Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Sumanta Rana vs Union Of India & Ors on 5 May, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
W.P.A. 18933 of 2021
Sumanta Rana
-Vs-
Union of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner :Mr. Sambhu Nath Ray
Mr. Asit Baran Ghsoh
Mr. Somesh Kumar Ghsoh
Ms. Munmum Das
Mr. Sumon Mukherjee
For the Respondents/U.O.I. :Mr. Debapriya Gupta
Judgment on : 05.05.2026
Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-
1. The petitioner, Sumanta Rana, a Constable/GD under the Central
Industrial Security Force, traced the commencement of his service career
to 15th May, 2010, when he entered the Force and thereafter underwent
institutional training at the CISF Training Centre situated at Arakkonam
in the State of Tamil Nadu. Upon successful completion of training, he
was first attached to the CISF Unit at O.T.H.P. Obra in the State of Uttar
Pradesh. In due course, he was transferred to the 6th Reserve Battalion
(NDRF) at Arakkonam and subsequently posted to CISF Unit, IOCL Pradip
on 1st November, 2017. The petitioner projected that throughout his
tenure under different establishments he discharged every assignment
entrusted to him with sincerity, discipline and fidelity to official duty and
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maintained the conduct expected of a member of a disciplined armed
force.
2. The writ petition recites that matters took an adverse turn upon issuance
of Office Memorandum dated 12th March, 2020 whereby five Articles of
Charge were framed against the petitioner.
3. Under Article of Charge-I, the petitioner was accused of making false and
scandalous allegations against Shri B.B. Mishra, Assistant Commandant
(Administration), CISF Unit, IOCL Paradip. The accusation arose out of an
online application dated 20th December, 2019 and a written
representation dated 7th January, 2020 wherein the petitioner allegedly
asserted that the said officer, being a native of Odisha, refrained from
taking action against Odia force personnel despite allegations of their
involvement in unlawful activities and instead extended patronage to
them. The memorandum characterised the allegation as constituting
gross misconduct, moral impropriety and breach of institutional trust.
4. Article of Charge-II alleged that on 2nd January, 2020 the petitioner
behaved in an insolent and discourteous manner with ASI/Steno P.K.
Meena, clandestinely recorded the conversation on his mobile phone and
thereafter issued an intimidating statement to the effect that unless his
application was resolved, he would demonstrate what he was capable of
doing. Such conduct was treated by the authorities as gross indiscipline
and insubordination unbecoming of a member of the Central Armed Police
Force.
5. Article of Charge-III alleged that while the petitioner was deployed in 'B'
Shift duty at Gate No. 2 of IOCL Paradip Refinery on 9th January, 2020,
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he became involved in illegal collection of diaries from private contractors
and supervisors associated with the refinery establishment. The conduct
was alleged to have violated departmental instructions and brought
disrepute to the image and integrity of the CISF.
6. Article of Charge-IV alleged that despite repeated telephonic
communications and physical approaches for service of nine official
letters and communications, the petitioner deliberately refused to receive
the same and failed to comply with lawful directives issued by superior
authorities on two separate occasions. Such refusal was alleged to
constitute gross negligence towards official duty and disobedience of
lawful orders in contravention of the provisions of the CISF Act, 1968.
7. Article of Charge-V referred to the petitioner's previous service
antecedents and recorded that during approximately ten years of service
he had already suffered one major penalty under Rule 36 and nine minor
penalties under Rule 37 of the CISF Rules, 2001 for various acts of
misconduct. The memorandum proceeded to describe him as a habitual
offender incapable of reformation and as a person whose repeated
misdemeanours rendered him unworthy of the discipline expected from a
member of the Armed Force of the Union.
8. The petitioner, however, sought to unfold a different factual narrative
behind the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding. According to him,
while posted at Gate No. 2 (Out) of IOCL Paradip along with Head
Constable P. Pradhan for protection of refinery property, certain unknown
individuals committed theft of copper cable allegedly at the instance of the
said Head Constable. The petitioner asserted that upon apprehending the
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culprits, he was instructed by the superior-ranking Head Constable to
permit them to leave without interference. The petitioner stated that
although he did not protest at the spot owing to the hierarchy of
command, he subsequently submitted a written report before the
Assistant Commandant approximately ten days later narrating the
incident in detail.
9. According to the petitioner, the departmental proceeding thereafter
commenced upon fabricated and retaliatory allegations. He asserted that
accusations relating to improper uniform, illegal collection of diaries and
other allegations were engineered solely because he had disclosed the
alleged theft incident involving his superior officer. The petitioner further
maintained that the Articles of Charge were not accompanied by complete
supporting documents and relevant list of witnesses, thereby depriving
him of an effective opportunity to defend himself.
