Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Jaysukhbhai Bhurabhai Vaishnav on 30 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/1902/2012 JUDGMENT DATED: 30/07/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1902 of 2012
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
à°
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
JAYSUKHBHAI BHURABHAI VAISHNAV & ORS.
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Appearance:
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Appellant(s) No. 1
MR YV VAGHELA(2450) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2
MS DIPMALA S DESAI(6596) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 30/07/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The appellant- State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal
under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 against the judgment and order of acquittal dated
31.07.2012 passed by the learned 2 nd Additional Special
Judge, Rajula (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”)
in Special Atrocity Case No.06 of 2011 whereby the Trial
Court has acquitted the respondents accused from the
charges under Sections 325, 323, 504, 506(2) r/w Section 114
of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as the
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“IPC“) Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act (hereinafter be
referred to as the “B.P. Act“) and Section 3(1)(x) of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocity)
Act, 1989 (hereinafter be referred to as the “Atrocity Act”).
2. The facts giving rise to present appeal are that the
complainant, Mansukhbhai Kalabhai Dafda, lodged a
complaint at Dhari Police Station, being C.R. No. II-52 of
2009, against the present accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC, Section
135 of the B.P. Act, and Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act
stating that on 06.08.2009 at about 18:00 hours, at
Vekariyapura, Village Dhari, Taluka Dhari, District Amreli,
accused No.1 threw a stick at Chandu. When the
complainant’s wife, Vimlaben, objected, accused No.1
assaulted her with a stick. When the complainant intervened,
accused No.1 inflicted stick blows on his head. Thereafter,
accused No.2 abused Vimlaben, caught hold of her hair and
assaulted her with fist blows. The village Sarpanch, Daxit
(Daku) Bhuva, intervened and rescued them. Thereafter,
accused No.1 threatened the complainant with dire
consequences and intentionally insulted the complainant and
Vimlaben by referring to their caste. Accordingly, the
complaint came to be lodged.
2.1 Pursuant to the complaint, investigation was carried out
and, on finding sufficient evidence, a charge-sheet was filed
before the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhari. As
the offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions,
the case was committed under Section 209 of the Code of
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Criminal Procedure and registered as Special Atrocity Case
No. 06 of 2011 before the Trial Court, Rajula. Charges were
framed for the aforesaid offences. The accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 17
witnesses and produced 19 documentary exhibits.
2.2 Upon conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court acquitted the
accused by the aforesaid charges vide judgment and order
dated 31.07.2012 in Special Atrocity Case No.06 of 2011.
3. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court in Special Atrocity Case No. 06 of
2011 the State of Gujarat has preferred the present appeal.
4. Heard Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the appellant
State, Mr. Y.V. Vaghela, learned counsel for respondent Nos.
1 and 2 and Ms. Dipmala S. Desai, learned counsel for the
respondent No.3.
5. Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court, while
acquitting the respondents-accused of the charges levelled
against them, has not assigned any cogent or convincing
reasons and has committed a serious error in acquitting the
accused.
5.1 Learned APP has submitted that the judgment and order
of acquittal is contrary to the evidence on record, based on
erroneous appreciation of material evidence, and has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice. The findings recorded by the Trial
Court are perverse and unsustainable in law, thereby calling
for interference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate
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jurisdiction.
5.2 Learned APP for the appellant has submitted that the Trial
Court failed to appreciate the evidence led by the prosecution
in its proper perspective, and therefore, the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal is bad in law, erroneous, and
illegal, and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
She has further submitted that the appeal deserves to be
allowed.
5.3 Learned APP has submitted that the Trial Court has not
properly appreciated the evidence led by the prosecution in
its true and proper spirit, and therefore, the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal deserves to be quashed and
set aside.
5.4 Learned APP has further submitted that the Trial Court
has committed a serious error of law and on facts while
recording the reasons and while appreciating the evidence led
by the prosecution.
6. Ms. Desai, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3
– original complainant, has adopted the arguments advanced
by the learned APP for the appellant and supported the case
of the prosecution. She has submitted that the Trial Court has
committed a serious error of law and on facts while passing
the impugned judgment and order, and therefore, the present
appeal deserves to be allowed.
7. As against the same, Mr. Vaghela, learned counsel for the
respondents-accused, has submitted that the prosecution
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miserably failed to establish whether the incident, as narrated
by the prosecution witnesses, had actually occurred or not.
