Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Sudeep Chitlangia vs Kanchan Jyoti Rao And Others on 10 July, 2026
2026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
01 10.07.2026
CRC 31 of 2025
IA No: CAN 1 of 2026
In
F.M.A.T 208 of 2025
Sudeep Chitlangia
Vs.
Kanchan Jyoti Rao and others
Mr. Krishnaraj Thaker, Snr. Adv.,
Ms. Susrea Mitra,
Mr. Chunky Agarwal,
Mr. Akshay Kumar Jain Sukhani
Ms. Simran Sureka
...for the petitioner.
Mr. Anirban Ray, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Aditya Chakraborty,
Mr. Arjun Roy,
Ms. Saolini Bose
....for the contemnor nos. 1, 5.
Mr. Ashok Banerjee, Sr. Adv.,
Ms. Saolini Bose
...for the contemnor no. 6.
Mr. Aniruddha Mitra, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Aishik Chakraborty
Mr. Anirban Ghosh
...for the contemnor nos. 2, 3 & 4.
1. The present Contempt Rule was issued on December
8, 2025, upon giving a preliminary hearing to the
alleged contemnors. Although initially, on the said
date, all the alleged contemnors were represented by
the same set of counsel, subsequently such
representation branched out and the contemnor nos.1
and 5, contemnor nos.2, 3 and 4 and contemnor no.6
have thereafter been represented by separate set of
counsel, each of the contemnors having filed
individual affidavits of show cause to the Rule.
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2. The brief backdrop of the case is that in a declaratory
suit filed by the contemnor no.1, an ad interim order
of status quo was passed. Subsequently, the learned
Trial Judge dismissed an application for vacating such
ad interim order filed by the petitioner in the present
contempt application (defendant in the suit) under
Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
simultaneously allowed the temporary injunction
application of the plaintiff/contemnor no.1, thereby
making the ad interim order of status quo with regard
to nature, character and possession of the suit
property absolute.
3. Being aggrieved, the defendant/petitioner preferred an
appeal bearing FMAT No.208 of 2025. Vide judgment
and order dated June 18, 2025, the said appeal was
disposed of by modifying the order impugned therein.
The crux of the ordering portion of such
judgment/order is found in Paragraph No.29 of the
same, which is quoted below:
"29. Accordingly, FMAT No. 208 of 2025 is disposed of by
modifying the impugned order to the limited extent that the
parties shall maintain status quo with regard to the nature
and character and/or possession of the suit property, with
the rider that the defendant/appellant and his men and
agents might have limited and temporary ingress and egress
to the suit property for specific purposes, if any. It is made
clear that such ingress and egress shall not be of such
nature as to disturb the exclusive possession of the plaintiff
in respect of the suit property and/or shall not create any
equity or special right in favour of the defendant/appellant."
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4. Subsequently the appellant therein, being the present
petitioner, filed the present contempt application
alleging that, in wilful and deliberate violation of the
Order dated June 18, 2025, the plaintiff/respondent
no.1 in the appeal (present contemnor no.1), in
collusion with the respondent no.5/contemnor no.2,
authorised third parties to affix a noticeboard and
nameplates in the suit property and permitted such
third parties to operate from the suit premises. It is
alleged that the nature, character and possession of
the suit property was altered by such creation of third-
party interest. Moreover, it is alleged that despite the
Court having granted access for specific purposes to
the petitioner, such access is being restricted.
5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
argues that from the photographs annexed to the
contempt application, it will be evident that signages
and nameplates/flex have been put up at the suit
premises which show that one Government Muslim
Marriage and Kazi Welfare Association (for short,
“GMM”) has set up a branch office at the suit
premises, situated at 113, Park Street, Poddar Point
Building, Kolkata – 700 016, which is the suit
property. It is contended that from the said
signboards, it would be evident that contemnor no.5,
Md. Razaul Khan, is the Director and contemnor no.6,
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Kazi Md. Faisullah Ansari, is the General Secretary of
the said GMM.
6. It is further alleged that in deliberate and wilful
violation of the order of this Court dated June 18,
2025, the said organization/association has been
permitted to indiscriminately hold religious
ceremonies, including animal slaughter, at the suit
building. Furthermore, the men and agents of the
petitioner, including telecom operators who attempted
to have access to the network apparatus situated at
the roof of the said premises, have been prevented by
the contemnors from entering into the suit premises.
7. The petitioner also submits that the contemnor no.2,
through its Directors, contemnor nos. 3 and 4, have
actively colluded in such violation of the order of this
Court.
8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
next argues that the contemnors, apart from flouting
the Court’s order, are guilty of aggravated contempt
due to their attempts to cover up their contumacious
acts by making false and contradictory pleas in their
show cause affidavits.
9. It is argued that the Order dated June 18, 2025 does
not only protect the possession of the plaintiff but also
the status of such possession of all entities as on the
date of the order. The Poddar Point Owners’ and
Occupiers’ Association has been in continuous
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possession of a small room above the stairwell in the
suit building. However, ingress and egress of the said
Association, of which the petitioner is the President, is
being obstructed by the contemnors, thereby halting
the day-to-day administration of the Poddar Point
building.
10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner relies on the
photographs annexed to the contempt application
which, according to him, substantiate the allegations
of creation of third-party interests as well as the
existence of network apparatus on the roof of the
building. However, the contemnors, it is submitted,
have blatantly denied the existence of any such
network apparatus, which is patently contradictory to
the photographic evidence.
