Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Street vs Gurram Rama Rao on 5 March, 2026
APHC010549512025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3311]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
Thursday, the fifth day of March two thousand and twenty six
Present
The Honourable Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi
Civil Revision Petition No.2730 of 2025
Between:
Maneger Chinna Honnur Saheb, S/o.Late M.Rahiman, aged about
60 years, Agriculturist and landlord, R/o.D.No.2
R/o.D.No.2-41--1, Maneger
Street, Kanekal village and mandal, Ananthapuramu District.
...Petitioner
and
1. Maneger Pedda Sarma Saheb, S/o. Late M.Rahiman, aged
about 72 years, agriculturist and landlord, R/o.D.No.2
R/o.D.No.2-98,
98, Maneger
Street, Kanekal village and mandal, Ananthapuramu District.
2. Maneger Chinna Sarma Saheb, S/o.Late M.Rahiman, aged
about 70 years, agriculturist and land lord, Kanekal village and
mandal, Ananthapuramu District
.....Respondents
Counsel for the petitioner:
etitioner:
1. S. Krishna Reddy
Counsel for the respondent
espondents:
1. P. Sravan Kumar Reddy
2. Veerendranath Maddineni
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
The Court made the following:
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
ORDER:
This revision petition is filed by the petitioner / plaintiff under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dismissing
I.A.No.34 of 2023 in O.S.No.05 of 2013 on the file of the Court of
Prl.Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ananthapuramu filed by the plaintiff
under Order XIII, Rule 3 and Section 151 of C.P.C. to demark the
document of photostat copy of an unregistered partition deed dated
11.10.1985, marked as Ex.B13.
2. The plaintiff filed suit initially only against the defendant No.1 for
partition of the suit schedule property stating that the suit schedule
landed property of Ac.3.65 cents in S.No.980 in Kanekal village,
Ananthapuramu district was purchased in the names of the plaintiff and
the defendant No.1 vide a registered sale deed dated 09.06.1975 when
the plaintiff was a minor and that the defendant No.1 used to cultivate
the land and give the share of the plaintiff, but as the defendant No.1
was not paying any rental amount and failed to give the share of the
property to the plaintiff when he demanded for partition of the same.
3. The defendant No.1 filed a written statement admitting the case of
the plaintiff that the suit schedule property was jointly purchased and
both of them had half share each in it, but the same was divided into
equal halves as per the recitals of the partition deed cum settlement
agreement dated 11.10.1985 and that the entries in revenue records
were mutated and pattadar pass books were issued, but suppressing
the facts, the suit was filed. He also pleaded that the plaintiff and the
defendant No.1 have brothers and five sisters and the suit is bad for
their non-joinder.
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4. Later, the defendant No.2, who is one of the brothers of the
parties to the suit, was impleaded through I.A.No.399 of 2013. The
defendant No.2 filed a written statement pleading collusion between the
plaintiff and the defendant No.1 in filing the suit. He further pleaded that
their father purchased a number of landed properties and got them
registered not only in his name, but also in the names of his children. As
there were some disputes in the family, the father of the parties orally
partitioned the landed properties. Each sharer has been enjoying their
respective share of land within specific boundaries. Evidencing the oral
partition on 11.10.1985, a family settlement deed was executed with the
consent of all his sons. The father and all his sons signed the settlement
deed dated 11.10.1985. As per the settlement, the suit schedule
property fell to the share of the defendants Nos.1 and 2. The northern
portion fell to the share of the defendant No.2 and the southern portion
fell to the share of the defendant No.1. Both the defendants submitted
an application to the gram panchayat for approval of lay out of the suit
schedule property into plots. The gram panchayat approved the lay out
bearing No.56 dated 19.07.1997. Plot Nos.1 to 44 on the southern side
of the suit schedule property fell to the share of the defendant No.1.
Northern side plot Nos.1 to 40 and plot No.9A fell to the share of the
defendant No.2. The defendant No.2 sold 15 number of the plots to third
parties in the year 1999 under various registered sale deeds and gifted
some of the plots to his daughters, namely Dislshad, Hazarabi and
Parvin. The names of the purchasers are mentioned. Some of the
purchasers (whose names are mentioned) constructed houses in the
sites purchased by them. They obtained electricity connections from
A.P.C.P.D.C.L. authorities. The plaintiff knows all these facts. The suit is
bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and liable to be dismissed. The
plaintiff filed the suit taking undue advantage of the sale deed dated
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09.06.1975. The suit schedule property as described in the plaint does
not exist. The suit is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.
