Karnataka High Court
Sri N Satish Babu vs State Of Karnataka on 23 April, 2026
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
R
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 3107 OF 2024 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI N SATISH BABU,
S/O LT SRI T NARASIMAHAIAH
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
OCC SUPERINTENDENT ENGINEER
PUBLIC WORKS PORTS AND INLAND
WATER TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT
BUILDING CIRCLE, 2ND FLOOR
KR CIRCLE, BENGALURU
R/AT 23/A, 6TH C ROSS,
3RD MAIN ROAD, JAYAMAHALL LAYOUT
BENGALURU - 560 046.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SANDESH.J.CHOUTA, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR
SRI. SHARATH CHANDRA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
Digitally LOKAYUKATA PS BENGALURU CITY
signed by REP BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
CHANDANA
BM OFFICE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA
Location: M S BUILDING, DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
High Court of BENGALURU 560 001.
Karnataka
2. SRI K G RAMAKRISHNA
S/O K P GANGARAJU
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT 06
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA
BENGALURU CITY, M.S. BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VENKATESH.S.ARABATTI, ADVOCATE)
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THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA, 1950 READ WITH SECTION 482 OF CPC, PRAYING TO QUASH
THE FIR AND COMPLAINT/SOURCE REPORT IN CRIME NO.03/2024 DTD
08.01.2024 REGISTERED BY THE R1 . KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE,
BENGALURU CITY AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN WHO IS
ARRAYED AS ACCUSED ALLEGING THE COMMISSIONER OF OFFENCE
PUNISHABLE U/S 13(1)(b) R/W SECTION 13(2) OF THE PREVENTION OF
CORRUPTION ACT, 1988 (AMENDMENT ACT 2018), WHICH IS PENDING
ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE XXIII ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
COURT, BENGALURU CITY, INSOFAR AS THE PETITIONER / ACCUSED IS
CONCERNED (PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURES-A AND B.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner was appointed as the Industrial Extension
Officer, Shikaripura, Industries and Commerce Department of the
Government of Karnataka on 24.10.1994 and continued to work in
the said Department till 2002, when he was appointed as a Junior
Engineer, PWD at Jagalur, Davanagere, and thereafter, promoted
to the post of Assistant Engineer, Executive Engineer, and
Superintendent Engineer, PWD, at Bangalore, from February 2023
onwards. The petitioner’s wife Smt.Sudha is also a public servant
having been appointed as the Child Development Officer in the
year 2002 and working under the State Government. It is
contended that the petitioner and his wife, both of whom are public
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servants have filed their timely income tax returns and also annual
property returns from time to time.
2. On 18.11.2023, the 2nd respondent – Dy.S.P.-
Lokayuktha filed a source report against the petitioner, in
pursuance of which, the Superintendent of Police passed an order
under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as
amended vide Amendment Act, 2018) (for short ‘the P.C.Act’),
granting approval / permission to register an FIR and investigate
against the petitioner – accused for alleged offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b) r/w Section 13(2) of the P.C.Act. In
pursuance of the said source report dated 18.11.2023, an FIR in
Crime No.3/2024 dated 08.01.2024 was registered against the
petitioner for the aforesaid alleged offences. In the said
proceedings, the Trial court issued a search warrant authorizing 1st
respondent – Lokayukha police to conduct search of the premises
belonging to the petitioner, which was accordingly searched on
09.01.2024, during the course of which, certain documents were
seized and reported in P.F.No.4/2024, P.F.No.15/2024, and
P.F.No.16/2024 before the Trial court.
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3. Aggrieved by the impugned source report and FIR,
petitioner approached this Court by way of the present petition
which was preferred on 25.01.2024.
4. In the first instance, vide final order dated 01.03.2024,
this Court quashed the impugned FIR and proceedings on the
ground that no preliminary enquiry was conducted before
registering the impugned FIR and according permission / approval
under the second proviso to Section 17 of the P.C.Act. Aggrieved
by the said order passed by this Court quashing the proceedings
against the petitioner, respondents – Lokayuktha approached the
Apex Court in Crl.A.No.2460/2025 arising out of
SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024. The said appeal was tagged / linked
along with other criminal appeals by the Apex Court with the lead
appeal being the case of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Police vs.
K.L.Gangadharaiah – Crl.A.No.2444/2025 arising out of
SLP(Crl.)No.12156/2023. By final order dated 06.05.2025, this
Court set aside the aforesaid order passed by this Court in the
present petition as well as the orders passed by this Court in the
remaining petitions and remitted the matter back to this Court for
reconsideration afresh in the light of the observations made by the
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Apex Court in its aforesaid final order. Accordingly, the present
petition was taken up by this Court and disposed of by the present
order.
5. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner and
learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on
record.
6. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in
the petition and referring to the material on record, learned Senior
counsel for the petitioner submits that a perusal of the source
report will indicate that the same is sketchy, which are incomplete
and lacking in necessary / material particulars, thereby warranting /
requiring conducting of a preliminary enquiry before registering the
impugned FIR and conducting investigation against the petitioner in
respect of the alleged offences. In this context, it was submitted
that while granting permission / approval to conduct investigation
by passing an order under the second proviso to Section 17 of the
P.C.Act, the Superintendent of Police had not applied his mind and
the said order granting permission was a cryptic, laconic, non-
speaking and unreasoned order without application of mind, as a
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result of which, the impugned FIR which was registered in
pursuance of the said order, deserves to be quashed.
6.1 It was also submitted that both the petitioner and his wife
being public servants and that the petitioner having worked for
more than 30 years and his wife for more than 20 years, the source
report and other material relied upon by the respondents do not
disclose that the petitioner possessed assets disproportionate to
their known sources of income within the meaning of Section
13(1)(b) of the P.C.Act and in the absence of any material to
establish that the petitioner had intention to enrich himself illicitly
during the period of his office, the petitioner cannot be incriminated
for the alleged offences and as such, the impugned FIR and
proceedings deserve to be quashed. In support of his submissions,
learned Senior counsel placed reliance upon the following
judgments:-
(i) The Karnataka Lokayuktha Police vs.
K.L.Gangadharaiah – SLP (Crl.) No.12156/2023 dated
06.05.2025;
(ii) State of Karnataka vs. T.N.Sudhakar Reddy –
2025 INSC 229;
(iii) State of Karnataka vs. Channakeshava Reddy
– 2025 INSC 471;
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(iv) G.Selvakumaran & Anr. Vs. State by Dy.S.P.,
Salem – Crl.O.P.No.12766/2021 dated 15.09.2021;
(v) CBI vs. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi &
Anr.- SLP (Crl.) No.1597/2021;
(vi) Shweta Mishra @ Sweta Mishra vs. The State
of Bihar – CR.MISC. No.42801/2025 dated 18.11.2025;
(viii) Prashant Kumar vs. The State of Bihar &
others – CR.MISC. No.26158/2025 dated 21.11.2025;
(ix) Meenakshi Khare & Another vs. The State of
Madhya Pradesh – W.P.No.33484/2025 Dated 28.01.2026;
(x) Nirankar Nath Pandey vs. State of U.P. &
Others – Crl.A.No.5009/2024 (SLP (Crl.)No.10101/2024)
dated 04.12.2024;
(xi) State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal – 1992 Supp(1)
SCC 335;
(xii) Udaya Ravi vs. State of Karnataka –
W.P.No.104906/2023 dated 20.12.2023;
(xiii) Shekharagouda vs. State of Karnataka
Lokayuktha – Crl.P.No.102951/2024 dated 21.04.2025;
(xiv) Ashish Dave vs. The State of Rajasthan &
Another – 2026 INSC 244.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents –
Lokayuktha invited my attention to the earlier order dated
01.03.2024 passed by this Court which quashed the impugned
proceedings on the ground that preliminary enquiry had not been
conducted which was reversed and set aside by the Apex Court in
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its aforesaid final order dated 06.05.2025 along with the other
matters with the lead case being K.L.Gangadharaiah and in view
of the finding recorded by the Apex Court that no preliminary
enquiry was required to be conducted / done by the respondents
before registration of FIR and / or obtaining permission / approval
under Section 17 of the P.C.Act, the said remand order of the Apex
Court had attained finality and was binding upon the petitioner, who
was not entitled to re-agitate the issue / question as to conducting
of preliminary enquiry in the present petition. It was submitted that
the source report, FIR and the order of the Superintendent of
Police under Section 17 of the P.C.Act was perfectly legal and
proper and there was no occasion / warrant for conducting a
preliminary enquiry and the various contentions urged by the
petitioner are liable to be rejected.
7.1 It was also submitted that the material placed by the
prosecution clearly established that the petitioner was guilty of the
alleged offences and the various contentions urged on merits
would necessarily have to be adjudicated upon after completion of
investigation and filing of the final report by the respondents and as
such, the present petition was not maintainable and liable to be
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dismissed. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places
reliance upon the following judgments:-
(i) State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta –
(2004) 1 SCC 691.
(ii) CBI v. Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi – (2021) 18 SCC 135.
(iii) State of Chattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh
– (2023) 6 SCC 559.
(iv) State through DSP v. R. Soundirarasu –
(2023) 6 SCC 768.
(v) State of Karnataka v. T. N. Sudhakar
Reddy – 2025 SCC OnLine SC 382.
(vi) State v. G. Easwaran – 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 643.
(vii) State of Karnataka v. Channakeshava H.D.
– 2025 SCC OnLine SC 753.
(viii) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of
Gujarat – (2025) 4 SCC 818.
(ix) The Karnataka Lokayuktha Police v. K.L.
Gangadharaiah – SLP (Crl.) No. 12156/2023 dated
06.05.2025.
(x) K. Veeraswami v. Union of India – (1991) 3
SCC 655.
8. By way of reply, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner
invited my attention to the earlier order dated 01.03.2024 passed
by this Court in the present petition as well as the order passed by
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the Apex Court setting aside the said order and remitting the matter
back to this Court for reconsideration in order to contend that the
Apex Court did not record any finding as to desirability of
conducting a preliminary enquiry and the Apex Court came to the
conclusion that conducting a preliminary enquiry was not
mandatory and no directions / findings regarding desirability were
given / recorded by the Apex Court and the said issue / question
was kept / left open to be decided by this Court in accordance with
law. It was further submitted that insofar as the prior approval /
permission under second proviso to Section 17 of the P.C.Act was
concerned, the only finding recorded by the Apex Court was to the
effect that such permission / approval could be granted either prior
to registration of the FIR or post registration of the FIR and all other
issues in relation to the said permission / approval including lack of
application of mind etc., were still kept / left open to be decided by
this Court after remand. It was therefore contended that the
impugned FIR and proceedings deserve to be quashed.
9. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
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10. Based on the rival contentions of the petitioner and
respondents, the following points arise for consideration in the
present petition;
(i) Whether the judgment of the Apex Court dated 06.05.2025
passed in case of Karnataka Lokayuktha Police vs.
K.L.Gangadharaiah – Crl.A.No.2444/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.12156/2023) along with connected matters including
the present Crl.A.No.2460/2025 (SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024), would
come in the way or have the effect of precluding the petitioner from
contending that conducting of preliminary enquiry prior to
registration of the impugned FIR was desirable / warranted /
required / necessary in the facts and circumstances obtaining in the
instant case?
(ii) Whether the source report dated 18.11.2023 submitted by
the 2nd respondent requires or warrants or makes it desirable for
conducting of preliminary enquiry by the respondents before
proceeding further in the matter?
(iii) Whether the impugned FIR is valid and sustainable in
law?
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(iv) Whether the order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the
Superintendent of Police – Lokayuktha under the second proviso to
Section 17 of the P.C.Act is valid and sustainable in law?
Re-Point No.1:-
11. At the outset, learned counsel for the respondents –
Lokayuktha contended that having regard to the fact that the earlier
order dated 01.03.2024 passed by this Court in the present petition
was set aside by the Apex Court in Crl.A.No.2460/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024) dated 06.05.2025, wherein it was held
that it was not necessary / essential for the respondents to have
conducted any preliminary enquiry prior to registration of the
impugned FIR, the petitioner is precluded from re-agitating the very
same issue / question once again; per contra, learned Senior
counsel for the petitioner would submit that in its aforesaid order
dated 06.05.2025, the Apex Court has come to the conclusion that
conducting of preliminary enquiry was not mandatory and the
question / issue as to whether preliminary enquiry ought to be
conducted or not would be dependent on the facts and
circumstances of a particular / given case and as such, it was open
for the petitioner to assail the FIR on the ground that preliminary
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enquiry was warranted / required / desirable in the instant case
having regard to the incomplete, inadequate, defective and sketchy
source report submitted by the 2nd respondent. In order to
appreciate the rival contentions, it would be apposite to extract the
earlier order passed by this Court in the present petition dated
01.03.2024, which is as hereunder:-
“This petition is filed by the petitioner/accused under
Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, read with 482 of
Cr.P.C for quashing the FIR in Crime No.3/2024 registered by
the Karnataka Lokayuktha police, Bengaluru, for the offences
punishable under Section 13(1) (b), read with 13(2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Amendment Act 2018)
(hereinafter referred to as ‘PC Act‘).
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned special counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2.