10. The petitioner further stated that without first obtaining his show-cause
explanation in a fair and meaningful manner, the authorities appointed
Inspector (Fire) A.K. Singh as the Enquiry Officer. Feeling aggrieved by
such appointment, the petitioner addressed a grievance petition before
the Director General requesting substitution of the Enquiry Officer.
According to the petitioner, the Director General advised the DIG, North
Sector to consider appointment of another Enquiry Officer, yet the
grievance raised by the petitioner was not acted upon.
11. The writ petition further asserted that the disciplinary proceeding
progressed in disregard of due process and culminated in the punishment
of removal from service without affording the petitioner a proper
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opportunity of hearing. It was alleged that the disciplinary authority,
namely Commandant Nukesh Kumar, appointed an Enquiry Officer
according to his own preference despite objections raised by the
petitioner. The petitioner further complained that the proceeding was
conducted in a predetermined fashion and that no proper show-cause
notice preceding imposition of punishment was served upon him.
According to him, even the final order of punishment was not duly
furnished.
12. A further grievance was advanced that the enquiry proceeding was
conducted ex parte and recorded in Hindi, a language which the petitioner
claimed he did not adequately understand. The petitioner accordingly
alleged denial of a fair opportunity to participate effectively in the
proceeding.
13. The petitioner also averred that on 20th November, 2020 he submitted a
representation before the Deputy Inspector General, South Eastern Zone-
II, setting forth the circumstances surrounding the disciplinary action and
requesting reconsideration thereof, though according to him the
representation did not receive meaningful attention.
14. The petition thereafter referred to W.P.(C) No. 28753 of 2020 instituted
before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack. The matter came up before
the Hon'ble Justice Dr. B.R. Sarangi on 24th November, 2020. Upon
hearing the Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, liberty was
sought to withdraw the writ petition so as to enable the petitioner to
obtain relevant documents under the Right to Information Act. The writ
petition was consequently disposed of as withdrawn.
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15. The petitioner next referred to the appellate order dated 16th January,
2021 passed by the Deputy Inspector General functioning as the
Appellate Authority. The appellate authority recorded that the petitioner
had been granted adequate opportunity for cross-examination of
witnesses and inspection of relied-upon documents during the course of
the enquiry proceeding. It was further observed therein that no infirmity
or procedural irregularity could be discerned in the decision-making
process adopted by the disciplinary authority. On such reasoning, the
appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected.
16. The petitioner nevertheless asserted that prior to approach the High Court
he had submitted appeal petitions dated 13th November, 2020, 18th
November, 2020 and 20th November, 2020. In response thereto, Office
Memorandum No.V-15015/CISF/IOCL(P)/MAJ/APPEAL/2021/480 dated
25th January, 2021 was issued by the Assistant Commandant forwarding
the appellate order passed by DIG, SEZ-II, CISF Headquarters, Mundali to
the petitioner's permanent residential address in the District of Bankura
with instruction to return the acknowledged copy duly signed with
particulars of date and name.
17. The petitioner further narrated he subsequently received a memorandum
dated 22nd March, 2021 from the office of the Commandant enclosing
risk-saving front final payment papers and directing him to fill up and
return the forms after due signature and attestation. According to the
petitioner, the said documents were neither signed nor returned by him.
18. The writ petition further disclosed on 19th February, 2021 the petitioner
submitted a representation before the Inspector General, South Eastern
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Sector, CISF Headquarters at Kasba, Kolkata invoking revisional
jurisdiction against the disciplinary and appellate orders. The petitioner
candidly admitted that the revisional application might not have been
drafted in proper technical format; however, he contended such
procedural deficiency ought not to have overshadowed the essence of the
grievance raised by a Constable unacquainted with legal formalities and
procedural intricacies.
19. By Office Memorandum No. V-11014/CISF/SES/LC/Rep./SR/2020-3264
dated 26th March, 2021, the office of the Inspector General returned the
petitioner's application on the ground that it was not framed in the
manner of a proper revision petition. The communication, however,
indicated that if the petitioner remained dissatisfied with the order of
penalty and the appellate order, he could prefer a fresh revision petition
before the competent revisional authority with appropriate contents and
proper format.
20. The petitioner further stated that he was residing in departmental family
accommodation along with members of his family including his aged
parents when suddenly Memorandum No. C-
11018/CISF/IOCL/QM/FA/RETN/2021-2884 dated 9th April, 2021 was
issued directing him to vacate the family accommodation within fifteen
days from receipt of the communication.
21. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner instituted WPA No.0280 of 2021
assailing the charge memorandum dated 12th March, 2020, the enquiry
proceeding, the final order dated 15th October, 2020, the appellate order
dated 16th January, 2021, the communication dated 26th March, 2021
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returning the revision petition and the order dated 9th April, 2021
directing eviction from family accommodation.
22. In the said writ petition, the petitioner prayed for extensive interim and
final reliefs. Besides seeking writs commanding withdrawal, rescission
and cancellation of the disciplinary proceeding and consequential orders,
the petitioner sought ad interim orders of injunction restraining the
respondent authorities from giving effect to the charge memorandum
dated 12th March, 2020, the enquiry proceeding, the final order dated
15th October, 2020, the appellate order dated 16th January, 2021, the
revisional communication dated 26th March, 2021 and the memorandum
dated 9th April, 2021 directing vacation of family accommodation.
Further prayer was made for interim protection in terms of the
substantive prayers and for issuance of consequential directions and
incidental costs.
23. The petitioner stated that the said writ petition was taken up for hearing
on 17th August, 2021 before the Hon'ble Justice Arindam Mukherjee who
disposed of the matter by passing a detailed order. Pursuant to the liberty
granted therein, the petitioner thereafter submitted a revisional
application before the Inspector General, CISF, South Eastern Sector
Headquarters, Kolkata under Section 9 of the Central Industrial Security
Force Act, 1968 read with Rule 54 of the CISF Rules, 2001 challenging
the final order dated 15th October, 2020 passed by the Commandant and
Disciplinary Authority at Paradip removing him from service.
24. According to the petitioner, upon receipt of the revisional application the
concerned authority directed him to appear personally on 10th
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September, 2021 for hearing. The petitioner asserted that he accordingly
appeared before the Inspector General, CISF, Kolkata and was orally
heard. During such hearing, the petitioner stated that he placed before
the revisional authority his humble socio-economic background, asserting
that he belonged to a financially marginalised family, that his aged
parents were suffering from ailments associated with old age and that the
family possessed approximately one bigha of agricultural land standing in
the name of his father.
25. The petitioner further narrated that by Office Memorandum No.
11014/SIS/LC/Rev-12/SR/2021-12724 dated 28th October, 2021,
communicated through Registered Post/AD and received by his father on
5th November, 2021, the revisional application stood rejected with the
following observation:-
"And whereas I have carefully gone through the departmental
proceedings vis-Ã -vis submissions made by the petitioner in his
revision petition. I find that enquiry was conducted as per the laid
down procedure and there was no violation of natural justice. The
charges were held proved by the Enquiry Officer on the basis of
evidences adduced during the course of enquiry. During short
span of service of 10 years he was awarded 10 penalties for
various delinquencies by the respective Disciplinary Authorities
but he did not mend himself. The petitioner has not come up with
any new point which warrants interference with the earlier
orders. The action taken by the Disciplinary Authority and
Appellate Authority are found fair and just."
26. The revisional authority observed therein that the departmental enquiry
had been conducted in accordance with prescribed procedure and without
violation of principles of natural justice; that the charges had been proved
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on the basis of evidence adduced during enquiry; that during a
comparatively short tenure of ten years the petitioner had already suffered
ten penalties for various delinquencies; and that no new point had been
raised warranting interference with the earlier orders. The revisional
authority further held that the actions of the Disciplinary Authority and
Appellate Authority were fair and justified.
27. The petitioner sharply criticised the aforesaid revisional order and
contended that the same was arbitrary, perverse, mala fide, mechanical
and bereft of proper application of mind. According to the petitioner, the
order merely created an impression of consideration without actually
dealing with the substance of the revisional grounds urged by him. It was
asserted that the revisional authority did not advert to the specific
submissions advanced in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the revisional application
and that there was scarcely any reflection in the order as to what aspects
were genuinely examined by the Inspector General.
28. The petitioner further contended that the charges themselves were
evasive, ambiguous and deficient in clarity and therefore incapable of
constituting a sustainable prima facie foundation for major penalty. He
asserted that allegations relating to previous minor penalties and one
major penalty could not lawfully be amalgamated so as to prejudice the
petitioner in the fresh disciplinary proceeding.