5. Thereafter, in response to the written statement of the defendant
No.2, the defendant No.1 filed an additional written statement denying
the case pleaded by the defendant No.2 in his written statement with
regard to allotment of the suit schedule property to the defendants and
also the lay out obtained and the sales. It is further pleaded that the
defendant No.2 ought to have taken steps to implead all the parties
named by him in his written statement and as he had not taken such
steps, the pleadings of the defendant No.2 shall be rejected and that the
averments in the written statement are false, baseless and cooked up to
blackmail the defendant No.1.
6. During course of the trial, when the defendant No.1 / D.W.1 filed
his affidavit in chief-examination showing the partition cum settlement
deed dated 11.10.1985 as the list document No.1 to be marked as
Ex.B1, along with the other documents at serial Nos.2 to 18, the said
partition cum settlement dated 11.10.1985 was not received in
evidence. Subsequently, when the defendant No.2 was examined as
D.W.2, a copy of the partition cum settlement deed dated 11.10.1985,
along with the original proceedings issued by the Tahsildar, Kanekal on
the application of the defendant No.2 under the Right to Information Act,
2005, was marked as Ex.B13.
7. Aggrieved by the same, I.A.No.34 of 2023 noted above was filed
by the plaintiff to demark Ex.B13 on the grounds that the document was
marked in the absence of the counsel for the plaintiff; that the
document, enclosed to the original proceedings issued by the Tahsildar,
Kanekal marked as Ex.B.13, is a photostat copy, not produced from
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proper custody and cannot be a primary evidence or secondary
evidence and the same cannot be marked as documentary evidence as
Ex.B.13; that earlier the same document was not marked as objected at
the time of evidence of D.W.1 due to its inadmissibility in evidence and
that the defendant No.2 / D.W.2, having knowledge of the same,
fraudulently got it marked.
8. The petition was opposed by filing the counter of the respondent
No.2 / defendant No.2 denying the averments of the petition and further
stating that this respondent filed a petition to receive the documents
vide I.A.No.571 of 2022 on 27.09.2022 after serving copies of all the
documents along with the petition to the counsel for the plaintiff and also
the counsel for the defendant No.1 and the said petition was allowed on
09.11.2022 and thereafter, on 22.11.2022, the chief-examination
affidavit of D.W.2 was filed after furnishing copy of the affidavit and later
documents were marked as Exs.B.11 to B.41 as the counsels for the
plaintiff and the defendant No.1 had not taken any objection for marking
of any document and the case was adjourned for cross examination of
D.W.2. It is further stated that Ex.B.13 was obtained under the Right to
Information Act and admissible in evidence. It is also stated that the
plaintiff himself requested the Tahsildar to mutate his name and to an
extent of Ac.1.00 in S.No.977 which is not the suit schedule property,
but fell to his share in the said partition, by enclosing the unregistered
partition-cum-settlement deed dated 11.10.1985 and accordingly, the
entries in the revenue records were mutated by the Tahsildar and
pattadar pass book and title deed were issued and thus, the plaintiff
himself used the unregistered partition deed and has no ground to seek
demarking of the document without any valid ground and that the
evidentiary value of the document already marked can be decided at the
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time of pronouncement of judgment. This respondent contended that
the petitioner played fraud and filed the petition to drag on the
proceedings and requested to dismiss the petition.
9. The respondent / defendant No.1 reported no counter.
10. After hearing the petitioner and the respondent No.2, the trial
Court dismissed the petition holding that the document in question titled
as ‘odambadika oppudala khararu’ is not a partition deed, but is an
agreement for partition agreeing to get a partition deed executed and
cannot be questioned, that too at a subsequent stage and further that
the petitioner, being a party to the proceedings, is at liberty to challenge
the genuineness of the public document i.e., the certified copy of a
public document issued by Public Information Officer. It is also
observed that the unregistered agreement of partition deed in the
present case does not require registration and cannot be demarked as
in the case of an unregistered agreement of sale if the agreement of
sale is unregistered one.
