Sunny vs State Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 29 April, 2026

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    Delhi High Court – Orders

    Sunny vs State Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 29 April, 2026

    Author: Prateek Jalan

    Bench: Prateek Jalan

                              $~46 Q
                              *         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                              +         CRL.M.C. 3832/2025, CRL.M.A. 16766/2025
                                        SUNNY                                                                .....Petitioner
                                                                      Through:            Mr.Chirag Madan, Ms.Ravleen
                                                                                          Sabharwal,    Ms.Rachal       Tuli,
                                                                                          Mr.Sumit Garg and Mr.Ronit
                                                                                          Bose, Advocates
                                                                      versus
    
                                  STATE NCT OF DELHI & ANR.                 .....Respondent
                                                Through: Mr.Tarang Srivastava, APP for
                                                         State with SI Priyanka, PS North
                                                         Rohini
                              CORAM:
                              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
                                                                      ORDER
    

    % 29.04.2026

    1. By way of the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
    Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”] (corresponding to Section 482
    of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC“]), the petitioner seeks
    quashing of FIR No. 482/2024, dated 02.08.2024, registered under
    Sections 137(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [“BNS”] at Police
    Station Rohini, Delhi, on the ground of settlement between the parties.

    SPONSORED

    2. Issue Notice. Notice is accepted by Mr. Tarang Srivastava, learned
    Additional Public Prosecutor, on behalf of the State. The prosecutrix
    [respondent No.2 herein] is present in person, and states that she does not
    require the assistance of counsel.

    3. The petitioner is present in Court, and is identified by his learned
    counsel and the Investigating Officer [“IO”]. Respondent No. 2 is also

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 1 of 10
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    present in Court and is identified by the IO.

    4. The FIR was registered at the instance of respondent No.2, who is
    the mother of the prosecutrix. It is alleged that on 31.07.2024, at about
    11:00 AM, the prosecutrix, who was aged 17 years and 10 months, left
    her house stating that she was going to work. However, at around 1:00
    PM, the complainant was informed by her other daughter that the
    prosecutrix had, in fact, not visited her workplace. Thereafter, the family
    made efforts to trace her but were unable to locate her, and her mobile
    phone was also found to be switched off.

    5. During investigation, the prosecutrix and the petitioner were
    recovered on 29.08.2024. After competition of investigation, a charge
    sheet was filed. Sections 64(1) of BNS and Sections 4/6 of the Protection
    of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 [“POCSO Act“] were added
    against the petitioner. The allegations against the petitioner stem from the
    statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 183 BNSS. In her
    statement, she alleged that the petitioner asked her to meet him at her
    workplace, after which they travelled together by bus and metro to an
    unknown location. Upon reaching there, the petitioner allegedly took her
    mobile phone, informed her that she would be staying with him, and did
    not permit her to contact her parents. She further alleged that the
    petitioner established sexual relations with her during this period.

    6. The petitioner was arrested on 31.08.2024 and was granted bail by
    the Sessions Court vide order dated 06.11.2024. While granting bail, the
    Court, inter alia, relied upon Dharmander Singh v. State1, and observed
    that although the matter was at the stage of scrutiny of

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 2 of 10
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    The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
    The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 04/05/2026 at 21:12:13
    documents/framing of charge, the prosecutrix had repeatedly appeared
    before the Court and stated that she had since attained majority and had
    gone with the petitioner of her own free will. The Court also took note of
    the fact that the marriage between the petitioner and the prosecutrix was
    fixed for 08.11.2024, and that she was residing with the petitioner and
    intended to marry him.

    7. The petitioner and the prosecutrix have since gotten married to
    each other on 08.11.2024, and also had a child out of the wedlock on
    13.10.2025.

    8. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner and the
    prosecutrix have entered into a settlement agreement dated 06.02.2025.

    9. The prosecutrix, who is present in person, states that she does not
    support the allegations in the FIR or the further allegations against the
    petitioner under Section 64(1) of the BNS and provisions of POCSO.
    Before this Court also, respondent No. 2 has signified her no objection to
    quashing of the FIR, and has filed an affidavit dated 06.02.2025 to this
    effect.

    10. It is well settled that, even in non-compoundable offences, this
    Court may, in exercise of its inherent power Section 482 of the CrPC
    [corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS], can quash criminal
    proceedings, even with respect to non-compoundable offences, on the
    ground that there is a compromise between the accused and the
    complainant, especially when no overarching public interest is adversely
    affected.

    11. The Supreme Court, in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.

    1

    2020 SCC OnLine Del 1267 [hereinafter, “Dharmander Singh”].

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 3 of 10

    This is a digitally signed order.

