Delhi District Court
State vs Dev Ashish Rawat on 30 April, 2026
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI
Presided over by - Ms. Medha Arya, DJS
Cr. Case No. : 2035247/2016
FIR No. : 1000/2015
Police Station : Saket
Section(s) : 352/212 Part-II IPC
In the matter of -
STATE
Vs.
Dev Ashish Rawat
S/o Sh. Jaspal Singh
R/o H. No. A-3, Leela Home
Sector-4, Vaishali, Ghaziabad (UP) .... Accused
1.
Name of Complainant : Smt. Monalisa Sagar 2. Name of Accused : Dev Ashish Rawat Offence complained of 3. : 352/212 Part-II IPC or proved 4. Plea of Accused : Not guilty Date of commission of 5. : 15.08.2015 offence 6. Date of Filing of case : 08.12.2015 7. Date of Reserving Order : 23.04.2026 8. Date of Pronouncement : 30.04.2026 9. Final Order : Acquitted Argued by - Ld. APP for the State. Ld. Counsel for the accused. State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 1 of 18
“A lie can travel halfway around the world while the
truth is putting on its shoes”
– Mark Twain
It was alleged against the accused, that without even knowing their
identities and having any prior connection with them, he shielded certain
offenders from their punishment. Prosecution did not bring on record any
details qua the actual offence committed by such persons, or their
identities even. A vague case has been set up against the accused, who as
the restaurant manager, merely did some act to de-escalate the situation
between two parties of guests fighting in the restaurant.
He is thus, acquitted.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE DECISION
FACTUAL MATRIX –
1. The instant case was registered on the complaint of complainant
namely, Ms. Monalisa Sagar, wherein she stated that she along with her
family members, was taking supper at Chili’s Restaurant, DLF Mall,
Saket, New Delhi at around 11.00 pm on 15.08.2025. She further stated
in her complaint that there were some issues with the food that had been
served to them, and they started sharing this issue with the Waiter in the
aforesaid restaurant. She further stated that all of a sudden, an another
guest present in the same restaurant started abusing her and her family
members. In the ruckus that ensued, the Manager of the said restaurant
came to their table, and started pushing the complainant and her family
members. The complainant further alleged in the complaint that the
Manager of the restaurant called other staff, and made a way for the said
guests to leave the restaurant. The complainant alleged that she and her
family members were manhandled by the Manager of the restaurant i.e.State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 2 of 18
Dev Ashish Rawat, accused herein. After conclusion of investigation, the
subject charge sheet was filed against the accused for the offences
punishable u/s 352/212 (Part-II) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “the IPC“).
2. Cognizance was taken, and accused was summoned to face trial.
Copy of charge-sheet was supplied to him in compliance of Section 207
CrPC. Thereafter, charge was framed against him under Section 352/212
(Part-II) IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty, and claimed trial.
Proceedings then progressed to the stage of PE.
Evidence and SA
3. In support of its version, prosecution led the following oral and
documentary evidence:
Oral Evidence
PW Name and Nature of Testimony
PW1 Ms. Monalisa Sagar – Complainant/Eyewitness
PW2 Sh. Rakesh Ranjan Jha – The then General Manager of Chilis
Restaurant, DLF Mall, Saket, New Delhi
PW3 Ms. Shiuli Banerjee – Eyewitness
PW4 Retired SI Ravi Shankar Tyagi – IO
PW5 ASI Rajpal – 1st IO
PW6 ASI Kumbha Ram – Assisted the 1st IO
PW7 Sh. Saravjit Singh – The then Security In-charge, DLF Place,
Saket, New DelhiState vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 3 of 18
Documentary Evidence
Document Nature
Ex A1 The present FIR
Ex A2 Certificate u/s 65B IEA and DD no. 52A dated
15.08.2015
Ex PW1/A Complaint
Ex PW1/B Site plan
Ex PW1/C Statement of complainant u/s 164 CrPC
Ex PW2/A DVD containing footage of incident dated
15.08.2015
Ex PW2/B Certificate u/s 65B IEA
Ex PW2/C & Ex PW2/D Documents w.r.t. employment of accused with
Chilis Restaurant
Ex PW3/A Statement u/s 164 CrPC of PW3 Ms. Shiuli
Banerjee
Ex PW4/A (Colly) Notice to DLF Mall, Saket
Ex PW4/B (Colly) Notice to Chili’s Restaurant u/s 91 CrPC
Ex PW5/A Rukka
Ex PW7/A CCTV video footage along with the reply
Ex PW7/B Certificate u/s 65B IEA
4. Accused admitted, as per Section 294 CrPC, the genuineness of
the present FIR, and certificate u/s 65B IEA and DD no. 52A dated
15.08.2015 (Ex A1 & A2). In view of the said admission, rest of the
prosecution witnesses, all formal in nature, were dropped from the list of
witnesses to be examined. PE was closed thereafter.