11. Aggrieved by the order, this revision petition was filed.
12. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the
document in question is not an agreement, but a partition deed and
requires registration and therefore, without deciding its admissibility in
evidence, the same cannot be admitted in evidence. He further
submitted that a photostat copy of a partition deed cannot be marked as
secondary evidence as the original document requires registration and
proper stamp duty, particularly when no step has been taken to cause
production of its original. He further submitted that it is not a public
document even if it is with the custody of Tahsildar and a certified copy
of it cannot be issued by the Tahsildar unlike any other document, such
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
as registers, etc., maintained in his office. He further submitted that the
photostat copy of the partition deed said to be given by the Tahsildar is
not a certified copy since it was not compared with its original. He
further submitted that a photostat copy cannot be received in evidence
even for collateral purpose as stamp duty can be collected only on an
original document. That apart, he contended that the photostat copy of
the partition deed was not directly marked as Ex.B.13, but showing it as
annexure to the proceedings of Tahsildar under the R.T.I.Act, the
document was brought in evidence in a back door method, since it was
already objected when tendered through D.W.1 and the Court was not
inclined to receive it in evidence in view of the objections raised by them
regarding its admissibility in evidence. He further submitted that when
a document is inadmissible in evidence due to statutory prohibition, it
can be demarked at any stage and therefore, the observation of the trial
Court that it cannot be raised at a subsequent stage is incorrect.
13. In support of his arguments, he placed reliance on the following
decisions:-
(i) A.P.Laly Vs. Gurram Rama Rao 1 , wherein it was held at
paragraphs Nos.30 & 31 as follows:
“30. Thus, in the absence of consideration of application
of Rule 3 of Order 13 to the cases of improperly admitted
documents, the arguments advanced on the basis of
such decision is of no avail. I am of the opinion that the
decisions of this Court in Syed Yousuf Ali Vs. Mohd.
Yousuf [2016 (2) ALT 557] and Srinivasa Builders Vs.1
2017 (5) ALT 753
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025A. Janga Reddy (died) per L.Rs. [2016 (2) ALT 321] do
not require any elaboration or clarification. It is also
relevant to notice that a learned single Judge of this
Court, who rendered the decision in Syed Yousuf Ali’s
case (supra), rendered another decision in S. Mohan
Krishna Vs. V. Varalakshmamma [2017 (5) ALT 264] to
the same effect. The Court has got right to de-exhibit a
document when its attention was drawn as to the
inadmissibility of the document, as it has got duty to
decide the admissibility of a document and eschew
irrelevant and inadmissible evidence. The Code of Civil
Procedure deals with the procedure in dealing with the
suits, whereas the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act
deal with the provisions for collection of proper stamp
duty on the documents. When a document which was not
properly stamped was admitted in evidence and when
the Court’s attention was drawn, the objection of the
party under Section 36 of the Act pales into insignificance
and the duty of the Court comes to the forefront to decide
with regard to admissibility of such a document. It is for
the Court to decide whether a particular document is
admissible or not. If it is inadmissible it can de-exhibit
such a document. It is the decision of the Court, but not
that of the objector. The role of the objector is only to
bring it to the notice of the Court. Even assuming that a
Court decides to admit a document in evidence, there is
nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure prohibiting the
Court from recalling such an order.
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
31. In view of the above position, in the absence of any
evidence as to the availability of a decision of the trial
Court with regard to document in question as to its
admission, the application as filed by the defendant is
maintainable and it is open to the plaintiff to pay the
stamp duty and penalty as per the Rules and make a
request to admit the same in evidence and it is for the
Court to admit the document and mark the same.”
(ii) Sure Ranga Murali Krishna Reddy Vs. Sure Yerri Vara
Prasada Reddy and others2, wherein it was held at paragraphs Nos.15
& 16 as follows:
“15. In the facts & circumstances and in view of the
precedential guidance, this Court is of the well
considered view that the Court below was in error in
marking the document, viz., CC of unregistered partition
deed as exhibit B1 without application of mind and
without first deciding the objection raised as ordained in
the decision of the Supreme Court in Bipin Shantilal
Panchal Vs. State of Gujarat and another [2001 (1)
ALT (Crl.)(SC) 230] and in further refusing to accede to
the request of the plaintiff to de-exhibit the document or
exclude/eschew it from evidence for deciding its
admissibility or otherwise after adverting to the aspects
viz., whether its original was duly stamped/charged with
duty and whether it can be admitted in evidence for
collateral purpose in the light of the ratios in the2
2018 (4) ALT 616 (S.B.)