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    [(2012) 10 SCC 303], has held as follows:

    “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having
    regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim
    has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does
    so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an
    exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute
    between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing
    the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes
    are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in
    wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of
    the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he
    and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has
    been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made
    compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In
    respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other
    offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude
    under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
    offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity,
    the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal
    sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and
    predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile,
    commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the
    offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc.
    or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and
    the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them
    amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
    made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of
    its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal
    complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement,
    there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by
    not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and
    ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not
    exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-
    fast category can be prescribed.”

    [Emphasis supplied.]

    Further, in Narinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. [(2014) 6
    SCC 466], the Supreme Court has also laid down guidelines for High
    Courts while accepting settlement deeds between parties and quashing the
    proceedings. The relevant observations in the said decision read as under:

    “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 4 of 10
    This is a digitally signed order.

    The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
    The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 04/05/2026 at 21:12:13
    following principles by which the High Court would be guided in
    giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and
    exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
    settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
    settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

    29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
    distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
    offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482
    of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
    proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where
    the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
    power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
    29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
    petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding
    factor in such cases would be to secure:

    (i) ends of justice, or

    (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

    While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on
    either of the aforesaid two objectives.

    29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
    involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
    like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature
    and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences
    alleged to have been committed under special statute like the
    Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
    servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
    on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
    29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
    and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
    commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship
    or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved
    their entire disputes among themselves.

    29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to
    whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
    continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
    oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
    him by not quashing the criminal cases.”

    [Emphasis supplied.]

    12. The question which requires consideration is whether inherent
    jurisdiction of this Court ought to be exercised in the present case to
    quash criminal proceedings, instituted inter-alia for the offence of rape,

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 5 of 10
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    and under the provisions of POCSO.

    13. While the Courts have always exercised utmost caution in allowing
    heinous crimes like rape and child sexual offences to be quashed on the
    basis of compromise between the parties, this is not a blanket rule, and
    exceptions have been made in deserving cases. The judgments of the
    Supreme Court in Kapil Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi)2, Madhukar v.
    State of Maharashtra3
    , and Jatin Agarwal v. State of Telangana and
    Anr.4
    , reflect this approach even in cases of rape.

    14. In Jatin Agarwal, the Court noticed inter alia that the prosecutrix
    and the accused had gotten married to each other.

    15. In the context of POCSO also, certain judgments of the Supreme
    Court and the High Courts suggest that the Courts must be cognisant of
    the consensual nature of relationships between young people, even in the
    context of allegations under the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court, in its
    recent judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh and Anr.5, has
    referred to judgments of several High Courts, and expressed concern with
    regard to the application of the POCSO Act on consenting adolescents.

    Four factors identified by the Allahabad High Court in Satish alias Chand
    v. State of Uttar Pradesh6
    have been reproduced therein, which are as
    follows:

    “A. Assess the Context: Each case should be evaluated on its individual
    facts and circumstances. The nature of the relationship and the
    interventions of both parties should be carefully examined.

    2

    (2022) 15 SCC 44.

    3

    2025 SCC OnLine SC 1415.

    4

    2022 SCC OnLine SC 1969 [hereinafter, “Jatin Agarwal”].

    5

    2026 SCC OnLine SC 40.

    6

    Crl.Misc.Bail Appln. No. 18596/2024.

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 6 of 10

    This is a digitally signed order.

    The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
    The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 04/05/2026 at 21:12:13
    B. Consider Victim’s Statement: The statement of the alleged victim should
    be given due consideration. If the relationship is consensual and based on
    mutual affection, this should be factored into decisions regarding bail and
    prosecution.

    C. Avoid Perversity of Justice: Ignoring the consensual nature of a
    relationship can lead to unjust outcomes, such as wrongful imprisonment.
    The judicial system should aim to balance the protection of minors with
    the recognition of their autonomy in certain contexts. Here the age comes
    out to be an important factor.

    D. Judicial Discretion: Courts should use their discretion wisely, ensuring
    that the application of POCSO does not inadvertently harm the very
    individuals it is meant to protect.”

    In fact, the Supreme Court has directed the Government of India to
    consider introduction of a “Romeo-Juliet clause”, with the following
    remark:

    “19. …the introduction of a Romeo – Juliet clause exempting genuine
    adolescent relationships from the stronghold of this law; enacting a
    mechanism enabling the prosecution of those persons who, by the use of
    these laws seeks to settle scores etc.”

    16. Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court, in Harmeet Singh v.
    State (NCT of Delhi
    )7, dealt with a case involving a 22 year old accused
    and a 17 year old prosecutrix, who subsequently married upon attaining
    majority and had a child out of the wedlock. After considering judgments
    of Supreme Court and various High Courts, this Court laid down relevant
    factors to be considered while examining a plea for quashing of offences
    under the POCSO Act on the basis of consent of a de juré victim. The
    relevant extract is reproduced below:

    “36. This court is of the view, that though quashing of criminal
    proceedings under the POCSO Act is not anathema to the law, such
    quashing demands careful and sensitive consideration of the fact

    7
    2026 SCC OnLine Del 1707 [hereinafter, “Harmeet Singh”].

