Supreme Court Expands Meaning Of ‘Unchastity’, Says Threat To Leak Woman’s Bathing Video Punishable Under S.506 IPC

1. The present appeal has been preferred against the

Judgment and Order dated 28.02.2024 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. A. No. 325 of 2017,

whereby the conviction of the appellant under Part II of

Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred

to as “IPC”) by the Sessions Judge, Magalir Neethi Mandram

(Fast Track Mahila Court), Villupuram, was confirmed and

upheld, and the appellant was directed to undergo rigorous

imprisonment of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/,

in default, to undergo simple imprisonment of three

months.

2. As per the prosecution case, a complaint was lodged

by the victim-prosecutrix alleging that the appellant

established a sexual relationship with her on a false

promise of marriage and also threatened the prosecutrix

with uploading a video on social media of her taking a bath,

which was allegedly recorded by the appellant. After the

investigation was completed, the appellant was charged

with committing offences of rape and sexual intercourse by

deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage, and criminal

intimidation with intent to impute unchastity to the victim,

punishable under Sections 376, 493, Part II of 506, and

354C of the IPC. As the appellant did not plead guilty to the

charges framed, the trial was held. On conclusion of the

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trial, the appellant was acquitted of the charges under

Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC but was found guilty of

the charge under Part II of Section 506 of the IPC.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction under

Part II of Section 506 IPC, the appellant preferred an appeal

before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, being

Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2017, which was disposed of by

the High Court by the impugned Judgment and Order dated

28.02.2024, dismissing the appeal and confirming the

conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. The

appellant is now before this Court challenging the said

conviction.

4. The appellant has argued before this Court that once

the charges under Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC were

held not proved against him, the question of conviction

under Part II of Section 506 IPC does not arise, as all these

incidents were inter-related. Further, no recovery had been

made of the mobile phone or the videography alleged to have

been recorded by the appellant, on the basis of which the

appellant was accused of intimidating the victim. Hence, in

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the absence of recovery of such evidence, the conviction

under Part II of Section 506 IPC cannot be sustained. It is

further the plea of the appellant that the complaint was filed

by the prosecutrix out of spite after a failed relationship

between them, as the appellant refused to marry her.

RELEVANT FACTS

5. In order to appreciate the contentions of the

appellant, it is necessary to revisit the relevant facts of the

case. The complaint was lodged by the prosecutrix before

All Women Police Station, Gingee on 10.08.2015, on the

basis of which offences under Sections 417, 376, and 354C

of the IPC were registered. The prosecution examined 13

witnesses and as many as 11 Exhibits were marked.

6. The star-witness is the prosecutrix herself, who was

examined as PW-1. She deposed that she became

acquainted with the appellant sometime in 2013, which was

about two years prior to the date of the complaint. He used

to work in the field of the complainant and had frequently

interacted with her. She stated that she helped him in his

studies, including by lending books, and through this they

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came to know each other. According to her, the appellant

sent messages to her over the phone expressing his love for

her. However, the victim, who belongs to the Christian

community, informed the appellant that he being a Hindu,

their relationship could create problems because of the

difference in their religion, and that he should remain only

a friend. She further stated that the appellant had on some

occasions helped her, including by taking her in his vehicle

in connection with a land dispute. The victim alleged that

on one occasion the appellant reiterated that he loved her

and that he would speak to her mother, and he then had

sexual intercourse with her against her will. It was further

stated that in the year 2013, when the appellant did not

secure a job in the Police Department and was upset, PW-1

pacified him. According to PW-1, despite her reluctance,

they had a sexual relationship in the house where PW-1 was

staying with her sister in Villupuram.

7. PW-1 alleged that one day the appellant, after taking

a bath in the bathroom, left his cell phone with the mobile

camera switched on. Thus, as she was taking her bath, the

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scene was recorded on the cell phone, of which she was not

aware at that time. After two days of the said incident, the

appellant allegedly told PW-1 that her bathing scene was

recorded in his cell phone, whereupon she wept, but the

appellant assured her that he would delete the said video.

Subsequently, the appellant, after getting a job in the Police

Department towards the end of 2013, left for training, and

PW-1 provided him with Rs. 2,000/- and also purchased

shoes and clothing for his training. After the appellant left

for training, PW-1 went to Pondicherry to stay with her

sister in 2014, and the appellant used to talk to her over the

phone. On returning to Pondicherry on 05.09.2014, when

PW-1 was staying with her sister, the appellant had sex with

PW-1 against her will but assured her that he would marry

her after she finished her education. Prior to that also they

had sexual intercourse on 12.05.2014.

8. After PW-1 informed the appellant that she had been

receiving several marriage proposals, the appellant told her

that he would come and discuss the matter. Accordingly,

the appellant came to PW-1’s place on 08.04.2015 and told

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her that if she married anyone else, he would show the video

that had been taken. According to PW-1, they had also gone

to Ayyanar Temple, Kondiankuppam, where the appellant

tied a yellow-coloured rope around her neck as a

Mangalsutra and thereafter had sex with her. He told her

that she should stay at his house for two days and that he

would find a house in Chennai and take her there. However,

when she asked him to take her along, he stated that the

members of his family would agree to the marriage only if a

huge amount was given as dowry, and he further asked her

to come to his place bringing all her jewellery. When the

prosecutrix informed the appellant that she would come to

his house, the appellant insisted that she remove the

Mangalsutra tied by him.

9. Later, when she informed him of the stoppage of her

menstruation, the appellant asked her to terminate the

pregnancy and brought her pills for the same. He further

advised her that if her menstruation did not resume, she

should go to a hospital. This conversation was recorded in

her cell phone, which the appellant asked her to erase. He

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further insisted that she remove the Mangalsutra and tear

off the photo taken together. He warned her that if she failed

to do so, he would upload her bathing video on the network.

Being distressed with the acts of the appellant, PW-1

contacted one Mr. Jothi, working as a Reporter in the

magazine Puthiya Thalaimurai, and told him of the

aforesaid incidents. Mr. Jothi then contacted the

Superintendent of Police, Villupuram, who asked her to

lodge a complaint, to which she hesitated, apprehending

that it would create problems for her and her family.

However, Mr. Srinivasan, Assistant Inspector, contacted the

appellant, and the appellant assured him that he would

delete the bathing scene from his cell phone. Thereafter, the

appellant contacted PW-1 and asked her to come to

Chennai immediately. She went to Chennai on 18.07.2015

but could not meet the appellant. Though the appellant

assured her that he would sort out the matter, he never

turned up. Given the circumstances, feeling betrayed and

exploited by the appellant, PW-1 lodged the complaint

before the Police Station.

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10. During the trial, two local prosecution witnesses,

Angelin (PW-2) and Sureshkumar (PW-4), did not support

the prosecution case, claiming ignorance of the incidents,

and were accordingly declared hostile witnesses. Another

local witness, Arokiyadass (PW-6), though he admitted to

have seen both the appellant and PW-1 together, denied

having executed any Mahazar (Ext.2) and was also declared

hostile. Two other witnesses, S. Arokiyadass (PW-8) and

Sakthivel (PW-9), though they admitted to have known both

the appellant and PW-1, denied having any knowledge of

the relationship between them or the allegations made by

PW-1, and were thus declared hostile.

11. On the other hand, the two sisters of the prosecutrix

sought to corroborate her testimony. PW-1’s elder sister,

Edwinrani (PW-5), who was staying in Pondicherry with

whom the prosecutrix used to stay occasionally, was aware

of the relationship between the prosecutrix and the

appellant. PW-5, in her testimony, mentioned the recording

of a video while the prosecutrix was taking a bath and the

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threat to expose it to others, as narrated to her by the

prosecutrix.

12. The younger sister of the victim,

Pushpadhanaeldamary (PW-10), also deposed that she

came to know from the prosecutrix that the appellant had

secretly recorded her while she was taking a bath and

threatened to publish the same on Facebook. PW-10 also

stated that the prosecutrix told her that the appellant had

tied a Mangalsutra around her neck at a place called

Kallanguthu and had also pressured her to terminate the

pregnancy. PW-10 stated that she heard the conversation

between the appellant and PW-1 as recorded in the mobile

phone of PW-1.

13. The prosecutrix’s sister-in-law, Suguna (PW-7),

testified about observing the prosecutrix talking nervously

through the phone, stating words to the effect of “no such

thing is there, do not release it on Facebook” and “don’t

leave it on Facebook.”

14. The Prosecution also examined the Panchayat

President of the village, Kumar (PW-3), where the victim was

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residing. PW-3 stated that on 20.07.2015, the victim, along

with two persons from the victim’s family, approached him

and informed him about the appellant’s conduct. At their

request, PW-3 took them to the house of the appellant and

spoke to his parents about the allegations. The parents of

the appellant told him that they would speak to their son to

arrive at a proper decision. However, there was no further

communication from them, and PW-3 later came to know

that a complaint had been lodged by the prosecutrix. The

other prosecution witnesses were mainly formal and official

witnesses.