11. Although contemnor no. 1 disowns knowledge or
involvement in putting up the boards-in-question, it is
alleged by her that contemnor nos. 5 and 6, both of
whom are her agents, have been instrumental in
conduct of religious ceremonies by GMM, with which
contemnor no.6 is admittedly associated. Such facts
are borne out from the show cause affidavits of the
different contemnors.
12. Insofar as the stand of the contemnors that the Rule of
contempt was defective and, hence, ought to be
discharged, it is argued by learned senior counsel for
the petitioner that the Rule was issued duly in
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accordance with the Calcutta High Court Contempt of
Courts Rules, 1975 (in brief, “the 1975 Rules”) and
that material particulars of the acts of contempt have
been categorically disclosed in Paragraph Nos. 11 to
17 of the contempt application, all of which have been
affirmed as true to knowledge or derived from the
records. Hence, the argument of the contemnors that
the allegations are vague and affirmed as submissions
is incorrect. It is submitted that Paragraph No. 19 of
the contempt application, which has been affirmed as
submission, merely contains the crux of the
allegations in a nutshell, preceded by specific
statements on oath in the earlier paragraphs.
13. Learned senior counsel submits that the “Slap-say
sorry-and forget” school of thought has been
deprecated in contempt jurisprudence by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the judgment of T.N. Godavarman
Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot, reported at (2006) 5
SCC 1.
14. It is submitted that although false apology has been
tendered by the contemnors, it has been tendered only
in the teeth of punishment for contempt and not as an
outcome of remorse or contrition. Learned senior
counsel cites Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma,
reported at (1995) 1 SCC 421, in support of the
proposition that an apology which is not the outcome
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of real remorse but is tendered as a weapon of defence
is not acceptable.
15. Learned senior counsel also relies on U.P. Resident
Employees Coop. House Building Society v. NOIDA,
reported at (2007) 15 SCC 515, for the proposition that
tendering apology after it was found that a false
statement has been made on oath is worthless.
16. Learned senior counsel reiterates that not stopping at
violating the order of the Court wilfully, the
contemnors have tried to mislead the Court in their
contradictory statements made in the show-cause
affidavits, which tantamounts to an aggravated act of
contempt.
17. Learned senior counsel also places reliance on the
definition of “status” as defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary, Eleventh Edition.
18. In reply, learned senior counsel for the contemnor
nos.1 and 5 raises a preliminary objection to the effect
that Rule 9 of the 1975 Rules clearly provides that the
petitioners ought to affirm statements made in
contempt applications based on knowledge,
information and belief or on records. There is no
scope of accepting statements affirmed as
submissions. In the present case, it is alleged that the
specific particulars of materials as required under
Rule 6 of the Rules have been affirmed as submissions
in Paragraph No.19 of the contempt application.
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19. With regard to the alleged violation of the parent order
dated June 18, 2025, it is contended that the Court
directed maintenance of status quo with regard to the
nature and character and/or possession of the suit
property and granted limited and temporary ingress
and egress rights to the appellant/present petitioner
and his men and agents, which ingress and egress
might be for specific purpose, if any, without
disturbing the exclusive possession of the
plaintiff/contemnor no.1 in respect of the suit
property. It is submitted that on a reading of the show
cause affidavits of contemnor nos. 1, 5 and 6, it is
evident that possession of the suit property is still with
contemnor no.1 and no one is claiming possession or
any rights to the suit property. It is argued that
parting with possession must be accompanied by
actual transfer, where the contemnor no.1 has
consciously excluded herself from her possession.
However, in the present case, contemnor no.1 has
never given possession to any third party and has only
used her leased-out property for allowing a specific
ceremony to her authorised persons. The suit property
has not been converted to a marriage house/hall, as
submitted by the petitioner.
20. In the absence of any proof of transfer of exclusive
control and possession of the property by the
contemnor no.1 in favour of third parties, it is argued
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that there cannot be any violation of the status quo
order.
21. It is argued that contemnor no.1 was never aware of
the offending signboard and, immediately upon
coming to know of the same, ensured that it was
removed from the suit property. Moreover, the board
was fixed outside the suit property, beyond the
entrance gate of the same, without any knowledge of
contemnor no.1.
22. It is submitted that the contemnor no.1 permitted
contemnor no.6, who has been acquainted with her
and her husband for quite some time and is also
associated with religious organizations, to conduct a
religious marriage ceremony for two days and did not
derive any commercial benefit therefrom.
23. It is submitted that contemnor no.5 is acquainted with
contemnor no.1 and has been working for her for the
purpose of upkeep and maintenance of the suit
property. He, it is submitted, had nothing to do with
the putting up of the signboard and is not the Director
of GMM or, for that matter, any other organization or
association.
24. It is contended that a register is being maintained and
the name of contemnor no.5 was displayed along with
his mobile number to ensure that persons seeking
access to the roof get the same. It is submitted that
the restriction in respect of access to the roof was in
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consonance with and in terms of the order of this
Court dated June 18, 2025 and not in violation
thereof.
25. Installation of a calling bell and the system of signing
a register for persons entering the roof which was put
in place were in terms of the exclusive possession of
contemnor no.1, recognised by this Court. The men
and agents of the petitioner and the association of
which he is the President have been signing the said
register without any demur. Thus, there was no
contumacious act at any point of time.