5. After conclusion of prosecution evidence, separate statement of
the accused was recorded under Section 313 CrPC, wherein he, interState vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 4 of 18
alia, stated as under:
“This is a false case against me. The complainant was sitting in the
restaurant, and she had a verbal altercation with some other guests at
the restaurant, who were about to leave the same. I was called by my
staff to pacify the situation. I was told by my staff that the guests
with whom the complainant was having an argument had already
paid their bill, and were about to leave anyway. As such, I asked
them to leave the restaurant to prevent any further argument between
them. I did not shield any offender.
The complainant has testified wrongly. She was the one who was
abusing the other guests in the restaurant. With a view to prevent any
further altercation in the restaurant and to maintain peace therein, I
asked the other guests to leave the restaurant as already explained. I
did not harbour any offender.
At the relevant time, the husband of PW1 (Complainant Ms.
Monalisa Sagar) and PW3 (Ms. Shiuli Banerjee) were sitting at the
table. Instead, it was PW1 and PW3 who were constantly abusing
the other guests, who were also six in number. I wish to say that the
party comprising of PW1 and PW3 was also constituting of six
members. PW1 and PW3 were constantly abusing the other guests.
In this backdrop, since the other party had already paid their bill, I
asked them to leave the restaurant premises, to maintain peace
therein.
Both PW1 and PW3 were really angry at the time of the incident.
When the other guests left, the confronted me by asking me why I
let them go. They were advised by their husband to approach women
helpline. Both of their husband manhandled me. Thereafter, police
officials came to the spot and the present complaint was made.”
5.1 Accused opted not to lead any DE in the affirmative.
Arguments
6. Proceedings then progressed to the stage of final arguments.
6.1 Ld. APP for the State submitted that prosecution has established
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 5 of 18
all the essential ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused.
6.2 During the course of final arguments, ld. counsel for the accused
submitted that the offence punishable under Section 212 of the IPC
cannot be invoked against the accused in view of the proviso to the said
provision. It was argued that the term “offence” used in the proviso
includes acts committed outside India which, if committed within India,
would be punishable under specific sections, namely Sections 302, 304,
382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450,
457, 458, 459, and 460 IPC. Ld. counsel submitted that since none of the
aforesaid offences have been alleged against the persons whom the
accused is alleged to have harboured, the accused cannot be convicted
under Section 212 IPC.
6.3 It was further contended that, in any event, the offence of
harbouring an offender is not made out, as it is not the case of the
prosecution that the persons with whom the complainant initially had an
altercation had been convicted of any offence. It was argued that there is
no evidence to show that the accused knew or had reason to believe that
such persons were offenders. Consequently, it cannot be held that the
accused knowingly harboured any offender. In support of the aforesaid
submissions, reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Patna High Court in Ramraj Chaudhary & Anr. v. Emperor, AIR 1946
Patna 74, as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sanjeev Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1999) 2 SCC 288. It was
submitted that Section 212 IPC is attracted only when it is shown that the
accused had the intention of screening an offender from legal
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 6 of 18
punishment. ld. counsel argued that no such intention can be attributed to
the accused in the present case. It was also submitted that the ingredients
of the offence punishable under Section 352 IPC are not made out, as the
accused neither assaulted nor used criminal force against the
complainant, Ms. Monalisa, or her friend, Ms. Shiuli Banerjee.