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025precedents adverted to supra. For the foregoing reasons,
this Court finds that the order is unsustainable and is
liable to be set aside.
16. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and
the order impugned is set aside. As a sequel, the
interlocutory application in I.A. No. 1637 of 2017 is
allowed and the certified copy of unregistered partition
deed marked as exhibit B1 shall stand eschewed from
evidence and the marking given to it shall stand
cancelled. However, the trial Court shall after affording
an opportunity of hearing to both sides, decide its
admissibility after considering the relevant aspects as to
its admissibility as per the settled law and procedure and
then proceed further in the matter in accordance with
law. No costs.”
(iii) C.Sreedhara Raja Vs. S.Vittoba Rao 3 , wherein it was held at
paragraphs Nos.25 & 27 as follows:
“25. From a reading of the above provision, the following
would emerge:
(1) The parties can file the documents at the initial
stage;
(2) Such documents shall be admitted into evidence as
provided under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 13 of the Code of
Civil Procedure;
(3) An unstamped or insufficiently stamped document
is not admissible in evidence per se as postulated under3
AIR 2005 AP 322
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, subject to Section
36;
(4) During the trial when actually the document is
tendered to be marked as piece of evidence, objection
can be raised either by the contesting party or by the
Court as regards its admissibility on account of
unstamped or insufficiently stamped and also can
impound and eventually can levy the stamp duty along
with penalty;
(5) In the event of any application made by the party
who tries to introduce a document into evidence for
admission can file an application under Section 38(2) of
the Stamp Act to send the document to the competent
authority for impounding and levying the stamp duty
along with the penalty;
(6) As and when such an application is made, it is
imperative for the Court, to send the document to the
competent authority under the Stamp Act;
(7) When once the document is admitted into evidence
and marked as an exhibit the same becomes the
property of the Court;
(8) So long as the document was not tendered in
evidence for admission and marked as an exhibit, such
document shall be treated as the property of the party
who files or places the said document on record; and
(9) At any stage, the document can be returned by the
Court on an application made by the party, who places
the document on record, subject to certain conditions.”
26. xxx xxx xxx
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
27. However, it is to be borne in mind that merely
because a document is impounded by the Court,
particularly the one, which is a xerox copy, even if
impounded by the competent authority under the Stamp
Act, need not necessarily be understood as legally got
validated, for the purpose of admissibility of the same in
evidence inasmuch as such document has to be tested
on the touch stone of Sections 63 and 64 of the Indian
Evidence Act.”
(iv) Jupudi Kesava Rao Vs. Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and
others4 , wherein it was held at paragraphs Nos.13 & 14 as follows:
“13. The first limb of Section 35 clearly shuts out from
evidence any instrument chargeable with duty unless it is
duly stamped. The second limb of it which relates to
acting upon the instrument will obviously shut out any
secondary evidence of such instrument, for allowing such
evidence to be let in when the original admittedly
chargeable with duty was not stamped or insufficiently
stamped, would be tantamount to the document being
acted upon by the person having by law or authority to
receive evidence. Proviso (a) is only applicable when the
original instrument is actually before the Court of law and
the deficiency in stamp with penalty is paid by the party
seeking to rely upon the document. Clearly secondary
evidence either by way of oral evidence of the contents
of the unstamped document or the copy of it covered by4
(1971) 1 SCC 545
14
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act would not fulfill the
requirements of the proviso which enjoins upon the
authority to receive nothing in evidence except the
instrument itself. Section 35 is not concerned with any
copy of an instrument and a party can only be allowed to
rely on a document which is an instrument for the
purpose of Section 35. ‘Instrument’ is defined in Section
2(14) as including every document by which any right or
liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited
extended, extinguished or recorded. There is no scope
for inclusion of a copy of a document as an instrument for
the purpose of the Stamp Act.