3. The case of the prosecution is that on the suo-motu
complaint registered by the Lokayuktha police, Bengaluru,
against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner was appointed
as Industrial Extension Officer, Shikaripura Industries and
Commerce Department on 24.10.1994. Then he was appointed
as Junior Engineer in 2002 and worked in various departments
of Public Works Department (for short ‘PWD’). Now he is
Executive Engineer in PWD. As per the source report collected
by the police on 18.11.2023, FIR has been registered, alleging
that during his tenure as public servant he has amassed wealth
to the tune of Rs.3,62,50,000/- about 110% disproportionate to
his known source of income in his name, from check period
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24.10.1994 till date. Accordingly, the investigation has taken up
which is under challenge. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently challenged the proceedings/investigation mainly on
the ground, that the DySP of Lokayuktha filed a source report
against the petitioner without conducting preliminary enquiry as
mandated under the law by the Lalita Kumari vs. Government
of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1,
passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. Further contended that the
superintendent of police without conducting preliminary
enquiry/verification and without satisfying himself of the
genuineness of the source report and without application of
mind, in contravention of the proviso to Section 17 of the PC
Act, had permitted the respondent No.1 to register the FIR and
conduct the investigation which is bad in law.
4. Learned counsel further contended, while according
the permission, the Superintendent of Police (SP), had not at all
considered that there is no preliminary enquiry or registering the
FIR and he should verify the preliminary enquiry and FIR, then
only accord the permission under Section 17 of the PC Act. But
the alleged permission reveals he has not verified any FIR and
no FIR was registered based upon the source report, the
permission has been granted. Therefore, conducting
investigation is bad in law and hence prayed for quashing
investigation. In support of his case, learned counsel for the
petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court as under:-
1. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in case of
State of Haryana & Ors. V. Bhajan Lal &
Ors.
2. WP No. 16028/2023 in case of
Shri. Pramod Kumar NG V. State of
Karnataka dated 14.12.2023.
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3. (2021) 5 SCC 469, in case of
Charansingh V. State of Maharashtra &
Ors.
4. W.P. No. 43817/2018 (GM-RES) in case of
Navaneeth Mohan N Vs. SHO, ACB,
Bengaluru dated 21.04.2021.
5. W.P. No. 15886/2022 (GM-RES) in case of
Balakrishna H.N. V. State of Karnataka by
ACB, Mysuru, dated: 03.01.2023.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent
Lokayuktha filed statement of objection contending that the
petitioner amassed wealth disproportionate to the known source
of income to the tune of Rs.3,62,50,000/- i.e., 110%. The
accused has purchased various properties and is leading lavish
life and purchased benami property in name of his wife, mother-
in-law and daughters. The matter is under investigation. The
SP after verifying the source report and then passed the order as
per proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act. He further contended
section 17 (a) of the PC Act, was amended on 26.7.2017.
Therefore, it is not applicable to the case. The petitioner cannot
seek relief under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, prayed for
dismissing the petition. In support of his contention learned
counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in case of ‘CBI Vs Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi alias
Vijayalakshmi reported in AIR (2021) 18 SCC 135 : 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 923 court 5041 and contended that this court
cannot verify and sit as a chartered accountant. The petitioner is
having right to file his documents and explanation. Therefore,
prayed for dismissing the petition.
6. Having heard the arguments, perused the records.
The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the Section 17, proviso 2 of the PC Act, was not followed,
which is mandatory in nature. Prior to according permission, the
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SP is required to verify the source report and should make
preliminary enquiry and to register FIR. Thereafter, shall pass
the order under Section 17 of PC Act, for investigating the
matter. But here in this case, no FIR was registered and based
upon the source report, he has accorded the permission under
Section 17 proviso 2 of the PC Act. In support of his case,
learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Bhajan lal’s case stated supra. Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held at paragraph 128 as under;
“128. The conspectus of the above decisions clearly
shows that the granting of permission under Section
5-A authorising an officer of lower rank to conduct
the investigation is not to be treated by a Magistrate
as a mere matter of routine, but it is an exercise of
his judicial discretion having regard to the policy
underlying and the order giving the permission
should, on the face of it, disclose the reasons for
granting such permission. It is, therefore, clear in
the light of the above principle of law that the
Superintendent of Police or any police officer of
above rank while granting permission to a non-
designated police officer in exercise of his power
under the second proviso to Section 5-A(1), should
satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient
reasons to entrust the investigation with such police
officer of a lower rank and record his reasons for
doing so; because the very object of the legislature
in enacting Section 5-A is to see that the
investigation of offences punishable under Section
161, 165 or 165-A of Indian Penal Code as well as
those under Section 5 of the Act should be done
ordinarily by the officers designated in clauses (a)
to (d) of Section 5-A(1). The exception should be for
adequate reasons which should be disclosed on the
face of the order. In this connection, it is worthy to
note that the strict compliance with Section 5-A(1)
becomes absolutely necessary, because Section 5-
A(1) expressly prohibits police officers, below
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certain ranks, from investigating into offences under
Sections 161, 165 and 165-A, IPC and under
Section 5 of the Act without orders of Magistrates
specified there- in or without authorisation of the
State Government in this behalf and from effecting
arrests for those offences without a warrant. See
also A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration“.
7. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Charansingh v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors, Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraph
Nos. 15 and 15.1 are as under;
“15. While expressing the need for a
preliminary enquiry before proceeding against
public servants who are charged with the allegation
of corruption, it is observed in P. Sirajuddin³ that:
(SCC p. 601, para 17),
“before a public servant, whatever be
his status, is publicly charged with acts of
dishonesty which amount to serious
misdemeanour or misconduct of indulging into
corrupt practice and a first information is lodged
against him, there must be some suitable
preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a
responsible officer. The lodging of such a report
against a person who is occupying the top position
in a department, even if baseless, would do
incalculable harm not only to the officer in
particular but to the department he belonged to in
general. If the Government had set up a Vigilance
and Anti-Corruption Department as was done in
the State of Madras and the said department was
entrusted with enquiries of this kind, no exception
can be taken to an enquiry by officers of this
Department.
It is further observed that: (P. Sirajuddin case³, SCC p.
601, para 17)“when such an enquiry is to be held for the
purpose of finding out whether criminal
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proceedings are to be initiated and the scope
thereof must be limited to the examination of
persons who have knowledge of the affairs of the
person against whom the allegations are made
and documents bearing on the same to find out
whether there is a prima facie evidence of guilt of
the officer, thereafter, the ordinary law of the land
must take its course and further enquiry be
proceeded with in terms of the Code of Criminal
Procedure by lodging a first information report.”
15.1. Thus, an enquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to
be permissible and not only permissible but
desirable, more particularly in cases where the
allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice
acquiring the assets/properties disproportionate to
his known sources of income. After the
enquiry/enquiry at pre-registration of FIR
stage/preliminary enquiry, if, on the basis of the
material collected during such enquiry, it is found
that the complaint is vexatious and/ or there is no
substance at all in the complaint, the FIR shall not
be lodged. However, if the material discloses prima
facie a commission of the offence alleged, the FIR
will be lodged and the criminal proceedings will be
put in motion and the further investigation will be
carried out in terms of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Therefore, such a preliminary enquiry
would be permissible only to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not and only
thereafter FIR would be registered. Therefore,
such a preliminary enquiry would be in the interest
of the alleged accused also against whom the
complaint is made.
8. Learned counsel also relied upon the coordinate bench
in Navaneeth Mohan’s case stated supra at paragraph Nos.15
and 16 as under;
“15. The source report which is part of
Annexure-A submitted before Superintendent of
Police, ACB, Bengaluru, the note of Superintendent
of Police, ACB do not indicate that along with the
said report any material was placed before him to
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grant permission to register the FIR and investigate
the matter. In the order of Superintendent Police
absolutely, there is no reference to submission of
any documents along with the source report. In one
stroke the Superintendent of Police says that he is
convinced that it is a fit case to register the FIR and
investigate the case. He does not even say that any
preliminary enquiry was conducted prior to placing
source report before him. Therefore, there is clear
violation of the direction issued by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Lalitha Kumari‘s case in
registering the FIR.
16. In the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Charansingh Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others in Crl.A.No.363/2021 dated 24.03.2021
relied upon by the learned Spl. Public Prosecutor
himself, in para 12 it was held that before
registering the FIR a preliminary enquiry shall be
conducted either confidential or open enquiry.”
9. Another coordinate bench in Balakrishna’s case
stated supra also taken similar view and has held at paragraph
12 as under;
“12. If the reasons rendered by Apex Court are
noticed, two factors would emerge one, that the
prosecution is required to draw up source report
after conducting some sort of a preliminary enquiry
to know the assets of the Government servant and
two, after the source information report is placed
before the Superior Officer – Superintendent of
Police, he has to verify as to whether a crime
should be registered or otherwise. If these
principles that would emerge from the judgment of
the Apex Court are considered qua the facts
obtaining in the case at hand, the registration of the
crime would fall foul of the principles laid down by
the Apex Court and that of this Court in the afore-
quoted judgment. Therefore, on this short ground
that the source information report disclosed blatant
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non-application of mind and non-conduct of
preliminary inquiry as is necessary in law only in
cases concerning disproportionate assets.
10. In view of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble
Supreme Court as well as coordinate benches of this court and
looking to the fact of the case, where the superintendent of
police have granted permission on 8.1.2024 and directed the
Dy.SP to investigate the matter. The said order has been
passed just based upon the source report submitted by one
Ramakrishna Dy.SP -06. On perusal of the order it does not
reveal the application of mind by the SP directing to register and
investigate the matter. Just that he has passed the order as per
the source report of the Dy.SP-06 and he has authorised to
register and investigate the case. But learned SP has not at all
applied his mind as to how the said figure was required to be
investigated and registered the FIR. The coordinate bench has
held in the Balakrishna’s case stated supra, the source report,
if makes out a cognizable offence, the police officer can register
the FIR by making a preliminary enquiry then forward the FIR as
well as preliminary enquiry report, along with the source report to
the SP for according permission to investigate the matter.
However, herein this case, it is a clear violation of the mandatory
provision of Section 17 (proviso 2) of PC Act. In the Charan
Singh’s case stated supra, has considered the same. Here in
this case, even if there is no preliminary enquiry to be conducted
by the police in order to know the veracity of the source report
and if the cognizable offence is made out, they have registered
FIR and then forwarded the same to SP for according the
permission to investigate the matter. In this case, after
according permission by the SP, the FIR has been registered.
Absolutely there is no preliminary enquiry conducted by police.
FIR was also not registered prior to order of SP. The coordinate
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bench of this court while considering the Lalita Kumari‘s case in
Balakrishna’s case stated supra had quashed the criminal
proceeding and another coordinate bench in WP.No.43817/2018
in Navaneeth Mohan’s case also had quashed the criminal
proceedings based upon the non-compliance of the guidance
issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Lalita Kumari’s
case and Charan Singh’s case stated supra.
Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the
case, there is clear violation of guidelines issued in Lalita
Kumari‘s case and Charan Singh’s case and in view of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal‘s case,
the prosecution launched by the respondent is abuse of process
of law. It is not a fit case for investigating the matter and FIR is
liable to be quashed.
Accordingly, this petition is allowed.
Consequently, the FIR filed against the
petitioner/accused in Crime No.3/2024 registered by the
Karnataka Lokayuktha police, Bengaluru, is hereby quashed.”
11.1 As stated supra, various Benches of this Court
quashed FIRs and proceedings arising out of alleged offences
punishable under Section 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) of the P.C.Act as
against various accused persons, aggrieved by which, the
respondents – Lokayuktha approached the Apex Court which
tagged / linked all the matters together with the lead case being the
case of Karnataka Lokayuktha Police vs. K.L.Gangadharaiah-
Crl.A.No.2444/2025 (SLP(Crl.)No.12156/2023) and the present
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proceedings in Crl.A.No.2460/2025 (SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024),
was tagged / linked along with the said matters and culminated in a
final order dated 06.05.2025 as hereunder:-
O R DE R
1. Heard.
2. Delay condoned.
3. Leave granted.
4. These appeals by special leave involve common
questions of facts and law and hence, the same are
being decided analogously by this order.
5. The appellants have challenged the orders passed by
the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (For short, “High
Court”) in writ petitions preferred by the respondents
herein, [the original writ-petitioners (Hereinafter, being
referred to as “respondents”.)], assailing the FIRs
registered against them by the Karnataka Lokayuktha
Police under the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (For short, “PC Act“.)
5. In the writ petitions, filed before the High Court, the
primary grounds laying challenge to the registration of the
FIRs were twofold: –
i. That no preliminary enquiry
whatsoever was conducted in accordance
with Section 9 of the Karnataka Lokayukta
Act, 1984 and hence, the direction given by
the Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayuktha to register the FIRs
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against the respondents for the offence/s
punishable under the PC Act, were illegal
and without jurisdiction.
ii. That the direction given by the
Superintendent of Police to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, for investigating
the cases pursuant to registration of the
FIRs, was contrary to the mandate of
Section 17 of the PC Act.
6. The High Court allowed the said writ petitions and
accepted the challenge laid by the respondents against
registration of the FIRs and further investigation on both
grounds referred to supra and quashed the said FIRs
having been registered without jurisdiction. One such
similar order was assailed by the State of Karnataka
and the Karnataka Lokayuktha Police by way of Criminal
Appeal No. 5001 of 2024 titled as State of Karnataka v.
T.N. Sudhakar Reddy – 2025 SCC OnLine SC 382,
wherein this Court reversed the judgment of the High
Court and affirmed the action of the Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha, in directing the
registration of the FIR and investigation thereof by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police without conducting any
preliminary inquiry.
