Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Ajitsinh Navalsinh Zala on 24 July, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/351/2000 JUDGMENT DATED: 24/07/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 351 of 2000
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE S.V. PINTO
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
AJITSINH NAVALSINH ZALA & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR ROHAN SHAH, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR AM PAREKH(562) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MR KIRTIDEV R DAVE(3267) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s)
No. 1
NOTICE SERVED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 3,4
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE S.V. PINTO
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
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Date : 24/07/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL)
A] PRELUDE:
1. This is an acquittal appeal at the instance of the State filed
under Section 378(1)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
assailing the judgment and order dated 06.12.1999 passed in
Sessions Case Nos. 7 of 1999 by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Gondal, whereby, respondents herein – original accused
came to be acquitted of all the charges levelled against them.
B] FACTUAL MATRIX:
2. Filtered facts of the prosecution case are that on 25.08.1998 at
about 6:00 a.m. de facto complainant namely Bhikhabhai Savabhai
Sakariya was waiting to open the shop near gram panchayat office
as he wanted to purchase Bidi and at that time, he saw the all the
four accused waiting for someone and were whispering with each
other. At about 6:30 a.m. deceased Chanubha Ravubha Zala
passed through on his Luna motorcycle and upon seeing him,
respondent No. 2 herein – Jayantibhai Hansrajbhai Patel called
him and hence, deceased Chanubha went there, whereupon,
keeping grudge of the unopposed win of daughter-in-law of
deceased Chanubha in the gram panchayat elections for Sarpanch,
the accused gave abuses to him and then, started beating. As the
complainant intervened, the accused threatened him to kill andPage 2 of 28
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hence, the complainant left the place. The respondent No. 1 –
Ajitsinh Navalsinh Zala and respondent No. 4 – Shambhubhai
Hansrajbhai Patel were possessing sword stick dagger (Gupti) in
their hands, whereas, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 – Jayantibhai
Hansrajbhai Patel and Vallabhbhai Hansrajbhai Patel, respectively,
were possessing Knives in their hands. The accused severely
assaulted the deceased. After about 10 minutes therefrom, the
complainant saw respondent No. 3 – Jayantibhai Hansrajbhai Patel
passing near his residence. He also saw a sword hilt at the back of
head of respondent No. 3 and hence, frightened complainant, did
not come out from his home. Then, he went to the hospital to pay
the last visit of deceased Chanubha. Thus, all the accused, in
connivance with each other, committed the alleged offence for
which FIR came to be registered.
3. Pursuant to FIR, investigation was carried out. On
completion of investigation, Charge-sheet was laid before the
jurisdictional Magisterial Court. As the offences were Sessions
triable, case came to be committed to the Sessions Court at Gondal.
The learned Sessions Judge framed the Charge against the accused
for the aforesaid offences. Charge was read over the accused to
which they pleaded not guilty and hence, the trial commenced.
3.1 To bring home the charge against the accused, the
prosecution has examined as many as 23 witnesses and produced
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several documentary evidence, as reflected in the impugned
judgment and order.
3.2 On culmination of trial, Court acquitted all the accused of
the charges levelled against them. Hence, the grieved appellant
has filed this appeal against acquittal.
C] SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES
PRESENT:
4. Heard, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Rohan
Shah for the appellant – State and learned advocate Mr. Kirtidev R.
Dave for the respondent No. 1. Learned advocate Mr. A. M.
Parekh for the respondent No. 2 is not present when the matter is
heard. Though served, there is no representation on behalf of the
respondent Nos. 3 and 4.
4.1 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that
the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on
record in its true and proper perspective and thereby, has
committed a grave error in acquitting the accused, as aforesaid.
4.2 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that
ingredients of offence alleged, more particularly, the offence
punishable under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC were satisfied
from the evidence produced on record, however, the learned trial
Judge has erred in considering the same and thereby, the
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judgment and order of the trial Court in acquitting the accused
persons from the said charges suffers from manifest perversity.