26. It is pointed out that the ingress and egress allowed to
the petitioner was only for specific purposes, which
has not been hampered by the system of maintaining
a register and putting up the phone number of
contemnor no.5 as the contact person for persons
seeking access to the roof.
27. Learned senior counsel for contemnor nos. 1 and 5
next argues that contempt jurisdiction is a quasi-
criminal jurisdiction; hence, rules have been framed in
such a manner that strict interpretation is to be given
thereto in order to ensure that an alleged contemnor is
not wrongly vexed. However, in the present contempt
application, the acts of contempt alleged is vague and
require a purposive interpretation of the order, which
creates doubts as to whether the alleged contemnors
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were aware that they were causing a deliberate and
wilful violation of the order.
28. Rule 19 of the Rules, it is submitted, requires that a
rule nisi be drawn up, and Form-1 of Appendix-1
thereof clearly require that the rule must set out the
nature of the contumacious conduct. The present rule,
however, stopped short of enumerating the
contumacious conduct for which this Court issued the
rule.
29. Lastly, it is argued that contemnor no.1 has taken all
necessary steps to uphold the order of this Court and
has ensured that the offending board is removed
immediately upon coming to learn of the same.
Possession, admittedly, remains with contemnor no.1
and contemnor no.5 is an agent who acts at the
instance of contemnor no.1. The allegations were
immediately put to rest by taking care to purge all acts
of contempt which have been alleged. Moreover,
unconditional apology has been offered by the
contemnors, which ought to be deemed to purge the
act of contempt, if any.
30. Learned senior counsel cites Kanwar Singh Saini v.
High Court of Delhi, reported at (2012) 4 SCC 307, for
the proposition that unless a clear-cut case of
obstruction is made out, the contempt jurisdiction
cannot be invoked merely on surmises and conjecture.
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31. Learned senior counsel appearing for the contemnor
nos. 1 and 5 next cites Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v.
Dharam Godha, reported at (2003) 11 SCC 1, in
support of the contention that there is no evil intent or
motive of transferring possession in any manner on
the part of the contemnors and the manner in which
allegations have been made is incapable of execution
by contemnor no.1, treating the order on its face
value.
32. Learned senior counsel further cites Jhareswar Prasad
Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, reported at (2002) 5 SCC
352, in support of the argument that in the event a
judgment/order does not contain any specific
direction, the Court ought not to exercise the
contempt jurisdiction.
33. Next citing a judgment of this Court in Suvendu
Adhikari v. Manoj Malaviya, reported at (2022) 1 HCC
(Cal) 330, it is submitted that in case the attending
material or circumstances do not clinch beyond
reasonable doubt that the action of the contemnors is
wilful or deliberate or an attempt to lower the dignity
of the Court, the contempt jurisdiction cannot be
invoked.
34. Learned senior counsel relies on U.N. Bora v. Assam
Roller Flour Mills Assn., reported at (2022) 1 SCC 101,
to contend that the Court is not expected to conduct a
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roving enquiry and disputed questions of fact should
be left to be decided in the original proceeding.
35. Citing Court on its own Motion v. Biman Bose, reported
at 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 855, it is argued that if the
rule is not drawn up properly, the same has to be
discharged, holding the rule to be defective ab initio.
36. By relying on Narayan Chandra Das v. Anjan Ghosh,
reported at 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 8317, it is further
submitted that unless full particulars of materials of
contempt are provided, a contempt rule should be
discharged.
37. Learned senior counsel cites Namita Sinha Roy v. State
of West Bengal, reported at 2009 SCC OnLine Cal
2753, for the proposition that the contemnor should
know the specific charge levelled against him and if
the rule does not specify the same, but the order for
drawing up the rule only observes prima facie
grounds, no foundational fact is established and the
rule should be discharged.
38. Citing Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors.,
reported at 2025 INSC 1337, it is submitted that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court disregarded statements made
and affirmed on submissions in the said case. In the
present case, Paragraph No.19 of the contempt
application, which contains the charges of contempt,
are affirmed true to submission.
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39. Lastly, learned senior counsel cites Gopal Saran v.
Satyanarayana, reported at (1989) 3 SCC 56, to argue
that the parting with possession depends upon the
quality of occupation given and that mere occupation
is not sufficient to infer parting with possession. The
test is whether the landlord retains control over the
property and exclusive right to enjoy the property. In
the present case, it is argued that contemnor no.1 has
not parted with possession and is all along in control
of the suit property.
40. Learned senior counsel for the contemnor nos. 2, 3
and 4 adopts the arguments of contemnor nos. 1 and
5. The written notes of arguments filed by contemnor
nos. 2, 3 and 4 is almost a verbatim reproduction of
the written notes of contemnor nos. 1 and 5. In
addition to the judgments cited by contemnor nos.1
and 5, contemnor nos. 2, 3 and 4 cite Mahendra Nath
Bagchi v. Tarak Chandra Sinha, reported at AIR 1932
Cal 504, to contend that constructive possession, as
distinguished from actual possession, generally means
possession through a tenant or agent.
41. Contemnor no. 6 adopts the arguments of the other
contemnors as well and reiterates that the said
contemnor has tendered unconditional apology, which
itself should suffice to purge the perceived contempt, if
any. However, it is denied that any deliberate or wilful
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violation of the order of this Court has been committed
by the said contemnor.