15. Thus, what can be gathered from the record is that

the prosecutrix and the appellant were friends for a period

of about two years and it was not a fleeting relationship.

They were known to each other, and prior to the occurrence,

the appellant had allegedly promised the prosecutrix of

marrying her and had sexual intercourse with her on

several occasions over the said period of two years. When

the family members of the prosecutrix began looking for a

suitable alliance, the prosecutrix claimed that the appellant

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had married her in a Temple, but when she wanted to live

with him, he backtracked and threatened her that he would

upload the video recording on Facebook which he had

captured while she was taking a bath if she insisted on

continuing the relationship. Thus, according to the

Prosecution, the appellant committed the offences under

Sections 420, 376, 354C and Part II of Section 506 of the

IPC.

DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW

16. The Trial Court, on consideration of the evidence on

record, held that the materials indicated that the parties

were in a romantic relationship for considerable period,

during which they were also in physical relationship. The

Trial Court held that the prosecutrix, being a grown-up, was

aware of the nature and consequences of her acts. The Trial

Court further held that the Prosecution failed to establish

beyond reasonable doubt that the consent for the sexual

relationship was obtained solely on a false promise of

marriage so as to attract the offence of rape. On the basis of

the testimony of the prosecutrix, the Trial Court concluded

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that the physical relationship had developed with her

consent, as there was no evidence of resistance from her

side nor any alarm raised by her at any point of time, and

she was a woman having adequate intelligence and

maturity to understand the significance and morality

associated with the acts she was engaged in. The Trial Court

accordingly concluded that the sexual encounters could not

constitute the offence of rape. It also held that at the

relevant time there was no adequate evidence to show that

the appellant had no intention to marry her and that it was

difficult to establish that but for the misconception, the

prosecutrix would not have consented to sexual

intercourse. The Trial Court observed that the prosecutrix

had agreed to have sexual intercourse with the appellant on

account of her love and passion for the appellant and the

provisions of Section 90 IPC could not be invoked.

Accordingly, the Trial Court held that no case was made out

for offences under Sections 376 or 493 of the IPC.

17. As regards the charge under Part II of Section 506 of

the IPC, though the Prosecution had not produced the

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videography or the mobile phone before the Court, the Trial

Court held that the charge had been proved by the evidence

of PW-1 as well as PW-5 and PW-10. The Trial Court

observed that such a threat to upload content on social

media would not normally be known to persons other than

the immediate family members, such as PW-5 and PW-10,

who are the sisters of the victim. Thus, The Trial Court held

that the evidence of PW-1 cannot be disbelieved. The Trial

Court accordingly held that the charge under Part II of

Section 506 IPC was proved, while the charges under

Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC were not proved beyond

reasonable doubt.

18. The said finding of the Trial Court was upheld by the

High Court, the appellate court. Since no appeal was

preferred by the prosecutrix or the State against the

acquittal of the appellant under the aforesaid charges under

Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC before the High Court, but

only against the conviction under Part II of Section 506 IPC

by the appellant, that was the only issue for consideration

before the High Court.

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19. The High Court upon appreciation of the evidence

held that it is discernible that the intention of the appellant

was to cause alarm to the prosecutrix to the effect that she

should not demand to live a married life with him. For this

purpose, the appellant had intimidated the prosecutrix by

stating that he would upload the video taken through the

cell phone which amounts to threatening to impute the

chastity of the prosecutrix. For arriving at this conclusion,

the High Court primarily relied on the evidence of PW-1,

the prosecutrix, by observing that her testimony was

corroborated by the evidence of PW-5, PW-7 and PW-10 who

were not inimical to the accused and that their testimony

was natural, cogent, contextual and trustworthy.

Accordingly, the High Court held that the Prosecution was

able to prove that the appellant had committed the offence

under Part II of Section 506 of the IPC. The High Court

rejected the plea of the appellant that since he stood

acquitted for charges under Sections 376, 493 and 354C of

the IPC, the charge under Part II of Section 506 could not

stand alone. The High Court held that each offence has to

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be examined independently and in a proper prospective.

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by

the appellant.

THE ISSUE

20. In view of the above, the only issue which requires to

be examined by this Court is whether the Prosecution can

be said to have proved beyond reasonable doubt the charge

against the appellant for committing the offence under Part

II of Section 506 IPC.

CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT

I. Independent Examination of Charges

21. As a threshold matter, we affirm the position, as

correctly observed by the High Court, that even where

multiple offences are alleged to have been committed arising

out of a series of transactions relating to the same persons,

the accused and the victim, it is necessary to examine each

charge separately and independently. It is true that some

offences may be so intrinsically connected that it may not

be possible to separate one from the other, in which case a

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finding in respect of one offence may have an effect on the

finding in respect of the other. Yet, it would be necessary to

examine each offence separately, as the ingredients may not

be same. If the evidence so gathered can prove the existence

of separate offences, merely because the incidents are

related and in respect of some of them the accused has been

acquitted, it would not invariably lead to acquittal in the

other offences. Facts involved in a series of transactions,

though related, may independently exist to provide the

foundational ingredients for a distinct offence. As such, if

the evidence in respect of an offence is separable and, can

exist on its own, and if proved, the accused can certainly be

fastened with criminal liability in respect of such offence

which can be independently proved.

22. Charges under Sections 376 and 493 IPC involve

certain sexual acts and activities, but whether these acts

are consensual or not has to be examined, as one can

visualize both the situations in a case. However, when it

relates to criminal intimidation involving imputing

unchastity or infringing upon the dignity of women, it would

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be very difficult to contemplate that a woman, even in a

consensual relationship, would consent to or condone any

act by her partner of releasing images of a very private act

in the public domain, which would have the effect of

violating her privacy and dignity, causing acute

embarrassment.

23. In the present case, as regards the offences under

Sections 376 and 493 IPC, the Trial Court had rendered a

finding that the relationship was consensual in nature and

hence no offence was committed. As regards Section 354C

IPC, it was held to be not proved. There was no appeal

against the acquittal under Sections 376, 493, 354C IPC

before the High Court. Therefore, the correctness or

otherwise of these findings is not in issue before this Court.

The only issue before us is to consider whether the charge

under Section 506 IPC has been proved or not as challenged

by the appellant.

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II. The Offence of Criminal Intimidation: Sections 503

and 506 IPC

(A) The Legal Framework

24. As to what amounts to criminal intimidation

punishable under Section 506 IPC is defined under Section

503 of the IPC. Section 503 IPC states:

“503. Criminal intimidation.— Whoever

threatens another with any injury to his person,

reputation or property, or to the person or reputation

of any one in whom that person is interested, with

intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that

person to do any act which he is not legally bound

to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is

legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the

execution of such threat, commits criminal

intimidation.”

25. Section 506 IPC provides for punishment for the

offence committed under Section 503 IPC.

Section 506 reads as follows:

“506. Punishment for criminal intimidation –

Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation

shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to two

years, or with fine, or with both.”

“If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt,

etc.- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous

hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by

fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or

(imprisonment for life), or with imprisonment for a

term which may extend to seven years, or to

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impute unchastity to a woman, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either description for

a term which may extend to seven years, or with

fine, or with both.”

(Emphasis added)

Section 506 IPC thus prescribes two kinds of

punishments. First, a lesser punishment for committing the

offence generally, as defined under Section 503 IPC, for

which the punishment may extend to two years, or with

fine, or with both. Second, where the criminal intimidation

relates to a threat to cause death or grievous hurt, or to

impute unchastity to a woman, it is considered an

aggravated form of the offence of criminal intimidation

which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which

may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

26. In order to sustain a charge under Section 503 IPC,

punishable under Section 506 IPC, the following ingredients

must be established:

Firstly, there must be issuance of a threat to another

person.

Secondly, the threat must be for causing injury to the

person, or reputation or property of the person, or to the

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person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is

interested.

Thirdly, the threat must be issued with the intention

to cause:

(i) alarm to that person; or

(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally

bound to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such

threat; or

(iii) to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled

to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

In the light of the charge framed against the appellant, the

threat of injury is by way of imputing unchastity to the

prosecutrix.

27. The charge framed against the appellant relevant to

the aforesaid offence under Section 506 IPC reads as

follows:

“THIRDLY (Accused)

In continuation of the aforesaid incident, you the accused,

when the 1st witness had telephoned to you, since you had

threatened her by saying that in case she makes any further

phone call to you, you would tarnish her chastity by releasing

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her photo taken at a time when she bathed, in the Facebook,

you have committed an offence punishable under Section

506(2) of IPC and to be enquired by this Court.”