7. During the course of hearing of the present
appeals, learned counsel representing the respondents,
candidly conceded that so far as the two pivotal issues
pertaining to the registration of the FIRs without a
preliminary inquiry being conducted and the power of
the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha to
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authorize investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police are concerned, the same are no longer res
integra and stand concluded against the respondents by
the judgment of this Court in T.N. Sudhakar Reddy
(supra) wherein, it was held as below:-
“51. In view of the above discussion, we
conclude that: –
a. The High Court erred in coming to
the conclusion that the order dated 4th
December, 2023, passed by the
Superintendent of Police, was directly
passed under Section 17 of the PC Act,
thereby violating the mandatory provisions
of the PC Act.
b. The preliminary inquiry is not
mandatory in every case under the PC
Act. If a superior officer is in seisin of a
source information report which is both
detailed and well-reasoned and such that
any reasonable person would be of
the view that it prima facie discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence, the
preliminary inquiry may be avoided.
c. Section 17 of the PC Act relates
specifically to the investigation process, and not
the initial act of registering the FIR, for which it
relies on the provisions of the CrPC. Hence, it
places limitations on only the investigation; it does
not impede the fundamental duty of the law
enforcement agency to record and register an
FIR for cognizable offences.
d. On a harmonious reading of the
provisions of the PC Act and the CrPC, it
is manifest that the Superintendent of
Police is competent to direct the
registration of an FIR if he has information
about the commission of a cognizable
offence, punishable under the PC Act. The
former is also competent to
simultaneously direct the Deputy
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Superintendent of Police to register an
FIR for the offences under the PC Act,
with the understanding that the
subsequent investigation will be subject
to the restrictions outlined in Section 17
of the PC Act. A composite order to register
the FIR and conduct investigation aligns with
the statutory framework of the CrPC and
the PC Act.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
8. Without prejudice to the above, the respondents’
counsel have asserted before us that in addition to the
above two grounds, relating to jurisdiction, numerous
other grounds touching upon the merits were raised by
the writ petitioners in their respective writ petitions which
were not adverted to by the High Court because the said
writ petitions were allowed on the above two preliminary
grounds only, finding the action of the Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha to be in teeth of the
provisions contained under the Karnataka Lokayukta
Act, 1984 and Section 17 of the PC Act.
9. They fervently urged that there was no foundational
material available with the Superintendent of Police,
Karnataka Lokayuktha so as to justify direct registration of
the FIRs, particularly those pertaining to the allegations of
amassing disproportionate assets punishable under
Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the PC Act.
10. The writ petitions came to be allowed on the
preliminary issues of jurisdiction and hence, various other
grounds raised by the respondents in their writ petitions
which touched upon the merits of the matter were not
dealt with by the High Court, thereby, causing grave
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prejudice to the respondents. Hence, they prayed that the
matters should be remitted to the High Court for fresh
consideration of the writ petitions on the issues and
grounds not adverted to by the High Court while deciding
the writ petitions.
11. To this submission, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant has no objection.
12. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
submissions advanced at bar and have gone through
the material placed on record.
13. Learned counsel representing the respondents
have fairly conceded to the position that the High Court
erred in quashing the FIRs on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Police to direct
registration of the FIR without a preliminary inquiry and
in authorizing the Deputy Superintendent of Police to
conduct investigation. Undeniably, these issues stand
concluded, and the reasoning assigned by the High
Court has been reversed by this Court in the case of
T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (supra) and which has been
followed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in State
of Karnataka v. Channakeshava H.D.- 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 753.
14. However, this Court is conscious of the fact that
the grounds taken by the respondents touching upon
the merits were not adverted to by the High Court because
the writ petitions were decided on the preliminary issues of
jurisdiction only. Hence, the respondents, [original writ
petitioners], were deprived of adjudication of other
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grounds raised in the writ petitions which has left them
remediless in view of the judgment in T.N. Sudhakar
Reddy (supra).
15. In view of the discussion made above, we hereby
quash the orders passed by the High Court and remit
the matters back to the High Court for fresh adjudication
of the writ petitions on merits. This consideration upon
remand shall be restricted to the grounds though taken but
not adjudicated by the High Court while deciding the writ
petitions.
16. Learned counsel for the respondents have brought
to the notice of this Court that owing to the orders
passed by this Court, permitting the Investigating
Agency to continue the investigation, chargesheets have
been filed against the respondents in some matters.
They, thus, urged that the respondents may be permitted
to assail the chargesheets in the writ petitions received
post-remand.
17. We, therefore, provide that in whichever cases
where the chargesheets have been submitted during
pendency of these appeals, the respondent/s (writ
petitioners before the High Court) concerned shall be at
liberty to assail the chargesheets in their respective writ
petitions, which shall stand revived pursuant to this
order. However, this liberty is limited to the extent of
assailing the chargesheets, if any, filed during pendency
of these appeals and shall not be taken as expanding
the scope of the writ petitions any further. Needless to
state that the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 do
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provide ample remedies to an accused to challenge the
orders passed by the trial Court whether interim,
interlocutory or final and thus, the aggrieved persons
would not be rendered remediless in any situation.
18. As the respondents were enjoying interim
protection, while the writ petitions were pending before the
High Court, we hereby direct that no coercive steps shall
be taken against the respondents for a period of six
weeks from today.
19. Accordingly, it is directed that the writ petitions
filed by the respondents before the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru shall stand restored to their
original numbers. We request the High Court to take up
and decide the writ petitions post remand expeditiously.
20. The impugned orders are set aside, and the
appeals are allowed in the above terms.
21. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
11.2 In pursuance of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex
Court, the present petition has been remitted back to this Court for
reconsideration afresh in accordance with law. A perusal of the
aforesaid judgment passed by the Apex Court will indicate that two
primary grounds laying challenge to the registration of FIR viz.,
non-conducting of preliminary enquiry in accordance with Section 9
of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984 and the direction given to
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the Dy.S.P. by the S.P. for investigating the cases pursuant to
registration of the FIRs was contrary to the mandate of Section 17
of the P.C.Act were taken note of by the Apex Court which placed
reliance upon its earlier judgment in T.N.Sudhakar Reddy’s case
and Channakeshava’s case supra, in order to come to the
conclusion that it was not mandatory to conduct a preliminary
enquiry before registration of the FIR and authorizing the Dy.S.P. to
conduct investigation; in fact, at paragraph-14 of its judgment, the
Apex Court took note of the concession made by the learned
counsel for the accused that as held in Sudhakar Reddy’s case
and Channakeshava’s case supra, conducting of preliminary
enquiry was not mandatory and accordingly, Ground No.1
extracted in paragraph-6 of its judgment was answered in favour of
the Lokayuktha; however, in the entire judgment, the Apex Court
did not address or deal with or record any finding as regards the
desirability or requirement of conducting preliminary enquiry and
merely held that conducting of preliminary enquiry was not
mandatory in every case and the question / issue as to whether a
source information report is both detailed and well reasoned and
such that any reasonable person would be of the view that it prima
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facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, preliminary
enquiry may be avoided, would necessarily have to be decided on
the basis of facts and circumstances which are case – specific and
dependent on the factual matrix obtaining in a particular case; in
other words, rather than laying down any proposition / rule of
absolute / universal application that a preliminary enquiry was not
required to be conducted in relation to the offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) of the P.C.Act, the Apex Court
categorically held that preliminary enquiry was not mandatory and
the requirement / desirability of conducting such a preliminary
enquiry would be completely and totally dependent on the facts of
each case.
11.3 Further, the Apex Court has specifically directed that
the matters be remitted back to this Court for fresh adjudication on
merits and the consideration upon remand shall be restricted to
grounds taken but not adjudicated upon by this Court while
deciding the present petition in its order dated 01.03.2024; in this
context, as stated supra, while allowing the present petition and
quashing the impugned FIR and proceedings, this Court came to
the conclusion that conducting of preliminary enquiry was
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mandatory and non-conducting of the same would vitiate the
impugned FIR and proceedings; however, this Court did not record
any finding that conducting of preliminary enquiry was desirable /
not desirable or warranted / not warranted or required / not required
and the said issue was not considered by the Apex Court in its
remand order and was accordingly, remitted back to this Court for
reconsideration afresh on all grounds including the said issue /
question as regards desirability / requirement of conducting a
preliminary enquiry. It follows therefrom that in the absence of any
finding recorded by the Apex Court while remitting the matter back
to this Court to the effect that conducting of preliminary enquiry was
not desirable / warranted / required, it cannot be said that the
petitioner is precluded from raising the said question / issue in the
present petition after remand and consequently, the said contention
urged by the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be
accepted; to put it differently, in the light of the unequivocal /
unambiguous directions issued by the Apex Court permitting the
petitioner to raise all grounds on merits without putting / imposing
any restriction as to the question / issue regarding desirability /
requirement of preliminary enquiry, I am of the considered opinion
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that the petitioner is not precluded from contending that conducting
of preliminary enquiry was required / warranted / desirable in the
facts and circumstances of the instant case.
11.4 Learned counsel for the respondents also alternatively
contended that in the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in
Vijayalakshmi‘s case supra, Sudhakar Reddy’s case supra and
Channakeshava’s case supra, conducting of preliminary enquiry
was neither desirable nor warranted or required to be done by the
respondent – Lokayuktha; in order to appreciate this contention, it
would be necessary to refer to the aforesaid judgments of the Apex
Court; in Vijayalakshmi‘s case supra, the Apex Court held as
under:-
“14. The rival submissions now fall for our
consideration. Based on the submissions, this Court is
called upon to decide two questions:
14.1. (i) Whether CBI is mandatorily required to
conduct a preliminary enquiry before the registration of an
FIR in every case involving claims of alleged corruption
against public servants; and
14.2. (ii) Independent of the first question, whether
the judgment of the High Court to quash the FIR can be
sustained in the present case.
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D. Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before
registering an FIR
D.1. Precedents of this Court
15. Before proceeding with our analysis of the issue,
it is important to understand what previous judgments of
this Court have stated on the issue of whether CBI is
required to conduct a preliminary enquiry before the
registration of an FIR, especially in cases of alleged
corruption against public servants.
16. The first of these is a judgment of a two-Judge
Bench in P. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras,
(1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] , in which it was
observed that before a public servant is charged with acts
of dishonesty amounting to serious misdemeanour, some
suitable preliminary enquiry must be conducted in order to
obviate incalculable harm to the reputation of that person.
G.K. Mitter, J. held that : (SCC p. 601, para 17)
“17. … Before a public servant, whatever be his
status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty
which amount to serious misdemeanour or
misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a
first information is lodged against him, there must be
some suitable preliminary enquiry into the
allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging of
such a report against a person, specially one who
like the appellant occupied the top position in a
department, even if baseless, would do incalculable
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harm not only to the officer in particular but to the
department he belonged to, in general.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The above decision was followed by another
two-Judge Bench in Nirmal Singh Kahlon [Nirmal Singh
Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 523] , wherein it was observed that in
accordance with the CBI Manual, CBI may only be held to
have established a prima facie case upon the completion of
a preliminary enquiry. S.B. Sinha, J. held thus : (SCC p.
456, para 30)
“30. Lodging of a first information report by CBI is
governed by a manual. It may hold a preliminary
inquiry; it has been given the said power in Chapter
VI of the CBI Manual. A prima facie case may be
held to have been established only on completion of
a preliminary enquiry.”
18. The most authoritative pronouncement of law
emerges from the decision of a Constitution Bench in Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] . The issue before the Court was
whether
“a police officer is bound to register a first
information report (“FIR”) upon receiving any
information relating to commission of a cognizable
offence under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 … or the police officer has the
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power to conduct a “preliminary inquiry” in order to
test the veracity of such information before
registering the same” (SCC p. 17, para 1).
Answering this question on behalf of the Bench, P.
Sathasivam, C.J. held that under Section 154 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC“), a police officer need
not conduct a preliminary enquiry and must register an FIR
when the information received discloses the commission of
a cognizable offence.
19. Specifically with reference to the provisions of
the CBI Manual, the decision noted : (Lalita Kumari case
[Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, paras 31-
35, 37-39, 83-86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105, 106-107, 111-
112, 114-119 and 120 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , SCC pp.
50-51, para 89)
“89. Besides, the learned Senior Counsel relied
on the special procedures prescribed under the CBI
Manual to be read into Section 154. It is true that the
concept of “preliminary inquiry” is contained in
Chapter IX of the Crime Manual of CBI. However,
this Crime Manual is not a statute and has not been
enacted by the legislature. It is a set of
administrative orders issued for internal guidance of
CBI officers. It cannot supersede the Code.
Moreover, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary in the Code itself, the provisions of the CBI
Crime Manual cannot be relied upon to import the
concept of holding of preliminary inquiry in the
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scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At this
juncture, it is also pertinent to submit that CBI is
constituted under a special Act, namely, the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and it
derives its power to investigate from this Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. However, the Court was also cognizant of the
possible misuse of the powers under criminal law resulting
in the registration of frivolous FIRs. Hence, it formulated
“exceptions” to the general rule that an FIR must be
registered immediately upon the receipt of information
disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence. The
Constitution Bench held : (Lalita Kumari case [Lalita Kumari
v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, paras 31-35, 37-39, 83-
86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105, 106-107, 111-112, 114-119 and
120 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , SCC pp. 59-60, paras 115,
117 & 119)
“115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold
that Section 154 of the Code postulates the
mandatory registration of FIRs on receipt of all
cognizable offences, yet, there may be instances
where preliminary inquiry may be required owing to
the change in genesis and novelty of crimes with the
passage of time. …
***
117. In the context of offences relating to
corruption, this Court inP. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v.
State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri)
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240] expressed the need for a preliminary inquiry
before proceeding against public servants.
***
119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims
regarding registration or non-registration, what is
necessary is only that the information given to the
police must disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is
mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is
made out in the information given, then the FIR need
not be registered immediately and perhaps the
police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification
or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as
to whether a cognizable offence has been
committed. But, if the information given clearly
mentions the commission of a cognizable offence,
there is no other option but to register an FIR
forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at
the stage of registration of FIR, such as, whether the
information is falsely given, whether the information
is genuine, whether the information is credible, etc.
