Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Phirat Singh on 7 April, 2026
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2026:CGHC:15695-DB
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
PRASHANT
PRASHANT DEWANGAN
DEWANGAN Date:
2026.04.08
10:45:57
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FAM No. 41 of 2025
Reserved on 24/03/2026
Pronounced on 07/04/2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Korba, District Korba
(C.G.)
2 - The Land Acquisition Officer Cum Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue)
Podiuproda, District Korba (C.G.)
3 - The Executive Engineer Water Resources Division, Korba, District
Korba (C.G.)
... Appellants
versus
Phirat Singh S/o Guha Ram, R/o Village Jurali, Tahsil Podiuproda, District
Korba (C.G.)
... Respondent
For State/Appellants : Mr. Dilman Rati Minj, Dy. A.G.
For Respondent : Mr. Sunil Otwani, Sr. Advocate appears
alongwith Mr. Vikas Pandey, Advocate and
Mr. Amit Soni, Advocate.
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D.B:-Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV ORDER
Per: Sanjay S. Agrawal, J.
1. Heard on I.A. No.02/2025 and I.A. No.03/2025, applications
seeking condonation of delay of 616 days’ in preferring of this
appeal.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/State submits
that the order impugned passed on 22/12/2023 by the Land
Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority
(hereinafter referred to as “Authority”) constituted under Section 51
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act, 2013”), was forwarded by the Government
Advocate appearing before the said Authority to the Executive
Engineer, Water Resources Department, Division- Korba (C.G.),
who in turn, has sought for an opinion from him on 02/02/2024 and
in response to it, the said Government Advocate vide letter dated
14/02/2024 has opined for assailing the same. It is contended
further that in the meantime, an opinion was also sought from the
Office of Advocate General on 08/02/2024, where, an opinion was
given vide letter dated 19/03/2024 for challenging the same. Further
of his contention is that, on 09/07/2024, a permission was sought by
the Water Resources Department from the Department of Law and
Legislative Affairs for filing an appeal against the said impugned
order, where, permission was accorded on 19/11/2024 and, in
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pursuance thereof, the Officer-in-Charge, appointed on 10/05/2024
has contacted the Officer of the Office of Advocate General on
20/11/2024. It is contended further that the said Officer-in-Charge
was directed to bring all the necessary and relevant documents, as
well as, the certified copy of the order impugned and, in pursuance
to the said direction, he contacted the said office and supplied the
relevant documents and, based upon which, an appeal, being F.A.
(M) No.01/2025, was filed without any further delay. It is contended
further that, since there was some default(s) in preferring the same,
therefore, after its withdrawal on 14/11/2025, the instant appeal has
been preferred. While furnishing these materials, it is contended that
the alleged delay in preferring this appeal has been occurred
bonafidely and may be condoned in order to provide substantial
justice to the parties.
3. In response to the aforesaid contention, it is contended by the
counsel appearing for the respondent that, after passing of the order
impugned, the Land Acquisition Officer vide its letter dated
24/01/2024, had directed the Executive Engineer, Water Resources
Department to deposit the amount of compensation, but the same
was not deposited even though the direction was issued by this
Court vide order dated 01/08/2024 in WP(C) No.3906/2024. It is
contended further that the Contempt Case (C) No.3906/2024 was,
therefore, filed where a notice was directed to be issued on
10/12/2024, however, in order to get rid of it, the State Authorities
have filed the appeal on 09/12/2024, registered as FA(M)
No.01/2025, which shows the lack of bonafide on part of the
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appellants/State Authorities. It is contended further that since the
appeal was filed on 09/12/2024, therefore, the said Contempt
Petition was disposed of vide order dated 21/01/2025 (Annexure
R/2). It is contended further that the order impugned was passed on
22/12/2023, where as the opinion was sought from the Government
Pleader only, on 02/02/2024 and, no explanation was given why it
was not obtained immediately thereafter and, contended further that,
though the legal opinion was given on 19/03/2024 by the Office of
Advocate General to this effect, but the Officer-in-Charge was
appointed only on 10/05/2024 and, no explanation to this effect has
also been offered, and permission for filing an appeal was sought
again from the Law Department on 09/07/2024, i.e. after passing of
a considerable period of two months and, despite the permission
was accorded by the said Department on 19/11/2024, the appeal
was filed earlier on 09/12/2024 with default(s) and after its
withdrawal on 14/11/2025, the instant appeal has been preferred on
04/12/2025 with a delay of 616 days’ without offering any proper
explanation. Therefore, the application as filed in absence of offering
proper explanation of the huge delays deserves to be rejected.