28. Thus, in terms of the aforesaid charge framed against

the appellant, it must be established: firstly, that a

photo/video was taken by the appellant when the

prosecutrix was bathing and that he threatened the

prosecutrix to release on Facebook the video which would

result in injury to her reputation by imputing unchastity to

her; and thirdly, that the said threat was made with the

intent to prevent her from making any further phone calls

to the appellant, so that in the event she does not desist,

the photo/video would be uploaded on Facebook.

(B) Whether the Alleged Threat Amounts to Imputing

Unchastity

29. For convenience, we will first examine whether the

act of video-recording the prosecutrix while she was taking

a bath and the threat to upload it on Facebook would

amount to imputing unchastity to her so as to constitute

some of the ingredients for the offence under Section 503

IPC.

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30. There can be no doubt that what is alleged to have

been video-recorded is not any particular act or activity of

the prosecutrix involving a sexual act, so as to impute

unchastity under the traditional notion of chastity.

However, while it may not be a scene that involves overtly

sexual acts, recording of a woman in a naked condition in

the modern context can create heightened vulnerability in

the digital world. Such a content in the possession of

another person can immediately be warped and altered to

create sexual connotations in a manner where the victim

will not be in a condition to control the narrative around it.

31. Unchastity, as opposed to chastity, though not

defined under the Indian Penal Code, is certainly a feminine

attribute, and imputing unchastity would involve casting

aspersions on the woman’s virtue and modesty, particularly

with reference to her sexual behaviour and conduct. Over

the decades, Indian jurisprudence has understood chastity

in different ways. This Court finds it prudent to lay out an

evolved understanding of chastity.

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32. During the colonial times, the courts in India,

primarily following traditional Hindu law, connected

unchastity with a woman’s sexual conduct, even going to

the extent of holding that if a woman was living in adultery

or was leading a life of unchastity, she stood disqualified

from inheriting property, as was held in Minor Ramaiya

Konar Alias Ramasami Konar v. Mottayya Mudaliar,

AIR 1951 Mad 954. This view held sway for a long period,

as was noted by this Court as late as in 1999 as can be

noticed in Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad (Dead) by LRs

v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu (Dead) by LRs and Others,

AIR 2000 SC 434.

33. However, there has been a paradigm shift in recent

times with the gendered approach to chastity and

differentiation of sexuality based on gender, as is noticeable

in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39,

wherein the constitutional validity of Section 497 IPC, by

which adultery was criminalised, was challenged. The

Constitution Bench held that Section 497 IPC is founded on

the antiquated notion by treating the wife as the property of

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her husband. While law punishes only the men, it makes

the sexual freedom of the wife depended upon the consent

of the husband. The Constitution Bench thus declared that

this classification between men and women lacks rational

nexus with the legitimate object of the statute and declared

it unconstitutional. Consequently, the provisions of Section

198(2) CrPC which made only the husband the aggrieved

person for offence under Section 497 or Section 498 IPC was

also held invalid.

34. This changed perspective in the traditional notion of

sexuality with the assigned role of women as the torchbearer

of virtues and morality can observed in the aforesaid

decision of Joseph Shine (supra) in the following words,

“191. Patriarchy has permeated the lives of women

for centuries. Ostensibly, society has two sets of

standards of morality for judging sexual behaviour.

One for its female members and another for males.

Society ascribes impossible virtues to a woman and

confines her to a narrow sphere of behaviour by an

expectation of conformity… Anachronistic

conceptions of ‘chastity’ and ‘honour’ have dictated

the social and cultural lives of women, depriving

them of the guarantees of dignity and privacy,

contained in the Constitution.”

35. The changed perception of the sexual autonomy of

women was further noticed in Pawan Kumar v. State of

H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780, wherein this Court observed that:

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“47.……The right to live with dignity as guaranteed

under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be

violated by indulging in obnoxious act of eve-teasing.

It affects the fundamental concept of gender

sensitivity and justice and the rights of a woman

under Article 14 of the Constitution. That apart it

creates an incurable dent in the right of a woman

which she has under Article 15 of the Constitution.

One is compelled to think and constrained to

deliberate why the women in this country cannot be

allowed to live in peace and lead a life that is

empowered with dignity and freedom. It has to be

kept in mind that she has a right to life and entitled

to love according to her choice. She has an individual

choice which has been legally recognised. It has to

be socially respected. No one can compel a woman

to love. She has the absolute right to reject.

48. In a civilised society male chauvinism has no

room. The Constitution of India confers the

affirmative rights on women and the said rights are

perceptible from Article 15 of the Constitution. When

the right is conferred under the Constitution, it has

to be understood that there is no condescension. A

man should not put his ego or, for that matter,

masculinity on a pedestal and abandon the concept

of civility. Egoism must succumb to law. Equality

has to be regarded as the summum bonum of the

constitutional principle in this context.”

36. Chastity, accordingly, is not to be considered purely

from a moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it has to

be seen from the prism of dignity and autonomy of the

individual woman to decide her sexual preferences and

habits, and empowering her to reprobate what is not

desirable and approbate what is acceptable to her. This

autonomy to decide what is acceptable or not is to be based

on inner self-determination and not dictated by external

societal norms which had been the determining factor for

centuries.

Chastity, thus, has to be determined not only by

societal values but also based on her individual sensitivities

as regards her sexuality. Chastity of a woman should be

understood as a person’s control over their own sexual

choices, in light of freedom of self-determination. It is the

ability to determine one’s own sexual choices and one’s own

sexual relationships without interference from another. It

would encompass the ability to freely decide who to

establish a sexual relationship with on their own terms

without any undue pressure or interference. As described in

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, the

dignity of an individual encompasses autonomy over

fundamental personal choices and control over

dissemination of personal information.

In Puttuswamy (supra) it was observed that:

“524. Privacy enables the individual to retain the

autonomy of the body and mind. The autonomy of

the individual is the ability to make decisions on

vital matters of concern to life. Privacy has not been

couched as an independent fundamental right. But

that does not detract from the constitutional

protection afforded to it, once the true nature of

privacy and its relationship with those fundamental

rights which are expressly protected is understood.

Privacy lies across the spectrum of protected

freedoms. The guarantee of equality is a guarantee

against arbitrary State action. It prevents the State

from discriminating between individuals. The

destruction by the State of a sanctified personal

space whether of the body or of the mind is violative

of the guarantee against arbitrary State action.

Privacy of the body entitles an individual to the

integrity of the physical aspects of personhood. The

intersection between one’s mental integrity and

privacy entitles the individual to freedom of thought,

the freedom to believe in what is right, and the

freedom of self-determination.

525. But most important of all is the cardinal value

of fraternity which assures the dignity of the

individual. The dignity of the individual

encompasses the right of the individual to develop to

the full extent of his potential. And this development

can only be if an individual has autonomy over

fundamental personal choices and control over

dissemination of personal information which may be

infringed through an unauthorised use of such

information. It is clear that Article 21, more than any

of the other articles in the fundamental rights

chapter, reflects each of these constitutional values

in full, and is to be read in consonance with these

values and with the international covenants that we

have referred to. In the ultimate analysis, the

fundamental right of privacy, which has so many

developing facets, can only be developed on a caseto-

case basis. Depending upon the particular facet

that is relied upon, either Article 21 by itself or in

conjunction with other fundamental rights would get

attracted.”

37. Seen from the above perspective, any consensual

sexual act is one that an individual, more particularly a

woman would reasonably want to keep private and retain

autonomy over, and is, therefore, an act that deserves

protection. ‘Unchastity’ should then be read also as an

action that interferes with the privacy and autonomy of

one’s own consensual sexual activities. Any such

interference would be a violation of the constitutional

understanding of both privacy and dignity under Article 21.

Any unwarranted interference with such sexual autonomy

can be said to impute unchastity, insofar as it prevents the

affected person from controlling the information and

choices that she chooses to make with respect to her sexual

life. Such a reading protects the dignity of all persons,

regardless of their sexual history.1

38. The threat to the reputation of the prosecutrix and

thus to her chastity must be understood in the context of

the dignity of individuals.

In Charu Khurana v. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC

192 this Court held that:

“33.….Be it stated, dignity is the quintessential

quality of a personality and a human frame always

1Section 53-A of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 48 of the Bharatiya SakshyaAdhiniyam) states that a person’s previous sexual experience is not relevant to the prosecution of sexual offences. We must borrow from this provision the principle that a  sexually active person is no less deserving of their dignity being protected than someone who is not sexually active.desires to live in the mansion of dignity, for it is a highly cherished value.”

In K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), it was stated that:

“298. Privacy of the individual is an essential aspect

of dignity. Dignity has both an intrinsic and

instrumental value. As an intrinsic value, human

dignity is an entitlement or a constitutionally

protected interest in itself. In its instrumental facet,

dignity and freedom are inseparably intertwined,

each being a facilitative tool to achieve the other. The

ability of the individual to protect a zone of privacy

enables the realisation of the full value of life and

liberty. Liberty has a broader meaning of which

privacy is a subset. All liberties may not be exercised

in privacy. Yet others can be fulfilled only within a

private space.”