These are the issues that have to be verified during
the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of
registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely
whether the information given ex facie discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. If, after
investigation, the information given is found to be
false, there is always an option to prosecute the
complainant for filing a false FIR.”
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(emphasis supplied)
21. The judgment provides the following conclusions
: (Lalita Kumari case [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014)
2 SCC 1, paras 31-35, 37-39, 83-86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-
105, 106-107, 111-112, 114-119 and 120 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] , SCC p. 61, para 120)
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we
hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no
preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not
disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be
conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable
offence is disclosed or not.
***
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to
verify the veracity or otherwise of the information
received but only to ascertain whether the
information reveals any cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. The
category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may
be made are as under:
***
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(d) Corruption cases
***
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not
exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. The Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari case
[Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, paras 31-
35, 37-39, 83-86, 89-92, 93-96, 101-105, 106-107, 111-
112, 114-119 and 120 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] thus held
that a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory when the
information received discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence. Even when it is conducted, the scope
of a preliminary enquiry is not to ascertain the veracity of
the information, but only whether it reveals the commission
of a cognizable offence. The need for a preliminary enquiry
will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
As an illustration, “corruption cases” fall in that category of
cases where a preliminary enquiry “may be made”. The use
of the expression “may be made” goes to emphasise that
holding a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory. Dwelling on
the CBI Manual, the Constitution Bench held that : (i) it is
not a statute enacted by the legislature; and (ii) it is a
compendium of administrative orders for the internal
guidance of CBI.
23. The judgment in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
was analysed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
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Yashwant Sinha [Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC
338] where the Court refused to grant the relief of
registration of an FIR based on information submitted by
the appellant-informant. In his concurring opinion, K.M.
Joseph, J. described that a barrier to granting the relief of
registration of an FIR against a public figure would be the
observations of this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]
noting that a preliminary enquiry may be desirable before
doing so. Joseph, J. observed : (Yashwant Sinha case
[Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338, paras 114-115
and 117] , SCC pp. 385 & 387-89, paras 108, 110, 112 &
114)
“108. Para 120.6 [of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari
v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] ] deals with the type of cases in which
preliminary inquiry may be made. Corruption cases
are one of the categories of cases where a
preliminary inquiry may be conducted. …
***
110. In para 117 of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari
v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] , this Court referred to the decision in P.
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras [P. Sirajuddin v. State
of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240]
and took the view that in the context of offences
related to corruption in the said decision, the Court
has expressed a need for a preliminary inquiry
before proceeding against public servants.
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***
112. In Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , one
of the contentions which was pressed before the
Court was that in certain situations, preliminary
inquiry is necessary. In this regard, attention of the
Court was drawn to CBI Crime Manual. …
***
114. The Constitution Bench inLalita Kumari
[Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] , had before it, the CBI
Crime Manual. It also considered the decision of this
Court inP. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v. State of
Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240]
which declared the necessity for preliminary inquiry
in offences relating to corruption. Therefore, the
petitioners may not be justified in approaching this
Court seeking the relief of registration of an FIR and
investigation on the same as such. This is for the
reason that one of the exceptions where immediate
registration of FIR may not be resorted to, would be
a case pointing fingers at a public figure and raising
the allegation of corruption. This Court also has
permitted preliminary inquiry when there is delay,
laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example,
over three months. A preliminary inquiry, it is to be
noticed in para 120.7 of Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari
v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] , is to be completed within seven days.”
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(emphasis supplied)
24. The decision of a two-Judge Bench in Managipet
[State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] thereafter has noted that while the
decision in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] held that a
preliminary enquiry was desirable in cases of alleged
corruption, that does not vest a right in the accused to
demand a preliminary enquiry. Whether a preliminary
enquiry is required or not will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and it cannot be said to be
mandatory requirement without which a case cannot be
registered against the accused in corruption cases. Hemant
Gupta, J. held thus : (Managipet case [State of Telangana
v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87, paras 33-34 : (2020) 3
SCC (Cri) 702] , SCC pp. 103-105, paras 28-30 & 32-34)“28. In Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] the
Court has laid down the cases in which a preliminary
inquiry is warranted, more so, to avoid an abuse of
the process of law rather than vesting any right in
favour of an accused. Herein, the argument made
was that if a police officer is doubtful about the
veracity of an accusation, he has to conduct a
preliminary inquiry and that in certain appropriate
cases, it would be proper for such officer, on the
receipt of a complaint of a cognizable offence, to
satisfy himself that prima facie, the allegations
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levelled against the accused in the complaint are
credible. …
29. The Court concluded that the registration of
an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code
if the information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is
permissible in such a situation. …
30. It must be pointed out that this Court has not
held that a preliminary inquiry is a must in all cases.
A preliminary enquiry may be conducted pertaining
to matrimonial disputes/family disputes, commercial
offences, medical negligence cases, corruption
cases, etc. The judgment of this Court in Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC
1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] does not state that
proceedings cannot be initiated against an accused
without conducting a preliminary inquiry.
***
32. … The scope and ambit of a preliminary
inquiry being necessary before lodging an FIR would
depend upon the facts of each case. There is no set
format or manner in which a preliminary inquiry is to
be conducted. The objective of the same is only to
ensure that a criminal investigation process is not
initiated on a frivolous and untenable complaint.
That is the test laid down inLalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524].
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33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows that
the information collected is in respect of
disproportionate assets of the accused officer. The
purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to screen wholly
frivolous and motivated complaints, in furtherance of
acting fairly and objectively. Herein, relevant
information was available with the informant in
respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a
cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer
recording the FIR is satisfied with such disclosure,
he can proceed against the accused even without
conducting any inquiry or by any other manner on
the basis of the credible information received by him.
It cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be quashed
for the reason that the preliminary inquiry was not
conducted. The same can only be done if upon a
reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is
disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a
judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] wherein, this Court
held inter alia that where the allegations made in the
FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused and also where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
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the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.
34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary
inquiry warranted in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v.
State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri)
524] is not required to be mandatorily conducted in
all corruption cases. It has been reiterated by this
Court in multiple instances that the type of
preliminary inquiry to be conducted will depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. There are
no fixed parameters on which such inquiry can be
said to be conducted. Therefore, any formal and
informal collection of information disclosing a
cognizable offence to the satisfaction of the person
recording the FIR is sufficient.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In Charansingh [Charansingh v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 469 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 617 :
(2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 52] , the two-Judge Bench was
confronted with a challenge to a decision to hold a
preliminary enquiry. The Court adverted to the ACB Manual
in Maharashtra and held that a statement provided by an
individual in an “open inquiry” in the nature of a preliminary
enquiry would not be confessional in nature and hence, the
individual cannot refuse to appear in such an inquiry on
that basis. M.R. Shah, J. writing for the two-Judge Bench
consisting also of one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) held :
(SCC pp. 479-82, paras 11, 14 & 15)
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“11. However, whether in a case of a complaint
against a public servant regarding accumulating the
assets disproportionate to his known sources of
income, which can be said to be an offence under
Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, an enquiry at pre-FIR stage is permissible or
not and/or it is desirable or not, if any decision is
required, the same is governed by the decision of
this Court in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of
U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524].
11.1. While considering the larger question,
whether police is duty-bound to register an FIR
and/or it is mandatory for registration of FIR on
receipt of information disclosing a cognizable
offence and whether it is mandatory or the police
officer has option, discretion or latitude of conducting
preliminary enquiry before registering FIR, this Court
in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] has
observed that it is mandatory to register an FIR on
receipt of information disclosing a cognizable
offence and it is the general rule. However, while
holding so, this Court has also considered the
situations/cases in which preliminary enquiry is
permissible/desirable. While holding that the
registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154,
if the information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary enquiry is
permissible in such a situation and the same is the
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general rule and must be strictly complied with, this
Court has carved out certain situations/cases in
which the preliminary enquiry is held to be
permissible/desirable before registering/lodging of
an FIR. It is further observed that if the information
received does not disclose a cognizable offence but
indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary
enquiry may be conducted to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not. It is observed
that as to what type and in which cases the
preliminary enquiry is to be conducted will depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
***
14. In the context of offences relating to
corruption, in para 117 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] , this Court also took note of the
decision of this Court in P. Sirajuddin v. State of
Madras [P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1
SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] in which case this
Court expressed the need for a preliminary enquiry
before proceeding against public servants.
***
15.1. Thus, an enquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to
be permissible and not only permissible but
desirable, more particularly in cases where the
allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice
acquiring the assets/properties disproportionate to
his known sources of income. After the
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enquiry/enquiry at pre-registration of FIR
stage/preliminary enquiry, if, on the basis of the
material collected during such enquiry, it is found
that the complaint is vexatious and/or there is no
substance at all in the complaint, the FIR shall not
be lodged. However, if the material discloses prima
facie a commission of the offence alleged, the FIR
will be lodged and the criminal proceedings will be
put in motion and the further investigation will be
carried out in terms of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Therefore, such a preliminary enquiry
would be permissible only to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not and only
thereafter FIR would be registered. Therefore, such
a preliminary enquiry would be in the interest of the
alleged accused also against whom the complaint is
made.
15.2. Even as held by this Court in CBI v. Tapan
Kumar Singh [CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6
SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305] , a GD entry
recording the information by the informant disclosing
the commission of a cognizable offence can be
treated as FIR in a given case and the police has the
power and jurisdiction to investigate the same.
However, in an appropriate case, such as
allegations of misconduct of corrupt practice by a
public servant, before lodging the first information
report and further conducting the investigation, if the
preliminary enquiry is conducted to ascertain
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whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not, no
fault can be found. Even at the stage of registering
the FIR, what is required to be considered is
whether the information given discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence and the
information so lodged must provide a basis for the
police officer to suspect the commission of a
cognizable offence. At this stage, it is enough if the
police officer on the basis of the information given
suspects the commission of a cognizable offence,
and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a
cognizable offence has been committed. Despite the
proposition of law laid down by this Court in a catena
of decisions that at the stage of lodging the first
information report, the police officer need not be
satisfied or convinced that a cognizable offence has
been committed, considering the observations made
by this Court in P. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v. State
of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240]
and considering the observations by this Court
inLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] before
lodging the FIR, an enquiry is held and/or conducted
after following the procedure as per Maharashtra
State Anti-Corruption & Prohibition Intelligence
Bureau Manual, it cannot be said that the same is
illegal and/or the police officer, Anti-Corruption
Bureau has no jurisdiction and/or authority and/or
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power at all to conduct such an enquiry at pre-
registration of FIR stage.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. Hence, all these decisions do not mandate that a
preliminary enquiry must be conducted before the
registration of an FIR in corruption cases. An FIR will not
stand vitiated because a preliminary enquiry has not been
conducted. The decision in Managipet [State of Telangana
v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702]
dealt specifically with a case of disproportionate assets. In
that context, the judgment holds that where relevant
information regarding prima facie allegations disclosing a
cognizable offence is available, the officer recording the
FIR can proceed against the accused on the basis of the
information without conducting a preliminary enquiry.
27. This conclusion is also supported by the
judgment of another Constitution Bench in K. Veeraswami
[K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991
SCC (Cri) 734] . The judgment was in context of Section
5(1)(e) of the old Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which
is similar to Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. It was argued
that : (i) a public servant must be afforded an opportunity to
explain the alleged disproportionate assets before an
investigating officer; (ii) this must then be included and
explained by the investigating officer while filing the charge-
sheet; and (iii) the failure to do so would render the charge-
sheet invalid. Rejecting this submission, the Constitution
Bench held that doing so would elevate the investigating
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officer to the role of an enquiry officer or a Judge and that
their role was limited only to collect material in order to
ascertain whether the alleged offence has been committed
by the public servant.
28. In his opinion for himself and Venkatachaliah, J.,
K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. held thus : (K. Veeraswami [K.
Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655, para 75 :
1991 SCC (Cri) 734] , SCC p. 715, para 75)
“75. … since the legality of the charge-sheet has
been impeached, we will deal with that contention
also. The counsel laid great emphasis on the
expression “for which he cannot satisfactorily
account” used in clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the
Act. He argued that that term means that the public
servant is entitled to an opportunity before the
investigating officer to explain the alleged
disproportionality between assets and the known
sources of income. The investigating officer is
required to consider his explanation and the charge-
sheet filed by him must contain such averment. The
failure to mention that requirement would vitiate the
charge-sheet and renders it invalid. This submission,
if we may say so, completely overlooks the powers
of the investigating officer. The investigating officer
is only required to collect material to find out whether
the offence alleged appears to have been
committed. In the course of the investigation, he
may examine the accused. He may seek his
clarification and if necessary he may cross check
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with him about his known sources of income and
assets possessed by him. Indeed, fair investigation
requires as rightly stated by Mr A.D. Giri, learned
Solicitor General, that the accused should not be
kept in darkness. He should be taken into
confidence if he is willing to cooperate. But to state
that after collection of all material the investigating
officer must give an opportunity to the accused and
call upon him to account for the excess of the assets
over the known sources of income and then decide
whether the accounting is satisfactory or not, would
be elevating the investigating officer to the position
of an enquiry officer or a Judge. The investigating
officer is not holding an enquiry against the conduct
of the public servant or determining the disputed
issues regarding the disproportionality between the
assets and the income of the accused. He just
collects material from all sides and prepares a report
which he files in the court as charge-sheet.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. Therefore, since an accused public servant does
not have a right to be afforded a chance to explain the
alleged disproportionate assets to the investigating officer
before the filing of a charge-sheet, a similar right cannot be
granted to the accused before the filing of an FIR by
making a preliminary enquiry mandatory.