14. If Section 35 only deals with original instruments and
not copies Section 36 cannot be so interpreted as to
allow secondary evidence of an instrument to have its
benefit. The words “an instrument” in Section 36 must
have the same meaning as that in Section 35. The
legislature only relented from the strict provisions of
Section 35 in cases where the original instrument was
admitted in evidence without objection at the initial stage
of a suit or proceeding. In other words, although the
objection is based on the insufficiency of the stamp
affixed to the document, a party who has a right to object
to the reception of it must do so when the document is
first tendered. Once the time for raising objection to the
admission of the documentary evidence is passed, no
objection based on the same ground can be raised at a
later stage. But this in no way extends the applicability of
Section 36 to secondary evidence adduced or sought to
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025be adduced in proof of the contents of a document which
is unstamped or insufficiently stamped.”
(v) Akkam Laxmi Vs. Thosha Bhoomaiah and others5, wherein it
was held at paragraph No.9 as follows:
“9. A perusal of Section 35 shows that the said section is
in two parts. The first limb pertains to the reception of the
document in evidence when the document is not duly
stamped. The second limb, however, pertains to acting
upon the said document. The bar contained in Section 35
of the Act is an absolute bar and it is two fold – firstly it
prohibits the reception of an instrument which has not
been duly stamped and secondly it inhibits the authority
which is expected to receive the same to act upon the
same. Section 36 of the Act, however, reads that when
an instrument has been admitted in evidence without
taking any objection in accordance with Section 35, such
admission shall not be called in question at any stage of
the suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument
has not been duly stamped. A combined reading of both
the sections would show that what was not admissible
under the mandatory provisions of Section 35 when
admitted inadvertently in evidence without taking any
objection in that regard, such admission shall not be
called in question at any stage of the suit or proceeding
subsequently. Therefore, what Section 36 speaks of, in
my considered view, is in regard to the original document5
2002 SCC OnLine AP 594
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025itself. A combined reading of Sections 35 and 36 of the
Act and the definition of ‘instrument’ as enjoined under
Section 2(14) of the Act would leave no room for any
doubt that what is required to be stamped is the original
instrument itself and the Act has not envisaged a copy of
the original for the purpose of Stamp Act. A copy of the
document cannot be called as an instrument and,
therefore, it is not required to be stamped.”
(vi) Koyya Ganga Venkata Satya Bhaskara Rao and another Vs.
Koyya Rama Krishnudu and others 6 , wherein it was held at
paragraphs Nos.9 & 10 as follows:
“9. The above and other recitals in the document, without
doubt, make it manifest that under the very document the
immovable properties are permanently partitioned once
and for all into two shares (A and B) and one share each
is allotted to the eligible sharer declaring that each sharer
shall enjoy, the allotted share with absolute rights
including the rights to enjoy, gift, sell, etcetera by paying
taxes to the Government on the allotted share
independently. It is also recited, as already noted, that
the parties to the document shall not raise dispute that
the shares are unequal and/or are not in accordance with
good and bad qualities at any time in future.
10. Having thus considered the transaction embodied in
the documents, this Court finds itself in agreement with
the finding of the Court below that the document in6
2019 SCC OnLine AP 20
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025question is a deed of partition and not a memorandum of
partition or a list of partition recording past partition and
that, therefore, the document in question is required to be
charged with duty and that as it is not charged with any
duty it is inadmissible in evidence until required stamp
duty and penalty are paid as per the provisions of the
Indian Stamp Act.”
(vii) In Tharammel Peethambaran and Ors. Vs. T. Ushakrishnan
and Ors7, it was held at paragraphs Nos.20.3 and 21 to 23 as follows:
“20.3. Secondary evidence is inadmissible until the non-
production of the original is accounted for in a manner
that brings the case within the specific exceptions
provided in Section 65.12 If the original itself is found to
be inadmissible through failure of the party who files it to
prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to
introduce secondary evidence of its contents.
21. Therefore, the introduction of secondary evidence is
a two-step process, wherein, first, the party must
establish the legal right to lead secondary evidence, and
second, they must prove the contents of the documents
through that evidence. The twin requirements are
conjunctive.
7
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 134 = Civil Appeal No. 856 of 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11868 of 2024), dated 06.02.2026
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
22. The High Court recorded a finding which is not
challenged, that the PoA produced by the 1st Defendant
is a notarised photocopy, and not the original document.