7.1 Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has
submitted that, in the absence of material evidence, which
was not produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court,
and in view of the non-examination of relevant witnesses, it
appears that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of
the case. Therefore, the Trial Court has rightly passed the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
7.2 Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has further
pointed out to the Court that, as per the case of the
prosecution, initially the injured, i.e., the complainant and his
wife, were taken to Dhari PHC, where preliminary treatment
was provided, and thereafter, they were referred to Amreli
Civil Hospital.
7.3 Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has
submitted that no documentary evidence from Dhari PHC was
produced, nor was the doctor of Dhari PHC examined by the
prosecution to prove the case. Further, one of the important
witnesses, namely, Mamaji alias Guruji, who was referred to
in the deposition of the wife of the complainant, was not
examined by the prosecution for reasons best known to it.
7.4 Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has
submitted that it is also borne out from the evidence of those
witnesses that the wife of the complainant had given a written
complaint to the concerned District Superintendent of Police
at Amreli. However, no evidence has been produced by the
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prosecution regarding what action was taken pursuant to the
said application, whether such an application was actually
received, or whether any inquiry was conducted.
7.5 Learned counsel for the respondents-accused has
submitted that even the prosecution has not examined any
witness from the office of the District Superintendent of
Police. Therefore, under the circumstances, the prosecution
has failed to prove the charges against the present
respondents, and the Trial Court was right and justified in
passing the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
8. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order, as well
as the submissions advanced by the learned advocates for
both sides, the issues that arises for consideration before this
Court are as under:-
Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?
Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of
law or fact?
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?
8.1 In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal
of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as
the evidence recorded by the Trial Court, it is appropriate to
first examine the facts of the case.
9. On 06.08.2009, at about 18:00 hours, an incident occurred
at Vekariya Para, Dhari Town, Taluka Dhari, District Amreli,Page 6 of 20
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near the house of the present respondents. According to the
complainant (PW-1), some mischievous children rang the
doorbell of the respondents’ house and ran away. As a result,
respondent No. 1 came out of his house carrying a stick and
threw it towards those children. He was unaware that the
children were the complainant’s children. The stick thrown by
respondent No. 1 struck one of the children, namely Chandu.
Thereupon, Chandu’s mother, PW-2 Vimlaben, who is the wife
of the complainant, reprimanded the respondents. This led to
a verbal altercation, during which respondent No. 1 became
enraged and assaulted PW-2 Vimlaben by inflicting a blow
with the stick.
10. When this information was received by PW-1, i.e., the
complainant, while he was sitting at a pan shop situated in the
market, he rushed to the place, where he was also beaten by
the present respondent No. 1. In the said incident, respondent
No. 2, the wife of respondent No. 1, was also accompanying
him. That is how the incident was narrated by PW-1. The
prosecution examined 17 witnesses in support of its case and
also produced 19 documentary pieces of evidence. Now,
coming to the evidence led by the prosecution, PW-1 is the
complainant; PW-2 is also an injured witness; PW-3 has also
deposed as an eyewitness and is the brother of the
complainant; and PW-4 is the uncle of the complainant.
11. Except for these four witnesses, no one has supported the
case of the prosecution. Now, even if we look at the evidence
of PW-1 and PW-2 and the documentary evidence, namely, the
complaint at Exhibit 7, which was recorded on the next day,
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i.e., on 07.08.2009, there are material discrepancies between
the evidence of PW-1 and the FIR lodged by PW-1.
12. It was proved from the deposition of the Investigating
Officer that certain facts, which were not narrated in the FIR,
were stated before the Court for the first time. PW-3 and PW-4
are the close relatives of the complainant, being his brother
and uncle, respectively. None of the independent witnesses
have supported the facts of the case or the case of the
prosecution.
13. Even if we look at the place of the incident as per the
panchnama at Exhibit 21, it is evident that the incident took
place near the house of the present respondents, on a public
road. Since it was a public road used by the public at large, no
noticeable marks were found on the road. Neither any
bloodstains nor any other articles were found, which is
completely contrary to the case of the prosecution as narrated
by the witnesses, namely PW-1 to PW-4. Even according to the
case of the prosecution, after the incident was over, they were
immediately taken to the Dhari, PHC where they were given
immediate treatment, and thereafter, within a short span,
they were discharged from the Dhari, PHC. Thereafter, they
were referred to the Civil Hospital, Amreli, for further
treatment, where they were admitted as indoor patients and
received treatment.