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30. Having revisited the precedents of this Court, it
is now necessary to consider the provisions of the CBI
Manual.
D.2. CBI Manual
31. In the judgment in Vineet Narain [Vineet Narain
v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] ,
as three-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the
provisions of the CBI Manual must be followed by the
officers of CBI strictly, and disciplinary action should be
taken against those who deviate from them. J.S. Verma,
C.J. noted : (SCC pp. 269-70, para 58)
“58. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we
hereby direct as under:
I. Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”) and
Central Vigilance Commission (“CVC”)
***
12. The CBI Manual based on statutory
provisions of CrPC provides essential guidelines for
CBI’s functioning. It is imperative that CBI adheres
scrupulously to the provisions in the Manual in
relation to its investigative functions, like raids,
seizure and arrests. Any deviation from the
established procedure should be viewed seriously
and severe disciplinary action taken against the
officials concerned.”
32. In the later judgment of a two-Judge Bench in
Shashikant [Shashikant v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 630 :
(2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 406] , it was held that CBI cannot
be faulted for conducting a preliminary enquiry in
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accordance with the CBI Manual. S.B. Sinha, J. held
: (SCC pp. 635-37 & 639, paras 9, 11, 19 & 25)
“9. … It is also not disputed that the CBI
Manual was made by the Central
Government providing for detailed procedure
as regards the mode and manner in which
complaints against public servants are to be
dealt with.
***
11. The CBI Manual provides for a
preliminary inquiry. By reason thereof a
distinction has been made between a
preliminary inquiry and a regular case. A
preliminary inquiry in terms of Para 9.1 of the
CBI Manual may be converted into a regular
case as soon as sufficient material becomes
available to show that prima facie there has
been commission of a cognizable offence.
***
19. When an anonymous complaint is
received, no investigating officer would initiate
investigative process immediately thereupon.
It may for good reasons carry out a
preliminary enquiry to find out the truth or
otherwise of the allegations contained therein.
***
25. … The procedure laid down in the CBI
Manual and in particular when it was required
to inquire into the allegation of the corruption
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on the part of some public servants, recourse
to the provisions of the Manual cannot be
said to be unfair.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In Ashok Kumar Aggarwal [CBI v. Ashok
Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295 : (2015) 1
SCC (Cri) 344 : (2015) 3 SCC (L&S) 475] , a two-
Judge Bench observed that the provisions of the CBI
Manual require strict compliance. B.S. Chauhan, J.
held : (SCC p. 309, para 24)
“24. … the CBI Manual, being based on statutory
provisions of CrPC, provides for guidelines which
require strict compliance. More so, in view of the fact
that the ratio of the judgment of this Court in M.M.
Rajendran [State of T.N. v. M.M. Rajendran, (1998)
9 SCC 268 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1000] has been
incorporated in the CBI Manual, the CBI Manual
itself is the best authority to determine the issue at
hand. The court has to read the relevant provisions
of the CBI Manual alone and no judgment of this
Court can be a better guiding factor under such a
scenario.”
34. Hence, it is necessary to scrutinise the
provisions of the CBI Manual. Chapter 8 of the CBI Manual
is titled “Complaints and Source Information”. Para 8.1
notes that CBI must register every complaint it receives,
whatever be its source, before it starts verifying it. Para
8.6(ii) provides that verification can be undertaken for
“[c]omplaints containing specific and definite allegations
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involving corruption or serious misconduct against public
servants, etc. falling within the ambit of CBI, which can be
verified”. Paras 8.8-8.9 describe the process of verification
where the officers are to examine records informally and
discreetly without making written requisitions, and that this
process ordinarily should not take more than three months
but can take up to four months for complicated cases. Para
8.24 indicates that the officer entrusted with verification
must submit a detailed report at the end of the process with
specific recommendations, including whether a preliminary
enquiry is required or if a regular case should be registered
directly.
35. The FIR in the present case has been registered
on the basis of “Source Information”. Both during the
course of the hearing and in the affidavit filed by CBI, it has
been explained that CBI found information and documents
while investigating another case. Para 8.26 of the CBI
Manual notes that every officer of CBI can develop source
information “regarding graft, misuse of official position,
possession of disproportionate assets, fraud,
embezzlement, serious economic offences, illegal trading
in narcotics and psychotropic substances, counterfeiting of
currency, smuggling of antiques, acts endangering wildlife
and environment, cybercrimes, serious frauds of
banking/financial institutions, smuggling of arms and
ammunition, forgery of passports, etc. and other matters
falling within the purview of CBI and verify the same to
ascertain whether any prima facie material is available to
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undertake an open probe”. However, while doing so, they
are to keep their superior officer “well informed”.
36. Further, Para 8.27 describes the process once
such “source information” is developed and submitted to
the superior officer. It reads as follows:
“8.27. The source information once developed
must be submitted in writing giving all available
details with specific acts of omissions and
commissions and copies of documents collected
discreetly. The internal vigilance enquiries or
departmental enquiry reports should normally not be
used as basis for submitting the source information.
The SP concerned after satisfying himself that there
is prima facie material meriting action by CBI and
further verification is likely to result in registration of
a regular case, would order verification if it falls
within his competence. In the cases which are within
the competence of higher officers, he will forward his
detailed comments to the DIG and obtain orders
from superior officer competent to order registration.
The verification of SIRs must begin only after the
competent authority has approved its registration. At
this stage a regular SIR number will be assigned to
the SIR which will also be entered in the source
information sub-module of Crimes Module with all
other details.”
The superior officer thus has to verify whether
the developed “source information” prima facie
would result in the registration of a case by CBI; if
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yes, they then have to direct the verification of such
information. Verification is governed by Para 8.29,
which speaks of a process similar to Para 8.9. Para
8.32 provides that verification of “source information”
shall be completed within three months and approval
of the competent authority is required to carry out
verification beyond that period. Similar to Para 8.24,
under Para 8.33, the officer entrusted with
verification has to submit a report with specific
recommendations on whether a preliminary enquiry
is required or if a regular case should be registered
directly.
37. If a preliminary enquiry is necessary, it is
covered by Chapter 9 of the CBI Manual. Para 9.1 notes:
“9.1. When, a complaint is received or
information is available which may, after verification
as enjoined in this Manual, indicate serious
misconduct on the part of a public servant but is not
adequate to justify registration of a regular case
under the provisions of Section 154CrPC, a
preliminary enquiry may be registered after obtaining
approval of the competent authority…When the
verification of a complaint and source information
reveals commission of a prima facie cognizable
offence, a regular case is to be registered as is
enjoined by law. A PE may be converted into RC as
soon as sufficient material becomes available to
show that prima facie there has been commission of
a cognizable offence. When information available is
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adequate to indicate commission of cognizable
offence or its discreet verification leads to similar
conclusion, a regular case must be registered
instead of a preliminary enquiry. It is, therefore,
necessary that the SP must carefully analyse
material available at the time of evaluating the
verification report submitted by Verifying Officer so
that registration of PE is not resorted to where a
regular case can be registered…”
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, two distinct principles emerge from the
above : (i) a preliminary enquiry is registered when
information (received from a complaint or “source
information”) after verification indicates serious
misconduct on part of a public servant but is not
enough to justify the registration of a regular case;
and (ii) when the information available or after its
secret verification reveals the commission of a
cognizable offence, a regular case has to be
registered instead of a preliminary enquiry being
resorted to necessarily.
38. Paras 9.7-9.8 note that once it is decided that a
preliminary enquiry is required, a “PE Registration Report”
is required to be prepared. Para 9.10 specifies that in
cases of corruption, the preliminary enquiry should be
limited to a scrutiny of records and talking to the bare
minimum persons. Para 9.11 notes that the records should
be collected under a proper receipt memo (unlike the
process of verification) and that the statements herein
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should be collected in the same manner as they would be
at the investigation stage. However, it is clarified that
notices under Sections 91 and 160CrPC shall not be
resorted to during a preliminary enquiry. Paras 9.12-9.14
then discuss the procedure for converting a preliminary
enquiry into a regular case, which has to happen the
moment sufficient material is available which discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence which could result in
prosecution. Finally, Para 9.16 provides that a preliminary
enquiry must be completed within three months.
D.3. Analysis
39. The precedents of this Court and the provisions
of the CBI Manual make it abundantly clear that a
preliminary enquiry is not mandatory in all cases which
involve allegations of corruption. The decision of the
Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State
of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds
that if the information received discloses the commission of
a cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary enquiry
would be required. It also clarified that the scope of a
preliminary enquiry is not to check the veracity of the
information received, but only to scrutinise whether it
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
Similarly, Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes that a
preliminary enquiry is required only if the information
(whether verified or unverified) does not disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence. Even when a
preliminary enquiry is initiated, it has to stop as soon as the
officer ascertains that enough material has been collected
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which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. A
similar conclusion has been reached by a two-Judge Bench
in Managipet [State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19
SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the
proposition that a preliminary enquiry is mandatory is
plainly contrary to law, for it is not only contrary to the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] but would also tear apart the framework created
by the CBI Manual.
40. This view is also supported by the decision of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. State
of Maharashtra [Union of India v. State of Maharashtra,
(2020) 4 SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] , which
reversed the decision of a two-Judge Bench in Subhash
Kashinath Mahajan v. Stateof Maharashtra [Subhash
Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC
454 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 124] which had, inter alia, held
that “a preliminary enquiry may be conducted by the DSP
concerned to find out whether the allegations make out a
case under the [Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“the Atrocities Act”)]
and that the allegations are not frivolous or motivated”.
However, in the three-Judge Bench decision, it was held
that such a direction was impermissible since neither CrPC
nor the Atrocities Act mandate a preliminary inquiry. Arun
Mishra, J. held : (Union of India case [Union of India v.
State of Maharashtra, (2020) 4 SCC 761 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Cri) 686] , SCC p. 801, para 68)
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“68. The direction has also been issued that the
DSP should conduct a preliminary inquiry to find out
whether the allegations make out a case under the
Atrocities Act, and that the allegations are not
frivolous or motivated. In case a cognizable offence
is made out, the FIR has to be outrightly registered,
and no preliminary inquiry has to be made as held
inLalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] by a
Constitution Bench. There is no such provision in the
Code of Criminal Procedure for preliminary inquiry or
under the SC/ST Act, as such direction is
impermissible. Moreover, it is ordered to be
conducted by the person of the rank of DSP. The
number of DSP as per stand of the Union of India
required for such an exercise of preliminary inquiry
is not available. The direction would mean that even
if a complaint made out a cognizable offence, an FIR
would not be registered until the preliminary inquiry
is held. In case a preliminary inquiry concludes that
allegations are false or motivated, FIR is not to be
registered, in such a case how a final report has to
be filed in the Court. Direction 79.4 cannot survive
for the other reasons as it puts the members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in a
disadvantageous position in the matter of procedure
vis-Ã -vis to the complaints lodged by members of
upper caste, for latter no such preliminary
investigation is necessary. In that view of the matter
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it should not be necessary to hold preliminary inquiry
for registering an offence under the Atrocities Act,
1989.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. In a recent decision of a two-Judge Bench in
Vinod Dua v. Union of India [Vinod Dua v. Union of India,
(2023) 14 SCC 286 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414] , a
direction of the Court was sought for requiring “that
henceforth FIRs against persons belonging to the media
with at least 10 years standing be not registered unless
cleared by a committee…”. In refusing such a prayer, the
Court observed that doing so would be akin to instituting a
preliminary inquiry which was not mandated by the
statutory framework. U.U. Lalit, J. speaking for the Bench
held : (Vinod Dua case [Vinod Dua v. Union of India, (2023)
14 SCC 286 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414] , SCC para 86)
“86. … the directions issued in Subhash
Kashinath Mahajan [Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v.
State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454 : (2018) 3
SCC (Cri) 124] regarding holding of a preliminary
inquiry were not found consistent with the statutory
framework. The second prayer made in the writ
petition is asking for the constitution of the
Committee completely outside the scope of the
statutory framework. Similar such exercise of
directing constitution of a Committee was found
inconsistent with the statutory framework in the
decisions discussed above. … Any relief granted in
terms of second prayer would certainly, in our view,
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amount to encroachment upon the field reserved for
the legislature. We have, therefore, no hesitation in
rejecting the prayer and dismissing the writ petition
to that extent.”
42. In view of the above discussion, we hold that
since the institution of a preliminary enquiry in cases of
corruption is not made mandatory before the registration of
an FIR under CrPC, the PC Act or even the CBI Manual,
for this Court to issue a direction to that effect will be
tantamount to stepping into the legislative domain. Hence,
we hold that in case the information received by CBI,
through a complaint or a “source information” under
Chapter 8, discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, it can directly register a regular case instead of
conducting a preliminary enquiry, where the officer is
satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence.
43. The above formulation does not take away from
the value of conducting a preliminary enquiry in an
appropriate case. This has been acknowledged by the
decisions of this Court in P. Sirajuddin [P. Sirajuddin v.
State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] ,
Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC
1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] and Charansingh [Charansingh
v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 469 : (2021) 2 SCC
(Cri) 617 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 52] . Even in Vinod Dua
[Vinod Dua v. Union of India, (2023) 14 SCC 286 : 2021
SCC OnLine SC 414] , this Court noted that “[a]s a matter
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of fact, the accepted norm — be it in the form of the CBI
Manual or like instruments is to insist on a preliminary
inquiry”. The registration of a regular case can have
disastrous consequences for the career of an officer, if the
allegations ultimately turn out to be false. In a preliminary
enquiry, CBI is allowed access to documentary records and
speak to persons just as they would in an investigation,
which entails that information gathered can be used at the
investigation stage as well. Hence, conducting a
preliminary enquiry would not take away from the ultimate
goal of prosecuting accused persons in a timely manner.
