Gauhati High Court
Sudam Das vs The State Of Assam on 21 May, 2026
Author: M. Zothankhuma
Bench: Michael Zothankhuma
Page No.# 1/17
GAHC010000832025
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.A./37/2025
SUDAM DAS
S/O. LT. SANTOSH DAS, R/O. GOBINDAPUR, P/S. SAPEKHATI, DIST.
CHARAIDEO, ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE PP, ASSAM.
Advocate for the appellants : Mr. H.R.A. Choudhury, Sr. Adv.
Mr. I.U. Chowdhury, Adv.
Advocate for the respondents : Ms. B. Bhuyan, Sr. Adv. & Addl. P.P., Assam,
Ms. R. Das, Adv.
:::BEFORE:::
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMADate on which judgment is reserved : 14.05.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment : 21.05.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the : N/A
operative part of the judgment ?
Page No.# 2/17
Whether the full judgment has been : Yes
pronounced?
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
(M. Zothankhuma, J)
1. Heard Mr. H.R.A. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. I.U.
Chowdhury, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan,
learned Sr. Counsel and Addl. P.P, Assam assisted by Ms. R. Das, learned counsel
for the State respondent.
2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned Judgment dated
04/12/2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Charaideo, Sonari, in
Sessions (Cha) Case No.18/2019, by which the appellant has been convicted
under Section 302 IPC, for having caused the death of his wife, by pouring
kerosene over his wife and setting her on fire.
3. One ground of challenge made to the impugned judgment is that the
deceased had told PW-6 that the appellant was innocent. The evidence of the
independent witness (PW-6) is to the effect that he had gone to the hospital,
where the deceased was undergoing treatment, wherein he was told by the
deceased that the appellant was not guilty in relation to the deceased being set
on fire.
4. The learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant also submits that though the
evidence of the sister of the deceased (PW-2), in her examination-in-chief, is to
the effect that the appellant husband had first strangulated the deceased and
then poured oil and set her on fire, the same had been denied by her in her
Page No.# 3/17cross-examination. In the re-examination of PW-2, which had been done 4 ½
years later on 26/06/2024, with regard to the contradictory evidence given by
PW-2 on 15/11/2019, PW-2 had stated that the appellant had poured kerosene
on her deceased sister and set her on fire. The learned Sr. Counsel for the
appellant submits that the above contradictory statements of PW-2 shows that
PW-2 is not a credible witness and her evidence would have to be corroborated
before her testimony can be relied upon. On the other hand, there is nothing to
show that PW-6 was not a credible witness, as his evidence was not shaken or
controverted during cross-examination. Thus, when there are two sets of
evidence/views with regard to a particular fact, the evidence/view in favour of
the accused would have to be accepted by the Court.
5. On the other hand, the learned Addl. P.P submits that the evidence of
PW-2 having clearly proved that the appellant had set the deceased on fire,
there was no infirmity with the decision of the learned Trial Court in convicting
the appellant under section 302 IPC. Further, the evidence of the witnesses
showed that the relationship between the deceased and the appellant, who
were a married couple, was not smooth and there were frequent quarrels
between them. Thus, there was motive for the appellant to have killed his wife.
The learned Addl. P.P further submits that the appellant has not discharged his
burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act with regard to his knowledge, in
relation to the death of the deceased.
6. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.
7. The brief facts of the case is that the informant (PW-1), who is the
brother of the deceased and the brother-in-law of the appellant, is to the effect
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that he submitted an FIR dated 08/09/2017 stating that the appellant and his
deceased sister had married about 11 years ago. However, after about 2 years,
the appellant began subjecting his sister to physical and mental torture over
household issues. Around 10 pm on 31/08/2017, the appellant had slapped,
kicked and punched his sister and also assaulted her with a bamboo stick. As a
result, she sustained severe injuries. Moreover, the appellant poured kerosene
oil on her body and set her on fire inside his house. Though his sister was taken
to Assam Medical College and Hospital (AMCH), Dibrugarh, she breathed her
last on 07/09/2017. He also stated that his younger sister (PW-2) also sustained
injuries while trying to save the deceased. Pursuant to the FIR dated 08/09/
2017, Sapekhati Police Station Case No. 78/2017 under section 302 IPC was
registered. After charge sheet had been filed, the learned Trial Court framed
charges under section 302 IPC against the appellant, to which the appellant
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
8. The evidence of the informant (PW-1), who is the brother of his
deceased sister, is to be effect that the appellant and the deceased were
married around 11 years ago. One day his younger sister (PW-2) informed him
that the appellant had burned the deceased. As the deceased was taken to
AMCH, Dibrugarh, he went there and saw severe burn injuries on the lower
parts of the body of his sister. The informant then stated that the deceased had
told him that on the previous night, she had a quarrel with the appellant, due to
which the appellant had poured oil on her and burnt her.