14. For that, the prosecution has neither produced any
evidence nor examined the doctor of Dhari, PHC to prove
what primary examination was conducted by the doctor, what
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injuries were noticed by the doctor at Dhari, PHC and what
history was given by the complainant before the doctor. In the
absence of all these facts, the prosecution has failed to prove
the genesis of the crime in question. Even if we look at the
document at Exhibit 39, i.e., the M.L.C. certificate issued by
the Civil Hospital, Amreli, the doctor has merely recorded that
the injured had sustained assault injuries and was referred
from C.H.C., Dhari, at about 6:30 p.m. on 06.08.2009. The
name of the assailant was not given by the injured, and the
same is not reflected in the said document. It was also
mentioned in the injury certificate that the primary injury
certificate was to be collected from C.H.C., Dhari. This
indicates that PW-12, was not aware of the primary treatment
administered to PW-1 and PW-2, the actual injuries initially
noticed by the Medical Officer at Dhari, or the history
narrated by PW-1 and PW-2 to the doctor at the time of their
first treatment. During his cross-examination, the doctor was
specifically asked whether the injuries sustained by PW-1 and
PW-2 could have been caused by a fall on the road. In
response, he admitted that such a possibility could not be
ruled out and that the injuries were possible if a person had
fallen on the road.
15. It is further reflected in the injury certificate that an injury
was noticed on the right hand of PW-1. However, the
depositions of PW-3 and PW-4 do not make any reference to
any injury on the right hand of the complainant. This
constitutes a serious discrepancy in the evidence led by the
prosecution. Furthermore, the prosecution neither collected
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nor produced the primary injury certificate and other material
medical evidence before the Trial Court. In the absence of
such vital evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its
case against the present respondents beyond reasonable
doubt.
16. Now, considering the evidence of PW-14 and PW-15, both
witnesses have categorically deposed before the Court that,
during the course of investigation and while recording the
statements of the witnesses, no material disclosing the
ingredients of an offence under Atrocities Act was found.
Therefore, the offence under the Atrocities Act was not
initially incorporated in the FIR. This fact has also been
confirmed by PW-15, who was serving as the Deputy
Superintendent of Police in charge of the SC/ST Cell, Amreli,
and under whose supervision the investigation was conducted.
In the cross-examination of PW-15, it has clearly emerged that
the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under
Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act were not borne out from
the investigation papers. In such circumstances, the
prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge under
the Atrocities Act against the present respondents.
17. Now, So far as basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of
Atrocity Act is concerned, it is relevant to refer the decision of
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Versus
State Of Kerala reported in 2024-AIR(SC)-0-4557 more
particularly head notes (d) to (h) which reads as under:-
“(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – S. 438 – Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u) – decline to grant anticipatory bail – when can it be said
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that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint – held,
‘prima facie’ is a Latin term that translates to “at first sight” or
“based on first impression” – expression “where no prima facie
materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR” should be
understood as “when based on first impression, no offence is made
out as shown in FIR or complaint” – this means that when
necessary ingredients to constitute offence under the Act, 1989 are
not made out upon reading of complaint, no case can be said to
exist prima facie.