39. In the age of the internet, the dignity of a person is

intrinsically tied to their person and reputation as perceived

online. Any private content circulated online with intent to

negatively impact their reputation can be understood to

cause harm to one’s reputation. It also causes harm to their

person by directly violating one’s privacy, which is a

recognised and protected right. Thus, chastity is not to be

seen from the narrow perspective of sexual behaviour

cloistered by traditional moral values only, but also from the

vantage point of dignity and autonomy associated with the

sexual autonomy of a woman. Any such reprehensible act

which seeks to lower or tarnish the dignity of a woman

relating to her sexual autonomy and identity, which she

seeks to jealously guard, can be said to be an assault on her

chastity amounting to imputing unchastity to the woman.

40. It is natural that a person would have a reasonable

expectation of privacy when disrobing in a bathroom, and

any publication of images depicting nakedness taken in the

bathroom would violate the privacy and dignity of the

individual and thus sully her chastity. Therefore, there can

be no doubt that such a video as is alleged to exist and the

making of a threat to upload it on Facebook would

reasonably be considered to impute unchastity to the

prosecutrix by publication, as it would amount to

transgressing her sexual autonomy, undermining her

dignity, invading her cherished privacy, and insulting her

sexual character, even though they may in a relationship

for such relationship would not end on any right to bring in

public domain.

41. We have noted that the charge under Section 354C

IPC was held not to be proved by the Trial Court as well as

by the High Court on the ground that the videography was

not produced before the Court. However, we need not

examine the correctness of such a finding, as neither the

prosecutrix nor the State has preferred any appeal against

the acquittal for the offence charged under Section 354C

IPC. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that in the light

of the changed perspective of women’s sexuality, the act of

video-recording the victim in a naked state while she was

taking a bath and the threat to upload it on digital social

media can be construed to be an act amounting to a threat

to impute unchastity within the meaning of Part II of Section

506 IPC.

(C) Examination as to the other Ingredients of the

Offence

42. We will now proceed to examine the various other

ingredients of the offence in the present case.

43. In the light of our above referred discussion, there

can be no doubt that if the video recorded by the appellant

is uploaded to social media, as threatened by the appellant,

it can certainly injure the reputation of the prosecutrix by

imputing unchastity to her by violating her privacy of a very

Page 33 of 78

personal and intimate moment concerning her sexual

identity.

44. The next consideration is whether such a threat was

meted out by the appellant with the intent to cause the

prosecutrix to omit to do any act which she is legally entitled

to do, as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

As noted above, the third charge against the appellant

stems from the allegation that when the prosecutrix

telephoned him, the appellant threatened her, saying that if

she made any further phone calls to him, he would tarnish

her chastity by releasing her photo, taken when she was

bathing, on the Facebook.

45. In this regard, it may be noted that the execution of

the threat has to be examined primarily from the

perspective of the victim, rather than of the accused, and as

to how the victim perceived such a threat. However, whether

such a threat could actually be carried out or not may not

be so relevant in considering this offence.

46. To illustrate the above position, if a stranger points a

real-looking toy gun to a chowkidar and threatens him to

Page 34 of 78

open the gate at the pain of death, and the chowkidar opens

the gate on the genuine belief that the person is holding a

real gun, the said person can be said to have committed

criminal intimidation against the chowkidar. In reality, the

toy gun could not have caused any harm, yet, as the person

had been able to instil the fear of harm and even death to

the chowkidar and compelled him to open the gate, which

he is not legally bound to do, the offence of criminal

intimidation has been committed. Under such

circumstances, it becomes irrelevant whether the threat

could actually be executed or not. What is relevant is that

the threat was issued, and the chowkidar truly believed and

felt threatened that such a threat could be carried out, and

opened the gate to avoid the execution of the threat.

47. This view is also supported by the first part of Section

503 IPC, which provides that whoever threatens another

with any injury to his person, reputation, or property, with

intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal

intimidation. What is important is that the threat must have

been issued to cause injury to a person or reputation, and

Page 35 of 78

the same must be issued with the intention to cause alarm.

Similarly, if the threat is made to make a person do or omit

to do certain things which he would not have done or

omitted but for the threat, it would amount to criminal

intimidation.

48. A person can be said to be “alarmed” when one is

seized with panic, fear, apprehension, fright, or gets

terrified. Thus, if, because of a threat issued to that person,

he is visited with any such mental condition and if such a

threat is made to cause such a condition, the person issuing

the threat can be said to have committed the offence of

criminal intimidation.

49. Thus, if an alarm is intentionally caused to another

person by issuance of a threat, it would amount to criminal

intimidation. For this, what is required to be established is

the factum of issuance of a threat and also to prove that it

was intended to cause alarm, and if alarm had indeed been

caused, the offence of criminal intimidation is established.

Further, if the person was compelled to do certain things

which he was not legally bound to do, or was prevented from

Page 36 of 78

doing what he was legally bound to do, the offence of

criminal intimidation can be said to have been established.

50. In the present case, the mere threat that the

appellant would upload the video of the prosecutrix in a

nude state on social media is quite a distressing and

frightening proposition for a woman. If acute shame,

distress, and embarrassment are visited upon a woman due

to fear that her nude picture would be displayed to the

public, there can be no doubt that such an act would

certainly be a cause for alarm, which is what Section 503

IPC speaks of and to the extend, the ingredient for the

offence under the first part of Section 503 IPC is clearly

made out.

51. Further, if it can be proved that the prosecutrix was

threatened by the appellant to upload the video, and that

the said threat was intended to prevent her from

communicating with the appellant at the disturbing

prospect of the video being uploaded, it can be said that

criminal intimidation was committed by the appellant,

which will come under the second part of Section 503 IPC.

III. Whether Non-Recovery of the Mobile

Phone/Videography is Fatal?

52. The appellant contends before this Court as also

contended before the Trial Court and High Court that no

photo or video material had been recovered during the

investigation to prove the existence of such a video and

hence in absence of the videos, it cannot be said that offence

under Section 503 IPC punishable under Section 506 IPC

has been made out.

It is noticeable that the Trial Court had also noted its

absence, and on that ground had acquitted the appellant of

the charges under Section 354C IPC. Certainly, had the

objectionable video been produced in the trial, the case

against the appellant would have been greatly strengthened

as far as the criminal liability under Sections 503/506 IPC

is concerned.

53. However, it cannot be said with absolute certainty in

all cases that merely because the video could not be

produced during the trial, it would be fatal to the

Prosecution case and that the Prosecution has not been

able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt as insisted

by the appellant.

Law does not mandate that recovery of an article of

crime is sine qua non for conviction of an offence, though

production of the same would strengthen the prosecution

case. Non-recovery of the same will not be fatal to the

prosecution case if there are other credible evidence to prove

the existence of such object of crime/material, and it would

depend on the peculiar facts obtaining in the case.

In Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3

SCC 378, this Court observed that it is now well settled that

non-recovery of the weapon of crime is not fatal to the

prosecution case and is not sine qua non for conviction, if

there are direct reliable witnesses available.

54. In the present case, even though the mobile phone

was not seized or recovered, if the existence of the video in

the mobile phone can be clearly inferred, it may not be fatal

to the prosecution’s case. We must, therefore, examine

whether the testimonial evidence on record, even in the

absence of recovery of the videography, is credible enough

to hold that such a videography was recorded.

IV. On Assessment of Evidence

55. As far as the law relating to evidence is concerned,

the court must first determine whether any evidence sought

to be relied upon is admissible or not. Once the

admissibility of the evidence is favourably decided, the court

must proceed to examine whether such admissible evidence

is relevant to the issues or not. If it is found to be relevant,

the court must then examine its credibility and determine

how much weight is to be attached to such evidence.

56. In the present case, there is no doubt that the oral

deposition of the prosecutrix before the Trial Court relating

to the recording of the video by the appellant while she was

taking a bath, and the threat made by the appellant in her

presence and knowledge, is not hearsay evidence and is

therefore admissible in law. There can also be no doubt that

her testimonial evidence is relevant to the said issue.

The only question to be determined is how much

weight should be attached to the said oral evidence to be

credible enough to prove the existence of the videography

and the threat to sustain the charge.

57. Assessing the credibility of the evidence of a witness,

unlike the issue of admissibility and relevance of evidence,

is a highly subjective task, depending on several attending

factors and surrounding circumstances, including

consistency with the prosecution case. It is thus,

contextual. As regards the credibility of witnesses, this

Court in Vadivelu Thevar: Chinniah Servai v. State of

Madras, 1957 AIR(SC) 614, observed as follows:

“11….Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well established

rule of law that the court is concerned

with the quality and not with the quantity of the

evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact.

Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context

may be classified into three categories, namely:

(1) Wholly reliable;

(2) Wholly unreliable;

(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

12. In the first category of proof, the court should

have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either

way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony

of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach

or suspicion. In the third category of cases, the court

has to be circumspect and has to look for

corroboration in material particulars by reliable

testimony, direct or circumstantial…..”

58. It may be also kept in mind that merely because the

evidence of the prosecutrix was not accepted by the courts

below on the allegation of rape by falsely promising to marry

her, it does not necessarily mean that her evidence has to

be thrown out in its entirety as wholly unreliable. It cannot

be said that if the evidence is not reliable in one respect, it

will be false in all other respects. This Court in Sohrab v.

State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751, held that the maxim

falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule,

observing that hardly one comes across a witness whose

evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate

exaggeration, embroideries, or embellishments.

The above principles are to be kept in mind as we

proceed to assess the evidence.

(A) Applicability of Sections 106 and 114 of the

Evidence Act

59. In the present case, the evidence primarily relates to

a romantic relationship between the appellant and the

prosecutrix and pertaining to incidents happening within

the said relationship, mostly in the private domain. For that

reason, most of the allegations and thus evidence pertain to

their intimate and private moments, which are ordinarily

not known to third parties. Only the appellant and the

prosecutrix would be privy to much of the conversations

and transactions between them, and it would be

unreasonable to expect others to have knowledge of the

same, to provide corroborative evidence. Under these

circumstances, a question may arise as to whether the

provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(hereinafter referred to as, “Evidence Act”) which deals with

“especial knowledge” would be attracted or not.

60. Section 106 of the Evidence Act states that:

“106. Burden of proving fact especially within

knowledge.— When any fact is especially within the

knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that

fact is upon him.”

61. The law relating to the scope of Section 106 of the

Evidence Act is well settled. The burden of proof in a

criminal trial is always on the prosecution, and Section 106

is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. It can be

invoked only in circumstances where certain facts are

‘especially within the knowledge’ of the accused. In the

landmark judgment in Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of

Ajmer, (1956) 1 SCC 337, the scope of Section 106 was

explained as follows:

“9. Section 106 is an exception to Section 101.

Section 101 lays down the general rule about the

burden of proof:

“101. Burden of proof.—Whoever desires any

court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability

dependent on the existence of facts which he

asserts, must prove that those facts exist.”

10. …………..

11.This lays down the general rule that in a criminal

case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and

Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of

that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet

certain exceptional cases in which it would be

impossible, or at any rate disproportionately

difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which

are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused

and which he could prove without difficulty or

inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that.

It means facts that are pre-eminently or

exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section

were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the

very startling conclusion that in a murder case the

burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not

commit the murder because who could know better

than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that

that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council

has twice refused to construe this section, as

reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to

mean that the burden lies on an accused person to

show that he did not commit the crime for which he

is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. R. [Attygalle v. R., 1936 SCC

OnLine PC 20 : AIR 1936 PC 169] and Seneviratne v. R. [Seneviratne v. R., 1936 SCC OnLine PC 57 : (1936) 44 LW 661]”

62. Section 106 of the Evidence Act thus provides that

when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any

person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. In our

opinion, this knowledge, however, need not be confined to

acts happening within a certain physical space; it can also

extend to interpersonal relationships which form an

intangible space formed by the relationship and any

incident happening within that interpersonal realm will be

known only to the individuals forming the space.

Consequently, it will be within the especial knowledge of

only those involved. Thus, whether, what the appellant had

stated to the prosecutrix was true or not, whether the

prosecutrix was telling a lie or not, only the appellant can

state. Only he could explain the allegation or deny it, as he

was in a romantic and intimate relationship with the

prosecutrix, forming the very private space between them

only.

63. Usually, the provision is invoked in cases involving

crimes taking place within the four walls of a domestic

house or a private space, where only the intimate or family

members would have knowledge, or in cases of the “last

seen” together, where the person last seen with the

deceased can only explain what happened thereafter.

However, this “especial” knowledge need not be confined to

time and physical space only. It can also extend to

interpersonal relationships where only the accused and the

victim would be privy to any incident arising out of or within

their intimate relationship, for only they would be in a

position to explain or state what transpired between them

in their private moments. In an intimate relationship

founded on romance and physical intimacy and that too, if

not legally wedded, there will be a tendency to keep such a

relationship under wraps as far as possible, and they would

not openly share what happens within their intimate

moments with others. In such circumstances, only they

would be privy to what they say or do to each other, and

hence, what transpires between them during these

moments in their relationship will be within their “especial

knowledge” within the meaning of Section 106 of the

Evidence Act. It may be also noted that in the present case,

the relationship went on for a fairly long period of about two

years and was not a chance acquaintance or a fleeting

relationship or a relationship separated by distance. There

cannot be any doubt that they had built a personal and

private space between themselves to which ordinarily other

third party would not have access.

64. At the same time, one must not lose sight of Section

114 of the Evidence Act, which provides that the court may

presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to

have happened, regard being had to the common course of

natural events, human conduct, and public and private

business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

65. As discussed above, if the prosecutrix and the

appellant had developed a romantic relationship involving

sexual intercourse and since, they were not formally

married and they had not publicly announced this

relationship, it would be natural that they would not

discuss what transpires between them with others unless

circumstances compel them to do so and certain

presumption about the relationship can be drawn based on

certain accepted facts.

Further, the alleged fallout between the couple

wherein the appellant didn’t want the prosecutrix to contact

him and insisted that the prosecutrix remove the

Mangalsutra as well as tear off the photo taken together and

the reasons attached to the same does not seem unusual or

unprecedented in the context of romantic relationships.

66. This Court in Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024)

15 SCC 48, referring to the earlier case in Tulshiram

Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra (2012)

10 SCC 373, reiterated the settled principle governing the

application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, namely that

once foundational facts are established by the prosecution,

the Court may draw reasonable inferences under Section

114 of the Evidence Act, and in such circumstances, the

burden shifts on the accused to furnish an explanation in

respect of facts within his especial knowledge. It was thus,

observed in Anees (Supra) as follows:

“40. In Tulshiram Sahadu

Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra

(2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as

under:

23.It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule

in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful

may be inferred from certain other proved facts.

When inferring the existence of a fact from other set

of proved facts, the court exercises a process of

reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the

most probable position… In these circumstances, the

principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence

Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this

section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of

its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where

the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from

which a reasonable inference can be drawn

regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless

the accused by virtue of his special knowledge

regarding such facts failed to offer any explanation

which might drive the court to draw a different

inference….”

67. It may be also noted that for Section 106 of the

Evidence Act to be invoked, it will suffice if the prosecution

is able to “make out a prima facie case”. In Shivaji

Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC

626, it was observed that:

“23. It could thus be seen that it is well-settled that

Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly

operate against either a husband or wife staying

under the same roof and being the last person seen

with the deceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act

does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its

primary burden of proving the prosecution case

beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the

prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will

sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima

facie case, that the question arises of considering

facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the

accused.”

(emphasis added)

68. We may now analyse the facts of the case in light of

the above settled principles. The appellant was in an

intimate and physical relationship with the prosecutrix for

a fairly long period of about two years is a fact which stands

established as we read the findings of the Trial Court

concurred by the High Court. This is the foundational fact

which stands established, on which the allegation qua the

third charge is built. In such circumstances, keeping in

mind human conduct, the allegations made by the

prosecutrix that the appellant recorded the video of the

prosecutrix while taking bath, cannot be brushed aside as

improbable and as a product of fictional imagination of the

prosecutrix. Therefore, ascertain to that effect by the

prosecutrix cannot be rejected off hand.

However, the Court also should not rush to draw any

conclusion of the existence of the aforesaid allegation as a

fact without subjecting the evidence of the prosecutrix to

scrutiny as contemplated under the law. Only when the

evidence adduced on behalf of prosecution has stands

scrutiny, and that a prima facie case is made out, the

burden of proof can be shifted on the appellant as per

Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

(B) Significance of “proviso” to Section 162 CrPC and

Section 145 of Evidence Act.

69. For assessing the oral evidence adduced before the

court, it is necessary to understand the statutory

mechanisms provided to scrutinise the evidence. One such

is to examine whether the evidence has been discredited in

any manner, including by way of contradiction as provided

under Section 162 of CrPC. Section 162 CrPC provides that

no statement made by any person to a police officer in the

course of investigation, if reduced to writing, shall be used

for any purpose, save as provided in the proviso. The proviso

thereto enables the accused to use such a statement to

contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145

of the Evidence Act. Importantly, the Explanation to Section

162 CrPC makes it abundantly clear that an omission to

state a fact or circumstance in a statement recorded under

sub-section (1) may amount to a contradiction if the same

appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having

regard to the context in which such omission occurs.

