
miscellaneous petition is closed.
10.07.2026
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
Index : Yes / No
NCC : Yes / No
MR
To
1.The I Additional Subordinate Judge,
Tiruchirappalli.
2.The II Additional District Munsif,
Tiruchirappalli.
3.The Section Officer,
VR Section,
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,
Madurai.
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S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
P.B.BALAJI, J.
MR
PRE-DELIVERY JUDGMENT MADE IN
S.A.(MD)No.97 of 2021
10.07.2026
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