42. Upon hearing the contentions of the respective parties,
the following issues fall for consideration:
(i) Whether the Contempt Rule was in form and
supported by clear allegations made in the
contempt application on oath, and is thus
maintainable;
(ii) Whether any willful and deliberate disobedience
of the Order of this Court dated June 18, 2025
has been made out;
(iii) Whether the apologies tendered by the
contemnors purge the acts of contempt, if any.
43. The above issues are answered in the following
manner:
(i) Whether the Contempt Rule was in form and
supported by clear allegations made in the
contempt application on oath, and is thus
maintainable
44. In order to decide this issue, certain facts have to be
taken into consideration. The Contempt Rule was
issued on December 8, 2025, “calling upon the
contemnors as pleaded in the contempt application to
show cause as to why they should not be committed to
prison or otherwise penalised or dealt with for having
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wilfully violated the order dated June 18, 2025 passed
by this Court in FMAT No.208 of 2025.”
45. The expression “as pleaded in the contempt
application” clearly links the rule to the contempt
application and the averments made therein.
46. It is to be noted that prior to the issuance of the rule,
copies of the contempt application had been served on
all the contemnors, upon which they were represented
by a single set of counsel on December 8, 2025. Upon
both parties being heard, the Court observed, upon
taking note of the averments and annexures to the
contempt application, that the Court was satisfied
prima facie of there being a deliberate and wilful
disobedience of the order of the Court dated June 18,
2025, by way of altering the status quo as regards the
possession by inducting third parties to the property-
in-question, and directed a rule to be issued.
47. Hence, there could not have been an iota of doubt in
the mind of the contemnors as to exactly what
allegations were levelled against them and what was
the scope of the contempt.
48. It is to be kept in mind that the power of contempt is
inherent in a Court of records, which every High Court
is, within the contemplation of Article 215 of the
Constitution of India and the Rules framed under the
Contempt of Courts Act are merely procedural aids to
the same. Unless there is a gross violation of any
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Rule, it cannot be said that the contempt rule is bad
in law or should be discharged on such ground alone.
49. Insofar as the present contempt application is
concerned, Paragraph Nos. 11 to 17 thereof, in
particular Paragraph Nos. 11, 13, 15, 16 and 17,
categorically spell out the exact nature of the
contumacious acts alleged against the contemnors.
The said paragraphs, in the jurat portion of the
supporting affidavit, are stated to be either true to the
knowledge of the petitioner or true to knowledge
derived from the records. Hence, the arguments of the
contemnors that the specific particulars of contempt
were not disclosed and/or that the rule was defective,
cannot be accepted from any perspective.
50. Paragraph No.19 of the contempt application, which
was affirmed as true to submission, was a mere
summarisation of the acts of contempt. In fact, the
statement made in the said paragraph, that the
contemnors are guilty of wilful violation of the order of
this Court, was to be decided finally by the Court and
it was for the petitioner only to submit the same before
the Court. The petitioner can only point out the
contumacious acts but not state, true to his
knowledge, as to whether the contemnors are actually
guilty of contempt. Hence, Paragraph No.19 was
rightly affirmed as true to submission, whereas the
necessary ingredients of the contumacious acts were
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elaborately stated in the preceding paragraphs, which
were duly affirmed as true to knowledge or records in
the affidavit.
51. In Biman Bose’s case1, the co-ordinate Bench of this
Court was dealing with a suo motu rule of criminal
contempt, as provided in Section 15 of the Contempt
of Courts Act. The rules issued therein were not in
conformity with the Rules framed by this Court. The
co-ordinate Bench observed, inter alia, that although
in the petition filed by the Bar Association and its
Secretary, the petitioners prayed for issue of suo motu
Rule, in fact, the Court issued the Rule as if those
Rules were founded on a petition moved by the
petitioners and also referred to the allegations
contained in the petition, without referring to the
particular acts complained of in the rule drawn up,
nor was there any reference of those contumacious
acts in the order issuing the rule.
52. Even in the order passed by the Division Bench
issuing the rule, it was found that there was no
reference of the contumacious acts which impelled
Their Lordships to issue the rule. In such context, it
was held that the tule was defective.
53. As opposed thereto, in the present case, the contempt
rule was issued in consonance with the governing
Rules of this Court and clearly referred to the
1 Court on its own Motion v. Biman Bose, reported at 2010 SCC
OnLine Cal 855
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contempt application, copies of which had already
been served on the contemnors. In the order directing
issuance of such rule as well, the Court had observed
clearly the nature of the contempt alleged. Thus, the
principle laid down in Biman Bose (supra)2 is not
applicable herein.
54. Again, in Namita Sinha Roy (supra)3, the Court
observed that there was no specific charge mentioned
in the cause title or the prayer portion of the contempt
application. However, a bare perusal of the contempt
application which gave rise to the instant rule, bearing
CPAN 1525 of 2025, shows that the exact acts of
violation of the Court’s order and nature of the
contumacious acts were categorically classified and
mentioned both in the cause title and the prayer
portion of the application. Thus, the said judgment
does not come to the aid of the contemnors as well.
55. In Rikhab Chand Jain (supra)4, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court disregarded statements affirmed on submission.