7. Arguments heard. Record perused. Considered.
Relevant Legal Provisions
8. Before proceeding further, it shall be apposite to note the
provisions of law germane for the adjudication of present proceedings:
8.1 Section 212 IPC provides for punishment for harbouring an
offender. It stipulates that whenever an offence has been committed,
whoever harbours or conceals a person whom he knows or has reason to
believe to be the offender, with the intention of screening him from legal
punishment, commits the offence of harbouring an offender and is liable
to be punished in accordance with the provision. The essential
ingredients of Section 212 IPC are:
(a) commission of an offence;
(b) harbouring or concealing a person who has committed such
offence;
(c) knowledge or reason to believe on the part of the accused
that such person is an offender; and
(d) intention to screen such person from legal punishment.
8.2 The term "harbour" is defined under Section 52A IPC -
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 7 of 18
Section 52A IPC - "Harbour"
Except in section 157, and in section 130 in the case in which the
harbour is given by the wife or husband of the person harboured, the
word “harbour” includes the supplying a person with shelter, food,
drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means of conveyance,
or the assisting a person by any means, whether of the same kind as
those enumerated in this section or not, to evade apprehension.
8.3 Further, the expression “reason to believe” has been defined under
Section 26 IPC.-
Section 26 IPC – “Reason to believe”
A person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has
sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise.
8.4 Section 352 IPC provides that whoever assaults or uses criminal
force against any person, otherwise than on grave and sudden
provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.
For a successful prosecution under Section 352 IPC, it is incumbent
upon the prosecution to establish that –
(a) the accused intentionally assaulted or used criminal force
against another person, and
(b) that such act was not committed on account of grave and
sudden provocation.
Analysis
9. In Pankaj Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand through CBI, 2017
(AJR) 445, it has been clarified that the term “offender” under Section
212 IPC does not necessarily mean a “convicted person.” Even if the
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 8 of 18
principal offender is not ultimately convicted, a person who harbours or
conceals such offender with the requisite intention of screening him from
punishment can still be held liable under Section 212 IPC. It has been
held,
“16. Lord Romer has further gone on to consider the term offender
and has held as follows:-
“The question that Your Lordships are asked to determine is whether
the word “offender” as there used means a person who has committed
one of the specified offences or whether it means a person who is
suspected of having committed one. That the ordinary meaning of the
word “offender” is a person who has in fact offended must be
conceded, but the context in which a word is found may be, and very
often is, strong enough to show that it is intended to bear other than
its ordinary meaning, and such a context is, in my opinion, to be
found in the present case, for the section provides that the “offender”
may be proceeded against by summons , and to give the word
“offender” in this connection its ordinary meaning would be to render
the provision nonsensical. It would mean that before issuing the
summons the magistrate would have to decide that the offence had in
fact been committed. The principle of verdict first and trial
afterwards might as on one occasion did that of ‘sentence first and
verdict afterwards, find some support in the Court of Wonderland,
but it is not one that is regarded with favour in this country.
Furthermore, if the “offender” failed to appear upon the hearing of
the summons, any warrant issued for his arrest would have been
issued illegally should the defendant’s innocence subsequently be
established. In this last mentioned event, moreover, any proceedings
upon the summons taken in his absence would be a mere nullity, and
could be successfully challenged by him. It seems clear, therefore,
that when the section provides that the offender may be proceeded
against by summons, the word.”
17. In the case of State of Kerala represented by the Public
Prosecutor, Ernakulam, reported in 2008 Cr. Law Journal 824, while
considering the similar issue with respect to the term offender, it was
held as follows:-
“17. Nowhere in section 212 it is stated that the person concealed
should be convicted for an offence. Even if the main offender leaves
unpunished by the court, the object of the provision under Section
212 requires that the person who has concealed or harboured the
offender whom he believes and knows has committed the offences
shall not leave unpunished if the other Ingredients are established.