4.3 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that
intention of the accused persons was to commit murder of the
deceased and it could very well be found from the fact that
keeping grudge of unopposed win of the daughter-in-law of the
deceased in the election of Sarpanch of the gram panchayat, the
accused persons, on the fateful day, stopped the deceased while he
was going on his motorcycle and then, abused and attacked the
deceased with Gupti and Knives, however, the learned trial Judge
has failed to consider this aspect and thereby, has committed a
mistake in evaluating the evidence on record.
4.4 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that
indisputably, the respondent No. 1 herein – Ajitsinh Navalsinh
Zala had, on the next day of the incident i.e. on 26.09.1998
surrendered himself before the police and he came to be arrested
accordingly, which fact itself proves involvement of the accused in
the crime in question, however, the learned trial Judge has failed
to consider this important aspect in its true and proper
perspective.
4.5 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted
that de facto complainant namely Bhikhabhai Savabhai Sakariya,
who is examined as PW-5 at Exh. 33 and PW-19 Hardevsinh @
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Bhagat Gotubha, who is examined at Exh. 65 both are eye-
witnesses to the incident and though, the complainant is partially
declared hostile, however, the learned trial Judge ought to have
taken into consideration the portion of his deposition to the extent
it is believable, however, the learned trial Judge has not considered
the same and thereby, has materially erred in evaluating the
evidence on record. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor
would submit that PW-19, another eye-witness has fully
supported the case of the prosecution, however, the learned trial
Judge has also disbelieved his evidence and thereby, also erred
materially in not believing his presence at the time of commission
of the offence.
4.6 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted
that even the medical evidence supports the case of the
prosecution, however, the learned trial Court has discarded the
said evidence without assigning any plausible reason therefor and
thereby, committed a grave error. He stated that blood of the
deceased was found on the clothes of the accused, more
particularly, respondent No. 2 herein – Jayantibhai Hansrajbhai
Patel. Further, he submitted that it has also come on record that
the accused persons also got injured in the incident in question,
however, the learned trial Judge has disbelieved the said evidence
and thereby, has committed a grave error.
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4.7 It is submitted that merely because of some minor
contradictions/omissions in the depositions of the eye-witnesses,
the entire prosecution case cannot be discarded and thus, the
learned trial Judge has materially erred in acquitting the accused
persons.
4.8 Thus, making above submissions, the learned Additional
Public Prosecutor urged that this appeal may be allowed and the
judgment and order of the trial Court acquitting the accused
persons from the aforesaid grave offence may be set aside and they
may be convicted and sentenced appropriately.
5. E contrario, the learned advocates for the respondent Nos. 1
and 2 – accused, while supporting the impugned judgment and
order, would submit that the impugned judgment and order of the
trial Court is based on due evaluation and appreciation of the
evidence on record requires no interference at the hands of this
Court inasmuch as the prosecution has failed to establish the case
against the respondents – accused beyond any reasonable doubt,
which is sine qua none in the criminal jurisprudence.
5.1 It is further submitted that after detailed appreciation of the
oral as well as the documentary evidence, the learned trial Court
recorded the findings that there are material contradictions in the
two key witnesses viz. PW-5 Bhikhabhai Savabhai Sakariya, Exh.
33 and PW-19 Hardevsinh @ Bhagat Gotubha, Exh. 65, who are the
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so-called eye-witnesses to the incident in question, upon whose
evidence, the entire case of the prosecution rests and accordingly,
has held that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges
levelled against the respondents – accused and thereby, has rightly
acquitted the accused.
5.2 Last but not the least, the learned advocates for the
respondents – accused would submit that this being acquittal
appeal and the accused having secured acquittal after full-fledged
trial, in view of double presumption in favour of the accused that
is, an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty and
the secondly, the trial Court record acquittal and accordingly, it is
urged that this Court may not interfere in this appeal against
acquittal and requested to dismiss the same.
5.3 In support of case, reliance is placed on a decision of the
Apex Court in Tota Singh v. State of Punjab, 1987 CJ (SC) 876.
D] FINDINGS:
6. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant – State as well as by
the learned advocates for the respective respondents – accused and
has also gone through the R&P of the learned trial Court
concerned.