However, the context of the said lis was a writ petition,
which is in the nature of an original action where the
averments on oath partake the character of not only
pleadings but evidence, as opposed to a suit. In a
contempt application, however, the function of the
petitioner is merely to bring to the notice of the Court
2 Court on its own Motion v. Biman Bose, reported at 2010 SCC
OnLine Cal 855
3 Namita Sinha Roy v. State of West Bengal, reported at 2009 SCC
OnLine Cal 2753
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the deliberate and wilful acts of violation, upon which
it is for the Court to issue or not to issue a rule. That
apart, the ratio laid down in the above report is not
germane in view of our above discussion that the exact
particulars of the contumacious acts were
categorically stated on oath, true to the knowledge of
the deponent and records, thus ruling out the reliance
of the Court only on statements affirmed on
submissions.
56. Hence, this issue is decided in favour of the petitioner
and against the contemnors.
(ii) Whether any willful and deliberate
disobedience of the Order of this Court
dated June 18, 2025 has been made out
57. We cannot but take note of the fact that even prior
to issuance of the rule, upon getting notice of the
contempt application and being served with copies
thereof, all the contemnors were represented by a
single set of counsel on the first day of their
appearance in the contempt proceeding, that is, on
December 8, 2025. However, the contemnors later
segregated into different sets and filed separate
show cause affidavits, each set being represented
by separate counsel as well. However, from the
inherent contradictions in the affidavits of the
4 Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India & Ors., reported at 2025
INSC 1337
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contemnors, such segregation is called out. The
said contradictions are discussed at length
hereinbelow.
58. Learned senior counsel appearing for all the
contemnors submitted before the Court on the very
first day, as borne out by the order dated
December 8, 2025, that contemnor nos. 5 and 6,
whose names were depicted in the signboard
affixed at the suit premises, were the “authorised
persons”/ “authorised agents” of contemnor no. 1.
59. Contemnor no. 1, in her show cause affidavit,
states in Paragraph No.8 that the suit premises are
being used by her for her official purpose. In
Paragraph No.11, it is stated that limited and
temporary ingress and egress was given to the
petitioner, to ensure adherence to the letter which
the lessor of contemnor no.1 wrote on June 22,
2025, proposing the maintenance of a register to
record the purpose of visit, time or entry and exit,
etc., which the petitioner and his men followed by
putting their names and details, without any
objection, in the register. In Paragraph No.14 of
her show cause affidavit, contemnor no.1 relies on
a letter dated August 14, 2025 to the petitioner
asserting her exclusive possession and the fact
that the property was being used for her official
purpose.
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60. It is further stated that the signboard and flex
depicted in photographs annexed to the contempt
application are not “at” or “inside” the suit
premises but at the entrance of the suit premises.
She further states that the same was put up for a
“couple of days” solely for a religious marriage
ceremony.
61. Again, contemnor no.1 states that she did not
know of the said board. However, in Paragraph
No.20, while reiterating her exclusive possession,
contemnor no.1 states that under her supervision,
contemnor no.6, Kazi Md. Faisullah Ansari, who
was known to contemnor no.1 and her family and
works with her, held a religious ceremony with the
permission of contemnor no.1. In the same breath,
it is admitted that contemnor no.6 is a part of
GMM.
62. In Paragraph No.15 of the said show cause,
contemnor no.1 admits that contemnor no.5, Md.
Razaul Khan, is the staff of contemnor no.1 and is
charged with the upkeep and maintenance of the
suit premises, working under the authorization of
contemnor no.1. It is further stated that contemnor
no.5 put up his name and mobile number at the
entrance of the roof in order to avoid inconvenience
to persons seeking to enter the roof.
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63. However, we fail to understand that if the property
has been in exclusive possession of the contemnor
no.1, how a religious ceremony could be permitted
to be performed there for a couple of days, which
cannot be the official purpose of contemnor no.1
by any stretch of imagination and would
tantamount to altering the status and character of
the suit property, for however limited a period.
64. Contemnor no.1 categorically admits, as does
contemnor no.5 in his show cause affidavit, that
contemnor no.5 is known since long to contemnor
no.1 and her family and works under her and
under her authorization. It is alleged that
contemnor no.5 is not associated with GMM or any
other organization or association for that matter.
65. However, such fact is categorically belied by the
photograph annexed at Page 899 of the contempt
application. From the same, it is seen that a board
has been affixed at the suit property, which
appears to be in sky blue colour in the photograph,
where contemnor no.5 Md. Razaul Khan is
mentioned as the Director and Kazi Md. Faizullah
Ansari, contemnor no. 6, as the General Secretary
of GMM. The phone number of the contemnor no.6,
and not contemnor no.5, is given thereunder.
66. The stand taken by contemnor no.1 is that she
was unaware of such board being put up.
24
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Contemnor no.5 follows suit by saying that he had
not put up the same. Surprisingly, contemnor no.6
also disowns having affixed the said board. Thus,
between themselves, the contemnor nos.1, 5 and 6
feign ignorance as to who put up the board, despite
the same depicting the names of contemnor nos.5
and 6 categorically in specific capacities as officials
of GMM, with which contemnor no.6 is admittedly
associated and contemnor no. 1 is not.
