Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P. Though Pr. Secy. (Pw) vs Smt. Purnu Devi (Deceased) Through Her … on 24 March, 2026
( 2026:HHC:9854 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMP (M) No. 59/2026 in
RSA No. 80 of 2026
.
Date of decision: 24.03.2026.
State of H.P. though Pr. Secy. (PW)
to the Govt. of H.P. & others ...Appellants.
Versus
Smt. Purnu Devi (deceased) through her LRs ...Respondents.
of
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
rt
For the appellants : Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, Additional
Advocate General.
For the respondents : Mr. L.S.Mehta, Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):
CMP (M) No. 59 of 2025
The present application has been filed for
condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. It has been
averred in the application that the judgment and decree as
passed by the learned Additional District Judge-I, Mandi, HP is
under challenge. Certified copy of the judgment was applied on
13.12.2024, which was attested on 28.12.2025 and delivered
on 01.01.2025. Thereafter, the same was received from the
District Attorney, Mandi, H.P. and thereafter, it remained
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment?
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pending in different channels and in the said process delay of
174 days has been occurred .
The learned Counsel for the non-applicant has
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submitted that he has no objection, in case, the present
application is allowed.
In view of the averments as made in the application,
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which is duly supported by an affidavit and keeping in view the
fact that the learned counsel for the non-applicants have no
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objection, in case delay is condoned, the present application is
allowed and the delay of 174 days in filing the appeal is
condoned.
Application stands disposed off.
RSA No. 80 of 2026
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and
decree, dated 12.12.2024 as passed by the learned Additional
District Judge-I, Mandi, H.P. camp at Karsog in Civil Appeal No.
11 of 2024, whereby the appeal preferred by the present
respondents/plaintiffs has been ordered to be allowed and the
Civil Suit No. 26/2017, titled as Smt. Purnu Devi (deceased)
through LRS vs. State of H.P. through the Principal Secretary,
(PWD) & another filed by them before learned Civil Judge,
Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. has been ordered to be decreed. It
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has been ordered that the respondents/plaintiffs are held
entitled for the compensation for the use of suit land for the
construction of road known as ‘Karsog- Kunnu Road’ and the
.
defendants are directed to initiate the acquisition proceedings
of the suit land and pay appropriate compensation of the same
as per law.
of
2. Brief facts of the case are that the
plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit for declaration and
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mandatory injunction in the Court of learned Civil Judge,
Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. on 01.04.2017 on the ground that
the land comprised in Khewat No. 37/36, Khatauni No. 77/74,
Khasra Nos. 240, 241 and 1051/438, Kitta-3, measuring 03-
13-03 bighas, situated in Muha/358, Tehsil Karsog, District
Mandi, H.P. which is owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. In
the year 1993 to 1998, the defendants had constructed ‘Karsog-
Kunnu Road’ and for that purpose, the land owned and
possessed by the plaintiffs was utilized without complying with
the provision of Land Acquisition Act. In order to ascertain the
factual position on the spot, an application was filed before the
Tehsildar Karsog for the demarcation of the land in order to
ascertain the extent of the utilization by the State. The
demarcation was conducted on the spot and report was filed by
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the Revenue Authority on 21.10.2014. As per the demarcation
report the area of the land of plaintiffs i.e. Khasra No. 240,
measuring 00-04-02 bigha, Khasra No. 241/1, measuring 00-
.
02-05 bighas, fruit bearing trees i.e. Aadu-3 aged 15, Almonds-
4 aged 18, Khurmani-1 age 12, Palams-3 age 18, Apple-5 age
16, were found under the construction of road. Though, an
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application was filed by the plaintiffs to the defendants to pay
the compensation or to vacate the unauthorized possession
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over the land owned by the plaintiff. The officials of the
defendants assured the plaintiffs to compensate them for
utilization of their land, however no steps were taken by them.
Though, assurance was given to the plaintiffs to compensate
them, but till date, no compensation amount has been paid,
therefore, the plaintiffs were constrained to file a suit for
declaration to the effect that they are owners in possession of
the suit land and for mandatory injunction that since the
defendants have utilized the suit land, therefore, the plaintiffs
sought vacant possession of the suit land.