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6.1 At the outset, if the principles governing the acquittal
appeals are taken in to consideration, it is well settled law that
when two views are possible from the evidence on record, the
view which is favourable to the accused shall be taken into
consideration by the Court. Further, it is also a settled that in
catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in acquittal appeals,
there is double presumption in favour of the accused; the first is
that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty and
the second is, the trial Court record acquittal and thus, the
presumption is further strengthened. In Constable 907 Surendra
Singh v. State of Uttarakhand with Ashad Singh Negi v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 (0) AIJEL-SC 74636, the Apex Court held:
“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and
others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149 a Bench of this
Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an
occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of
interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles
laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference
by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for
challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial
court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC
(Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field
after considering various earlier judgments and held as
below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)Page 9 of 28
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29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this
Court culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in
the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa
v. State of Karnataka,(2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432 , para 42)
42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regarding
powers of the appellate court while dealing with
an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts
no limitation, restriction or condition on
exercise of such power and an appellate court on
the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, substantial
and compelling reasons, good and sufficient
grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted
conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal.
Such phraseologies are more in the nature of
flourishes of language to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court
to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear
in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
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the presumption of innocence is available to him
under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly,
the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court.
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3
SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing
with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as
follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8)
8. 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens
the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is
required to consider whether the view taken by the
trial court is a possible view which could have been
taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and
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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible.
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment
of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the
accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the
following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; and41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused
is possible from the evidence available on record.
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the
interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned
trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the
judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same
is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the
view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the
evidence available on record.”
(emphasis supplied)
6.2 Further, Apex Court in the decision in State of Karnataka v.
Hemareddy @ Vemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417, has held:
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“6. We were taken through the Judgement of the learned Judges
of the High Court. We are satisfied that the learned Judges were
justified in coming to the conclusion on the evidence that
Hemareddy alias Vemareddy is guilty u/s. 467 read with sec. 114,
I. P. C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka is guilty u/s. 467, I. P. C. Since
we agree with the learned Judges of the High Court on the question
of fact in so far as it relates to A-2 in full and as regards
Hemareddy alias Vemareddy (A-2) in respect of his conviction u/s.
467 read with sec. 114, it is unnecessary for us to refer to the
evidence relied upon by the learned Judges for coming to the
conclusion that Hemareddy alias Vemareddy is guilty under
Section 467 read with sec. 114, I. P. C. and that Pyatal Bhimakka
is guilty under Section 467, I. P. C. This Court has observed in
Girija Nandini Devi V/s. Bigendra Nandini Choudry (1967) 1
SCR 93 that it is not the duty of the appellate Court when it
agrees with the view of the trial Court on the evidence to
repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the
reasons given by the trial Court expression of general
agreement with reasons given by the Court the decision of
which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice. We shall deal
with the case of the prosecution against Hemareddy alias
Vemareddy under Section 193. I. P. C. separately. We, therefore,
confirm the conviction of Hemareddy alias Vemareddy u/s. 467
read with sec. 114, I. P. C. and of Pyatal Bhimakka u/s. 467, I. P.
C. We are of the opinion that no interference with the Judgement of
the learned Judges of the High Court in regard to the sentence
awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka is called for having regard to the fact
that the learned Judges have given sufficient reasons for taking a
lenient view in regard to that accused on the question of sentence.
We, therefore, dismiss the Criminal Appeal in so far as it relates to
the question of sentence awarded to Pyatal Bhimakka.”
(emphasis supplied)
6.3 Thus, it is trite law that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of
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criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the benefit of acquittal by the trial Court. Further,
the appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if
it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be
recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt
of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no
other conclusion was possible. It is also a trite law that it is not the
duty of the appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the
trial Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence
or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of
general agreement with reasons given by the Court the decision of
which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.
E] EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE:
a] Evidence of Eye-witnesses:
7. Keeping in mind the afore-stated principles, if adverted to
the case on hand, it appears that to bring home the charge against
the respondents – accused, prosecution has examined 23 witnesses
and produced several documentary evidence. Out of the said 23,
according to the prosecution, two are the key witnesses viz. PW-5
Bhikhabhai Savabhai Sakariya, Exh. 33, who is the de facto
complainant, and another is PW-19 Hardevsinh @ Bhagat
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Gotubha, Exh. 65, who is stated to be the eye-witness and was
present at the time of incident in question. So far as the de facto
complainant (PW-5) is concerned, he has partly not supported the
case of the prosecution and is declared partly hostile.
7.1 Before taking into consideration the evidence of PW-19, it
would be apt to note that in criminal trial, to prove its case beyond
all reasonable doubt is sine qua none. and the evidence must be of
sterling and unimpeachable quality. At this juncture, a decision of
the Apex Court in Naresh @ Nehru and Others v State of Haryana
and Others, 2023 (0) AIJEL-SC 72586 would be worthwhile to
refer, wherein, the Court observed:
“9.3 As noticed hereinabove, the evidence of the eye-witness
should be of very sterling quality and calibre and it should not only
instil confidence in the court to accept the same but it should also
be a version of such nature that can be accepted at its face value.
This Court in the case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu alias Deepu Vs.
State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21 has held:
“22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness”
should be of very high quality and caliber whose
version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court
considering the version of such witness should be in a
position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation.
To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the
witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is
the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness.
What would be more relevant would be the
consistency of the statement right from the starting
point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness
makes the initial statement and ultimately before the
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court. It should be natural and consistent with the case
of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be
any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The
witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-
examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it
may be and under no circumstance should give room
for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the
persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a
version should have co-relation with each and every
one of other supporting material such as the recoveries
made, the weapons used, the manner of offence
committed, the scientific evidence and the expert
opinion. The said version should consistently match
with the version of every other witness. It can even be
stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the
case of circumstantial evidence where there should not
be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to
hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against
him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the
above test as well as all other such similar tests to be
applied, can it be held that such a witness can be
called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be
accepted by the court without any corroboration and
based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more
precise, the version of the said witness on the core
spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all
other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary
and material objects should match the said version in
material particulars in order to enable the court trying
the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other
supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of
the charge alleged.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.2 Based on the above, if the evidence of the above two
witnesses are tested, so far as de facto complainant (PW-5) is
concerned, his evidence is completely shaky and unreliable as
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there are material contradictions in the same. Furthermore, the
conduct of the witness raises serious concerns regarding his
reliability. The following circumstances cast a deep shadow of
doubt upon the veracity of his evidence:
a) “First,” the very presence of this witness at the scene of the
crime at the alleged hour is steeped in improbability. His assertion
that he was waiting at 06:00 a.m. solely to purchase a Bidi from a
shop that was yet to open appears contrived and fails to inspire
confidence;
b) “Second,” there is a stark and unexplained contradiction
between his initial version in the FIR (Exh. 76) and his sworn
testimony before the Court (Exh. 33). While in the complaint he
alleged the presence of all four accused persons, in his deposition he
resiled from that stance, restricting his account to respondent Nos.
2 to 4 alone and omitting any mention of respondent No. 1
(Ajitsinh Navalsinh Zala). Furthermore, his testimony remains
conspicuously silent on whether respondent No. 1 participated in
the alleged assault;
c) “Third,” the witness has displayed a glaring inconsistency
regarding visibility and identification. In his examination-in-chief,
he pleaded an inability to identify the assailants owing to darkness;
yet, during cross-examination, he made a complete turnaround and
purported to identify respondent Nos. 2 to 4;
d) “Fourth,” as per his own narrative in the FIR (Exh. 76), he
fled the spot immediately upon being threatened with dire
consequences by respondent No. 4 (Shambhubhai Hansrajbhai
Patel), thereby establishing that he had not witnessed the actual
occurrence or assault. Conversely, in his cross-examination (Exh.