The 1st Defendant is obligated to follow the procedure for
adducing secondary evidence, and thereafter, claim
presumption, if any, available to a document so adduced
in evidence. It is axiomatic that secondary evidence is
permissible only as an exception to the requirement of
adducing primary evidence.
23. The case on hand falls within the meaning of
mechanical copies. In law, the existence of Exh. B-2, in
the absence of laying down a factual foundation and
following procedure, ought to be ignored for the purpose
of appreciating the 1st Defendant’s claim on the power to
alienate Plaint A-Schedule Property. It is apposite to refer
to one of the views expressed by the First Appellate
Court by examining the signature in Exh. B-2, and
recording a finding against the Plaintiff. It is axiomatic
and fairly established by the authorities18 of this Court
that courts should not by itself compare disputed
signatures without the assistance of any expert, when the
signatures with which the disputed signatures compared,
are themselves not the admitted signatures. In our
considered view, neither Section 33 of the Registration
Act nor Section 85 of the Evidence Act would come into
application if the primary requirement of adducing
secondary evidence is discharged by the party relying on
the document. Section 85 of the Evidence Act falls under
Chapter V, titled Documentary Evidence. In the absence
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025of an original or at least a secondary evidence, it is
impermissible to apply Section 85 of the Indian Evidence
Act to conclude the execution and extent of authority
given by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant. No order is
brought to our notice through which secondary evidence
is brought on record before the Trial Court. A photocopy
of a document is no evidence unless the same is proved
by following the procedure set out. Relying on Exh. B-2,
the First Appellate Court acted on inadmissible evidence
and accepted the existence of power to alienate. Exh.
B-2 / photocopy is no evidence, and the incorrect
reliance on no evidence, has been rightly corrected by
the High Court through the impugned judgment. The
High Court has considered the misreading of evidence by
the Appellate Court and, by applying the correct
principles of law, allowed the second appeal.”
14. Though the respondent No.1 appeared through counsel before
this Court, he has not represented and submitted arguments.
Moreover, he did not contest the interlocutory petition before the trial
Court.
15. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No.2
submitted that the trial Court rightly observed that the document is an
agreement for partition but not partition deed and or at the most, it may
be memo of past partition and does not require registration and that
even if it is a deed of partition, it can be received in evidence for
collateral purposes of proving division of status and nature of
possession. It is his further argument that the document filed by the
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
defendant No.2 is not mere photostat copy, but a copy of a public
document issued under the R.T.I. Act and is squarely covered by
Section 74 of the Evidence Act. He further submitted that the said
document was furnished by the petitioner himself to the Tahsildar to get
the entries in the revenue records mutated and issue of pattadar pass
book etc., in respect of his share of property, which is other than the suit
schedule property, but now he has taken a ‘U’ turn to admit the
document.
16. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Roshan
Singh and others Vs. Zile Singh and others8, Khaja Habeebuddin
Vs. Md. Ibrahim & others9 and Mr. Katike Bheem Shankar Vs. Mrs.
T.Laxmi @ Punyavathi & others10.
17. Before going further, it is pertinent to examine the nature of the
document.
18. The document speaks that the immovable properties were divided
among the parties four years before the date of the document in the
presence of the village elders and the parties are separately living with
their respective families, but their landed properties were kept joint and
that the yield was being divided. The document further states that due
to subsequent disputes among the parties due to joint cultivation, the
landed properties were divided into five (5) parts in the presence of the
village elders as shown in the document. Just because past tense verb
was used in the document that joint land was divided before the elders,
8
(2018) 14 SCC 814 = AIR 1988 SC 881
9
2004 (2) A.P.L.J. 239 (HC)
10
2022 Supreme (Telangana) 723
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
it was argued that the document speaks of its execution as a
memorandum of past partition. A combined reading of the contents of
the document does not indicate that there was a partition on any other
day and this document is intended to record the past transaction of
dividing the joint lands. It merely states that it was divided in the
presence of the elders. The document is just record of what was
divided. Had it been the intention of writing the document to record a
past partition effected before the elders dividing the landed properties,
there would have been a reference of the date or the period when the
said past partition was effected regarding the lands as was specifically
noted regarding the division of properties. The intent of the document
should be understood from the contents therein. As such, it is clear that
the document is a deed of partition noting the extent of shares of each
party. It is neither an agreement of partition nor is it a memorandum of
past partition. So the decision in Roshan Singh case (8 supra),
wherein it was held that memorandum of past partition does not require
registration has no application. It is erroneous for the trial Court to note
that it is an agreement of partition. As a deed of partition, it requires
registration as per Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908.