29. The petitioner also alleged that the Inspector General acted with a
predetermined disposition in affirming the order of removal from service
and failed to appreciate the disproportionate nature of the punishment
imposed for the alleged acts of insubordination. The petitioner reiterated
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that the genesis of the disciplinary hostility lay in the grievances
ventilated by him against Assistant Commandant S.B. Mishra, whom he
accused of harbouring sectarian and provincial prejudice. According to
the petitioner, the revisional authority failed to examine the background
circumstances giving rise to the charges and mechanically upheld the
findings returned by the disciplinary authority.
30. The petitioner further criticised the revisional authority for placing
repeated emphasis upon the petitioner's previous penalties suffered
during service and quoted the observation that despite ten penalties
during ten years of service the petitioner did not mend his character.
According to the petitioner, the reliance upon earlier punishments, which
had already been undergone by him without protest, amounted to placing
him repeatedly in peril for matters already concluded.
31. It was additionally urged that while exercising revisional jurisdiction the
Inspector General was not functioning merely as an administrative
functionary but was discharging powers bearing the attributes of a quasi-
judicial authority. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the revisional
authority was expected to independently evaluate the factual and legal
dimensions of the matter instead of mechanically endorsing the
conclusions of subordinate authorities. The petitioner alleged that the
revisional authority failed to rise above bureaucratic formalism and
upheld the order of removal in a stereotyped and closed-minded manner.
32. Ultimately, the petitioner asserted that the revisional order dated 28th
October, 2021 was illegal, unconstitutional, discriminatory and grossly
disproportionate and that the same was liable to be set aside.
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Consequential relief was sought for reinstatement in service with
retrospective effect together with all attendant service benefits, salary and
allowances admissible under the governing service rules.
33. The petitioner prayed for issuance of writs in the nature of mandamus
commanding the respondent authorities to withdraw, rescind, cancel,
recall or forbear from giving effect to the aforesaid proceedings and orders.
34. The Learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner assailed the
revisional order dated 28th October, 2021, received by the petitioner on
5th November, 2021, as an order bearing the imprint of arbitrariness,
mala fides and manifest non-application of mind. It was submitted that
the revisional authority merely clothed the order with the appearance of
consideration without in truth entering into the marrow of the grievances
projected by the petitioner. According to the Learned Advocate, the order
passed by the Inspector General was a perfunctory exercise undertaken in
a mechanical fashion solely to create an outward semblance that the
revisional application had been examined and rejected on merits.
35. The Learned Advocate contended that the revisional authority failed to
indicate, even in the faintest measure, the aspects which actually weighed
with him while affirming the order of removal. It was urged that the
revisional order remained conspicuously silent regarding the detailed
submissions advanced by the petitioner, particularly those contained in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the revisional application, thereby rendering the
decision vulnerable as a nonspeaking and unsustainable order.
36. It was further submitted that the very foundation of the disciplinary
proceeding rested upon charges which were vague, evasive and deficient
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in material particulars. The Learned Counsel argued that the allegations
lacked the certainty and clarity required in law to sustain a departmental
proceeding involving a major penalty. According to the petitioner, no
prima facie case could emerge from accusations so nebulous and
internally inconsistent. It was additionally urged that previous
punishments already suffered by the petitioner, whether minor or major,
could not legally be amalgamated and resurrected to prejudice him in a
subsequent disciplinary action.
37. The Learned Counsel next contended that the Inspector General
approached the revisional proceeding with a predetermined disposition
and failed to maintain the detachment expected of a statutory authority
exercising quasi-judicial powers. The punishment of removal from service,
according to the petitioner, stood wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the alleged misconduct and disclosed a punitive severity incompatible
with settled principles governing disciplinary jurisprudence.
38. The petitioner further asserted that the genesis of the disciplinary
hostility lay in the grievances ventilated by him against Assistant
Commandant S.B. Mishra. The Learned Counsel submitted that the
petitioner had raised genuine complaints against the said superior officer
and thereafter became the target of vindictive departmental action. It was
argued that the petitioner had been subjected to humiliation and
discriminatory treatment owing to what was described as a sectarian and
provincial attitude harboured by the superior authority. According to the
petitioner, neither the disciplinary authority nor the revisional authority
undertook any meaningful examination into the factual background
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giving rise to the allegations and instead proceeded to affirm the order of
removal in a straight-lined and predetermined manner.
39. The Learned Advocate further criticised the revisional authority for
repeatedly relying upon the petitioner's earlier punishments while
ignoring that those penalties had already been suffered by him without
demur. It was contended that such reliance effectively subjected the
petitioner to repeated prejudice for matters already concluded and thereby
offended settled notions of fairness.
40. Developing the argument further, the Learned Counsel submitted that
while dealing with the revisional application, the Inspector General was
not acting merely as an administrative superior but as an authority
exercising powers carrying the trappings of a quasi-judicial forum.