9. In his cross examination, PW-1 stated that they used to visit the house
of the appellant and that the appellant treated them well. He also stated that no
case had been lodged by them in respect of the incident of harassment of his
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sister. He also stated that he did not tell the Police that prior to her death, the
deceased sister had told him that the appellant had burned her by pouring oil.
In his evidence, PW-1 also stated that the appellant had tried to save the
deceased by providing treatment and that his sister had died on the way home
after being discharged from hospital. He also stated that it was true that his
sister died by committing suicide. However, he stated that it was not true that
the appellant did not commit any offense. PW-1 also stated that no one had
attended the funeral of his sister
10. The evidence of PW-2, who is the sister of the deceased and the sister-
in-law of the appellant, is to the effect that she was at her sister’s house at the
time of incident, which occurred around 9.30 am. A quarrel had taken place
between her sister and the appellant, which led to the appellant strangulating
her sister. Thereafter, when her sister started taking her meal, the appellant
threw away her plate. The appellant then poured oil on her sister and set her on
fire. PW-2 states that she tried to save her sister due to which she sustained
burn injury. Her sister was then taken to AMCH, Dibrugarh, where she stayed
for 7 (seven) days and subsequently died. In her cross examination, PW-2
stated that she did not say anything about the incident to anybody, as her sister
told her that a stove had burst and as she had been threatened. Further, her
sister did not tell anyone anything. PW-2 further stated that prior to lodging the
FIR, she did not tell anything to anyone. She also denied the suggestion that
she did not tell the Police that the appellant threw the plate of her sister while
she was having her meal and that the appellant tried to take her sister to
Sivasagar hospital. In her cross examination, PW-2 also stated that the
appellant had not poured oil on her sister and set her on fire. PW-2 also stated
that no one had attended the funeral of her sister.
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11. As the deposition of PW-2, which was held on 15/11/2019, was
contradictory, inasmuch as, she had stated that the appellant had poured oil on
her sister and set her on fire, PW-2 had stated the same to be not true in her
cross examination. Due to the above contradiction, PW-2 was again called for
re-examination on 26/06/2024 wherein she was asked to clarify the
contradiction in her evidence given 4½ years earlier. The PW-2 in her evidence
given on 26/06/2024, clarified that the appellant had poured kerosene on her
sister and set her on fire.
12. The evidence of PW-3, who is the brother of the informant, is to effect
that he was informed by PW-2 and PW-1 that the appellant had set the
deceased on fire. PW-3 stated that the deceased was unable to talk. In his cross
examination, PW-3 stated that the appellant also tried to save the deceased.
13. The evidence of PW-4, who is another brother of the informant, was to
the effect that PW-2 had informed him that a quarrel had taken place between
the deceased and the appellant. When the deceased went to have a meal, the
appellant threw it away. After that the appellant set the deceased on fire.
Thereafter, PW-4 and his mother went to AMCH, Dibrugarh, to meet the
deceased, who was being treated there. On meeting her, PW-4 stated that the
deceased was able to talk slowly, wherein she told him that the appellant had
poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. In her cross examination, PW-4
stated that they did not lodge any case as they had been prevented by the
appellant. He also stated that they did not attend the funeral of his sister.
14. The evidence of PW-5, who is a villager, is to the effect that he had
heard that the deceased had caught fire and that the appellant had
extinguished it. On hearing about the incident, he had gone to the house of the
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appellant and saw the deceased who was being taken to hospital. In his cross
examination, PW-5 stated that the hand of the appellant was burnt while trying
to douse the fire on the deceased.
15. The evidence of PW-6, who is a Mason, is to the effect that on hearing
a hue and cry, he went to the house of the appellant and saw the deceased on
fire. He also stated that he heard that the deceased had set herself on fire by
pouring oil. PW-6 also stated that he went to AMCH while the deceased was
undergoing treatment, wherein the deceased told him that the appellant was
not guilty and that she had set herself on fire. He also stated that the family
members of the deceased were present. In his cross-examination, PW-6 stated
that the appellant had taken the deceased for treatment and burnt his hand
while trying to save her life.
16. The evidence of PW-7, who is a carpenter, is to the effect that he did
not know how the deceased had caught fire.
17. The evidence of PW-8, who is the Doctor who conducted post-mortem
examination over the dead body of the deceased, is to the effect that there was
burn injury of 72% on the body of the deceased. In his opinion, the cause of
death was due to syncope, as a result of massive burn.