67. Read in conjunction, the averments of the said
three contemnors to the effect that the contemnor
nos.5 and 6 work under the contemnor no.1 and
contemnor no.4, and that contemnor no.6 is
associated with GMM, with which contemnor no.1
admittedly has no nexus, goes on to show beyond
reasonable doubt that with active permission of
contemnor no.1, who claims to be in exclusive
possession of the suit property, the said property
was permitted to be used by a third-
party/organization, being the GMM, for a purpose
unconnected with contemnor no.1. Although
contemnor no.6 allegedly works as an agent of
contemnor no.1, in view of the admission of
contemnor no.1 that she has no connection with
GMM, with which contemnor no.6 is independently
associated, it is clear as daylight that the property
was permitted to be used by a third-
25
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party/organization having no nexus with
contemnor no.1, for whatever purpose. The
averment that such user was not for any
commercial benefit but for religious purpose does
have any bearing on the issue at hand, since
monetary gain is not a component of the order of
the status quo passed by this Court, which
unequivocally directed all parties to maintain
status quo not only as regards possession but as
regards the nature and character of the suit
property as well. The character of the suit
property, which is admittedly used for the official
purpose of contemnor no.1, was altered by
permitting user of the same for
religious/ceremonial purposes, that too by a third
party-association over which contemnor no.1
admittedly has no control.
68. Contemnor no. 5 conveniently feigns ignorance
about his name being depicted as a Director of
GMM in the board put up at the suit premises,
which is admittedly in exclusive possession of
contemnor no.1. If contemnor no.1 admittedly is in
exclusive possession and contemnor no.5, as
admitted in his show-cause affidavit, has been
present at the suit premises throughout the
relevant period, it defies logic as to how the said
board could be put up without their knowledge.
26
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69. It is sought to be made out by the contemnors that
the other navy-blue signboard seen in the
photograph at Page 899 of the contempt
application was for the purpose of implementing
the order of this Court. In the said board, the order
of this Court has even been referred to. However,
the directions contained in the said board were not
a part of the status quo order of this Court. The
board uses the expression “in compliance with the
above order” (the date of the Order of this Court is
also stated) but proceeds to state certain
restrictions which were never a part of the order,
such as persons entering the property duly
identifying themselves and proving their identity by
ID/authorization verification, etc. Thus, the
mutilation and perversion of the contents of the
order, as depicted in the said board, is itself a
deliberate and willful violation of the order of this
Court and is palpably contumacious.
70. In the said board, the names of contemnor no. 5
and 6, with their respective mobile numbers, find
place in the capacity of “authorized signatory”.
Since such capacity was indicated with reference
to the Court’s order, the obvious connotation to
any layman would be that the Court had
authorized contemnor nos. 5 and 6 to put up the
board, which is a travesty of justice and a
27
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deliberate effort to twist the order of the Court
beyond recognition and putting words into the
order which were never there in the original order.
Even otherwise, contrary to the statements in the
show cause affidavits of contemnor nos. 1 and 5,
in none of the said boards is it reflected that the
depiction of the mobile number of contemnor nos.5
and 6 was for the purpose of assisting people to get
access to the roof.
71. Another board is seen in the photograph annexed
at Page 901 of the contempt application. An absurd
and ridiculous defence has been taken by the
contemnors, that the same was not “in the suit
premises” but at its entrance gate. If a signboard is
put up at the entrance of a building, it would be
preposterous to say that the same is not “at the
suit building”. On a much more serious note is
what is written on the said board. The full name of
the GMM, an association, having admittedly no
connection with contemnor nos. 1 to 5, is depicted
thereon with its branch office being shown as the
suit property itself. Thus, the said signboard,
affixed at the entrance gate of the suit premises
and boldly depicting the branch office of an alien
association to be the suit property itself, clearly
goes on to show that the third-party association
was given possession in respect of the suit
28
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property which is not of a temporary but of a
permanent nature.
72. The consistent case of the contemnors has been
that no possession was handed over to the said
association, apart from the purpose of an one-off
conduct of a “religious marriage ceremony”. The
contemnors even rely on Mahendra Nath Bagchi
(supra) 5 to distinguish between constructive
possession and actual possession.
73. In Gopal Saran (supra) 6 cited by contemnor nos.2
to 4 as well as contemnor nos.1 and 5, it was held
in the context of an eviction suit that parting with
possession depends on the quality of occupation
given and if the landlord retains control and the
exclusive right to enjoy the property, mere
occupation of a third-party would not be sufficient
to infer parting with possession. However, as
enumerated in the said judgment, the
consideration therein was whether the ground of
eviction, being assignment, subletting or otherwise
parting with possession, was satisfied. The tests
thereof are different from a contempt application.
In case of an eviction suit, transfer of exclusive
possession and control is required to be proved for
the purpose of establishing the ground of
subletting/assignment/parting with possession.
5 Mahendra Nath Bagchi v. Tarak Chandra Sinha, reported at AIR
1932 Cal 504
29
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However, in the instant case, we are to look only at
the purport of the order alleged to be violated. The
order directed categorically both parties to
maintain status quo as regards nature, character
and possession of the suit property. Even if an
element of permanent hand over of possession is
not proved, still, an act of parting with possession
even for a limited period would tantamount to
violation of the said order.
74. Insofar as the last above-mentioned photograph is
concerned, it clearly shows that the suit property
has a branch office of GMM, with which contemnor
no. 1 admittedly has no connection, at the suit
premises. In the teeth of the consistent assertion of
contemnor no.1 of being in exclusive possession,
the said photograph militates against the stand of
the contemnors and clearly shows that the
contemnors are trying to cover up the deliberate
violation of the order of this Court by parting with
possession, even if of a portion of the subject
property, in favour of a complete stranger.
75. The attempts at misguiding the Court do not end
there. The contemnor nos. 1 and 5, despite
admitting exclusive possession and being present
in the suit property at all points of time, pretend to
have been completely unaware of who set up the
board. Not stopping there, they admitted to have
6 Gopal Saran v. Satyanarayana, reported at (1989) 3 SCC 56
30
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removed the board, allegedly after detecting the
same.