33), he introduced an embellished version, claiming to have seen
accused Jayantibhai and Vallabhbhai armed with knives assaulting
the deceased, Chanubha. This major improvement seriously
damages his testimony;
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e) “Fifth,” his post-event conduct severely undermines his
credibility. Despite witnessing a serious crime and being
threatened, he inexplicably chose not to inform the police, his
family members, or the relatives of the victim immediately. His
silence until the afternoon, when he allegedly disclosed the incident
to the deceased’s son, is highly unnatural and inconsistent with
normal human conduct;
f) “Lastly,” in his FIR recorded at Exh. 76, he made no
reference whatsoever to the presence of PW-19 (Hardevsinh @
Bhagat Gotubha) at the time of the occurrence, raising serious
doubt as to the genuine narrative of the prosecution regarding
eyewitness presence.
7.3 In the light of the foregoing, where the testimony of the
witness is fraught with material contradictions and vital omissions
when juxtaposed against his first information report, and is further
tainted by entirely unnatural conduct, it would be extremely
unsafe to predicate a finding of guilt upon such inherently suspect
evidence.
7.4 So far as another eye-witness to the incident in question viz.
PW-19 Hardevsinh @ Bhagat Gotubha, who is examined at Exh.
65, is concerned, as per his statement, as he was to go to Muli
village of Surendranagar District, he went to the Gundala Bus-
stand early in the morning and as he wanted to have Pan, he went
near an electric pole near Panchayat office. As per his version, he
saw all the four accused standing nearby and on seeing deceased
coming on his motorcycle, accused Jayantibhai called him then, the
had exchange of words and then all the accused assaulted the
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deceased with Gupti and knives. From his deposition, following
aspects emerge:
a) “First,” as per the record, deceased, Chanubha, was a daily
visitor to the house of the witness’s father (PW-18, Exh. 64) for
tea, establishing beyond doubt that the family shared a close and
cordial relationship with the deceased;
b) “Second,” despite claiming to be an eyewitness to the
occurrence, his presence is conspicuously absent from the First
Information Report. Crucially, even the de facto complainant, in
his deposition at Exh. 33, makes no reference whatsoever to the
presence of this witness at the scene of the crime;
c) “Third,” the conduct of this witness during and immediately
after the incident casts a heavy shadow of doubt over his presence
at the spot. It defies logic that a witness closely acquainted with the
victim would remain a passive spectator to a brutal assault–
neither making an attempt to intervene nor taking any steps to
render medical assistance or rush the victim to the hospital after
the assailants fled. Such total inaction is wholly contrary to normal
human behavior and renders his presence at the scene deeply
suspect;
d) “Fourth,” despite the close familial ties between his father and
the deceased, the witness inexplicably maintained total silence
regarding the tragedy. He made no effort to inform his own father,
nor did he notify any member of the victim’s family, which further
underscores the veracity of this witness;
e) “Lastly,” while the witness asserts that he conveyed details
of the attack to Dharmendrasinh, the son of the deceased, the record
reveals that Dharmendrasinh himself failed to disclose this crucial
information to the police at the earliest opportunity. This failure
severely compromises the credibility of the alleged prompt oral
disclosure attributed to PW-19.
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7.5 It would be apt to refer to a decision rendered by the Apex
Court in Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401 : (2014)
2 SCC (Cri) 195] : (SCC pp. 410-11, para 19), wherein the Court
held that:
“19. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not
the number of witnesses but quality of their evidence which is
important, as there is no requirement under the Law of Evidence
that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to
prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle that evidence
must be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence
has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or
otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value provided by
each witness, rather than the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses.
It is quality and not quantity, which determines the adequacy of
evidence as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act.
Even in probate cases, where the law requires the examination of at
least one attesting witness, it has been held that production of more
witnesses does not carry any weight. Thus, conviction can even be
based on the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if the same inspires
confidence. (Vide Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [Vadivelu
Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCR 981 : AIR 1957 SC 614],
Kunju v. State of T.N. [Kunju v. State of T.N., (2008) 2 SCC 151 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 331], Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.
[Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011)
2 SCC (Cri) 150], Mahesh v. State of M.P. [Mahesh v. State of
M.P., (2011) 9 SCC 626 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 783], Prithipal
Singh v. State of Punjab [Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2012) 1 SCC 10 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and Kishan Chand v.
State of Haryana [Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2
SCC 502 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 807])”
7.6 Thus, a meticulous analysis of the depositions of these so-
called eyewitnesses brings to the fore glaring material
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root of the prosecution’s case. We are mindful of the settled legal
position laid down by the Supreme Court in Namdeo v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150, wherein the evidentiary value of
a sole credible witness was elaborately expounded, affirming that
a conviction can indeed be founded upon the uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness, provided such evidence is of sterling
quality.
7.7 To qualify as a ‘sterling witness’, the testimony must exhibit
unwavering consistency from inception to conclusion–starting
from the initial statement recorded during investigation up to the
sworn deposition before the Court. The account must be natural,
inherent, and fully aligned with the prosecution framework
regarding the role assigned to the accused, leaving no room for
prevarication, vacillation, or doubt. Such a witness must be
capable of withstanding the rigors of searching and strenuous
cross-examination without faltering on core aspects, such as the
factum of the occurrence, the identity of the assailants, or the
sequence of events. Furthermore, the version deposed must find
seamless harmony with every piece of corroborative material on
record–including recoveries made, weapons deployed, medical
and scientific evidence, and expert opinions–besides remaining
consistent with the testimony of other witnesses. It is only when a
witness passes this rigorous scrutiny that they can be elevated to
the status of a ‘sterling witness’ whose solitary testimony can form
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principles, both the complainant and the purported eyewitness fail
miserably to satisfy this standard. Their evidence, being fraught
with irreconcilable discrepancies and unnatural conduct, is
thoroughly untrustworthy and cannot be safely relied upon to
sustain a conviction.
7.8 Thus, what transpires from the prosecution’s case is, the two
witness are chance witness. The Apex Court in the decision in
Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200 : 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 150, at page 220 has held for chance witness as follows:
“Chance witness
29. A chance witness is the one who happens to be at the place of
occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of
course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A
person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence
can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see
an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed though
a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an
aspect which is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do
not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been
clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu
Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 817] : (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13):
“12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4
and 9 who are independent witnesses by labelling them as
chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being
chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have
clearly explained as to how they happened to be at the spot of
occurrence and the trial court and the High Court have
accepted the same.
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13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9
were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they
happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be
noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses.
There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they
had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder
trial by describing the independent witnesses as “chance
witnesses” it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is
suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders
are not committed with previous notice to witnesses;
soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a
dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural
witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passers-
by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside
or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere
“chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is
borrowed from countries where every man’s home is
considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation
for his presence elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is
quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are
less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter
explaining their presence.”
30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v.
State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC
719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] : (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23):
“21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal
Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410 : 2004 SCC
(Cri) Supp 105] this Court while considering the evidentiary
value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had
taken place in a street and a passer-by had deposed that he
had witnessed the incident, observed as under:
If the offence is committed in a street only a passer-by
will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed
aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground
that he was a mere chance witness. However, there
must be an explanation for his presence there.
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The Court further explained that the expression
“chance witness” is borrowed from countries where
every man’s home is considered his castle and
everyone must have an explanation for his presence
elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is quite
unsuitable an expression in a country like India where
people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in
the matter of explaining their presence.
22. The evidence of a chance witness requires a very
cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must
adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence
(Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC
192 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder Singh v. State of
Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC
253 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28], Acharaparambath
Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan
v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri)
241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh
Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness
whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful
should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan
[Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 579] ).
23. Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the
incident may also be taken into consideration particularly as
to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about
the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v.
State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284] ).
Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan
Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR and the fact of
conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18)
and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not
been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness
on this issue has not been examined by the prosecution.
Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of
the prosecution case relating to conspiracy. However, in the
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fact situation of the present case, acquittal of the said two co-
accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is
concerned.”