However, we once again clarify that if CBI chooses not to
hold a preliminary enquiry, the accused cannot demand it
as a matter of right. As clarified by this Court in Managipet
[State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 702] , the purpose of Lalita Kumari
[Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] noting that a preliminary enquiry is valuable
in corruption cases was not to vest a right in the accused
but to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of law in
order to target public servants.
11.5 In Sudhakar Reddy’s case supra, the Apex Court
held as under:-
13. The core questions which arise for our
consideration in the present case are as follows:–
A. Whether a preliminary inquiry was mandatory
before directing registration of an FIR under the
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PC Act in the facts of the case at hand or whether
the source information report could be treated to
be a substitute for the preliminary inquiry?
B. Whether the Order dated 4th November, 2023,
passed by the Superintendent of Police under
Section 17 of the PC Act, is sustainable in the eyes
of law?
Issue A : Whether a preliminary inquiry was mandatory
before directing registration of an FIR under the PC Act
in the facts of the case at hand or whether the source
information report could be treated to be a substitute
for the preliminary inquiry?
14. It is the case of the appellant-State that
preliminary inquiry is not mandatory before registration of
an FIR. Without prejudice to the above, it is contended that
the source information report submitted by the Police
Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station to the
Superintendent of Police, detailing acquisition of assets by
the respondent disproportionate to his known sources of
income, itself serves as a preliminary inquiry report as it
was elaborate enough to disclose a prima facie case for the
offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12
read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
respondent would urge that the Superintendent of Police
acted in gross violation of law while issuing an order to the
Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an FIR as
preliminary inquiry in ‘corruption cases’ is a condition
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precedent for registration of the FIR. Further, preliminary
inquiry can only be conducted by a police officer, who is
competent to investigate the offence, and thus, a source
information report, however detailed, cannot be taken to be
a substitute for a preliminary inquiry.
16. In addressing this issue, we must first consider
the legal framework established by this Court in a catena of
decisions, particularly in P. Sirajuddin (supra), Lalita
Kumari (supra), Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi (supra), and Managipet (supra). This Court
in P. Sirajuddin (supra) has held that before any public
servant is charged with any acts of dishonesty, a
preliminary inquiry ‘must’ be conducted in order to obviate
incalculable harm to the reputation of that person. The
relevant para from P. Sirajuddin is extracted herein
below:–
“17. Before a public servant, whatever be his
status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty
which amount to serious misdemeanour or
misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first
information is lodged against him, there ‘must’ be
some suitable preliminary inquiry into the allegations
by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report
against a person, specially one who like the appellant
occupied the top position in a department, even if
baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the
officer in particular but to the department he belonged
to, in general…”
(emphasis supplied)
17. However, the authoritative pronouncement of
law in respect of registration of the FIR emerges from the
decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra)
wherein, the issue before the Court was whether a police
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officer is obligated to register an FIR upon receiving
information regarding the commission of a cognizable
offence under Section 154 of the CrPC (corresponding
Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023) or whether it is essential to conduct a preliminary
inquiry to verify the information before registration of the
FIR. This Court held that under Section 154 of the CrPC, a
police officer is required to register an FIR when the
information received by him discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, without undertaking a preliminary
inquiry. However, the Court was also cognizant of the
possible misuse of the criminal law resulting in the
registration of frivolous FIRs. To address this concern, it
outlined specific ‘exceptions’ to the general rule, which
mandates the immediate registration of FIR upon receiving
information about a cognizable offence. The Constitution
Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra) held:
“119. Therefore, in view of various
counterclaims regarding registration or non-
registration, what is necessary is only that the
information given to the police must disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence. In such a
situation, registration of an FIR is
mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is
made out in the information given, then the FIR
need not be registered immediately and perhaps
the police can conduct a sort of preliminary
verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of
ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence
has been committed. But, if the information given
clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable
offence, there is no other option but to register an
FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not
relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such
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as, whether the information is falsely given,
whether the information is genuine, whether the
information is credible, etc. These are the issues
that have to be verified during the investigation of
the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what
is to be seen is merely whether the information
given ex facie discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the
information given is found to be false, there is
always an option to prosecute the complainant
for filing a false FIR.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. The following guidelines were laid down by the
Constitution Bench governing the issues:–
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is
mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the
information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is
permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not
disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry
may be conducted only to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR
must be registered. In cases where preliminary
inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of
the entry of such closure must be supplied to the
first informant forthwith and not later than one
week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing
the complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his
duty of registering offence if cognizable offence
is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring
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officers who do not register the FIR if information
received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is
not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the
information received but only to ascertain
whether the information reveals any cognizable
offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The category of cases in which preliminary
inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal
delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for
example, over 3 months’ delay in reporting the
matter without satisfactorily explaining the
reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not
exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. It was held that a preliminary inquiry is not
mandatory if the information received by the police
officer/Investigating Agency discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence. However, if the preliminary inquiry is
conducted, its scope is limited to determine whether the
information prima facie reveals commission of a cognizable
offence and does not extend to verifying its truthfulness.
The necessity of a preliminary inquiry depends on the
specific facts and circumstances of each case. For
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instance, corruption cases fall into a category where a
preliminary inquiry ‘may be made’.
20. The use of the term ‘may be made’ as noted
in Lalita Kumari (supra) underscores that conducting such
an inquiry is discretionary in nature and not a mandatory
obligation.
21. Following the rationale of Lalita Kumari (supra),
this Court in Managipet (supra) held that while the decision
in Lalita Kumari (supra) noted that a preliminary inquiry was
desirable in cases of alleged corruption, this does not vest
a right in the accused to demand a preliminary inquiry.
Whether the preliminary inquiry is required to be conducted
or not will depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances
of each case, and it cannot be said to be a mandatory
requirement, in the absence of which, an FIR cannot be
registered against the accused in corruption-related
matters.
22. The relevant paragraphs from Managipet (supra)
are extracted herein below:–
“33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows
that the information collected is in respect of
disproportionate assets of the accused officer. The
purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to screen wholly
frivolous and motivated complaints, in furtherance of
acting fairly and objectively. Herein, relevant
information was available with the informant in
respect of prima facie allegations disclosing a
cognizable offence. Therefore, once the officer
recording the FIR is satisfied with such disclosure, he
can proceed against the accused even without
conducting any inquiry or by any other manner on the
basis of the credible information received by him. It
cannot be said that the FIR is liable to be quashed for
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the reason that the preliminary inquiry was not
conducted. The same can only be done if upon a
reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is
disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a
judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] wherein, this Court
held inter alia that where the allegations made in the
FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused and also where a criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.
34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary
inquiry warranted in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] is not required to be mandatorily
conducted in all corruption cases. It has been
reiterated by this Court in multiple instances that the
type of preliminary inquiry to be conducted will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. There are no fixed parameters on which such
inquiry can be said to be conducted. Therefore, any
formal and informal collection of information
disclosing a cognizable offence to the satisfaction of
the person recording the FIR is sufficient.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. A three-judge bench of this Court
in Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra) extensively
discussed the judicial precedents and legal principles
governing the requirement of conducting a preliminary
inquiry before registration of an FIR. The Court affirmed the
view taken by the two-judge Bench in Managipet (supra),
holding that a preliminary inquiry may not be necessary if
the officer recording the FIR possesses relevant
information which discloses the commission of a
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cognizable offence. The relevant extracts
from Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra) are
reproduced herein below:–
“32. [..]… we hold that since the institution of a
Preliminary inquiry in cases of corruption is not made
mandatory before the registration of an FIR under
the CrPC, PC Act or even the CBI Manual, for this
Court to issue a direction to that affect will be
tantamount to stepping into the legislative domain.
39. The precedents of this Court and the
provisions of the CBI Manual make it abundantly
clear that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in all
cases which involve allegations of corruption. The
decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC
1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds that if the
information received discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary
inquiry would be required. It also clarified that the
scope of a preliminary inquiry is not to check the
veracity of the information received, but only to
scrutinise whether it discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence. Similarly, Para 9.1 of the CBI
Manual notes that a preliminary inquiry is
required only if the information (whether verified or
unverified) does not disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence. Even when a preliminary inquiry
is initiated, it has to stop as soon as the officer
ascertains that enough material has been collected
which discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence. A similar conclusion has been reached by a
two-Judge Bench in Managipet [State of
Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020)
3 SCC (Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the proposition that
a preliminary inquiry is mandatory is plainly contrary
to law, for it is not only contrary to the decision of
the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita
Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 524] but would also tear apart the
framework created by the CBI Manual.”
(emphasis supplied)
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24. Applying these principles to the case at hand, it
is perspicuous that conducting a preliminary inquiry is
not sine qua non for registering a case against a public
servant who is accused of corruption. While preliminary
inquiry is desirable in certain categories of cases including
those under the PC Act, it is neither a vested right of the
accused, nor a mandatory pre-requisite for registration of a
criminal case. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is not to
verify the veracity of the information received, but merely to
ascertain whether the said information reveals the
commission of a cognizable offence. The scope of such
inquiry is naturally narrow and limited to prevent
unnecessary harassment while simultaneously ensuring
that genuine allegations of a cognizable offence are not
stifled arbitrarily. Thus, the determination, whether a
preliminary inquiry is necessary or not will vary according to
the facts and circumstances of each case.
25. In the present case, the Police Inspector of the
Karnataka Lokayukta submitted a comprehensive source
information report dated 10th November, 2023 to the
Superintendent of Police, which included meticulous
documentation and evaluation of the assets acquired by
the respondent, which were grossly disproportionate to his
known sources of income. The respondent, during his
tenure of service in various departmental units, had
acquired assets worth Rs. 3,81,40,246/-, which were
disproportionate and almost 90.72% more than his known
sources of income. Thereupon, the Superintendent of
Police took cognizance of the source information report and
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concluded that the allegations made against the
respondent did constitute prima facie offences punishable
under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section
13(2) of the PC Act.
26. It is clearly discernible that the source
th
information report dated 10 November, 2023, was in the
nature of a preliminary inquiry in itself and nothing else.
The comprehensive nature of the said report took it beyond
a simple complaint, as it provided a meticulous breakdown
of the respondent’s monetary acquisitions. Further, the
report makes cross-referencing of official income records
with actual property acquisitions, bank deposits, and other
financial assets. In substance, the source information
report prime facie reflects a systematic pattern of financial
irregularities, wherein the discrepancy in acquisition of
assets was found to be 90.72% more than the known
sources of income of the respondent.
27. Thus, in our view the source information report
dated 10th November, 2023, served as a critical piece of
information which not only documented the financial
discrepancies but also presented a clear, prima
facie picture of disproportionate assets accumulated by the
respondent but also demanded immediate and thorough
investigative action. As we have noted above, the scope of
preliminary inquiries is not to verify the absolute
truthfulness of information, and it is only to ascertain
whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not therefrom.
The source information report in the case at hand clearly
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satisfies this criterion by comprehensively documenting the
financial irregularities committed by the respondent and
disclosed a prima facie case of commission of a cognizable
offence involving acquisition of disproportionate assets,
punishable under the PC Act. Thus, we are of the opinion
that the High Court erred in concluding that the FIR was
liable to be quashed on account of omission to conduct a
preliminary inquiry.
11.6 In Channakeshava’s case supra, the Apex Court held
as under:-
11. Mr. Devadatt Kamat, senior advocate appearing
for the appellant would rely upon the judgment of this Court
in State of Karnataka v. T.N Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 382 to contend that an enquiry before
registration of FIR under PC Act is not mandatory. After
considering the law as laid down in Lalita Kumari (Supra),
this Court in T.N Sudhakar Reddy (Supra) observed as
follows:
“19. … The necessity of a preliminary inquiry
depends on the specific facts and circumstances
of each case. For instance, corruption cases fall
into a category where a preliminary inquiry ‘may
be made’.
20. The use of the term ‘may be made’ as noted
in Lalita Kumari (supra) underscores that
conducting such an inquiry is discretionary in
nature and not a mandatory obligation.
21. Following the rationale of Lalita Kumari
(supra), this Court in Managipet (supra) held that
while the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) noted
that a preliminary inquiry was desirable in cases
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of alleged corruption, this does not vest a right in
the accused to demand a preliminary inquiry.
Whether the preliminary inquiry is required to be
conducted or not will depend on the peculiar facts
and circumstances of each case, and it cannot be
said to be a mandatory requirement, in the
absence of which, an FIR cannot be registered
against the accused in corruption-related
matters.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, in the said case, this Court held that:
“51. In view of the above discussion, we conclude
that:
a…..
b. The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in
every case under the PC Act. If a superior officer
is in seisin of a source information report which is
both detailed and well-reasoned and such that
any reasonable person would be of the view that
it prima facie discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may
be avoided.
(Emphasis Supplied)
12. To sum up, this Court has held that in matters of
corruption a preliminary enquiry although desirable, but is
not mandatory. In a case where a superior officer, based
on a detailed source report disclosing the commission of a
cognizable offence, passes an order for registration of FIR,
the requirement of preliminary enquiry can be relaxed.
13. All the same, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior
advocate for respondent no. 1, would argue that
respondent no. 1 was never given a chance to explain his
position before the registration of FIR. He would, further,
argue that FIR has been used as an instrument to harass
the public servant and this is a case where no prior notice
or hearing was given to the officer (respondent no. 1),
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which could have taken place if a preliminary enquiry had
been held.