18. The evidence of PW-9, who is the Investigating Officer, is to the effect
that he took charge of the investigation and recorded the statement of the
witnesses. He also stated that PW-2 did not state during investigation that the
appellant had thrown away the plate of her deceased sister while she was
having her meal. Further, PW-2 did not tell him that the appellant tried to take
her deceased sister to the hospital at Sivasagar. Further, the deceased had died
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after being discharged from the hospital on 07/09/2017 and that the deceased
had been admitted to AMCH, Dibrugarh on 03/09/2017.
19. The examination of the appellant under section 313 Cr.P.C. is to the
effect that the evidence that he had burnt his wife, was false.
20. The facts of the case, as can be culled out from the evidence of the
witnesses shows that the incident had occurred on 31/08/2017. The injured
deceased was then taken to AMCH, Dibrugarh. In the evidence of PW-9 (IO),
she was taken to hospital on 03/09/2017. The deceased was then discharged
from hospital on 07/09/2017 and died on the way home.
21. The issues that have to be decided is as to whether the appellant had
set the deceased on fire. While PW-2 had stated that she saw the appellant
pouring kerosene on her sister and setting her on fire, the evidence of PW-4 is
to the effect that when he went to meet his sister in AMCH, Dibrugarh, the
deceased told him that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her
on fire. On the other hand, the evidence of the independent witness, PW-6, is to
the effect that the deceased told him in the hospital that the appellant was not
guilty and she had set herself on fire. On a consideration of whether the
evidence of PW-1 and PW-4 are to be believed, keeping in view the
contradictory evidence given by PW-6, we find that nothing to that effect has
been mentioned in the FIR submitted by PW-1. If we are to assume that PW-1
& 4 were told by the deceased in the hospital that the appellant set her on fire,
there was no reason not to have mentioned the same in the FIR, while the
deceased was undergoing treatment in the hospital, where she spent 8 days
prior to discharge. The reason for the delay in filing the FIR is also not
explained.
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22. We find that PW-2 cannot be said to be a credible witness, inasmuch as,
she has given contradictory evidence. While she has stated in her examination-
in- chief and re-examination that the appellant had set her sister on fire by
pouring kerosene oil upon her, she has stated the opposite in her cross-
examination, where she stated that the deceased had told her that a stove had
burst and that the appellant had not poured oil on her sister or set her on fire.
23. In the case of Rai Sandeep alias Deepu Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported in (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Supreme Court has held that conviction can
rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, which should be of sterling quality.
It also held that the statement of a prosecutrix should be consistent, natural
and free from material contradictions. The stand of the sterling witness should
be consistent from the very beginning till the very end, besides the witness
being able to withstand any questions put to him or her.
24. The other issue is that PW-4, in his examination-in-chief, had stated
that he had gone to meet his injured sister who was completely burnt, in the
hospital. She was able to talk slowly and she told him that the appellant had
poured kerosene and set her on fire. PW-4 has not clarified as to whether it was
PW-2 or the deceased who had told him that the appellant had poured kerosene
and set the deceased on fire. Even if we are to assume that PW-4 had been
talking about the deceased, with regard to the above statement made by the
deceased that the appellant was guilty, we have to remember that PW-2 and
PW-4 are the sister and brother of the deceased. Though the relationship of a
Prosecution witness to the deceased itself is not sufficient for disbelieving the
testimony of a relative unless motive is alleged and proved, the Court would
have to be careful with the evidence of a relative if there are some other factors
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which may go against the prosecution case. In the present case, the major
contradictions in the evidence of PW-2 and the delay in lodging the FIR, despite
the alleged disclosure made by the deceased to PW-1 and PW-4 that the
appellant had set her on fire, creates a doubt as to whether the testimonies of
PW-1, 2 and 4 are truthful. In the case of Shiv Ram Vs. State of U.P.
reported in (1998) 1 SCC 149, the Supreme Court has held that the evidence
of a witness cannot be discredited on the ground that they are close relatives of
the deceased person, but what is required is that the Court must scrutinize the
evidence with utmost care and caution.
25. In the present case, PW-6 has categorically stated in his evidence as a
Prosecution witness that the deceased had told him that the appellant was
innocent and that she had burnt herself. PW-6 has also not been declared a
hostile witness and the evidence given by him had not been subjected to any
cross-examination. The evidence of PW-6 is also to the effect that the appellant
took his burnt wife for treatment and burnt his hand while trying to save her.