7.9 Thus, when tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid legal
principles, a scrutiny of the depositions of the two purported
eyewitnesses leaves their presence at the scene of the crime at the
early hour of 06:00 a.m. shrouded in severe doubt. Although an
attempt was made by these witnesses to account for their presence
near the pan shop, their explanations, for the detailed reasons
recorded herein above, fail to command belief or inspire judicial
confidence. A rigorous examination of their evidence reveals that
neither witness could offer a satisfactory explanation for their
presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, marking
them as mere chance witnesses. This doubt is further compounded
by their post-event conduct, inasmuch as neither witness made
any attempt to inform the villagers or any third party regarding
the incident, rendering their account wholly unnatural and
untrustworthy.
b] Evidence of other material witnesses:
i) Evidence of PW-1 (Bus Driver):
7.10 So far as the evidence of PW-1 (Hushenbhai Alibhai, Exh.
16), the State Transport bus driver posted at the Gondal Depot
who conveyed the deceased to the hospital following the incident
–is concerned, it is striking to note that he did not even inquire
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from the injured deceased as to the cause of his injuries.
Consequently, his testimony sheds no light on the involvement of
the respondent-accused.
ii) Evidence of PW-13 (Bus Conductor):
7.11 Similarly, the testimony of PW-13 (Laljibhai Shamjibhai, Exh.
55), who was performing duty as the bus conductor alongside PW-
1 on the date of the occurrence, offers no substantive assistance to
the prosecution case, beyond the undisputed fact that they
transported the victim to the hospital.
iii) Medical Evidence (PW-2):
7.12 Turning to the medical evidence, PW-2 (Dr. Rashmibhai
Durlabhji Shukla, Exh. 17), the Medical Officer on duty at the
Government Hospital, Gondal, admitted in his cross-examination
that Injury Nos. 1 to 3 could not have been caused by the seized
Gupti (muddamal weapon). With respect to Injury No. 4, his opinion
remained equivocal as to whether it could at all be inflicted by the
said weapon. Furthermore, under cross-examination, he conceded
that it could not be conclusively determined whether the internal
incised wounds on the 4th and 5th ribs were attributable to a sharp
or a blunt object.
c] Failure of Corroborative Evidence:
7.13 In the light of the fact that the two primary eyewitnesses are
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either unsupportive of the prosecution’s narrative or wholly
unworthy of credence, the remaining evidence, including the
Discovery Panchama, though supported by the Panchas, which at
best possesses merely corroborative character, cannot form the sole
foundation to displace the well-reasoned findings of acquittal
recorded by the learned trial Judge upon appreciating the
testimonies of the so called eyewitness in its true and correct
perspective, thereby, committing no mistake either in law or on
facts.
d] Benefit of Two Plausible Views:
8. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that where
two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate Court must lean toward the view that favors
the accused.
E] SUMMING UP:
9. Upon a thorough re-evaluation and re appreciation of the
entire evidentiary matrix, and after giving due consideration to the
submissions advanced by the learned Additional Public
Prosecutor as well as the learned advocates for the respondents,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the findings recorded
by the learned trial Court culminating in the acquittal of the
accused suffer from no perversity or manifest illegality. Hence, no
interference is warranted at our hands.
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9.1 It is well settled that where the appellate Court concurs with
the conclusions reached by the trial Court upon a reappraisal of
the evidence, it is not obliged to mechanically reiterate the entire
evidence or restate the reasoning in exhaustive detail; a general
expression of concurrence with the findings under appeal would
ordinarily suffice and for the reasons stated herein above we
concur with the findings of the trial Court.
9.2 In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no legal
infirmity or flaw in the findings recorded by the trial Court. The
Court below has meticulously appreciated the material on record
and arrived at a legally sound conclusion in acquitting the accused
of all charges.
F] CONCLUSION:
10. In fine, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, stand cancelled,
and the sureties are discharged. Registry is directed to return the
Record & Proceedings (R&P) to the concerned trial Court
forthwith.
[ S. V. Pinto, J. ]
[ P. M. Raval, J. ]
hiren/11tss24726+
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