Therefore, the revisional authority was under an obligation to
independently assess the factual and legal dimensions of the controversy
with impartiality and intellectual detachment. According to the petitioner,
the Inspector General failed to transcend bureaucratic formalism and
affirmed the order of removal in a stereotyped manner with a closed and
biased approach.
41. The petitioner accordingly contended that the revisional order dated 28th
October, 2021 was illegal, unconstitutional, discriminatory, malicious and
grossly disproportionate and thus liable to be set aside. Consequential
relief was sought for reinstatement into service with retrospective effect
together with all consequential monetary and service benefits admissible
under the governing service rules.
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42. Per contra, the Learned Advocate representing the respondents stoutly
defended the disciplinary proceeding and the consequential orders passed
by the authorities concerned. It was submitted at the outset that the
departmental enquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance with the
prescribed procedure and in faithful adherence to the principles of
natural justice. According to the respondents, the petitioner had been
afforded repeated and adequate opportunities to defend himself at every
stage of the proceeding, but he consciously declined to cooperate with the
enquiry process.
43. The Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner
had developed a continuing habit of refusing official communications
despite repeated attempts made by the authorities for service of notices
and orders. It was pointed out that even the final order of punishment
was initially sought to be served through the supervising Inspector of the
Unit, but the petitioner refused to accept the same. Thereafter, the order
was dispatched through speed post, which too, according to the postal
endorsement, was refused by the petitioner.
44. It was further submitted that the Articles of Charge together with
annexures were forwarded to the petitioner through the Company
Commander, but the petitioner declined to receive the same on 13th
March, 2020. According to the respondents, another attempt was made
on 19th March, 2020 when the petitioner was physically present in the
Unit, yet he again refused service. Ultimately, a Board of Officers had to
be constituted for affixing the charge memorandum at the petitioner's
government family accommodation on 12.02.2020.
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45. The respondents further submitted that despite service of notices the
petitioner neither submitted any written statement of defence nor
participated in the enquiry proceeding. Although he appeared during the
preliminary hearing held on 17th April, 2020, he allegedly refused to
participate in the proceeding, declined to sign the order sheet and
statements and abruptly quit from attending the enquiry. Such conduct,
according to the respondents, itself reflected grave indiscipline and
insubordination unbecoming of a member of a disciplined armed force.
46. The Learned Counsel argued that the petitioner persistently disregarded
the notices issued by the Enquiry Officer from time to time and paid no
heed to official directions. Such refusal to receive communications
relating to disciplinary and administrative matters, coupled with
deliberate non-cooperation in the enquiry proceeding despite being
present in the Unit, furnished substantial grounds for imposition of a
major penalty. The respondents characterised the petitioner's conduct as
one of sheer negligence, indiscipline and insubordination incompatible
with the discipline expected from a member of the Force.
47. It was further submitted that the petitioner was not merely a habitual
offender but a person whose continued misconduct demonstrated
complete reluctance to function within a disciplined command structure.
According to the respondents, the petitioner's repeated acts disclosed
unwillingness to abide by lawful authority and inability to conform to
institutional discipline.
48. The Learned Counsel for the respondents lastly placed reliance upon
settled principles governing judicial review in disciplinary matters and
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submitted that a writ court does not sit as an appellate forum over
departmental findings. It was argued that the High Court could not re-
appreciate or reassess evidence adduced during the disciplinary
proceeding and that the scope of interference remained confined to
examine whether the procedure adopted violated principles of natural
justice or statutory rules. According to the respondents, in the present
case the enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the applicable
rules and with due observance of procedural safeguards. Consequently, it
was contended that no scope existed for judicial interference and the writ
petition deserved dismissal with exemplary costs.
49. The edifice of the writ petition rests upon the petitioner's assertion that
the departmental proceeding culminating in his removal from service was
borne out of prejudice, nurtured through procedural impropriety and
ultimately carried to its conclusion without affording him the safeguards
of fairness embedded within the principles of natural justice. The
petitioner endeavoured to portray himself as a member of the Force who,
after rendering service in different establishments of the Central
Industrial Security Force since 15th May, 2010, became the target of
institutional hostility upon allegedly exposing certain irregularities
involving superior officers to official notice. According to the petitioner,
the disciplinary machinery was thereafter set into motion upon allegations
which were retaliatory in character, imprecise in formulation and
disproportionate in consequence.