70. Section 145 of the Evidence Act provides that a

witness can be questioned during cross-examination about

previous written statements they made, or statements that

were recorded in writing. These writings are not required to

be shown or proven at that moment. However, if the

intention is to use the writing to contradict the witness,

their attention must first be directed to the specific parts

that will be used for that contradiction before the writing

can be proved.

71. Thus, while there is a prohibition on the use of

statement made to the police in evidence under Section 162

CrPC, there is an exception as provided under the proviso to

the said Section which is to be applied read with Section 145

of the Evidence Act.

The proviso, thus, is applicable under the following

conditions :

(i) Statement must have been reduced to

writing and made to a police officer in course of

an investigation.

(ii) The written statement must be duly

proved.

(iii) The witness must have been called for the

prosecution and does not apply to a defence

witness.

(iv) It must be used only in the manner laid

down in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872.

72. The manner in which Section 145 of the Evidence Act

is to be applied in conjunction with the proviso to Section

162 CrPC has been elaborated by this Court in Bhagwan

Singh v. State of Punjab, (1952) 1 SCC 514, in the

following words,

“18. ……… Resort to Section 145 would only be

necessary if the witness denies that he made the

former statement. In that event, it would be

necessary to prove that he did, and if the former

statement was reduced to writing, then Section 145

requires that his attention must be drawn to those

parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that

position does not arise when the witness admits the

former statement………..”.

73. In Tahsildar Singh & Another v. State of U.P., AIR

1959 SC 1012 this Court further elucidate as follows:

“13. …………The procedure prescribed is that, if it is

intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his

attention must, before the writing can be proved, be

called to those parts of it which are to be used for

the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to

Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only

enables the accused to make use of such statement

to contradict a witness in the manner provided by

Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing

violence to the language of the proviso if the said

statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of

cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the

first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are

we impressed by the argument that it would not be

possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of

the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions

under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more

imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145

of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple

procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the

witness box that B stabbed C; before the police he

had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be

drawn to that part of the statement made before the

police which contradicts his statement in the witness

box. If he admits his previous statement, no further

proof is necessary; if he does not admit, the practice

generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by

the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure

suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated

thus: If the witness is asked “did you say before the

police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he

answers “yes”, then the statement which does not

contain such recital is put to him as contradiction.

This procedure involves two fallacies: one is it

enables the accused to elicit by a process of crossexamination

what the witness stated before the

police officer. If a police officer did not make a record

of a witness’s statement, his entire statement could

not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police

officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of

cross-examination, the witness’s oral statement

could be brought on record. This procedure,

therefore, contravenes the express provision of

Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that

by the illustration given by the learned counsel for

the appellants there is no self-contradiction of the

primary statement made in the witness box, for the

witness has yet not made on the stand any

assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The

contradiction, under the section, should be between

what a witness asserted in the witness box and

what he stated before the police officer, and not

between what he said he had stated before the

police officer and what he actually made before him.

In such a case the question could not be put at all:

only questions to contradict can be put and the

question here posed does not contradict; it leads to

an answer which is contradicted by the police

statement. This argument of the learned counsel

based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is,

therefore, not of any relevance in considering the

express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure……….”

Thus, Section 162 of CrPC read with Section 145 of

the Evidence Act provides a very important mechanism to

test the veracity of the testimony of a witness made in the

court.

74. We have noted that the prosecutrix (PW-1) was

extensively cross-examined by the defence/appellant.

However, the cross-examination was in the nature of denial

and in the form of suggestions only to the effect that the

details stated in her examination-in-chief were not

mentioned in the complaint filed by the prosecutrix. No

suggestion was made proposing a possible alternative

scenario. Thus, there was nothing to discredit or

fundamentally shake the prosecutrix’s testimony by

invoking the mechanism contemplated under the proviso to

Section 162 CrPC.

It is the settled principle of evidence law that even the

reply made to the suggestions put forth by the defence has

evidentiary value. The same was also observed by this Court

in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023)

13 SCC 365 :

“42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that

suggestions made to the witness by the defence

counsel and the reply to such suggestions would

definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied

upon by the Court along with other evidence on

record to determine the guilt of the accused.

43. The main object of cross-examination is to find

out the truth on record and to help the Court in

knowing the truth of the case. It is a matter of

common experience that many a times the defence

lawyers themselves get the discrepancies clarified

arising during the cross-examination in one

paragraph and getting themselves contradicted in

the other paragraph. The line of cross-examination

is always on the basis of the defence which the

counsel would keep in mind to defend the accused.

At this stage, we may quote with profit the

observations made by a Division Bench of the

Madhya Pradesh High Court in Govind v. State of

M.P. [Govind v. State of M.P., 2004 SCC OnLine MP

344 : 2005 Cri LJ 1244] The Bench observed in para

27 as under : (SCC OnLine MP)

“27. The main object of cross-examination is to find

out the truth and detection of falsehood in human

testimony. It is designed either to destroy or weaken

the force of evidence a witness has already given in

person or elicit something in favour of the party

which he has not stated or to discredit him by

showing from his past history and present

demeanour that he is unworthy of credit. It should

be remembered that cross-examination is a duty, a

lawyer owes to his clients and is not a matter of

great personal glory and fame. It should always be

remembered that justice must not be defeated by

improper cross-examination. A lawyer owes a duty

to himself that it is the most difficult art. However,

he may fail in the result but fairness is one of the

great elements of advocacy. Talents and genius are

not aimed at self-glorification but it should be to

establish truth, to detect falsehood, to uphold right

and just and to expose wrongdoings of a dishonest

witness. It is the most efficacious test to discover the

truth. Cross-examination exposes bias, detects

falsehood and shows mental and moral condition of

the witnesses and whether a witness is actuated by

proper motive or whether he is actuated by enmity

towards his adversaries. Cross-examination is

commonly esteemed the severest test of an

advocate’s skill and perhaps it demands beyond

any other of his duties exercise of his ingenuity.

There is a great difficulty in conducting crossexamination

with creditable skill. It is undoubtedly

a great intellectual effort. Sometimes crossexamination

assumes unnecessary length, the Court

has power to control the cross-examination in such

cases. (See Wrottescey on cross-examination of

witnesses). The Court must also ensure that crossexamination

is not made a means of harassment or

causing humiliation to the victim of crime [See State

of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit

Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] ].”

44. During the course of cross-examination with a

view to discredit the witness or to establish the

defence on preponderance of probabilities

suggestions are hurled on the witness but if such

suggestions, the answer to those incriminate the

accused in any manner then the same would

definitely be binding and could be taken into

consideration along with other evidence on record in

support of the same.”

75. Such is the importance of cross-examination in the

evaluation of evidence. However, what we have noticed is

that the only question asked from the prosecutrix was

whether she had stated in the complaint what she was

deposing before the court, as evident from the following, as

recorded in her cross-examination:

“Similarly, if it is stated that I have not mentioned in

the complaint about the details of the accused

having taken my photos when I was bathing in the

house of my elder sister at Vizhuppuram, the same

is correct”.

76. The said question was with reference to the

complaint, and no question was asked as regards any

previous statement of the prosecutrix recorded under

Section 161 CrPC during the investigation. If the

prosecutrix had stated anything new in her deposition

before the Trial Court which she did not mention in her

statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC, the

defence/appellant could have invoked the proviso to Section

162 CrPC and Section 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict

her and discredit her testimony. The Explanation to Section

162 CrPC makes it abundantly clear that an omission to

state a fact or circumstance in the statement referred to in

sub-section (1) may amount to a contradiction if the same

appears to be significant and otherwise relevant having

regard to the context in which such omission occurs.

However, no such contradiction was sought to be

demonstrated by the defence/appellant by referring to the

previous statement of the prosecutrix recorded under

Section 161 CrPC. Instead, the defence merely referred to

the contents of the FIR, which cannot be equated with a

statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC. It may also be

kept in mind that the FIR or the complaint filed is primarily

to set the criminal investigation into motion and may not

necessarily contain all the details of the case. It is not an

encyclopaedia of all the relevant facts and omission to

mention all the facts in the PIR, unless fundamentally goes

to the root of the prosecution case cannot be faulted with.

77. Cross-examination under Section 145 of the

Evidence Act is not the only enabling provision to impeach

the credibility of a witness. By invoking Sections 140

(witness of character), 146 (lawful questions in crossexamination),

and 155 (impeaching credit of witness) of the

Evidence Act, the credibility of the prosecutrix could have

been impeached. However, no endeavour was made to

impeach the credibility of the prosecutrix by invoking any

of these statutory provisions which the appellant was

entitled to.

