Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Anish Toppo on 5 May, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
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2026:CGHC:20834-DB
Digitally signed by
ALOK SHARMA
Date: 2026.05.06
NAFR
16:50:42 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 1233 of 2026
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station Bagicha, District
Jashpur (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Anish Toppo S/o Prafull Toppo Aged About 18 Years R/o Village
Bamba (Bhandari), Police Station Bagicha, District Jashpur (C.G.)
2 - Prafull Toppo S/o Sukha Toppo Aged About 50 Years R/o Village
Bamba (Bhandari), Police Station Bagicha, District Jashpur (C.G.)
3 - Tarsisiya Toppo W/o Prafull Toppo Police Station Bagicha, District
Jashpur (C.G.)
.. Respondent(s)
:
For Petitioner/State Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate
General
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
05/05/2026
1. Heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General,
appearing for the State/Petitioner on I.A. No. 01, which is an
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application for condonation of delay of 52 days in preferring the
instant appeal.
2. The State/petitioner has preferred the instant application for grant
of leave to appeal as well as an appeal against the findings and
judgment of acquittal dated 17.11.2025, passed in Special
POCSO Case No. 28/2023 by the Court of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Jashpur, District Jashpur
(C.G.), whereby respondent No. 1 has been acquitted of the
offences punishable under Sections 363, 366-A, 376(3) and
368/34 of the IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have
been acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 368/34
of the IPC and Section 17 of the Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012, in connection with Crime No.
128/2023 registered at Police Station Bagicha, District Jashpur
(C.G.).
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner / State submits that though the
scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the
appellate Court nonetheless possesses wide powers of
reappreciation of evidence, and where such reappraisal reveals
that the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against the
weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to
reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently
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erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law.
Despite there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence
available on record establishing the guilt of the
accused/respondents, the learned Trial Court has erroneously
acquitted them on wholly insignificant, unreasonable, and legally
unsustainable grounds. Learned trial Court failed to appreciate
the circumstances and acquitted the respondents on account of
minor omissions and contradictions.
4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary
documents and information with respect to the case preferred the
present petition, however, some delay was occurred due to
fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the
Government machinery because the State Government is a multi
functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental
formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases
the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed
period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The
instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 52 days
from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed
upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996)
3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned
State counsel prays that the delay of 52 days in preferring the
petition may be condoned.
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5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3
SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a
party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that
in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
5accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red-tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper
explanation offered by the Department for the delay
except mentioning of various dates, according to us,
the Department has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the
appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of
delay.”
7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed
as follows:-
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“5. The legal position is that where a case has been
presented in the Court beyond limitation, the
petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was
the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach
the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was
held by this Court that even though limitation may
harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be
applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute.
A reference was also made to the decision of this
Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC
Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
“13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised
to the effect that where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
7condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit any
mistake in dismissing the delay condonation
application of the present appellant.”
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances
of each case and that, the expression
‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala,
J) was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should
not be excused as a matter of generosity and
rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant
passage of the same is profitably extracted
below:
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“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made
it very clear that we are not going to look into
the merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been
made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India when
it comes to condoning the gross delay of more
than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to
approach the court long after the lapse of the
time prescribed under the relevant provisions
of the law, then he cannot turn around and say
that no prejudice would be caused to either
side by the delay being condoned. This
litigation between the parties started sometime
in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years
have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of
justice if we condone the delay of 12 years
and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the
legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration
while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the appellants, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation
for instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is
held that a party has lost his right to have the
9matter considered on merits because of his
own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed
to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by
the party seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and
the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid the
merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy
and principles of equity. We should not keep
the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the
head of the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached
to the conclusion that the High Court
committed no error much less any error of law
in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its
10supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The appellants have failed
to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of
the present case, we are of the opinion that the High
Court correctly refused to condone the delay and
dismissed the appeal by observing that such
inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no
sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no
plausible reason was put forth by the State.
Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at
the threshold.
At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside
the delay occurred in preferring the second
appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude
on the part of the officials functioning in the
State machinery. Though the Government
adopts systematic approach in handling the
legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the officials
in merely communicating the information on
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time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present case is one
such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788
days occasioned in preferring the second appeal
due to the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though valuable
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion,
filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc.,
fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned,
and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if
any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which
we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of
time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea
for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a
private litigant or State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the limitation starts
and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4
years till the end of the same. For example if the
period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable to
institute the proceedings within that period of
limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day
till the last is of no consequence. The court is
required to consider what came in the way of the
party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day
and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to
wait until the last day of limitation for filing an
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appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not possible to
file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute
such sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation
which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire without
the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause
arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh
Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR
1981 SC 733).”
8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon
a select few.
9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, I find that the State has
failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the
delay in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the
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Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal
to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an appeal
against the impugned acquittal order dated 17.11.2025.
Thereafter, the case was processed, and the present petition was
ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events, lacking in
specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or
acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an
inordinate delay of 52 days.
10. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The
learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any
convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is
no justification for condoning the delay of 52 days in filing the
petition against acquittal.
11. In view of the above, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal
is hereby rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/- Sd/-
Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Alok