14. Mr. Devadatt Kamat, senior counsel, has relied upon
a recent Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in CBI v.
Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135
where it was specifically stated that an accused public
servant does not have any right to explain the alleged
disproportionate assets before filing of an FIR. We are also
of the opinion that this is the correct legal position as there
is no inherent right of a public servant to be heard at this
stage.
15. In view of the above, it is clear that preliminary
enquiry was not mandated in the present case, considering
that detailed information was already there before the SP in
the form of the source report referred above. We have also
gone through the order passed by the SP, directing
registration of FIR against respondent no. 1, which reflects
that the SP had passed that order on the basis of material
placed before him in the form of the source report.
16. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the
case, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court
ought not to have quashed the FIR in the present case.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal and impugned order
dated 25.04.2024 is hereby set aside.
17. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
18. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.”
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11.7 As can be seen from the aforesaid judgments, the
Apex Court has categorically reiterated that whilst conducting /
holding of a preliminary enquiry cannot be said to be a mandatory
requirement without which a case cannot be registered against the
accused, whether a preliminary enquiry is required or not will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case; the Apex
Court has not laid down any absolute principle of universal
application to the effect that preliminary enquiry is not desirable /
required in corruption cases and the aforesaid judgments of the
Apex Court cannot be construed / treated / understood as having
laid down any such absolute / universal proposition as sought to be
contended by the learned counsel for the respondents and
consequently, the said contention urged by the learned counsel for
the respondents – Lokayuktha cannot be accepted.
11.8 In the instant case, petitioner has specifically
contended that there was no foundational material available with
the respondent to justify the direct registration of the impugned FIR
without conducting preliminary enquiry, particularly in view of the
instant case involving allegations of disproportionate assets and
the contentions of the petitioner in this regard goes to the root of
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the matter and forms part of the merits to the challenge to the FIR;
in this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Apex Court has
categorically remitted the matter for de novo adjudication touching
upon the merits in relation to grounds which were earlier not
considered by this Court and in the absence of any finding
recorded by this Court as regards desirability of a preliminary
enquiry, the said question / issue as to whether a preliminary
enquiry was required or desirable clearly remained open and live
for adjudication upon remand forming part of the grounds on merits
that were raised but not decided by this Court in its earlier order
dated 01.03.2024.
11.9 Further, the factual issue as to whether the source
information report in the present case was sufficiently detailed,
credible and capable of disclosing the commission of a cognizable
offence remains a matter for judicial scrutiny and consequently, the
petitioner is clearly not precluded and on the other hand, he is
entitled to contend before this Court that the material relied upon by
the respondents was inadequate and insufficient so as to justify
registration of the impugned FIR without a preliminary enquiry and
such an examination by this Court clearly falls squarely within the
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scope of adjudication permitted by the remand order. It is therefore
clear that the issue / question relating to necessity and justification
for dispensing with preliminary enquiry, particularly in the absence
of credible foundational material remains open for consideration
and adjudication by this Court in the present petition and as such, it
cannot be said that the petitioner is precluded from contending that
preliminary enquiry was desirable / required / warranted in the facts
and circumstances of the instant case and the various contentions
urged by the learned counsel for the respondents – Lokayuktha
cannot be accepted.
11.10 Under these circumstances, I am of the considered
opinion that the judgment of the Apex Court dated 06.05.2025
passed in case of Karnataka Lokayuktha Police vs.
K.L.Gangadharaiah – Crl.A.No.2444/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.12156/2023) along with connected matters including
the present / instant Crl.A.No.2460/2025
(SLP(Crl.)No.14325/2024), would not come in the way or have the
effect of precluding the petitioner from contending that conducting
of preliminary enquiry prior to registration of the impugned FIR was
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desirable / warranted / required / necessary in the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Point No.1 is accordingly answered in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondents by holding that the petitioner
is not precluded from contending that conducting of preliminary
enquiry was required / desirable / warranted prior to the
respondents registering the impugned FIR against the petitioner in
the instant case.
Re-Point No.2:-
12. While dealing with Point No.1 supra, I have come to the
conclusion that though it is not mandatory to conduct a preliminary
enquiry, the question / issue as to whether preliminary enquiry is
desirable / required / warranted depends on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case; in this context, it is pertinent to
reiterate that while the petitioner contends that the source report
submitted by the 2nd respondent in the instant case is inadequate,
incomplete, inaccurate and sketchy without containing sufficient
details and material particulars thereby warranting / requiring
conducting of preliminary enquiry, respondents contend that the
source report is self-sufficient and would obviate / dispense with
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the necessity / requirement of conducting a preliminary enquiry,
which was not required or warranted in the instant case.
12.1 Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be
necessary to refer to the Circular dated 11.05.2023 issued by the
Karnataka Lokyuktha prescribing guidelines to be followed by
Investigating Officers while investigating disproportionate assets
(DA) cases – regarding as hereunder:-
“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA
LOK/DGP/CIRCULAR-01/2023 Office of the
Director General of Police
Karnataka Lokayukta,
M.S.Building, Bengaluru-560001.
Date: 11/05/2023.
CIRCULAR
Sub: Guidelines to be followed by the
Investigating officers while Investigating
Disproportionate Asset (DA) cases-reg.
****
With a view to standardise investigation of
Disproportionate Asset (DA) cases the following directions
are issued for immediate compliance by all the Investigation
Officers (I.O) henceforth. These directions will also apply to
DA cases under Investigation currently.
i. All DA cases shall be registered only after
a. Submission of detailed Source Information
Report (SIR) by the generating officer to the
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Unit Superintendent of Police (SP), followed
byb. Thorough verification of the SIR by the
Unit SP and submission of the same to
DGP/ADGP KLA, andc. Obtaining orders of the DGP/ADGP
ii. All SIRs submitted for orders of DGP/ADGP, shall
contain A, B, C and D statements and calculation
of DA as per Annexure-1 and comments of the
Unit SP on being satisfied with the SIR.
iii. Upon receipt of orders from DGP/ADGP KI.A, the
Unit SP shall get the FIR registered and issue
orders under Sec. 17 PC Act 1988 assigning the
Investigation Officer (10). The 1.0 shall not be the
same as SIR generating officer.
iv. The FIR shall be submitted to the concerned court
in scaled cover, with request to be opened on
completion of the search proceedings.
v. Wherever required, searches shall be planned
without any delay after thorough verification of
addresses to be searched.
vi. In all Class-1* cases, the detailed proposal for
searches shall be submitted to the Headquarters
through the Unit Ssl (confidentially through E-
mail, fax or any other means) and searches
conducted after approval from DGP/ADGP, KLA.
In all other cases the Unit SP shall be competent
to approve the search proposal.
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vii. All searches shall be conducted only under
warrants issued by the Court under sec 93 (1) (c)
of Cr.P.C. Only in exceptional circumstances,
searches may be conducted under sec 165
Cr.P.C, at new locations discovered during the
course of searches.
viii. Extreme confidentiality shall be maintained
during briefing and conduct of the search
operations. The Unit officer shall make all logistic
arrangements such as travel, halt, meals,
equipment and stationery etc., seeking assistance
of witnesses, well in advance. Search parties
should compulsorily comprise of at least some
woman staff. The Unit Officer shall ensure
searches are conducted as per law following the
Standard Operating Procedure. Provisions of
Sections 96, 165, 166. 101, 102 and 103 of
Cr.P.C. must be fully complied with.
ix. On completion of searches, the IO shall consider
freezing of accounts and assets that are suspect
in nature, without affecting day to day livelihood of
the accused and connected individuals.
x. In appropriate cases, I.O may initiate process for
attachment of properties under the Criminal Law
Amendment Ordinance, 1944 after getting
authorization from the State Government.
xi. The I.O shall prepare a detailed Plan of Action and
gut approved by the unit SP. I.O. shall take up
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investigation on a day to day basis without any
delay and ensure completion within the time
frame set in the plan.
xii. The process of obtaining Schedule 1-23
statements from the accused is discontinued and
henceforth, I.Os to collect Statements I-VI as in
Annexure -2. The request shall be made through
the controlling officer of the AGO, fixing a time
frame of two months for its submission,
extendable up to three months with justifiable
reasons failing which the investigation shall be
concluded recording the fact that the accused
failed to submit the statements.
xiii. With respect to day-to-day living expenditure of
the AGO, the I.O to consider 33% of the Net
Salary Income as per Hon’ble Supreme Court
guidelines in State of Punjab Vs. Sajjan Singh –
AIR 1964, SC 465
xίν. On completion of investigation, the I.O shall issue
notice to the AGO to finally explain the DA made
out in the investigation and record defence of the
accused.
xv. The IO shall conduct investigation into the
defence of the accused and record his/her
reasoned rebuttal if any.
xvi. In appropriate cases the I.O to consider invoking
sections of The Prohibition of Benami Property
Transactions Act, 1988.
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xvii. The final calculation of DA shall be made as per
Annexure-3xviii. During the course of Investigation, the IO shall
submit detailed Progress reports to the Unit SP
and DGP/ADGP as per SoPxix. On conclusion of Investigation, the Final Report
(FR) of the I.O along with SP Comments shall
reach Office of DGP/ADGP without any further
delay, for Final Orders.
xx. It shall be the responsibility of the Unit SP to
ensure strict compliance of the I.O, to this circular
and ensure timely completion of investigations in
D.A cases.
*Class-I cases:
a) All cases involving officers of and above the Rank
of Class-1 Gazetted or Officers of equivalent
Ranks.
b) All cases involving Elected representatives of
MLA/MP or above Rank.
c) All cases referred by the Hon’ble High Court or
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.
d) Cases of Criminal Misconduct involving a
wrongful loss to the Government of and above 5
Crores.
Sd/-
Director General of Police
Karnataka Lokayukta
Bengaluru”
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12.2 As can be seen from the aforesaid guidelines issued
by the respondents themselves prescribing strict guidelines /
directions to be followed for immediate compliance by all
Investigating officers including cases under investigation with a
view to standardize investigation of DA cases, it is incumbent upon
the I.O. to submit a detailed source information report to the Unit
Superintendent of Police; the said guidelines, directions also
prescribe a thorough verification of the source information report by
the Unit S.P. and submission of the same to DGP / ADGP, KLA
and thereafter, to obtain orders of the DGP / ADGP; as per the
aforesaid Circular, it is only after submission of a detailed source
information report by the I.O., verification of the same by the Unit
S.P. and submission to the DGP / ADGP and passing of orders by
him along with a satisfaction note of the Unit S.P. on being satisfied
with the source information report that the I.O. shall register the FIR
and issue orders under Section 17 of the P.C.Act.
12.3 The aforesaid guidelines issued by the respondents
themselves clearly indicates that submission of a detailed source
information report is necessary / essential / required before
proceeding further in the matter and all necessary and material
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particulars are to be incorporated in the source report including
conducting of preliminary enquiry, if required / desirable for the
purpose of submission of a detailed source information report; in
other words, having regard to the mandatory requirement of a
submission of a detailed source information report by the I.O., in
the event, the source report is found to be sketchy, incomplete,
inaccurate and inadequate in a given case, preliminary enquiry
would be desirable, warranted and required depending on the facts
and circumstances of a particular case, as can be discerned from
the Circular issued by the Lokayuktha itself.
12.4 There is no gainsaying the fact that in the case of
Lalitha Kumari vs. Government of U.P. – (2014) 12 SCC 1, the
Apex Court held that if no cognizable offence is made out in the
information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately
and perhaps, the police can conduct a sort of preliminary
verification or enquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to
whether a cognizable offence has been committed by the accused.
In the said judgment, the Apex Court illustrated the types of cases
which may require conducting of preliminary enquiry and one such
category as held by the Apex Court included cases relating to
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corruption, apart from offences under the Indian Penal Code(IPC).
The principles laid down in Lalitha Kumari‘s case supra, have
been statutorily recognised and incorporated in sub-section(3) of
Section 173 of the BNSS, 2023 and explained by the Apex Court in
the case of Imran Pratapgadi vs. State of Gujarat – 2026 (1)
SCC 721, and the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Ashish Dave vs. State of Rajasthan – 2026 INSC 244,
wherein it was held as under:-
22. In the given facts, the least that was
expected from the police officials was to either
require the complainant-company to furnish
supporting material and details to prima facie make
out the allegations made in the FIR, or else to hold a
preliminary inquiry before registering the formal FIR.
This conclusion finds support from the following
observations made by this Court in Lalita Kumari
v. Govt. of U.P. – (2014) 2 SCC 1.: –
“119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims
regarding registration or non-registration, what is
necessary is only that the information given to
the police must disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence. In such a situation,
registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if
no cognizable offence is made out in the
information given, then the FIR need not be
registered immediately and perhaps the
police can conduct a sort of preliminary
verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of
ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence
has been committed….”