4. From perusal of the record, it appears that the land owned by
the respondent situated at Village-Jurali, Tahsil- Pondiuproda of
District- Korba (C.G.) was acquired by the State Authorities for the
construction of Canal as per the award, dated 06/02/2019 passed by
the Land Acquisition Officer in Land Acquisition Case No.04/A-
82/2014-15. Since, the amount of compensation was inadequate, a
Reference Petition under Section 64 of the Act, 2013 was made
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before the Authority constituted under Section 51 of the Act, 2013,
who in turn has allowed the same vide its order impugned, dated
22/12/2023 passed in Reference Case No.48/2022 “Phirat Singh v.
State of C.G. and Others” enhancing the amount of compensation
payable to the respondent by the State Authorities.
5. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order impugned passed by
the Authority, the instant appeal has been preferred by the State
Government on 04/12/2025 under Section 74 of the Act, 2013, along
with the said applications for condonation of delay in preferring the
same while mentioning the reasons as contended herein-above by
the counsel appearing for the appellants in precedent paragraph.
6. It is, however, to be seen that, after passing of more than three
months from the date of the opinion given by the Office of Advocate
General on 19/03/2024, the Department of Water Resources vide its
letter dated 09/07/2024 sought an opinion again from the
Department of Law and Legislative Affairs, where sanction to prefer
an appeal was accorded on 19/11/2024 and, an appeal, being FA(M)
No.01/2025, was initially filed on 09/12/2024 under Section 74 of the
Act, 2013 with a delay of 292 days’. The said appeal was listed in
default(s) on 08/01/2025, but the same was not cured and instate,
the appeal so preferred, was withdrawn on 14/11/2025 without
offering any explanation as to why the default(s) was not cured for
such a considerable time, commencing with effect from 08/01/2025
up to 14/11/2025. No explanation, whatsoever has, infact, been
assigned from the date of filing of earlier appeal to the date of its
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withdrawal and, instate, the instant appeal has been preferred with a
huge delay of 616 days’.
7. Pertinently to be noted here further that, the Land Acquisition
Officer after passing the order impugned has directed the Executive
Engineer, Water Resources Department vide its letter dated
24/01/2024 to deposit the enhanced amount of compensation
payable to the respondent, however, the same was not deposited
and, when it was not deposited, a petition, being WP(C)
No.3906/2024, was filed by the respondent seeking an appropriate
directions to this effect. In the said petition, three months time was
granted to the appellants/State Authorities to deposit the same while
disposing the said petition, as revealed from the order dated
01/08/2024 (Annexure R/1) passed by this Court. It is to be seen
further that, though three months time was granted to deposit the
enhanced amount of compensation, but the same was not deposited
which led to filing of a Contempt Petition, being Contempt Case (C)
No.1433/2024, where a notice was directed to be issued on
10/12/2024. However, in order to get rid of it, the said sanctioned
appears to have been obtained on 19/11/2024 and, based upon
which, the earlier appeal, being FA(M) No.01/2025, was preferred on
09/12/2024 and, the appellants/State Authorities have succeeded to
get rid of the said contempt proceedings, as owing to filing of the
said appeal, the said Contempt Petition was disposed of vide order
dated 21/01/2025 (Annexure R/2) with the directions, made at para
7, as under:-
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“7. Having considered aforesaid contentions of learned
counsel for both the parties, though it is found that the
order under contempt has not been complied with by
respondents well within a time, but by filing FA No.2/2025
against the order dated 22.12.2023 passed by the
Tribunal, they have taken recourse to law, as such, no
case of contempt is made out at this stage.”