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – S. 438 – Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u), 18 – Constitution of India – Art. 226 – rejection of
application for anticipatory bail – legal bar – duty of Court – in
present case, an accused may argue that although allegations
levelled in FIR or complaint do disclose commission of an offence
under the Act, 1989, yet FIR or complaint being palpably false on
account of political or private vendetta, Court should consider plea
for grant of anticipatory bail despite specific bar of S. 18 of the Act,
1989 – however, if accused puts forward case of malicious
prosecution on account of political or private vendetta then the
same can be considered only by High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers u/S. 482 of CrPC or in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution – however, powers
u/S. 438 of CrPC cannot be exercised once contents of
complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie case – thus, if all ingredients
necessary for constituting offence are borne out from complaint,
then remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to accused –
duty to determine prima facie existence of case is cast upon courts
with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to
the accused – Courts should not shy away from conducting a
preliminary inquiry to determine if narration of facts in
complaint/FIR in fact discloses essential ingredients required to
constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 – it is expected of courts
to apply their judicial mind to determine whether allegations
levelled in complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy ingredients
constituting alleged offence application of judicial mind should be
independent and without being influenced by the provisions
figuring inLicenced to : Shri.Ashish Modi (Judicial Academy)
complaint/FIR – words “having committed an offence under this
Act” denote that it is only when accusation in complaint clearly
points towards commission of an offence under the Act, 1989 that
bar of S. 18 would apply – minimum threshold for determining
whether an offence under the Act has been committed or not is to
ascertain whether all ingredients which are necessary to constitute
offence are prima facie disclosed in complaint or not – accusation
which does not disclose necessary ingredients of offence on a
prima facie reading cannot be said to be sufficient to bring into
operation bar envisaged by S. 18 of the Act, 1989 – in cases like the
one in hand, Courts should have the discretion to look into
materials based upon which complaint has been registered, in
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addition to verifying the averments made in the complaint – if on a
prima facie reading of materials referred to in complaint and
complaint itself, ingredients necessary for constituting offence are
not made out, then bar of S. 18 would not be applicable – hence, it
would be open to Courts to consider plea for grant pre-arrest bail
on its own merits.
(f) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u) – whether averments in
FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence u/S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 held, no – in present case appellant is
alleged to have published a video on YouTube, containing a slew of
reckless statements in the form of allegations levelled against
complainant – there is nothing in transcript of uploaded video to
indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by
appellant only on account of fact that complainant belongs to a SC
– from nature of allegations made by appellant, it appears that he is
at inimical terms with complainant – his intention may be to malign
or defame him but not on ground or for reason that complainant
belongs to a Scheduled Caste – offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
is not established merely on fact that complainant is a member of a
SC or ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member
for reason that he belongs to such community – S. 3(1)(r) of the
Act, 1989 is attracted where reason for intentional insult or
intimidation is that person who is subjected to it belongs to a SC or
ST – object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide
stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted
towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the
reason of their caste status.
(g) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – S. 3(1)(r) – expression “intent to humiliate” –
words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in text of S. 3(1)(r)
of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to caste identity of person
who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation – not every
intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST
community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation – it
is only in those cases where intentional insult or intimidation takes
place either due to prevailing practice of untouchability or to
reinforce historically entrenched ideas like superiority of the
“upper castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables”, notions of
purity and pollution, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or
intimidation of type envisaged by the Act, 1989 – mere fact that
person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a SC or ST
would not attract offence u/S. 3(1)(r) unless it was intention of
accused to subject concerned person to caste-based humiliation –
humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a
psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart –
distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation –
resistance is internal to humiliation – thus, those who are
humiliated also inherently possess capacity to protest against it –
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however, those who protest also run risk of inciting opposition
from those who want to push traditionally humiliated groups to
margins – this apprehension of opposition and push back from
dominant against marginalised is also evident from Statements of
Objects of the Act, 1989 – thus, term humiliation as it appears in S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it
deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation
is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.
(h) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 – S. 7(1)(d) – Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 –
S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u), 18 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – S. 438 –
grant of anticipatory bail – legal bar – it is clear from a plain
reading of provision of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act that any insult
against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the
ground of “untouchability” was punishable with imprisonment for a
maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act – Civil
Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based
offences and the practice of “untouchability”, leading to enactment
of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for
combating such practices – S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus,
be seen in the context of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act – thus, words
“with an intent to humiliate a member of a SC or ST” become
inseparable from underlying idea of “untouchability” which is
sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989 – having
regard to reprehensible conduct and nature of derogatory
statements made, appellant, at best could be said to have prima
facie committed offence of defamation punishable u/S. 500 of IPC –
if that be so, it is always open for complainant to prosecute
appellant accordingly – however, complainant could not have
invoked provisions of the Act, 1989 only on premise that he is
member of SC, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of
transcript of video and complaint fails to disclose that actions of
appellant were impelled by caste identity of complainant.
18. In the decision in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir
Dhama Versus State Of U.P. reported in 2025 (4) Crimes
375 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: 3.