The criminality lies in act of concealment committed with theState vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 9 of 18
knowledge or belief that the person who is harboued or concealed is
the offered and also with the criminal intention of screening him
from legal punishment. Hence, we are unable to accept the dicta in
Kuriakose Chacko v. State (supra) and similar line of decisions to the
effect that the word ‘offender’ under section 212 means a convicted
offender. It is true that if the accused who is alleged of committing
the offence under section 212 if charged separately, on the facts of a
particular case, it may be advisable to wait for the conclusion of trial
of main accused as finding in the same may have a bearing on the
question whether ‘an offence at all has been committed’, but, in such
case, we are of the opinion that proper course advisable would be to
commit the case to the Sessions Court where the main offence is
being tried and club with the main case as was done in this case. It
will give an opportunity to the accused also to prove that no offence
has been committed as alleged. In such case, only after considering
the question of commission of the offence part pleaded by the main
offender etc. question of commission of offence under section 212
will be considered by the trial judge and no prejudice will be caused
to the accused also.”
18. The object of Section 212 of IPC has to be gathered from the
language itself. Giving a narrow and constricted meaning to the word
offender would clearly render section 212 of IPC redundant and
imbecile and would frustrate the legislative intent. The word offender
therefore in the strict sense of the term as used in Section 212 of IPC
would include a person who is an accused and a criminal proceeding
can be initiated and continued irrespective of the accused being
convicted or not by the trial court. It is, therefore, concluded that the
main accused harbouring of whom has led to institution of the case
against the petitioner under section 212 IPC is an offender for the
purpose of Section 212 of IPC.”
10. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement, the argument advanced
by ld. counsel for the accused that, since the person allegedly screened
from punishment has not been convicted, the accused cannot be
convicted for an offence punishable under Section 212 IPC, is devoid of
merit and is accordingly rejected.
11. As regards the further contention of ld. counsel for the accused
that, since the main offence is not one of those specified in the proviso to
Section 212 IPC, the accused cannot be held guilty of harbouring or
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 10 of 18
screening an offender, the same is also untenable. In this context, it is
pertinent to note that the term “offence” as used in Section 212 IPC is of
wide import. The proviso employs the expression “includes”, and it is a
well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that the use of the word
“includes” is generally intended to expand and not restrict the natural
meaning of the term defined. Though in certain contexts the term may be
exhaustive, in the present provision it is clearly extensive in nature,
enlarging the scope of the term “offence” so as to also cover certain
grave acts committed outside India, which would constitute specified
offences if committed within India. Therefore, the proviso does not have
the effect of limiting the applicability of Section 212 IPC only to those
offences enumerated therein. Rather, it merely extends the ambit of the
provision to certain extraterritorial acts of a serious nature (Ref:
Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, 1899 AC 99). Consequently, it
cannot be held that Section 212 IPC is attracted only in respect of
offences specified in the proviso, and the argument advanced to the
contrary is hereby rejected.
12. Having dealt with the above arguments, facts of the case shall now
be analyzed. PW-1 Ms. Monalisa Sagar deposed in her examination-in-
chief that on 15.08.2015, she was having dinner with her family,
comprising her husband, daughter, brother, sister-in-law and niece, at
Chili’s. She stated that as they were dissatisfied with the food,
particularly the avocado sauce which tasted bitter, they called the waiter
and conveyed their grievance. According to her, the waiter responded
that the sauce was intended to taste as served, upon which she made a
remark expressing her displeasure, and in that remark, made a general
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 11 of 18
comment insinuating that Delhiites have a tendency to oversmart others.
She further deposed that upon hearing this, about 4-5 persons sitting at
an adjacent table, who appeared to be in an inebriated condition,
approached her table and objected to her remarks, stating that she should
not abuse residents of Delhi. She stated that she asked them to mind their
own business; however, they claimed association with the restaurant and
asserted that she could not say anything against Delhiites. She further
stated that when her husband intervened and asked them to return to their
table, one of the said persons began abusing her husband, caught hold of
his collar and pushed him. She deposed that she then called for the
manager, whereupon the manager, i.e., the accused Devashish Rawat,
arrived at the spot along with staff members. According to her, the
accused did not heed their complaint, formed a barricade with the staff,
pushed her and her sister-in-law, and facilitated the escape of the said
persons from the restaurant. She further stated that she thereafter called
the police and lodged her complaint, which is exhibited as Ex. PW1/A.
She also proved the site plan Ex. PW1/B stated to be prepared at her
instance, and her statement under Section 164 CrPC as Ex. PW1/C. She
correctly identified the accused in court.