3. The suit was contested by the defendants/State by
raising preliminary objections qua maintainability, locus stand,
estoppel etc. On merits, it was averred that the
defendants/appellants had constructed the road in question
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with the consent of the plaintiffs and the defendants had not
given any assurance to the plaintiffs to pay the compensation
for the suit land. The demarcation on which the plaintiff is
.
relying is not in accordance with law since officials of the
department were not associated with the same. At the time of
construction of the road, the plaintiffs never raised any
of
objection and now they cannot be permitted to raise objection
that too after elapse of more than 35 years of the construction
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of road and consequently, the defendants sought dismissal of
the suit.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial
Court on 19.06.2018 framed the following issues:-
1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the
damages/compensation against the defendants ofthe land over which they unauthorizedly and
unlawfully constructed the road i.e. Karsog-
Kunnu Road entered in the measurement book
No. 1125, P-42, as alleged ? OPP
2. If issue No.1 is not proved in affirmative then
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of
possession against the defendants on the above
mentioned suit land, as alleged ? OPD
3. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is not
maintainable in the present form, as alleged ?
OPD
4. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs are barred by
limitation, as alleged ? OPD
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5. Whether the plaintiff has not complied with the
mandatory provision of Section 80 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as alleged ? OPD
6. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to
.
file the present suit against the defendants, as
alleged ? OPD
7. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their own
act and conduct to file the present suit, as
alleged ? OPD
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5. The learned trial court directed the respective
parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions to
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corroborate their respective case and ultimately, the learned
trial court vide its judgment and decree dated 28.03.2024
dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents.
6. Feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and decree,
dated 28.03.2024, the defendants/State preferred an appeal
before the learned First Appellate Court on 05.06.2024, which
came to be allowed vide judgment and decree dated 12.12.2024
by ordering that the plaintiffs are entitled for the compensation
of the use of the suit land in the construction of Karsog-Kunnu
Road and the defendants are directed to initiate the acquisition
proceedings of the suit land and pay appropriate compensation
of the same as per law.
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7. Still feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments
and decrees, the appellants/State have preferred the present
regular second appeal.
.
8. It is contended by Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, learned
Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants/State
that the learned First Appellate Court have not appreciated the
of
real point of controversy inter-se the parties and the impugned
judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate
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Court is perverse and thus, liable to be quashed and set aside.
He has further contended that the claim as put forward by the
plaintiff is stale and beyond the period of limitation and
learned First Appellate Court have not appreciated oral as well
as documentary evidence, therefore, on that count, the instant
appeal deserves to be allowed.
9. On the other hand, Mr. L.S.Mehta, learned counsel
for the respondents has defended the judgment and decree as
passed by the learned First Appellate Court and has submitted
that since the land of the respondents was utilized for the
construction of the road in question, therefore, in view of the
mandate as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, whereby
it has been repeatedly held that no person can be deprived of
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his property without following the due process of law, therefore,
the impugned judgments and decrees deserve to be upheld.
10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
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have also gone through the material available on the case file.
11. With the consent of the parties, the case is finally
heard at admission stage.
of
12. It is admitted fact that the land of the plaintiff
/respondents has been utilized by the defendants/State for the
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construction of road i.e. Karsog-Kunnu Road.
13. The First Appellate Court has held that the land of
the plaintiffs/respondents was utilized for construction of
Karsog-Kunnu Road without payment of compensation to them.
No dispute has been raised as to such findings of fact. It has
only been contended on behalf of the defendants/State that the
suit was filed by the plaintiffs after almost 35 years and the
same was time barred. In alternative, it was contended that
since the plaintiffs/respondents remained silent for such a long
period, they were estopped from raising the stale claim.
Principle of acquiescence has also been sought to be applied
against the plaintiffs/respondents on the premise that the
plaintiffs/respondents were aware about the construction of
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road and the road was constructed with their implied consent
and now they cannot, turn around to raise objections against
the construction of road.
.
14. The defendants/appellants are constituents of a
welfare State. It is well settled that the welfare State cannot
claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on
of
the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right
could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of
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adverse possession by the other.