76. Contemnor nos. 1 as well as 5 and 6 assert
repeatedly in their show cause affidavits that the
religious ceremony took place only for two days,
with the permission of contemnor no. 1 and active
assistance of contemnor no. 5, immediately after
which the offending signboards were removed.
Hence, not only possession was parted with for two
days, on a much graver note, the board affixed at
the entrance, which was removed after detection,
clearly goes on to show that the suit property was
permitted to be used as a branch office of a
complete stranger association, which was sought
to be covered up by removing the board to efface
evidence of contempt after being caught out.
77. When we pose the question to ourselves, “Is it
possible that contemnor no. 1, who admittedly
permitted contemnor no. 6 (admittedly her agent)
to organize a religious/marriage ceremony as a
functionary of a third-party organization, and
contemnor no. 5, also an agent of contemnor no. 1,
who actively assisted in conduct of such ceremony
on the instruction of contemnor no. 1, were
completely unaware of the board at the relevant
juncture?”, the resounding answer we get is “No”.
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78. The complicity of all the contemnors in the
deliberate violation of the order of this Court is,
thus, evident, since contemnor nos.5 and 6, who
were not parties to the original appeal, have their
names printed boldly in the offending boards
referred to above, in which the order of this Court
was categorically mentioned. Thus, the contemnor
nos.1, 5 and 6 all along acted in tandem and
deliberately violated the order of this Court without
any scruple.
79. The said contumacious acts are aggravated by the
attempts of the said contemnors to cover up such
misdeed by making contradictory statements in
their respective show cause affidavits and pretend
ignorance of the boards being set up.
80. In Kanwar Singh Saini (supra) 7, cited by the
contemnors, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court that if disobedience is under compelling
circumstances, no criminal contempt lies.
Contempt was held to be of a quasi-criminal
nature, requiring standard of proof as in criminal
cases, not resting on surmises and conjecture.
81. We take note of the fact that the said proceeding
arose out of a criminal contempt, as distinguished
from the present case, which is a civil contempt in
nature, by dint of willful and deliberate violation of
7 Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, reported at (2012) 4
SCC 307
32
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a Court’s order. In a criminal contempt, the
standard is higher, to the extent that the Court
has to come to a conclusion that an obstruction
has been come to the administration of justice,
although the “beyond reasonable doubt” principle
is applicable to both.
82. Even otherwise, there is no scope of conjecture and
surmise in the present instance, as a clear-cut
case of contumacious acts has been made out.
83. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union (supra) 8, it was held
that a deliberate action with evil intent or bad
motive/purpose tantamounts to civil contempt, as
in the present case. An exception was made in
cases where the order is not capable of execution
but requires extraordinary effort, independent
upon the act or omission of a third-party, for
compliance. No extraordinary effort, however, was
required in the instant case to comply with the
status quo order passed by this Court. Rather,
positive and deliberate acts in violation of the same
were required to flout such order, the ingredients
of which have been established from the facts as
discussed above.
84. In Jhareswar Prasad Paul (supra) 9 it was held that
Court shall not enter into questions not dealt with
8 Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha , reported at (2003)
11 SCC 1
9 Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, reported at (2002)
5 SCC 352
33
2026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
in the parent order or consider directions not
issued but which the order “should have”
contained. In the present case, we only proceed on
the premise of the exact words of the order dated
June 18, 2025, which are neither ambiguous nor
vague, requiring clarification.
85. In Suvendu Adhikari (supra) 10 it was only held that
the benefit of the doubt regarding deliberate
disobedience, if available, goes to the contemnor.
We agree with the proposition that censure for
contempt is an extreme measure to protect the
dignity of the Court. However, it is the dignity of
the Court which is at stake in the present case due
to the willful violation of the Court’s order by the
contemnors.
86. In U.N. Bora (supra) 11, it was observed that no
roving enquiry is to be undertaken by the Court
going beyond the violated order and that such
principle would apply with more vigour when
disputed question of facts are involved.
87. However, in the present case, we go only by the
admitted facts. The boards and flexes depicted in
the photograph-in-question were admitted to have
existed and to have been removed by the
contemnors themselves. We further proceed on the
10 Suvendu Adhikari v. Manoj Malaviya, reported at (2022) 1 HCC
(Cal) 330
11 U.N. Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Assn., reported at (2022) 1SCC 101
342026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
basis of the averments made in the show cause
affidavits of the contemnors themselves.
88. Thus, none of the judgments cited by the
contemnors come to their aid.
89. The next facet of the matter is that the contemnors
consistently deny the existence of any network
apparatus or device on the roof of the suit
premises.
90. However, the photograph at Page 907 of the
contempt application, which is not denied by the
contemnors, clearly depicts a microwave dish
antenna which is generally used as a wireless
internet receiver for internet service providers.
Devices in the nature of the said rooftop
infrastructure which is visible in the said
photograph are generally utilized by wireless
internet service providers to enhance network
connectivity in buildings or complexes. We also
find on record several e-mails sent by the different
service providers to the Association of Owners,
complaining that they have been denied access to
the roof. Seen in the context of the admitted
position that a register was put in place and the
roof was locked by the contemnors, which was not
provided for in the parent order, it is quite credible
that due to the locking of the roof entrance by the
35
2026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
contemnors, the network providers could not get
access thereto.