Punishments for offences of atrocities. (1) Whoever, not being a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (s) abuses any
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name
in any place within public view;
10. The expression any place within public view has been
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interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in
Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 0 INSC 132. Relying on
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 this
Court reaffirmed that:
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place within public
view, the place should be open where the members of the
public can witness or hear the utterance made by the
accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place
within the four corners of the wall where members of the
public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has
taken place at a place within public view.
11. A perusal of the Application filed by the complainant under
Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals that the alleged casteist abuses
were stated to have been used by the Appellants inside the
premises of the complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does
not satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were made in
any place within public view, which is an essential component of
the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of
the complainant cannot be considered to be within public view.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2 has not
been able to show that the complaint or the statement recorded
under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific averment that the
caste based abuses were hurled at a place within public view.
13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in concluding that
the incident occurred in public view. A careful reading of the
complaint makes it evident that the alleged castebased abuses
were uttered inside the premises, in the presence of the Appellants
and Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement of the
offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied.
14. Upon consideration of the submissions and scrutiny of the
material placed on record, we find merit in the contention raised
on behalf of the Appellants insofar as the applicability of the SC/ST
Act is concerned. On the allegations as they stand, a prima facie
case under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not made out against
the Appellants.
15. It is beyond dispute that the appellate powers are to be invoked
with due caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. It is
equally well established that the Court cannot delve into the
truthfulness or credibility of the allegations contained in the FIR or
complaint. The Appellate Court has to examine the contents of the
complaint as they stand. In the facts of the present case, the High
Court ought to have exercised its appellate powers to quash the
summoning order with respect to offences under the provisions of
the SC/ST Act.
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16. In view of the foregoing discussion and having found that the
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are not prima facie satisfied, we deem it appropriate to
interfere to that limited extent. Accordingly, the proceedings
initiated against the Appellants under the Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the trial insofar as it
pertains to the remaining offences under the IPC shall proceed in
accordance with law.”
19. Even in the decision in case of Karuppudayar Versus
State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Lalgudi
Trichy reported in 2025 (0) AIR(SC) 705, Gunjan @ Girija
Kumari Versus State (Nct Of Delhi) reported in 2026 (0)
AIJEL-SC 76984 and Talari Naresh Versus State Of Telangana
reported in 2026 (0) AIR(SC) 2499, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has taken a similar view. In the decision of this Court in the
case of State Of Gujarat Versus Laxmanji Sadaji Thakor
reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 36421 also similar view has been
taken by this Court.
20. In view of the above, the Court has rightly observed that
unless the basic ingredients required to attract the provisions
of Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are proved and
established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held
liable under the said provision. In the absence of the
fulfilment of such basic ingredients, the Trial Court has rightly
passed the impugned judgment and order in favour of the
present respondents.
21. In that circumstance the Trial Court has rightly passed the
impugned judgment in order in favour of the present
respondents and there was no any infirmity found in the
impugned judgment in order.
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22. Even with regard to proving the charges under Sections
325, 323, 504, 506(2) read with Section 114 of the IPC, unless
and until there is documentary evidence, namely, the
testimony of the doctor or the medical records relating to the
treatment provided to PW-1 and PW-2, the prosecution cannot
be said to have satisfactorily proved its case against the
present respondent-accused. Therefore, in the circumstances,
I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the
Trial Court.
23. In paragraph Nos. 10 to 17, the Trial Court has discussed
the evidence of the witnesses in detail. After considering the
submissions advanced by the parties and appreciating both
the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court
has assigned cogent reasons from paragraph 18 onwards.
Further, after referring to the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal. I am in complete agreement
with the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court.
24. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it
transpires that the respondent-accused has established his
innocence before the Trial Court and that, after due
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and
other material placed on record, the Trial Court has rightly
passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The
findings recorded by the Trial Court are just, proper and in
accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore,
no interference is warranted by this Court.
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25. It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
26. Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
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record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find
out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.
27. The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly
paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently re-
affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State
of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general
principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph
No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex
Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the trial Court.
28. It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:-
“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
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principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs.
State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court
while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The
principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and
weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the
Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of
guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High
Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses
and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the
brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing
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the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial
Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
29. Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
30. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any
error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record
and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled
against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it
clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and the present appeal
is liable to be dismissed.
31. In view of the above, the present appeal is devoid of
merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is
dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond
stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the
concerned Trial Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
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