(C) Significance of Section 313 CrPC – Examination of

the Accused

78. It is well settled that the exercise undertaken under

Section 313 CrPC (examination of the accused) is not an idle

formality. It is a procedural safeguard provided to an

accused to meet the requirement of the principle of natural

justice by providing him an opportunity to explain the facts

and circumstances appearing against him in the evidence.

In Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2010) 10

SCC 439, it was held that:

“22. Section 313 CrPC is based on the fundamental

principle of fairness. The attention of the accused

must specifically be brought to inculpatory pieces of

evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an

explanation if he chooses to do so. Therefore, the

court is under a legal obligation to put the

incriminating circumstances before the accused and

solicit his response. This provision is mandatory in

nature and casts an imperative duty on the court

and confers a corresponding right on the accused to

have an opportunity to offer an explanation for such

incriminatory material appearing against him.

Circumstances which were not put to the accused in

his examination under Section 313 CrPC cannot be

used against him and have to be excluded from

consideration.”

79. It is also settled that no adverse inference can be

drawn against the appellant for not adducing any defence

evidence or for maintaining a studied silence, which the

appellant is entitled to. However, when a prima facie case is

made out by the prosecution on the basis of the evidence

led, Section 106 of the Evidence Act could be invoked

against the accused, whereupon it becomes incumbent

upon the accused to discharge his burden on the basis of

preponderance of probability that the prosecution case may

be doubtful. In Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab,

(2020) 8 SCC 811, it was observed:

“22. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,

after the prosecution closes its evidence and

examines all its witnesses, the accused is given an

opportunity of explanation through Section 313(1)(b).

Any alternate version of events or interpretation

proffered by the accused must be carefully analysed

and considered by the trial court in compliance with

the mandate of Section 313(4). Such opportunity is a

valuable right of the accused to seek justice and

defend oneself. Failure of the trial court to fairly

apply its mind and consider the defence, could

endanger the conviction itself [ Reena

Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289,

para 19 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 546]. Unlike the

prosecution which needs to prove its case beyond

reasonable doubt, the accused merely needs to

create reasonable doubt or prove their alternate

version by mere preponderance of probabilities [M.

Abbas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103, para

10 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1270]. Thus, once a plausible

version has been put forth in defence at the Section

313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the

prosecution to negate such defence plea.”

(emphasis added)

80. When the appellant was confronted with the

incriminating evidence of the prosecutrix during his

examination under Section 313 CrPC, he merely responded

with two words, “False evidence”. When asked whether he

would like to lead any evidence in his defence or say

anything concerning the case, he declined to examine any

defence witness and merely stated that the allegations are

false. Thus, he chose not to utilise the full opportunity

granted to him to defend himself by examining himself or

any other witness in his defence.

Page 62 of 78

81. As noted above, the appellant, by his conduct in

remaining silent and merely stating generally that the

prosecution evidence is false, missed an important

opportunity to discredit or contradict the evidence of the

prosecutrix on material aspects or to proffer an alternative

version on the basis of preponderance of probability which

would have been fatal to the prosecution case. The aforesaid

opportunity becomes vital for the reason that what

transpired between the appellant and the prosecutrix was

mostly within the private realm between them, to which

normally a third party will not have any access. Thus, when

the prosecutrix made certain specific allegations against the

appellant relating to a very private moment, which only the

two of them could have known, it cast a legal obligation on

the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to give

his own version of the incident to throw a doubt on the

version of the prosecutrix. If the appellant had done so, the

Court would be faced with two possible scenarios, which

would have rendered the version of the prosecutrix

doubtful. Once a reasonable doubt could be raised on the

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version of the prosecutrix, the defence would have

accomplished its ultimate objective of getting the

prosecution case thrown out.

V. Assessment of the Credibility of the Prosecution

Witnesses

82. In light of the above discussion, we have no reason to

disbelieve the evidence of the prosecutrix, PW-1. Even if her

oral testimony may not fall in the first category, as

contemplated in Vadivelu Thevar (supra), it certainly does

not fall in the second category either, in which event it

would fall in the third category requiring careful scrutiny.

For this reason, we have carefully perused her testimony

and her cross-examination and juxtaposed them with the

response of the appellant and statement made under

Section 313 CrPC and found the evidence of the prosecutrix

to be natural and reliable, having been not impeached and

discredited in any manner.

83. The Trial Court gave a specific finding that the

prosecutrix voluntarily developed sexual relationship with

the appellant and was aware of the morality involved in the

Page 64 of 78

said acts and the inherent risk involved. The Trial Court

held that it had been established that there was a love affair

between the prosecutrix and the accused, and that there

was no element of a forced sexual act against her consent.

Thus, when the relationship broke down and the appellant

allegedly declined to maintain the relationship, not only

allegations of rape, but also of criminal intimidation were

levelled against the appellant. It is in this context of proven

physical and intimate relationship between the appellant

and prosecutrix that the evidence of the prosecutrix has to

be examined to determine whether the appellant had indeed

threatened her.

84. While the Trial Court held that the offences under

Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC had not been made out,

there is a clear finding that the prosecutrix and the

appellant had an intimate physical relationship which

lasted for a long period of about two years. The Trial Court

considered as to whether the sexual relationship was based

on a false promise to marry so as to constitute the offence

of rape under Section 376 IPC, which it held not to be so.

Page 65 of 78

However, there is finding by the Trial Court that there was

physical relationship between them which it held to be

consensual. What is noticeable is that there was no attempt

at all on the part of the appellant to discredit the prosecutrix

on this aspect of physical relationship. Neither did he

specifically deny the sexual relationship.

85. In view of the established fact of relationship between

the appellant and the prosecutrix, which is of a physical and

intimate nature, which has not been categorically denied by

the appellant, taking into account the normal human

conduct as contemplated under Section 114 of the Evidence

Act coupled with the failure of the appellant to discredit the

evidence of the prosecutrix in any manner known to law,

the allegation of the prosecutrix against the appellant of

making criminal intimidation after the prosecutrix insisted

on continuing the relationship cannot be disbelieved as

fabricated or concocted.

86. Considering their relationship they were maintaining,

the prosecutrix genuinely believed that the appellant was in

possession of a video of her recorded while she was taking

Page 66 of 78

a bath, which obviously will be in a state of nakedness or

semi-nakedness. This belief of the prosecutrix in the alleged

recording was born out of the intimate relationship she had

with the appellant for a long period. The appellant was not

a chance acquaintance who met her briefly. She claimed to

have seen the mobile phone in the bathroom, though she

did not see the details of what was being recorded. However,

since the appellant had told her about it and she had an

intimate relationship with him based on trust, there was no

reason why she would not have believed him about the

existence of such a video recording. In fact, when she was

told about it by the appellant, she, believing him, cried, and

the appellant assured her that the video would be deleted.

87. Thus, from the perspective of the prosecutrix, she

genuinely believed that there was a video of her taken while

she was bathing. That the appellant later threatened the

prosecutrix with uploading the videography on social media

would further convince her of the existence of such

videography. She thus, held the bona fide belief that such a

video was in existence. It was when the relationship broke

Page 67 of 78

up that the appellant threatened to upload the video if the

prosecutrix persisted in seeking to continue the

relationship. In our opinion, the genuine perception of the

prosecutrix that such a video exists and that the appellant

threatened to upload in social media would constitute key

ingredients for the purpose of invoking Section 503 IPC. The

failure of the prosecution to procure and produce the mobile

phone or video would not be fatal, so long as the prosecutrix

was under the genuine belief that it existed.

88. We have also noted that the Trial Court before whom

the prosecutrix testified had the opportunity to examine the

demeanour of the witnesses under Section 280 CrPC, and

the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence, did not

consider the evidence of the prosecutrix to be unreliable and

unbelievable.

89. In this regard, the observations of this Court in

Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, are

apposite:

“28. At the same time, however, the appellate court

is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding

recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should

Page 68 of 78

not forget that the trial court had an advantage and

opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses

and, hence, the trial court’s conclusions should

not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate

court possesSses the same powers as that of the

original court, but they have to be exercised with

proper care, caution and circumspection. When a

finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court

mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not

be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial

court in appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary

to well-established principles of law or

unreasonable.

29. ***

30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [Sara

Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya, 1948 SCC OnLine

PC 48 : (1947-48) 75 IA 252 : AIR 1949 PC 32] the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after

referring to relevant decisions on the point, stated

“…But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be

regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the

trial, and especially if that conclusion has been

arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal

which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate

court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this

opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as

to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight.

This is not to say that the Judge of first instance can

be treated as infallible in determining which side is

telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration.

Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question

of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge

of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal

testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to

courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him

and observing the manner in which their evidence is

given.”