19. The effect of an unregistered document for the purpose of
evidence is stated in Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and it is
excerpted hereunder:
“49. Effect of non-registration of documents required
to be registered.
No document required by section 17 or by any
provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of
1882), to be registered shall
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein,
or
(b) confer any power to adopt, or
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction
affecting such property or conferring such power, unless
it has been registered:
Provided that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by this Act, or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be
registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a
suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the
Specific Relief Act, 1877 or as evidence of any collateral
transaction not required to be effected by registered
instrument.”
Therefore, Section 49 itself provided exceptions. As per the exceptions,
the document can be received in evidence for the purpose of collateral
transaction which by itself does not require registration. It cannot be
used as evidence of main transaction. In case of a deed of partition,
the main transaction is division of properties by metes and bounds. To
that extent, the document cannot be used as evidence. It was held in
Khaja Habeebuddin (9 supra), at paragraphs Nos.5 & 6 as follows:
“5. In the suit for partition filed by the 1st respondent, the
petitioner raise a plead of prior partition. He intended to
prove and establish his plea on the basis of the two
documents referred to above. It is not in dispute that they
were neither stamped nor registered. The Trial Court
took the view that the contents of one of the document
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025dated 16.8.1957 indicate that it is a partition deed and in
the absence of registration, it is not admissible in
evidence. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner
has made an attempt to impress upon this Court that the
document cannot be treated as partition deed by itself,
the contents of the same disclose that it provides for the
extent of shares of various persons and intends to bring
about a partition. Under these circumstances, no
exception can be taken to the finding of the trial Court
that the document is partition deed.
6. The admissibility of an unregistered partition deed has
been the subject-matter of discussion by this Court in
several cases. A Larger Bench of this Court in its
decision rendered in Muthyalareddy v. Venkatareddy
(supra), held that even an unregistered partition deed
can be received in evidence for the collateral purposes.
In Kaheeda Moin v. Md. Iqbal Ali (supra), this Court
analysed the nature of purposes which can be treated as
collateral or otherwise, in the context of partition. It was
held therein that the whole process of partition
contemplates three phases, viz.,
(a) Severance of status,
(b) Division of joint property by meets and bounds; and
(c) Nature of possession of the various sharers.”
The party relying on this document did not indicate the collateral
transaction for which it can be received in evidence. Whenever such a
document is received in evidence, the collateral purpose for which it is
received in evidence shall be indicated by the Court.
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
20. That apart, a document can be objected from receiving in
evidence on the ground of insufficient stamp duty. The deficiency of
stamp duty can be cured by getting the document impounded in the light
of Sections 33 & 35 of the Stamp Act. Unless the defect is cured, it
cannot be used in evidence for any purpose, including the collateral
transaction. Therefore, the impugned document cannot be received in
evidence even for the purpose of collateral transaction unless it is duly
stamped and penalty is paid on impounding. In Khaja Habeebuddin
case (9 supra), an unregistered partition deed was allowed to be
marked for collateral purpose. It was held in the said decision at
paragraphs Nos.7, 8 & 9 as follows:
“7. Phases ‘a’ and ‘c’ were treated as collateral purposes
and capable of being evidenced by even unregistered
documents. So far as phase ‘b’ viz., partition of property
by meets and bounds is concerned, it was held that such
an aspect can be dealt with only by registered partition
deeds. This view was adopted in the subsequent
Judgments of this Court in Pallapothu Naga Prasad and
Ors. v. Pallapothu Venkata Krishna Rao and Ors.
(supra) and in Pudi Balraju v. Jallu Annapoorna
(supra).
8. Reversing to the facts of this case, it is evident that the
document in question did provide for extent of shares of
various individuals. This fact can be brought in evidence
only through a registered document. Therefore, the
documents in question are inadmissible to establish the
factum of partition of the property by meets and bounds.