50. The petitioner drew attention to the charge memorandum dated 12th
March, 2020 whereby allegations related to false accusations against a
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superior officer, insubordinate conduct towards another officer of the
Unit, illegal collection of diaries from contractors attached to IOCL
Paradip and repeated refusal to receive official communications issued by
the authorities. The petitioner further questioned the propriety of reliance
upon his previous service antecedents, contending that earlier penalties
already suffered by him could not once again be employed as instruments
of aggravation in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding.
51. It was further urged that the enquiry proceeding proceeded in an
atmosphere bereft of fairness. The petitioner alleged non-supply of
documents, inadequate opportunity to defend himself, appointment of an
Enquiry Officer despite objection raised by him and conduct of the
proceeding in Hindi, a language with which he claimed limited familiarity.
The petitioner sought to impress upon the Court that the disciplinary
authority, appellate authority and revisional authority all acted with a
predetermined disposition and that the revisional order dated 28th
October, 2021 bore only the outward trappings of consideration without
any genuine engagement with the grounds advanced in the revisional
application.
52. The submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents, however,
unravel a narrative substantially at variance with the one projected by the
petitioner. The Learned Advocate representing the respondents placed
before the Court materials indicating repeated and sustained attempts to
serve the petitioner with the Articles of Charge, annexures, notices and
consequential communications. The records revealed the charge
memorandum was initially sought to be served through the Company
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Commander; that upon refusal by the petitioner, further attempts were
undertaken on subsequent dates; and eventually a Board of Officers was
constituted for affixation of the charge memorandum at the petitioner's
government accommodation. The respondents further asserted that even
the final order of punishment, sought to be served both through official
channel and by speed post, was refused by the petitioner.
53. The records also disclose that the petitioner appeared during the
preliminary hearing held on 17th April, 2020 but declined to associate
himself with the enquiry proceeding, refused to sign the order sheets and
thereafter withdrew from participation. The respondents contended that
despite repeated notices, the petitioner neither submitted any defence
statement nor cooperated with the disciplinary process and consciously
rendered the proceeding ex parte by his own conduct.
54. The allegation of violation of natural justice cannot be examined in
isolation from the conduct of the delinquent employee himself. The
principles of natural justice are intended to secure fairness in decision-
making; they do not furnish a sanctuary to an employee who deliberately
obstructs the disciplinary process by refusing communications, avoiding
participation and frustrating procedural progress at every successive
stage.
55. A disciplinary authority is undoubtedly under an obligation to afford
reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee. Yet the law does not
contemplate that administrative proceedings shall be rendered sterile
merely because the employee elects to remain uncooperative. Fair
opportunity is measured not by the subjective willingness of the employee
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to participate, but by the objective availability of such opportunity. Once
notices are issued, service attempts undertaken and avenues of
participation allowed, the obligation resting upon the disciplinary
authority stands substantially discharged. Thereafter, abstention or non-
cooperation becomes a matter attributable to the delinquent himself.
56. In the present case, the records reveal persistent efforts undertaken by
the authorities to communicate the charges and facilitate participation of
the petitioner in the enquiry proceeding. The petitioner's repeated refusal
to receive official communications cannot subsequently be transformed
into an allegation that the proceedings continued in his absence. The
Court cannot permit the principles of natural justice to be converted into
instruments for paralysing disciplinary administration, particularly in
establishments where discipline and responsiveness to lawful authority
constitute foundational attributes of service.
57. Equally unpersuasive is the contention that the charges lacked clarity or
specificity. The Articles of Charge disclosed with sufficient precision the
nature of allegations delineated against the petitioner, namely
accusations against superior officers, insubordinate conduct, refusal to
comply with official communications and conduct inconsistent with the
discipline expected from a member of the Force. The petitioner himself
addressed each of those allegations in considerable detail before the
appellate and revisional authorities as also before this Court. The plea
that the petitioner remained unaware of the allegations or incapable of
understanding the substance thereof thus lacks convincing force upon
examination of the record itself.
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58. This Court also cannot accede to the invitation to undertake a re-
evaluation of the evidentiary materials forming the basis of the
disciplinary findings. The contours of judicial review under Article 226 of
the Constitution remain well delineated. A writ court does not don the
mantle of an appellate authority for reassessing factual determinations
arrived at in a departmental enquiry. The Court does not weigh the
evidence as though conducting a fresh adjudication upon facts, nor does
it substitute its own conclusions merely because another view may appear
plausible.
59. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Biecco Lawrie Ltd. & Anr. v. State of West Bengal
& Anr.1, held as follows:-
"22. In South Indian Cashew Factories Workers' Union v. The Managing
Director, Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors. [(2006)
5 SCC 201], it was held that the inquiry had been conducted by the Assistant
Personnel Manager of the Corporation and the Union raised an industrial
dispute in which Labour Court set aside the inquiry on the ground of
institutional bias as the Enquiry Officer was part of the same institution and
had also made certain uncorroborated remarks against the employee. This
Court in appeal held that mere presumption of bias cannot be sustained on the
sole ground that the officer was a part of the management and where findings
of the Enquiry Officer were based on evidence and were not perverse, the
mere fact that the inquiry was conducted by an officer of the management
would not vitiate the inquiry.
23. On a bare perusal of these decided cases, it could be strongly established
that the fact that P.K.Mukherjee, the Enquiry Officer, who was also the
company lawyer cannot be considered as being "biased and partisan" who
favoured and was partial towards the management of the company.
....
26. However in The State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Mangalore University Non-
Teaching Employee‘s Association & Ors. [(2002) 3 SCC 302] the requirement of
notice will not be insisted upon as a mere technical formality when the party
1
AIR 2010 Supreme Court 142
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concerned clearly knows the case against him and is not thereby prejudiced in
any manner in putting up an effective defence, then violation of the principle of
natural justice cannot be insisted upon.
27. In the present case, the materials on record show that the respondent had
been furnished with proper notices intimating him the date, time and place of
hearing well before time and the respondent has also received notices as
is indicated from the postal acknowledgements made by him in his own letters
addressed to the management.
…
50. While dealing with the domestic inquiry and misbehaviour by an employee
at one inquiry and refusal to attend the next inquiry, this Court in Eastern
Electric & Trading Co. vs. Baldev Lal [(1975) 4 SCC 684] observed that the
misbehaviour by an employee at one inquiry and refusal to attend the next
inquiry held even after adjournment if the employee did not appear in the
domestic inquiry, the ex parte inquiry held by the Inquiry Officer cannot be
vitiated and must be held to be valid.”
60. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Alok Kumar2, held the
following:-
“85. Doctrine of de facto prejudice has been applied both in English as well as
in Indian Law. To frustrate the departmental inquiries on a hyper technical
approach have not found favour with the Courts in the recent times. In the
case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1980 (4) SCC 379], a three Judge Bench of
this Court while following the principle in Ridge v. Baldwin stated that if upon
admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such
a case that principle of natural justice was in its self prejudice would not
apply. Thus, every case would have to be examined on its own merits and
keeping in view the statutory rules applying to such departmental
proceedings. The Court in S.L. Kapoor (supra) held as under:
86. Expanding this principle further, this Court in the case of K.L. Tripathi v.
State Bank of India [(1984) SCC 379 held as under:
“31. … It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of
natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. There must also
have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a
merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural
justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of2
2010 (5) SCC 349
23
the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to
be dealt with, and so forth.”
87. In the case of ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727], this Court noticed
the existing law and said that the theory of reasonable opportunity and the
principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to
assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are neither incantations
to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether,
in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of denial
of report to him, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each
case. The Court has clarified even the stage to which the departmental
proceedings ought to be reverted in the event the order of punishment is set
aside for these reasons.
88. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of
Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [2008 (9) SCC 31] at
page 38 where the Court held as under:
“21. “From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar it is explicitly clear that
the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the inquiry officer’s
report to the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary
authority. It is also clear that non- supply of report of the inquiry officer is in
the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a
report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally
clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent
employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null
and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the
delinquent employee to plead and prove that non- supply of such report had
caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to
satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically
set aside.”
61. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in The State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj3, held
as follows:-
“9. In State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, a three Judge
Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over
the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed3
(2023) 3 SCC 423
24
in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The
Court held as under:
“7. …The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article
226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities
holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether
the rules of natural justice are not violated. …”
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, again a three-Judge Bench of this
Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from an decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches necessarily correct in
the eyes of court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act
as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under:
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of
the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the
conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the
court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public
servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry
was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are
complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some
evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But
that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules
of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to
disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is 3 (1995) 6
SCC 749 entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The
Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate
authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules
prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
25
the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding
be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal
may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to
make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is
presented. The appellate authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate the
evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof
of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this
Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the
evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from
patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.”
10. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., this Court held that
interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such
authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice
or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held
as under:
…
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya [State Bank of
Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : (2011) 1 SCC
(L&S) 721] , this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court
and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the
ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry
has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will
not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The
Court held as under:
“7. … Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based
on extraneous considerations. (vide B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India – 1995
(6) SCC 749, Union of India vs. G. Gunayuthan – 1997 (7) SCC 463, and Bank
of India vs. DegalaSuryanarayana – 1999 (5) SCC 762, High Court of
Judicature at Bombay vs. Shahsi Kant S Patil – 2001 (1) SCC416).
26
13. In another judgement reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran6, this
Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the
parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary
proceedings:”
62. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash
Singh4, observed as follows:-
“3. …
II. This Court in Board of Directors Himachal Pradesh Transport
Corporation v. HC Rahi, has held that the principles of natural justice cannot
be viewed in a rigid manner. The application of these principles depends on
the facts and circumstances of each individual case. To sustain the plea of
violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish how he has been
prejudiced by the violation. In the present case, Respondent was aware of the
disciplinary proceedings, yet, refused to participate in the same. It can be
inferred from the respondent’s actions that he had waived any right to natural
justice.”
63. Interference becomes warranted only where the decision-making process
is vitiated by demonstrable mala fides, patent arbitrariness, procedural
illegality or findings so utterly divorced from the evidentiary record that
they shock the conscience of judicial scrutiny. None of those features
emerge with sufficient force from the present record.
64. The petitioner’s allegations of bias and provincial prejudice remain resting
substantially upon assertion rather than substantiated material.
Accusations of mala fides against superior officers, particularly in matters
of disciplinary control within a uniformed force, demand a degree of
evidentiary firmness far greater than speculative inference or subjective
perception. The materials placed before the Court do not disclose
circumstances of such compelling character as would justify the
4
(2025) SCC OnLine SC 891
27
conclusion that the entire disciplinary framework stood contaminated by
institutional bias.
65. The distinctive nature of service under the Central Industrial Security
Force is glaringly unique and accountable. A member of such force is not
engaged in ordinary civil employment divorced from considerations of
command, obedience and institutional discipline. The architecture of a
disciplined force survives upon prompt compliance with lawful authority,
respect for hierarchical structure and unwavering responsiveness to
official command. Indiscipline within such services possesses
consequences extending beyond individual misconduct; it has the
capacity to erode collective functioning and institutional confidence.
66. Repeated refusal to receive official communications, deliberate non-
cooperation with disciplinary proceedings and demonstrable disregard
towards superior authority strike at the very discipline which forms the
lifeblood of such organizations. A force entrusted with the protection of
strategic industrial establishments and public assets cannot function
upon selective obedience or episodic compliance. Recalcitrance, if
repeatedly tolerated, gradually weakens the moral and administrative
fabric upon which disciplined institutions stand erected.
67. The service antecedents of the petitioner, as noticed by the disciplinary
authority and referred to by the revisional authority, also cannot be
brushed aside as wholly irrelevant. Previous penalties may not
independently determine guilt in a subsequent proceeding; yet while
considering the proportionality of punishment and the overall suitability
of an employee to continue within a disciplined establishment, the
28
authorities are not expected to proceed in studied ignorance of the
employee’s past conduct and behavioural history.
68. The submission that the punishment of removal from service stands
disproportionate likewise does not commend acceptance before this
Court. The disciplinary authority, situated within the operational
framework of the Force and acquainted with the practical consequences of
misconduct upon institutional discipline, remains the primary judge of
the gravity and operational impact of delinquency committed by a member
of the service. Judicial review does not extend to substitute the Court’s
own subjective assessment of what punishment ought to have been
imposed. Unless the punishment appears outrageously disproportionate,
vindictive in character or so irrational as to defy accepted standards of
administrative fairness, judicial restraint remains the governing principle.
69. In the present matter, the punishment imposed cannot be characterised
as one so unconscionably excessive as to warrant interference under writ
jurisdiction. The disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional
authority each considered the matter within the framework of the
governing rules and arrived at concurrent conclusions regarding the
petitioner’s conduct. The Court does not discern circumstances
warranting displacement of those findings through judicial substitution.
70. The departmental proceeding was conducted in substantial conformity
with the governing statutory framework and procedural safeguards; that
adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to participate in the
enquiry; that the allegation of violation of natural justice does not
withstand scrutiny when tested against the petitioner’s own conduct
29
during the proceeding; and that neither the order of the disciplinary
authority nor the appellate or revisional orders suffer from arbitrariness,
perversity or procedural illegality warranting interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
71. In view of the above discussions, the instant writ petition being WPA
18933 of 2021 is dismissed.
72. There is no order as to costs.
73. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties
on priority basis on compliance of all formalities.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)