In her cross-examination, she conceded that there was no direct
altercation between her and the accused, but clarified that the accused
had physically pushed her while creating a passage for the other persons
to leave the restaurant, allegedly on the ground that they were regular
customers. She admitted that Ex. PW1/A was in her handwriting, and
denied suggestion of interpolation therein. Though she initially denied
the suggestion that the manager and staff had intervened at her instance,
she subsequently admitted that she had called for the manager,
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 12 of 18
explaining that it was natural for her to seek assistance of restaurant staff
in the situation. She denied the suggestion that the name of the accused
was added later in the complaint to falsely implicate him.
13. From the testimony of PW-1, it emerges that the primary
altercation on the date of the incident was between her and certain other
guests of the restaurant, and that the intervention of the accused, being
the manager, occurred pursuant to her calling for assistance. The witness
has herself admitted that she had called the manager to intervene on her
behalf and that the accused was primarily concerned with ensuring that
the other guests left the restaurant. From the overall factual matrix, it
appears that the accused, being the manager of Chili’s at the relevant
time, merely attempted to de-escalate the situation arising out of the
altercation between the complainant and certain other guests, and in that
process asked the said persons to leave the premises. There is nothing on
record to show that the accused had any prior acquaintance or connection
with the said guests. Significantly, even the identities of those persons
have not been brought on record by the prosecution. Even against the
said guests, it is alleged that they “abused” the complainant, but exactly
what words they used, and whether they actually committed any offence
punishable u/s 509 IPC is also not clear. In the absence of any material to
suggest prior association or concert, it cannot be inferred that the
accused acted with any intention to screen such persons from legal
punishment. The essential ingredient of intent as required u/s 212 IPC,
therefore, remains unproved. Further, the allegation made by PW-1 in
her deposition that the accused had pushed her appears to be an
improvement. A perusal of the complaint Ex. PW1/A shows that the
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 13 of 18
portion containing allegations against the accused is written in a different
ink and appears to be an interpolation. Despite being confronted with the
same, the witness failed to furnish any plausible explanation and merely
denied the suggestion that she added the allegation against the accused
on record as an afterthought. This circumstance casts a serious doubt on
the credibility of the witness to that extent. Moreover, even if it is
assumed for the sake of argument that some physical contact occurred
during the incident, the same appears to have been incidental to the
accused’s intervention in a heated situation and not a deliberate or
intentional use of criminal force by him against the complainant. This
view is further corroborated by her statement under Section 164 CrPC
(Ex. PW1/C), wherein she did not attribute any act of assault or pushing
to the accused, but merely stated that the manager asked the other guests
to leave.
14. Thus, from the overall tenor of the evidence, it emerges that the
role attributed to the accused is limited to that of an intervenor
attempting to manage a disturbance, and the allegations against him
appear to be embellished and not wholly reliable. The prosecution has
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally
used criminal force against the complainant so as to attract the offence
under Section 352 IPC, or that he harboured or screened any offender
within the meaning of Section 212 IPC.
15. A similar inference can be drawn from the testimony of PW-3 Ms.
Shiuli Banerjee. In her examination-in-chief, she deposed that on
15.08.2015, she had visited Chili’s along with her family members,
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 14 of 18
including PW-1 Ms. Monalisa Sagar. She stated that when PW-1
complained about the quality of food, the manager arrived and expressed
willingness to replace the same. She further deposed that certain
customers seated behind them became agitated upon remarks made by
PW-1, following which the situation escalated. She attributed a role to
the accused in pushing certain customers out of the restaurant and
alleged that members of her party were manhandled by the staff.
However, in her cross-examination, she admitted that there was no direct
altercation between her and the accused, and accepted that the primary
altercation was between PW-1 and other guests. She further admitted that
the accused had intervened and attempted to pacify the situation.
Significantly, this witness also did not state anything to suggest that the
accused had any prior acquaintance or connection with the said guests.