15. Admittedly, the respondents/plaintiffs are the title
holder of the suit property. Being owner of the suit property,
they may file a suit at any stage until and unless the said right
is defeated by the present appellants/ defendants by perfection
of title by way of adverse possession.
16. Being the owners of the suit land, the
plaintiffs/respondents were well within their right to file a suit
for injunction and mandatory injunction since the suit land
was utilized by the State for construction of the road in
question without adopting due process of law including the
payment of amount of compensation.
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17. Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had
consented for construction of road through the suit land.
.
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that
no person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without
of
any legal sanction and without following the due process of law
and depriving her payment of just and fair compensation. The
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State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot
arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the
Constitution. The Court has held as follows:
“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
perused the record. 12.1. The Appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right toproperty was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article
31 in Part III of the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The StateOf Himachal Pradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31
guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could notbe deprived without due process of law and upon just and
fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a
welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300
A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
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property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be
inferred in that Article The State of West Bengal v. Subodh.
Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2 Tukaram Kana
Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his privateproperty, without following due process of law, would be
violative of a human right, as also the constitutional rightof
under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed
on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
rt ” 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300A of the Constitution, the State inexercise of its power of “eminent domain” may
interfere with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be for apublic purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, this
Court held that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also
a constitutional right, the same cannot be takenaway except in accordance with law. Article 300A
of the Constitution protects such right. The
provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right,
keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of
the Constitution of India, must be strictly
construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC
627.
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12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as
a basic human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
.
different political thinkers that some amount of
property right is an indispensable safeguard
against tyranny and economic oppression of theGovernment. Jefferson was of the view that liberty
cannot long subsist without the support of property.
of
“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist”
was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that
property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if
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other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus
among political thinkers and jurists.” (emphasis supplied)
12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7
this Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
powers of the State that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.
There has to be no deprivation without any sanction
of law. Deprivation by any other mode is notacquisition or taking possession under Article 300A.
In other words, if there is no law, there is nodeprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case,
the Appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law,
there is no deprivation.”
12.6 In this case, the Appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law, and
depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC
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596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is
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completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant
of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,
the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
of
property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed
on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &
Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State
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must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The
State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law
cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided
by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
held that the right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right
to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human
rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State
before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous
possession of the land for over 42 years, it would
tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a
welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of
adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a
person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title
over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be
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permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the
doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its
own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and
.
laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable
to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a
case of a continuing cause of action, or if the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.
Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
of
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in
the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon
the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
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claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no
period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise
their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which
state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put
forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to
them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other categories of similar cases,
etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that
lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from
seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of
T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32 or 226 of
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the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different
scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without
any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked
.
repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The
State must either comply with the procedure laid down for
acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate
of
person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has
been deprived of her private property by the State without
resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The
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Appellant has been divested of her right to property
without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over
half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a
continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily
expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal
sanction or following due process of law. The present case
is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since
the State has admitted that the land was taken over
without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any
procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary
jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the
Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to
the appellant.
19. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs.
State of H.P. and others has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
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process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this
dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King’s
Bench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir
Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, in.
several judgments, this court has repeatedly held that
rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the
State often has a higher responsibility in demonstratingthat it has acted within the confines of legality, and
therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule ofof
law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this
court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must
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be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and
even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v.
State of Punjab19 this court rejected the contention that
the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be
removed by an executive order, and instead concludedthat the executive action taken by the State and its
officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the ruleof law. This court, in another case – State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. 20, held:
“A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee,even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by
forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression ‘re-entry’
in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods
to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a
lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is
juridical possession and forcible dispossession is
prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise
than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact
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or better position. On the contrary, it is under an
additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that
all actions of Government and Governmental authorities
should have a ‘legal pedigree'”.
.
16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in
Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet
while acquiring land, the question remains – can the
of
State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its
legal responsibility towards those from whom private
property has been expropriated? In these facts and
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circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable,
and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and
fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s
actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the
injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them
to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of
acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred
only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend
the benefit of the court’s directions to those who
specifically approached the courts. The State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of
initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in
respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other
land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in
CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No.