Though the learned Trial Court in Para 44 of the impugned judgment has held
that PW-6 had not made any such statement to the police regarding what had
been told to PW-6 by the deceased in his 161 Cr.P.C statement, PW-6 has not
been confronted with his Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement, to discredit his
testimony. As such, we would have to consider the evidence of PW-6 as
uncontroverted.
26. The learned Trial Court in paragraph 36.4 and 37 of the impugned
judgment has come to a finding that the deceased was able to talk prior to her
death and that the deceased gave a dying declaration, which proved that the
appellant had set fire to her. Interestingly, the learned Trial Court has not
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discussed about the evidence of PW-6, except by stating that in the statement
of PW-6 made under Section 161 Cr.P.C, there was nothing to the effect that the
deceased had stated that the appellant was innocent.
27. It is interesting to note that the learned Trial Court has, however,
forgotten to take into consideration the evidence of PW-5, who stated that the
appellant had extinguished the fire which had engulfed the victim.
28. The learned Trial Court has also found the appellant to be guilty on the
ground that the couple used to quarrel. With regard to the above, we find
nothing abnormal with regard to couples quarrelling. Marriage makes couples
learn to compromise and quarrelling doesn’t imply that the marriage is doomed
or on the rocks. The learned Trial Court should have understood that there can
be a bad quarrel, or there could be a quarrel for resolution of differences,
inasmuch as, different people have different points of view. As couples get to
know each other, there is bound to be some aspects that a couple might like or
dislike in respect of the other person. There can be healthy fights where parties
vocalize their disagreements. It can be productive, and it can be non-productive
too. No discussion having been made by the learned Trial Court as to whether
the quarrels between the couple was abnormal or a bad quarrel which ended in
physical beatings or otherwise, does not allow us to speculate or come to a
finding that the couple had bad quarrels. The fact that also cannot be lost sight
of is that the couple had been married for 11 years.
29. The FIR submitted by PW-1 is to the effect that the appellant had
slapped, kicked and punched the deceased, besides assaulting her with a
bamboo stick. Thereafter, the appellant was alleged to have poured kerosene oil
on her body and set her on fire. This slapping, kicking, punching and assaulting
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the deceased with a bamboo stick is however, completely absent in the evidence
of PWs-1, 2, 3 & 4. None of the Prosecution witnesses have stated that the
appellant had beaten up the deceased. This leads us to believe that the
contents of the FIR submitted by PW-1 which had been made on the basis of
the information received by him from PW-2 was not correct. Thus, we are not
inclined to believe the evidence of PW-2 who is the alleged sole eyewitness to
the alleged crime. Besides, the deceased had apparently told PW-6 that the
appellant was innocent and that she had burned herself. Though the learned
Trial Court has held that the deceased could talk and that she had made a dying
declaration at the time PW-1 and PW-4 along with their mother were present in
the hospital, PW-1 has not stated in his evidence that the deceased had given a
dying declaration. In fact, except for PW-4, none of the Prosecution witnesses
have stated that the deceased had given a dying declaration, pointing to the
guilt of the appellant as the person who had set the deceased on fire.
30. In view of the above reasons, we have two contradictory evidence and
as such, two views as to whether the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime
or not.
31. In the case of Kali Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , reported in
(1973) 2 SCC 808, the Supreme Court has held that if two views are possible
on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be
adopted. Thus, when a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the
accused, the benefit of that doubt cannot be withheld from the accused.
32. Though the learned Trial Court has taken the view that the deceased,
during her stay in hospital, could talk and that she made a dying declaration to
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PWs 1, 4 & 6, we are of the view that the alleged information given by the
deceased to the above Prosecution Witnesses cannot be said to be a dying
declaration, inasmuch as, there is nothing to show that the deceased was on
the verge of death. Further, if the deceased was going to die, but had been able
to speak at different times, the Doctor and the Police could have been called
and the dying declaration recorded. No doubt, an oral dying declaration of a
person suffering from serious burn injuries, which is free from tutoring and
found reliable by the Court, can form a basis for conviction of person, as held in
the case of State of M.P. Vs. Dal Singh reported in (2013) 14 SCC 159.
However, as stated above, the deceased could not be said to have given a dying
declaration and as such, the same cannot be used as evidence against the
appellant, especially when a different statement has been given to PW-6.