There is no material in her testimony to indicate that the accused acted
with any intention to screen such persons from legal punishment. On the
contrary, her version indicates that the accused asked the said persons to
leave the premises in order to restore order in the restaurant. Her
allegation of “manhandling” is vague and unsubstantiated, as she failed
to specify the manner in which such manhandling took place. This
assertion is further weakened by the fact that in her statement under
Section 164 CrPC (Ex. PW3/A), she did not allege any such act either
against the accused or the restaurant staff. Moreover, no such allegation
finds mention in the complaint Ex. PW1/A, which bears her signatures.
To this extent, her testimony appears to be embellished and exaggerated.
Even otherwise, and at the cost of repetition, the role attributed to the
accused, as emerging from her testimony, is that of an intervenor
attempting to de-escalate a dispute between patrons. Thus, it cannot be
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 15 of 18
held that he acted with the requisite intention either to screen any
offender within the meaning of Section 212 IPC or to intentionally use
criminal force against her or PW1 so as to attract Section 352 IPC.
16. As regards the remaining witnesses, their testimonies are seen to
be formal in nature. PW-2 Mr. Rakesh Ranjan Jha, the then General
Manager of Chili’s, merely deposed that he had supplied the CCTV
footage of the incident to the Investigating Officer in response to notice
under Section 91 CrPC (Ex. PW2/A), along with a certificate under
Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act (Ex. PW2/B), and documents
pertaining to the employment of the accused (Ex. PW2/C and Ex.
PW2/D). However, when the said footage was played before the Court, it
was found to be non-functional. The witness admitted in cross-
examination that he was not present at the time of the incident and did
not depose regarding the contents of the footage. His testimony is thus
purely formal, and does not advance the case of the prosecution.
17. Similarly, PW-4 SI Ravi Shankar Tyagi deposed regarding the
procedural steps undertaken during investigation, including issuance of
notice under Section 91 CrPC and collection of CCTV footage, as well
as recording of statements under Section 164 CrPC and issuance of
notice to the accused under Section 41A CrPC. In his cross-examination,
he admitted that though several persons were present at the spot, none of
the independent witnesses supported the prosecution version, and were
thus not joined to the investigation. His testimony is also formal in
nature, and does not establish any incriminating circumstance against the
accused.
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 16 of 18
18. PW-5 ASI Rajpal deposed that upon receiving DD entry No. 52A,
he reached the spot and obtained a written complaint from PW-1 and
PW-3, on the basis of which rukka (Ex. PW5/A) was prepared and FIR
registered. He admitted that he did not conduct any substantive
investigation and merely recorded the complaint. His testimony,
therefore, also does not prove any of the essential ingredients of the
offences alleged against the accused.
19. PW-6 ASI Kumbha Ram also merely deposed that, on the basis of
the rukka handed over to him, he got the present FIR registered and
thereafter entrusted the same to the Investigating Officer, SI Ravi
Shankar Tyagi. His testimony is purely procedural in nature, and does
not establish any of the essential ingredients of the offences alleged
against the accused.
20. Similarly, PW-7 Mr. Saravjit Singh is also a formal witness. He
deposed that he had supplied the CCTV footage of the incident along
with a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to
the Investigating Officer. He relied upon his reply Ex. PW7/A and the
said certificate Ex. PW7/B. However, it is noteworthy that no
independent footage was successfully exhibited during his testimony.
The only DVD sought to be played during the course of trial was found
to be blank/non-functional. In these circumstances, the electronic
evidence sought to be relied upon by the prosecution remains unproved
and of no evidentiary value. Consequently, the testimony of PW-7 also
does not advance the case of the prosecution in any manner.
State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 17 of 18
Conclusion
21. In view of the above discussion, none of the prosecution witnesses
have been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused
either intentionally used criminal force against the complainant or acted
with the intent to screen any offender from legal punishment. The
evidence on record, taken as a whole, does not inspire confidence and
falls short of the standard required for conviction. As such therefore,
accused Dev Ashish Rawat S/o Sh. Jaspal Singh is acquitted of all
charges levelled against him.
22. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance with
Section 437A CrPC. Digitally
signed by
Pronounced in open Court on
Medha Medha arya
Date:
30.04.2026 in the presence of accused. arya 2026.04.30
16:33:04
+0530(Medha Arya)
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate
South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi
30.04.2026State vs. Dev Ashish Rawat
FIR No. 1000/2015, PS: Saket Page 18 of 18
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