1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage,
the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring
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land required for public use in the manner prescribed by
law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches
which conclude either way – as contended by both sides
.
in the present dispute – however, the specific factual
matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the
appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself
behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation;
there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in
of
a much earlier case – Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:
rt ’11……”Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
Where it would be practically unjust to give aremedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by hisconduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in asituation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to beasserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the
validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
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either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as relates to the remedy.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the
.
State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as
required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all
those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which
of
is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing Article
31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly
warranted consideration, and intervention by the
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High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction. This
court, in Manohar (supra) – a similar case where the
name of the aggrieved had been deleted from
revenue records leading to his dispossession from
the land without payment of compensation – held:
6″Having heard the learned counsel for the
appellants, we are satisfied that the case projectedbefore the court by the appellants is utterly
untenable and not worthy of emanating from anyState which professes the least regard to being a
welfare State. When we pointed out to the learnedcounsel that, at this stage at least, the State should
be gracious enough to accept its mistake and
promptly pay the compensation to the respondent,
the State has taken an intractable attitude and
persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and
reasonable claim of the respondent.
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the
rights available to the citizens are declared by the
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by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be
deprived of property save by authority of law.–No.
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find
utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of therespondent’s property by the appellants who are
State authorities. In our view, this case was anof
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…
rt
20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this court heldas follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)
“11”There are authorities which state that delay
and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.
Most of these authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong
done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory
dues, claim for educational facilities and other
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that
delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
remedy, even if his fundamental right has been
violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution,
the case at hand deals with a different scenario
altogether. The functionaries of the State took over
possession of the land belonging to the appellants
without any sanction of law. The appellants had
asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with
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-21- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
the procedure laid down for acquisition, or
requisition, or any other permissible statutory
mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
.
court finds that the contentions raised by the State,
do not inspire confidence and deserve to be
rejected. The State has merely averred to the
appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of
objection, but has not placed any material on record
of
to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was
unable to produce any evidence indicating that the
rt land of the appellants had been taken over or
acquired in the manner known to law, or that they
had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to
note that this was the State’s position, and
subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as
well, in the other writ proceedings.”
20. The similar position has been reiterated by the
Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491 of 2022,
titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh & another dated 20.10.2023. After relying upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi & SukhDutt Ratra’s
case, the Court held as follows:
“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that contention advanced by the State
of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:35:31 :::CIS
-22- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
liable to be rejected especially when it is not in dispute
that petitioner are suffering continuous loss coupled with
the fact that they repeatedly requested the authorities to
initiate acquisition proceedings.
.
8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it
clearly emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of
their land, without following due process of law. If it is so,ground raised by the respondents that petitioners have
made their land available with consent, is of noof
consequence rather, this court, having taken note of the
fact that the land of petitioners stands utilized for the
construction of road in question, is compelled to agree
rt
with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners
that her clients are entitled for compensation qua the landutilized by respondents for construction of road in
question.
10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for
construction of road but till date, they have not been paid
any amount, which action of the respondent-Statecertainly amounts to forcible dispossession of the
petitioners from their land, which is violative of provisioncontained under Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India.
14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed
Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has
held that entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area
and without workable roads, no communication is
possible; every person is entitled to life as enjoined in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India; every person has
right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to
move freely, throughout the territory of India; for the
residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life
itself. Stand taken by the respondents that there was a::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:35:31 :::CIS
-23- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
policy for providing roads on demand of residents as a
favour to them on conditions that they would not claim
compensation, cannot be sustained because such stand is
violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
.
15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of
Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that though right to property is not afundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right
under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also aof
human right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no
person can be deprived of his property save by the
authority of law. No doubt, State possesses the power to
rt
take or control the property of the owner of the land for
the benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged tocompensate the injury by making just compensation.”
21. The learned First Appellate Court, after appreciating
the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record and
on the basis of the title, decreed the suit as filed by the
respondents and have rightly came to the conclusion that they
are entitled for mandatory injunction with the direction to
acquire the portion of the suit land which has been utilized by
the present appellants for the construction of the road.
22. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that no
person can be deprived of his property without adopting due
process of law, therefore, under such circumstances, the plea
as set up by the appellants-State is not tenable in the facts and
circumstances of the case, once they have utilized the land of
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-24- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
the villagers without adopting due process of law. Now the plea
as raised by the present appellants is not permissible that too
at the stage of Regular Second Appeal. There are concurrent
.
findings of fact by the Courts below.