33. In the case of Purshottam Chopra & Anr. Vs. State (Govt. of NCT
of Delhi) [Crl. Appeal Nos. 194-195 of 2012], which was disposed of on
07/01/2020, the Supreme Court in para 21 of the said judgment, summed up
some of the principles relating to recording of a dying declaration, its
admissibility and its reliability, which are as follows :-
“i) A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without
corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the Court.
ii) The Court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind
at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement,
which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
iii) Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity
such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should
not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
iv) When the eye-witnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and
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v) The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor
there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person
recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state
of mind and is capable of making the statement
vi) Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for
recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it
is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration
and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of
recording the dying declaration.
vii) As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not,
by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive
factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of
the declarant to make the statement.
viii) If after careful scrutiny, the Court finds the statement placed as dying
declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is
no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without
corroboration.”
34. In the case of Parbin Ali and another Vs. State of Assam reported
in (2013) 2 SCC 81, the Supreme Court has held that the constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710 had held that a dying declaration can be oral.
In the case of Laxman (Supra), the Supreme Court held that a dying
declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of
communication, whether by words or by sign or otherwise will suffice, provided
the indication is positive and definite. The Supreme Court in Laxman (Supra)
further held that the acceptability of a dying declaration is that the same is
made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope
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of the world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. It further
held that notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in
considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence, on account of the
existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth.
35. As the deceased had apparently blamed the appellant as the cause for
being set on fire to PWs 1 & 4, at the time she was in hospital, the same does
not ipso facto mean that she was at the point of death when she made the
statement. Similarly, the information given to PW-6 by the deceased, that the
appellant was not to blame for her being on fire, also cannot be said to be a
dying declaration. The Supreme Court in the case of Laxman (Supra) has held
that a dying declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and every hope of the world is gone, every motive to falsehood is
silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak
only the truth. On the other hand, in this case, there is no evidence to the effect
that the deceased was at the point of death, at the time when she made the
contradictory statements to PWs-1, 4 & 6, regarding the role of the appellant in
the deceased being set on fire. In fact, the witnesses have also not stated that
the deceased had given a dying declaration. Further the deceased had been
discharged from hospital 8 days after the incident and had died on the way
home. As such, it cannot be said that the deceased had given any dying
declaration to PW-1, PW-4 or PW-6.
36. The above being said, it is settled law that in a criminal case, when two
views are possible, the view favouring the accused should be accepted. In view
of the above, we hold that the evidence of PWs-1 and 4, to the effect that the
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deceased had told them that the appellant had set her on fire cannot be
accepted, when there is the uncontroverted evidence of PW-6. As such, it
cannot be said that it was proved beyond all reasonable doubt, that the
appellant was guilty of having set fire to his wife.
37. Another aspect of the case is that the incident occurred on 31/08/2017
and the deceased died on 07/09/2017, after being discharged from hospital.
The FIR was however been filed only on 08/09/2017. If the family members of
the deceased were sure that the appellant had been the perpetrator of the
crime, as PW-1 & PW-4 had stated that they were told of the same in the
hospital by the deceased, there was no justifiable reason for the FIR to be filed
only after the death of the deceased, i.e., 8 days after the incident on
08/09/2017, while the incident occurred on 31/08/2017. It could have been filed
at any prior time, especially during the initial period of the crime. This delay in
filing the FIR, in our view, does not support the case of the Prosecution, as
there is no reason given by any of the family members to have filed a delayed
FIR.
38. In the case of Hariprasad alias Kishan Sahu Vs. State of
Chattisgarh, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 557, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the delay in lodging an FIR, by itself cannot be regarded as sufficient
ground to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution case, nor could it
be treated to be fatal to the case of prosecution. The Court has to ascertain the
causes for the delay, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
If the causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version, mere delay
by itself would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
39. On considering all the above facts, we are of the view that the
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Prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of the appellant as being the
perpetrator of the death of the deceased beyond all reasonable doubt. The
delay in lodging the FIR has not been explained and as such, we find the same
to be fatal to case of the Prosecution, as there was enough time to make
embellishments to the case and concoct a false case for the death of the
deceased, especially when the eyewitness (PW-2) had also stated in her cross-
examination that the stove had burst. Further, some of the Prosecution
witnesses have testified that the appellant tried to save the deceased. Besides,
we are not fully convinced with the truthfulness of the Prosecution case and the
testimonies of the witnesses due to the FIR not being filed earlier. Accordingly,
we acquit the appellant from the charge under Section 302 IPC, by giving him
the benefit of doubt. Consequently, the impugned Judgment dated 04/12/2024,
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Charaideo, Sonari is hereby set aside.
40. The respondents are directed to release the appellant from judicial
custody immediately, if not required in some other case.
41. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
42. Send back the TCR.
JUDGE JUDGE
Anup Digitally
by Anupam
signed
Chutia
am Date:
2026.05.21
Chutia 14:16:27
Comparing Assistant
+05'30'