So far as the collateral purpose referred to above are
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
concerned, the documents can be taken into account for
the purpose of severance of status. As regards the
nature of possession, it needs to be observed that the
document itself did not indicate the nature of possession
of the properties by various sharers. The result of this
discussion is that:
(i) The document in question is partition deed.
(ii) It is not registered and
(iii) It does not deal with the nature of possession.
9. In the light of the law laid down by this Court in the
judgments referred to above, the document in question
cannot be received in evidence to establish the factum of
partition. It, however, can be received in evidence for the
collateral purpose of severance of status and nothing
more.”
But, in that case, it was not examined whether the document is
sufficiently stamped or not. Whereas, in Koyya Ganga Venkata Satya
Bhaskara Rao case (6 supra), it was held that an unregistered partition
deed is inadmissible in evidence unless required stamp duty and
penalty are paid. As the disputed document is on white paper bearing
no stamp value, the document is defective not only due to non-
registration but also due to insufficient stamp.
21. In the present case, stamp duty and penalty also cannot be
collected on the impugned document since it is not the original
document, irrespective of the fact that it is a public document or not. To
fortify this observation, it is apt to refer the decision in Jupudi Kesava
Rao case (4 supra), wherein it was held that stamp duty cannot be
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
collected on a copy of a document, if its original was not subjected to
stamp duty. It was referred in Sure Ranga Murali Krishna Reddy case
(2 supra). When the impugned document cannot be impounded, the
defect of deficiency in stamp duty cannot be cured. As a result, the
document cannot be used even for evidence of collateral transaction.
Under these circumstances, this Court is not inclined to appreciate the
argument on the question whether certified copy (issued under the
R.T.I. Act) of a photostat copy submitted by a party and kept in the files
of Tahsildar is a public document within Section 74 of the Evidence Act,
in the light of the decision of the High Court for the State of Telangana
in Mr. Katike Bheem Shankar case (10 supra).
22. It is also pertinent to mention that when the document in its
original condition shown as list document in the affidavit of the
defendant No.1 / D.W.1 was not marked, but the same was introduced
in evidence through the defendant No.2 / D.W.2 by showing it as an
enclosure to the letter describing the letter as an exhibit to mark it as
Ex.B13. Thus, in a circuitous and dubious manner, it was introduced
through D.W.2 in spite of its non-marking through D.W.1 when it was
tendered as a document by itself.
23. It was also argued that the plaintiff himself submitted the
photostat copy to the Tahsildar and got the entries made in the revenue
records and obtained pattadar pass book in his favour basing on the
very same document, but when it comes to the use of it as evidence by
the defendants, the plaintiff is objecting. The fact that the plaintiff
submitted a photostat copy of a certain document is separate from the
facts stated in the said documents. Insofar as the facts which are
contents of the document are barred from being received in evidence in
view of its non-registration and inadequate stamp duty. But, insofar as
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
the facts that the plaintiff submitted a photostat copy of a document to
the Tahsildar and basing on it revenue records were mutated and
passbook etc., were issued to him are concerned, they are independent
facts and those facts can be proved through other means irrespective of
the contents of the document which cannot be proved due to non-
registration and want of stamp duty. Therefore, it is open for the parties
to establish the facts as permitted by law and prove the case.
24. Merely because a document is marked in evidence without
applying the mind and deciding on the objection, even if a document is
given an exhibit number, it cannot be treated as receiving the document
in evidence overruling the objection. An inadmissible document can be
demarked as held in the cases of A.P.Laly (1 supra) and Sure Ranga
Murali Krishna Reddy (4 supra).
25. The letter given by the Tahsildar showing that it has document
annexed to it may be received in evidence, but the contents of the
document, dated 11.10.1985, cannot be read in evidence for the above
stated reasons. Therefore, Ex.B13 as such need not be demarked, but,
as is noted, the contents of the annexed document, dated 11.10.1985,
cannot be read in evidence. If it is proved that the Tahsildar issued the
letter with annexures, the same can be appreciated as evidence of such
facts.
26. Accordingly, the revision petition is disposed of retaining the
document marked as Ex.B13 in evidence, subject to the rider that the
contents of the document, dated 11.10.1985, cannot be read in
evidence as proof of such contents.
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C.R.P.No.2730 of 2025
There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________
B.S.BHANUMATHI, J
Dt.05.03.2026
GRL / PNV / RAR