91. We are rather surprised that the exact words of the
order were altered and new words alien to the
order were introduced in the board seen in the
photographs at Pages 899 and 900 of the contempt
application. Words were put into the mouth of the
Court which were not there, by giving out that
such statements were “in compliance with the”
order of this Court.
92. In the order dated June 18, 2025, it was merely
mentioned that the right of ingress and egress of
the appellant/petitioner and his men and agents
would be limited and temporary, for specific
purposes if any, and would not be of such nature
as to disturb the exclusive possession of the
plaintiff/contemnor no.1. However, there was no
provision in the said order permitting the
respondent/plaintiff or any of the contemnors to
block the ingress and egress and subject the entry
and exit to the suit property, insofar as the
petitioner and his agents are concerned, to the will
and whims of the contemnors. There is not a single
word in the order dated June 18, 2025 to the effect
that the ingress and egress of the petitioner and
his men and agents, although limited and for
specific purposes, would be subject to the
36
2026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
permission of the contemnors. In the absence of
the same, putting a lock on the door and
subjecting the petitioner and his men and agents
to permission being taken from the contemnors on
each and every occasion was not at all in
consonance with the order; rather, in gross
derogation of the same.
93. Thus, this Court comes to the conclusion that
there was deliberate and willful violation of the
order of this Court, both in letter and spirit, by the
contemnor nos.1, 5 and 6.
94. However, insofar as other contemnors are
concerned, we do not find any specific proof of any
deliberate and willful violation on their behalf or
their direct involvement in the acts of contempt
narrated hereinabove. Moreover, contemnor no.2
and its Directors, contemnor nos.3 and 4, are
apparently in constructive possession of the
property through the contemnor no.1, the latter
claiming exclusive possession in any event.
95. This issue is decided accordingly.
(iii) Whether the apologies tendered by the
contemnors purge the acts of contempt, if
any
96. The apology supposedly tendered by the contemnors
in their show cause affidavits, although described as
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2026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
“unconditional”, are qualified by the rider: “in the
event the contemnors are found to be guilty of
contempt”. Thus, the contemnors have not come
clean before the Court, apologising for their violation
of the order of Court, but have only paid lip-service to
the concept of apology.
97. In U.P. Resident Employees’s case12, it was
categorically observed that the apology tendered in the
case was worthless, after it being found that false
statements were made on oath. In the present case,
the attempts of the contemnors have been to mislead
the Court by making false and incorrect statements on
oath, thus rendering the apology worthless.
98. In Chandra Shashi (supra)13, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court succinctly observed that had the contemnors
shown real contriteness and regret for the act done,
the Court would have perhaps accepted his apology;
but such apology cannot be used as a weapon of
defence to get purged of the guilt which precisely the
contemnor had sought to do as he desired to avoid
worldly suffering which would follow if sentenced. In
such context, such lip-service of an apology was
discarded.
12 U.P. Resident Employees Coop. House Building Society v. NOIDA ,
reported at (2007) 15 SCC 515
13 Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, reported at (1995) 1 SCC
421
38
2026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
99. Again, in T.N. Godavarman (supra)14, the Supreme
Court reiterated that the explanations of the
contemnors were clearly unacceptable and mens rea
was writ large. Apology was held to be an act of
contrition and unless it was offered at the earliest
opportunity and in good grace, it was shorn of
penitence and hence liable to be rejected. The same
principle applies in the present case as well, since
after having made misleading and deliberately
incorrect statements in their show-cause affidavits,
the contemnors tender the charade of an apology.
100. Hence, such mechanical and empty apology is a farce
and is thus unacceptable, having been used merely as
an alternative line of defence to escape the
consequences of contempt. Thus, reject such so-called
apology as a mere ploy and a defence to ward off
punishment for contempt.
101. This issue is, thus, also decided against the
contemnor nos.1, 5 and 6.
CONCLUSION
102. In view of our above observations, the Court comes the
conclusion that the contemnor nos. 1, 5 and 6 are
guilty of deliberate and wilful disobedience of the
Order dated June 18, 2025, passed in FMAT No.208 of
2025 (with CAN 1 of 2025).
14 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot, reported at
(2006) 5 SCC 1
39
2026:CHC-AS:1010-DB
103. Accordingly, we hold the contemnor no. 1 (Kanchan
Jyoti Rao), contemnor no. 5 (Md. Razaul Khan) and
contemnor no. 6 (Kazi Md. Faizullah Ansari) guilty of
contempt of court and sentence them to simple (civil)
imprisonment for 2 days (48 hours) starting from
today, as well as fine of Rs. 2000/- each, payable by
the each of the contemnors within 24 hours. In default
of payment of such fine, the period of imprisonment
shall stand extended for a further period of 2 days (48
hours).
104. The Deputy Sheriff shall take immediate custody of
the contemnor nos. 1, 5 and 6 and do the needful in
terms of the above order.
105. Subsistence allowance, costs, and other requisites
shall be put in by the petitioner immediately.
106. CRC 31 of 2025 is made absolute in terms of the
above order.
107. The connected contempt application, being CPAN 1525
of 2025, stands allowed accordingly.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Uday Kumar, J.)
40
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Later
After the above order is passed, a prayer of stay is
made on behalf of the contemnors.
However, we do not find any mitigating
circumstances to grant such prayer.
Accordingly, such prayer is refused.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Uday Kumar, J.)