Having perused the oral evidence of the prosecutrix

which has not been discredited, there appears to be a ring

of truth in it, and hence, the finding made by the Trial Court,

which has also been endorsed by the High Court, the

Page 69 of 78

Appellate Court, as regards this charge, this evidence of the

prosecutrix does not appear to be perverse.

90. When we closely scrutinise the evidence of the elder

sister of the prosecutrix, PW-5, she says that when she

enquired from the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix told her that

when she was bathing, the appellant had taken a

photograph, and he was threatening her with the said

photograph. Thereafter, she contacted one Jyothi who was

working in a television channel, who went to the police

station and complained about the incident. Then the

Superintendent of Police telephoned one Srinivasan, who

was working as an Assistant Inspector of Police, who called

the appellant and warned him. This interaction between

PW-5 and PW-1 took place before the filing of the complaint,

after the relationship between the prosecutrix and the

appellant had broken down. The evidence of PW-5 also

appears to be natural, and she stated what a sister would

ordinarily do in such circumstances.

91. PW-7, the sister-in-law of the prosecutrix, testified

that one day, PW-1 was heard conversing over the phone

Page 70 of 78

and was heard nervously saying that there was nothing like

that and not to release it on Facebook.

92. PW-10, the younger sister of the prosecutrix, stated

that she was informed to come home as there was some

problem, and when she went home, her elder brother, elder

sister, and everyone were present. At that time, PW-1 was

crying, and PW-10 was told that the appellant had taken

pictures when PW-1 was bathing and that he had

threatened her by saying he would upload it on Facebook.

PW-10 thus corroborated the testimony of the prosecutrix

regarding the video recording and the threat issued by the

appellant. Though PW-5, PW-7, and PW-10 may not have

spoken in the same or similar language, their evidence

appears to be natural and generally corroborates the

evidence of the prosecutrix, and no serious inconsistencies

or contradictions are visible. There is nothing to suggest

that they were inimical to the appellant and they had

deposed to falsely implicate the appellant.

93. The evidence of the prosecutrix does not appear to be

a concocted tale merely to malign the appellant. There is a

Page 71 of 78

history behind the allegations made. Both the prosecutrix

and the appellant were in a romantic relationship and

physically involved which has been held established by the

Trial Court and High Court. Thus, when the prosecutrix had

given her version, the appellant could have cast a doubt on

her version either by leading evidence, or by bringing out

contradictions and inconsistencies in her evidence, or by

impeaching the credibility of her evidence. However, as

discussed above, that was not forthcoming from the

appellant. Had the appellant denied any such close

relationship and denied the allegations by claiming that the

prosecutrix had made these allegations out of spite after he

did not want to continue the relationship, he could have

stated so. But he remained silent as if nothing even

happened between them and that they were strangers.

Unfortunately, in view of the finding of the courts below that

there was a physical relationship between them, his studied

silence does not help him. The appellant appears to have

relied his defence solely on the failure of the prosecution to

recover the mobile phone and by maintaining a studied

Page 72 of 78

silence, and by merely denying the allegations as if nothing

had happened between them. To every incriminating

evidence of the prosecution put to the appellant, his stock

reply is “false evidence”, nothing less and nothing more.

Since the testimony of the prosecutrix who appeared before

the Court and testified in front of the appellant and was

cross-examined, has not been discredited, reliance on the

said evidence would justify conviction of the appellant on

the third charge.

This oral evidence of the prosecutrix had passed

through the statutory filtrations of, and was tested on the

anvil of Sections 162(2) and 145 of Evidence Act, Sections

280 and 313 CrPC during the trial and emerged unscathed,

thus can be acted upon.

VI. Standard of Proof

94. At this stage we must also address the standard of

proof in a criminal trial. We are mindful that the prosecution

case, which is primarily based on oral testimony, must pass

the test of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”. However,

Page 73 of 78

reasonable doubt which criminal law contemplates is not an

imaginary, trivial, or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt

based upon reason and common sense. It must be actual

and substantial, and not a mere apprehension devoid of

suppositional speculation, as observed in Ramakant Rai v.

Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 as under:

“24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are

free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot

afford any favourite other than the truth. To

constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an

overly emotional response. Doubts must be actual

and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused

persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack

of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A

reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a

merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon

reason and common sense. It must grow out of the

evidence in the case.”

In Goverdhan (Supra), this Court reiterated that the

law requires the prosecution to establish the case “beyond

reasonable doubt” and not “proof beyond all doubts” and it

was observed as follows:

“25. At this point, it may be also relevant to

mention an observation made by Lord Denning, J.

in Miller v. Miller of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372,

373 H:

“That degree is well settled. It need not reach

certainty, but it must carry a high degree of

probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not

mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law

would fail to protect the community if it admitted

fanciful possibilities to deflect the court of justice….”

26. Thus, the requirement of law in criminal trials is

not to prove the case beyond all doubt but beyond

reasonable doubt and such doubt cannot be

imaginary, fanciful, trivial or merely a possible

doubt but a fair doubt based on reason and common

sense. Hence, in the present case, if the allegations

against the appellants are held proved beyond

reasonable doubt, certainly conviction cannot be

said to be illegal.”

95. Applying the aforesaid standard, the oral testimonial

evidence of the prosecutrix, when scrutinised on the

crucible of the statutory provisions to test the veracity and

credibility as discussed above, we are satisfied that the

evidence of the prosecutrix has successfully passed the test

of “beyond reasonable doubt”.

96. Under the circumstances, there is no reason to

disbelieve the statement of the prosecutrix. Nothing has

been shown to doubt the veracity of her testimony. She

broached the subject with her sisters and proceeded to

lodge the complaint against the appellant, and she

remained steadfast in her accusation against the appellant.

It is a different matter that the Trial Court and the High

Court did not agree with her accusation of rape on the

promise of marriage. However, the Trial Court and the High

Court noted the factum of long physical relationship they

had together, which provides the backdrop to the offence of

which the appellant was convicted. In the light of the above,

it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed to prove

the case beyond reasonable doubt.

VII. Concurrent Findings: Scope of Interference

97. It may also be noted that we are dealing with an

appeal where there are concurrent findings of fact and law

by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. Under such

circumstances, unless there is some manifest illegality or

grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of

misreading or ignoring material evidence, which is absent in

the present case, this Court ought not interfere with such

findings of fact, as observed in Mekala Sivaiah v. State of

A.P., (2022) 8 SCC 253, as follows:

“15. It is well settled by judicial pronouncement that

Article 136 is worded in wide terms and powers

conferred under the said Article are not hedged by

any technical hurdles. This overriding and

exceptional power is, however, to be exercised

sparingly and only in furtherance of cause of justice.

Thus, when the judgment under appeal has resulted

in grave miscarriage of justice by some

misapprehension or misreading of evidence or by

ignoring material evidence then this Court is not only

Page 76 of 78

empowered but is well expected to interfere to

promote the cause of justice.

16. It is not the practice of this Court to reappreciate

the evidence for the purpose of examining whether

the findings of fact concurrently arrived at by the

trial court and the High Court are correct or not. It is

only in rare and exceptional cases where there is

some manifest illegality or grave and serious

miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or

ignoring material evidence, that this Court would

interfere with such finding of fact.”

98. Though we are satisfied that in spite of non-recovery

of the mobile phone/video recording, the charge against the

appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt in

the present case, there can be no doubt that had the

Investigating Officer (IO) recovered the same, it would have

bolstered the case of the Prosecution. Unfortunately, there

is nothing on record to show that the (IO) even tried to

recover the same from the appellant. We also do not know

what steps had been taken by the IO to recover and what

prevented the IO to recover the same. This lapse on the part

of IO is disappointing to say the least.

In a case like the present one, where the offence

involves digital evidence, it is the onerous responsibility of

the IO to recover such an evidence and failure to do so may

be attributable to incompetency of the IO or lack of expertise

or professionalisation, of which we do not wish to make any

conjecture in the present case, but certainly requires to be

brought to the notice of the competent authorities to ensure

that the IOs do not commit such lapses.

CONCLUSION

99. For the reasons discussed above, we are in

agreement with the finding rendered by both the courts

below that the offence of under Section 503 IPC punishable

under Section 506 IPC against the appellant has been

proved beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, we are inclined to

dismiss the appeal and uphold the conviction of the

appellant on the third charge.

100. However, considering the peculiar facts of the case

and also the fact that the incident happened in 2015, we

are of the view that the interest of justice will be served if

the sentence is reduced to the period of custody already

undergone by the appellant.

101. Consequently, the impugned Judgment and Order

dated 28.02.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature

at Madras in Crl. A. No. 325 of 2017 is confirmed and the

appeal is accordingly dismissed with the modification in the

sentence as above. As the appellant had already been

released on bail during the pendency of this appeal, the bail

bond and surety shall stand discharged.

……………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

….…………….…………………………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

May 22, 2026.