8. Be that as it may, the appeal, being FA(M) No.01/2025, so
preferred, was delayed by 292 days’ and was listed in default(s) on
08/01/2025. But, instead of removing the default(s), it was
withdrawn, much after that, i.e. only on 14/11/2025 though, sufficient
time for more than ten months’, was available to cure the same.
9. What is, therefore, reflected from the above facts that, despite
the legal opinion given by the Office of Advocate General on
19/03/2024 for assailing the order impugned, no sanction was
obtained immediately thereafter, i.e. within the prescribed period of
limitation of 60 days’ as provided under Section 74 of the Act, 2013
and, instate much after passing of a considerable period of more
than three and half months, a letter dated 09/07/2024 was written by
the Office of Water Resources Department to the Department of Law
and Legislative Affairs seeking sanctioned for preferring an appeal
and, even upon the sanction was accorded by the said Department
on 19/11/2024, the appeal, being FA(M) No.01/2025 was preferred
only on 09/12/2024 and, that too with an ulterior motive to get rid of
the said contempt proceedings, with a delay of 292 days’, and
despite of its listing in default(s) on 08/01/2025, it was not cured and
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withdrawn on 14/11/2025 and thereafter, the instant appeal has been
preferred on 04/12/2025.
10. It is, however, the settled legal position that, where the case
has been presented in the court beyond limitation, it is, then required
to be explained with proper reasons as to why, it was not preferred
in time and, unless and until the sufficient reasons are assigned, the
same cannot be condoned.
11. At this juncture, the principles laid down by Hon’ble the
Supreme Court in the matter of “State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Ramkumar Choudhary” reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3612, as
relied upon by the counsel appearing for the respondent, is to be
seen, wherein at paragraphs 5, 5.1 and 7, it has been held as
under:-
“5.The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has
to explain the Court as to what was the “sufficient cause”
which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In
Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, reported in SCC Online
SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to
be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A
reference was also made to the decision of this Court in
Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Rams, reported in 2023 SCC Online
SC 92, wherein, it was held as follows:
“13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special
9Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while
rejecting an application for condonation of delay for
lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph
15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent
a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
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14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that
the High Court did not commit any mistake in
dismissing the delay condonation application of the
present appellant.”
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone
the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts
and circumstances of each case and that, the expression
‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted, if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to
the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his legal heir (2024 SCC Online SC 489) , wherein,
one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring
to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite
party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably
extracted below:
“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very
clear that we are not going to look into the merits of
the matter as long as we are not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for condonation
of such a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the court long after
11the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and
say that no prejudice would be caused to either side
by the delay being condoned. This litigation between
the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his
decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to undergo the
rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned or
not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants,
it appears that they want to fix their own period of
limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction for
a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to
first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if
12the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that
the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter
for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation
is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep
the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.
XXX XXX XXX
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the
conclusion that the High Court committed no error
much less any error of law in passing the impugned
order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising
its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is
not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this
vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in
this case.
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36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and
is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to
costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the
present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court
correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for
the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at
the threshold.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we
must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is plea for condonation
of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State
the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the
limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3
years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the
period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute
the proceedings within that period of limitation. What
events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to consider what came
in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between
the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an
appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
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sufficient cause must establish that because of some event
or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was
not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can
constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the
limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal
being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State
of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495: AIR 1981 SC 733).”
12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as
observed herein-above, in the light of the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in the above referred matter, the explanation so
offered for the delay of 616 days’ in preferring of this appeal cannot
be held to be a sufficient one and, rather appears to have been
made with malafide intention. The applications are, thus, liable to be
and are hereby rejected with costs of Rs.15,000/- (Fifteen Thousand
Only), payable by the appellants/State to the respondent within a
period of 60 days’ from today, failing which, the same shall carry
interest @ 6% per annum from the date of passing of this order till
its realization and, the appellants/State may recover the same from
its erring officers. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
JUDGE JUDGE
Prashant