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 7 of 10

    This is a digitally signed order.

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    situation. When examining a plea for quashing of an offence under
    the POCSO Act based on the consent of a de-juré victim, the court
    must carefully evaluate the reasons as to why the victim disclaims any
    loss or injury to her and must record its satisfaction inter-alia on the
    following aspects :

    36.1. Based on the circumstances of a given case, the court must be
    satisfied that in granting a ‘no-objection’ to the quashing of criminal
    proceedings, the de-juré victim is genuinely acting on her own free will
    and volition and has not been misled, pressurised or deceived into
    offering such no-objection;

    36.2. Whether the de-juré victim has taken a consistent stand in
    favour of closing the case from the inception of the criminal
    proceedings, and has disclaimed that she has suffered any loss or
    injury at the hands of the offender;

    36.3. Whether the circumstances of the case justify an inference
    that the acts or omissions that the parties have indulged in, were
    volitional on the part of the de-juré victim;

    36.4. Whether the marriage or other arrangement, based on which
    the offender and the de-juré victim are seeking closure of criminal
    proceedings, evokes confidence on the part of the court; or does it
    appear to be a ruse or stratagem of the offender to evade conviction
    and punishment;

    36.5. Whether the parties have been living together as a family for
    a length of time; and whether children are born to the parties, whose
    future would also be impacted by a decision not to quash the criminal
    proceedings;

    36.6. Whether the offender is alleged to have committed any
    violence or brutality on the de-juré victim; or has committed any other
    act or omission that points to the absence of genuine volition on the
    part of the de-juré victim; and if so, is there any medical and other
    forensic evidence to show such conduct on the offender’s part;
    36.7. What was the respective age of the offender and the de-

    juré victim at the relevant time; whether both were minor; and what
    are the ramifications of the relative age difference and minority;
    36.8. This court would hasten to add, that the aforementioned
    considerations are only suggestive and far from exhaustive; and before
    quashing any criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act, the
    court must interact with the parties and arrive at a subjective
    satisfaction that the quashing of the case is warranted on larger

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 8 of 10
    This is a digitally signed order.

    The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
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    considerations of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of law, as
    discussed above; and
    36.9. Ultimately, the decision to quash criminal proceedings under
    the POCSO Act must be founded on the best interests of the de-
    juré victim and the children, if any, born from the union of the parties.

    17. Applying the aforesaid factors to the present case, it can be held as
    follows:

    A. The date of birth of prosecutrix, according to her school records
    and Aadhar card, is 16.09.2006. The date of birth of the petitioner,
    on the other hand, in his Aadhar card is 01.01.2001. The allegation
    against the petitioner thus pertains to the period when the
    prosecutrix was on the cusp of adulthood – she was over 17 years
    and 10 months of age – and the petitioner was around 23 years old.
    B. The FIR was not lodged at the instance of the prosecutrix, but was
    initiated by her mother upon being unable to locate her. During the
    course of investigation, the petitioner and the prosecutrix were
    traced and recovered on 29.08.2024, nearly one month after the
    registration of the FIR.

    C. The allegations against the petitioner under the POCSO Act were
    made for the first time in the statement of the prosecutrix recorded
    under Section 183 BNSS on 30.08.2024, i.e., one day after their
    recovery. No such allegations were reflected in the MLC, which
    preceded the said statement. Thereafter, the prosecutrix has
    consistently maintained that she had gone with the petitioner of her
    own free will, as also reflected in the bail order passed in favour of
    the petitioner.

    D. The marriage between the parties was solemnized more than one

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 9 of 10
    This is a digitally signed order.

    The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
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    year and six months ago, and since then they have been living
    together. A child has also been born out of the wedlock on
    13.10.2025.

    E. There is no allegation that the petitioner was violent against
    respondent No. 2.

    F. Even as of today, the prosecutrix is present before this Court and
    has expressed her unequivocal support for the quashing of the
    impugned FIR against the petitioner.

    18. In such circumstances, following the judgment in Harmeet Singh, I
    am of the view that the continuation of the criminal proceedings would be
    an impediment in the continued peaceful and harmonious family life of
    the parties. Having regard to the above facts, the possibility of conviction
    in the criminal proceedings, if continued, also appears to be remote.

    19. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, the petition is allowed,
    and FIR No. 482/2024 dated 02.08.2024, registered under Sections
    137(2) of the BNS, along with all consequential proceedings arising
    therefrom, is hereby quashed.

    PRATEEK JALAN, J
    APRIL 29, 2026
    ‘sv’/AD/

    CRL.M.C. 3832/2025 Page 10 of 10
    This is a digitally signed order.

    The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
    The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 04/05/2026 at 21:12:13



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