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments
has held that the first appellate is the final court of the fact. No
of
doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under
Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on
rt
limited grounds such as – (a) where the finding is based on
inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the
relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on
misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not
case in hand.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope
of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs.
Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that without
insisting for the statement of such a substantial question
of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the
same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been
issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals
without adhering to the procedure prescribed under
Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a
number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish
between a question of law and a substantial question of::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:35:31 :::CIS
-25- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
law. In exercise of the powers under this section in
several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate
court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept
in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an.
inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a
substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in
accordance with law in force at the relevant time. Theconditions mentioned in the section must be strictly
fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and noof
court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds.
The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable
grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be
rt
disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers
under this section. Further, a substantial question of lawhas to be distinguished from a substantial question of
fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v.
Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) heldthat : “The proper test for determining whether a question
of law raised in the case is substantial would, in ouropinion, be whether it is of general public importance or
whether it directly and substantially affects the rights ofthe parties and if so whether it is either an open question
in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or bythe Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free
from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.
If the question is settled by the highest court or the
general principles to be applied in determining the
question are well settled and there is a mere question of
applying those principles or that the plea raised is
palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial
question of law.
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-26- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
” 19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were
arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court.
should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the
trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has
rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, thesame is no ground for interference in second appeal when
it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactoryof
reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of
circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one
drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered
rt
by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other
approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however,interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by
the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to
the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settledposition on the basis of pronouncements made by the
Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence orarrived at by ignoring material evidence. 20. to 22 xx xx
xx xx
23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be
debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or abinding precedent, and must have a material bearing on
the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar
as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a
question of law “involving in the case” there must be first
a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question
should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact
arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to
decide that question of law for a just and proper decision
of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:35:31 :::CIS
-27- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
before the High Court is not a question involved in the
case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,
therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each
case whether a question of law is a substantial one and.
involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall
consideration being the need for striking a judicious
balance between the indispensable obligation to do justiceat all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis.”
of
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs.
Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:-
rt
“16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the
aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to bedetermined by a court of fact after appreciating the
evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate
court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a secondappellate court exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC
can interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds,such as, (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible
evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of relevantadmissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading
of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is notthe case here.
17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in
paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement
(Exb. A-2) made on the back of a registered document
(Exb. A-1) after considering the oral evidence led by the
plaintiff-appellant and the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were not
disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank
paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in::: Downloaded on – 03/04/2026 20:35:31 :::CIS
-28- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
paragraph 29 of its judgment was not addressed by the
High Court. In fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy
defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed that
genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our view, the.
High Court fell in error here. While exercising powers
under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have interfered
with the finding of fact returned by the first appellate
court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate
court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the
of
evidence available on record as also the circumstance that
signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document
(Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while
rt
disturbing the finding of the first appellate court, the High
Court did not hold that the finding returned by the first
appellate court is based on a misreading of evidence, or is
in ignorance of relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus,
there existed no occasion for the High Court, exercising
power under Section 100 CPC, to interfere with the finding
of the first appellate court regarding payment of
additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above
the sale consideration fixed for the transaction. 18. Once
the finding regarding payment of additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first appellate
court is sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold
that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not ready and willing to
perform its part under the contract particularly when Rs.
4,70,000, out of total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was
already paid and, over and above that, additional sum of
Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 &
D-2. This we say so, because an opinion regarding
plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform its part
under the contract is to be formed on the entirety of
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-29- ( 2026:HHC:9854 )
proven facts and circumstances of a case including
conduct of the parties. The test is that the person claiming
performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he
has treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to
.
fulfill his obligation and accept performance when the
time for performance arrives.”
26. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for
the parties.
of
27. Learned First Appellate Court has rightly
appreciated the Point in controversy after considering the oral
rt
as well as documentary evidence placed on record. No question
of law much less substantial question of law arises in the
present case.
28. In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of
any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
24th March, 2026.
(Nisha)
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