[Emphasis supplied]
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23. The new regime under the BNSS
specifically deals with such situations and provides an
additional safeguard where the complaint is for
offences carrying punishment between three to seven
years. Sub-section (3) of Section 173 BNSS empowers
the officer in charge of a police station, with prior
permission of a superior officer, to conduct a
preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a
prima facie case for proceeding in the matter where the
alleged offence is punishable with imprisonment for a
term between three and seven years. For ease of
reference, Section 173 BNSS is reproduced
hereinunder:
“173. Information in cognizable cases.–
(1) Every information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence,
irrespective of the area where the offence is
committed, may be given orally or by
electronic communication to an officer in
charge of a police station, and if given–
(i) orally, it shall be reduced to
writing by him or under his
direction, and be read over to the
informant; and every such
information, whether given in
writing or reduced to writing as
aforesaid, shall be signed by the
person giving it;
(ii) by electronic
communication, it shall be taken
on record by him on being
signed within three days by the
person giving it, and the
substance thereof shall be
entered in a book to be kept by
such officer in such form as the
State Government may by rules
prescribe in this behalf:
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Provided that if the information is
given by the woman against whom an
offence under Section 64, Section 65,
Section 67, Section 70, Section 75,
Section 78, Section 68, Section
71,Section 76, Section 79 or Section
66, Section 69, Section 74, Section 77,
Section 124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 is alleged to have been
committed or attempted, then such
information shall be recorded, by a woman
police officer or any woman officer:
Provided further that–
(a) in the event that the
person against whom an
offence under Section
64,Section 65, Section 66,
Section 68, Section 71, Section
76, Section 69, Section 74,
Section 77, Section 67, Section
70, Section 75, Section 78,
Section 79 or Section 124 of the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
is alleged to have been
committed or attempted, is
temporarily or permanently
mentally or physically disabled,
then such information shall be
recorded by a police officer, at
the residence of the person
seeking to report such offence or
at a convenient place of such
person’s choice, in the presence
of an interpreter or a special
educator, as the case may be;
(b) the recording of such
information shall be
videographed;
(c) the police officer shall get
the statement of the person
recorded by a Magistrate under
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clause (a) of sub- section (6) of
Section 183 as soon as possible.
(2) A copy of the information as
recorded under sub-section (1) shall be
given forthwith, free of cost, to the
informant or the victim.
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in Section 175, on receipt of
information relating to the commission
of any cognizable offence, which is
made punishable for three years or
more but less than seven years, the
officer in charge of the police station
may with the prior permission from an
officer not below the rank of Deputy
Superintendent of Police, considering
the nature and gravity of the offence, —
(i) proceed to conduct
preliminary enquiry to
ascertain whether there exists
a prima facie case for
proceeding in the matter within
a period of fourteen days; or
( i i ) proceed with
investigation when there exists
a prima facie case.
(4) Any person aggrieved by a refusal
on the part of an officer in charge of a
police station to record the information
referred to in sub- section (1), may send
the substance of such information, in
writing and by post, to the
Superintendent of Police concerned who,
if satisfied that such information
discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, shall either investigate the case
himself or direct an investigation to be
made by any police officer subordinate to
him, in the manner provided by this
Sanhita, and such officer shall have all
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the powers of an officer in charge of the
police station in relation to that offence
failing which such aggrieved person may
make an application to the Magistrate.”
[Emphasis supplied]
24. This provision was considered by this
Court in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat –
(2026) 1 SCC 721 , wherein the scope of Section 173
BNSS has been explained as follows: –
“23. Section 154 of the CrPC does not provide
for making any preliminary inquiry. However,
as held in the case of Lalita Kumari, a
preliminary inquiry is permissible if the
information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence and indicates the necessity
for an inquiry. A preliminary inquiry must be
conducted only to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is disclosed. However,
sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS
makes a significant departure from Section
154 of the CrPC. It provides that when
information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence which is made
punishable for 3 years or more but less
than 7 years is received by an officer-in-
charge of a police station, with the prior
permission of a superior officer as
mentioned therein, the police officer is
empowered to conduct a preliminary
inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a
prima facie case for proceeding in the
matter. However, under Section 154 of the
CrPC, as held in the case of Lalita Kumari,
only a limited preliminary inquiry is
permissible to ascertain whether the
information received discloses a
cognizable offence. Moreover, a
preliminary inquiry can be made under the
CrPC only if the information does not
disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry. Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of
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the BNSS is an exception to sub-Section
(1) of Section 173.In the category of cases
covered by sub-Section (3), a police officer
is empowered to make a preliminary
inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie
case is made out for proceeding in the
matter even if the information received
discloses commission of any cognizable
offence. That is very apparent as sub-
Section (3) of Section 173 refers explicitly
to receiving information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence.
Therefore, in a case where sub-Section (3)
of Section 173 is applicable, even if the
information pertaining to the commission
of any cognizable offence is received, an
inquiry can be conducted to ascertain
whether a prima facie case exists for
proceeding in the matter. The intention
appears to be to prevent the registration of
FIRs in frivolous cases where punishment
is up to 7 years, even if the information
discloses the commission of the
cognizable offence. However, under
Section 154 of the CrPC, the inquiry
permitted by paragraph 120.2 of the
decision in the case of Lalita Kumari is
limited only to ascertain whether the
cognizable offence is disclosed.
24. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173
of the BNSS, after holding a preliminary
inquiry, if the officer comes to a conclusion
that a prima facie case exists to proceed, he
should immediately register an FIR and
proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the
view that a prima facie case is not made out
to proceed, he should immediately inform
the first informant/complainant so that he
can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of
Section 173.
25. Before we go into the applicability of
sub- Section (3) of Section 173 of the
BNSS to the facts of the case, we must
deal with sub-Section (1) of Section 173.
Take a case where a person approaches
an officer-in-charge of a police station
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either personally or by electronic
communication and alleges that he has
seen ‘A’ assaulting ‘X’ with a stick. If the
injury caused is simple, it will be an
offence punishable under Section 115 (2)
of the BNS. As per the first Schedule of
the BNSS, it is a non-cognizable offence.
Therefore, based on such information,
FIR cannot be registered. If grievous hurt
is caused, it will be an offence punishable
under Section 117 (2) of the BNS, which
is a cognizable offence. Therefore, the
allegations made in the information
furnished to an officer-in-charge of a police
station must be examined by the officer
only with a view to ascertain whether a
cognizable offence is made out. Taking
the information as correct, the officer has
to determine whether it makes out a case
of the commission of a cognizable
offence. If the allegation makes out a
case of a cognizable offence, unless the
offence falls in sub-Section (3) of Section
173, it is mandatory to register FIR.
[….]
28. Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the
BNSS confers a discretion on the officer
receiving information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence to
conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain
whether a prima facie case exists to
proceed. This option is available when the
offence alleged is made punishable for 3
years or more but less than 7 years. In
the facts of the case, all the offences
except the offence under Section 57 of the
BNS are punishable by imprisonment for
less than 7 years. Section 57, on the face
of it, is not applicable. Therefore, this
option was also available to the police
officer in the present case. The officer did
not exercise the said option.”
[Emphasis supplied]
The crux of the above observations, therefore, is
that under the regime of Section 154 of the CrPC, as
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explained in Lalita Kumari (supra), a preliminary
inquiry is permissible only for the limited purpose of
ascertaining whether the information discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. However, the
scheme of Section 173(3) of the BNSS travels a step
further and exposits situations where preliminary
inquiry may be made even where the complaint is filed
for cognizable offences. The said provision empowers
the police officer, even in a case where the information
may ostensibly disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence punishable between three and
seven years, to conduct a preliminary inquiry so as
to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case
for proceeding in the matter. Thus, the legislative intent
behind incorporating sub-section (3) of Section 173
appears to be to provide a safeguard against
mechanical registration of FIRs in cases where the
allegations, though couched in the language of a
cognizable offence, may in substance be vague,
speculative or inherently doubtful.
25. None of the offences alleged in the
impugned FIR carries imprisonment which may extend
to more than seven years, thereby bringing the case
within the category where the option of conducting a
preliminary enquiry under Section 173(3) of the
BNSS was clearly available to the police authorities.
However, the police officials did not choose to
exercise this option, and the FIR came to be
registered straightaway in a mechanical manner
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without even a semblance of verification of the fictional
and conjectural allegations made in the complaint. In
the given facts, where the complaint contained vague
allegations and was completely bereft of particulars,
the situation clearly warranted a preliminary enquiry
so as to arrive at the necessary “prima facie”
satisfaction as to the commission of a cognizable
offence. Though there is no hard and fast criterion for
determining when such prima facie satisfaction may
arise, the very object of permitting a preliminary
enquiry is to prevent initiation of criminal proceedings
on the basis of frivolous or speculative allegations.
The allegations contained in the complaint being so
indeterminate and lacking in basic particulars, we are
of the opinion that the police authorities ought to have
exercised the option available under Section 173(3) of
the BNSS.
26. Thus, ex facie, we are satisfied that the
complainant-company has misused the process of
law to settle the scores and to escape possible
liabilities which it may have apprehended on account
of some sharp reporting.”
12.5 As can be seen from the aforesaid judgment, the
desirability, relevance, importance, requirement etc., of conducting
a preliminary enquiry under Section 173(3) of BNSS, 2023 has
been explained by the Apex Court, thereby indicating that there
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cannot be an absolute / straitjacket / universal rule / formula as
regards conducting / non-conducting of a preliminary enquiry and
the same would be dependent on the facts and circumstances
obtaining in a particular case.
12.6 In Nirankar Nath Pandey‘s case supra, the Apex
Court held as under:-
1. Leave granted.
2. The Appeal before us is against the order of
the High Court of Allahabad dated 11.01.2024 whereby
the High Court has refused to quash the FIR lodged
against the Appellant.
3. The factual background of the present case
is that FIR No.0002 of 2023 dated 17.10.2023 was
registered as Case Crime No.0002 of 2023 against the
Appellant under Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2)
of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988(Hereinafter, PC
Act). The Appellant filed Criminal Miscellaneous Writ
Petition No.18777 of 2023 before the High Court for
quashing of the said FIR. The High Court vide order
dated 11.01.2024 dismissed the Appellant’s Writ Petition.
Aggrieved by this, the Appellant is before us.
4. Prior to the present FIR, another FIR was
lodged in the year 2018, bearing Case Crime No.476 of
2018 for offences under Section 420, 467, 468, 471,
120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section
13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act in Police Station Kotwali,
District Fatehpur, U.P against some officials of the Excise
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Department, U.P., wherein the present Appellant was
implicated and he was subsequently enlarged on bail.
This Case Crime No.476 of 2018 is pending before the
Trial Court.
5. Due to the earlier FIR, a notice dated
25.08.2020 was issued to the Appellant by the
Department of Vigilance Establishment, U.P. whereby the
Appellant was directed to submit the Statement of
Declaration of Assets and other income details. Pursuant
to this notice, the Appellant submitted all such details
before the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Department.
6. The Appellant was working as Assistant
Excise Commissioner when the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance
Establishment initiated an inquiry against him. This open
inquiry disclosed the Appellant’s income from known and
legitimate sources during the period of checking as
Rs.94,28,605/- (Rupees Ninety Four Lakh Twenty Eight
Thousand Six Hundred Five only). For the same period,
the Appellant was found to have amassed assets
including living expenses worth Rs.1,16,02,669/- (Rupees
One Crore Sixteen Lakh Two Thousand Six Hundred
Sixty Nine only). The Appellant is said to have amassed
assets including expenses of around Rs.21,74,064/-
(Twenty One Lakh Seventy Four Thousand Sixty Four
only) more than his known income. This is said to be the
disproportionate assets in question. The Inquiry Report
was forwarded to the Government on 20.03.2023 by the
Joint Director, Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment and
directions were issued vide Demi-Government Letter
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dated 20.04.2023 issued by the Vigilance Department,
Government of U.P. for institution of criminal proceedings
against the Appellant. Consequent to this, the present
FIR was registered against the Appellant based on the
complaint of Inspector, Uttar Pradesh Vigilance
Establishment Sector, Ayodhya.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the relevant material.
8. The Appellant has declared his and his
wife’s assets consequent to notice dated 25.08.2020. It is
stated that the wife of the Appellant is also earning from
teaching yoga, agriculture, and from receiving house rent.
It is submitted that the Appellant’s total income since
1996 to 2020 is Rs.75,73,676/- (Seventy-Five Lakh
Seventy-Three Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Six only)
and the income of his wife during the aforesaid period is
about Rs.41,67,592/- (Rupees Forty One Lakh Sixty
Seven Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Two only). These
declarations are supported by the relevant income tax
returns. The ornaments of the Appellant’s wife have been
sold for an amount of Rs.2,16,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh
Sixteen Thousand only) and the Appellant received
Rs.1,00,000/(Rupees One Lakh only)from a Life
Insurance Policy plus there is an amount of Rs.49,000/-
(Rupees Forty Nine Thousand only)that was given to the
Appellant by his father. Therefore, the total income and
assets of the Appellant and his wife has been submitted
to be Rs.1,21,06,268/- (Rupees One Crore Twenty One
Lakh Six Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight only) during
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the period of 1996 to June 2020. Further, the Appellant
has explained and submitted documents regarding the
properties owned by him and his wife and a loan given by
the Bank. This has not been considered by the Uttar
Pradesh Vigilance Department. The present FIR is lodged
on the basis of the Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment
prima facie finding the Appellant guilty. However, if we
consider the declared assets of the Appellant and his wife
for the aforesaid period it comes up to
Rs.1,21,06,268/(Rupees One Crore Twenty One Lakh Six
Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight only). The present
FIR states the disproportionate assets to be
Rs.1,16,02,669/(Rupees One Crore Sixteen Lakh Two
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine only) for the same
period.
9. We are of the view that the Appellant’s
wife’s income must be considered as well while
calculating the total income and assets. Both the
Appellant and his wife have filed the relevant income tax
returns in order to show their respective incomes
andassets. The Respondents in their Counter-Affidavit
have not denied these income tax returns or alleged them
to be forged or fabricated. Therefore, when a public
servant is submitting his income tax returns, they should
be presumed to be true and correct. If you duly consider
the income tax returns of the Appellant and his wife for
the check period of the year 1996-2020, the total income
is coming up to be Rs.1,21,06,268/-(Rupees One Crore
Twenty One Lakh Six Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight
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only) which is in fact more than the assets amounting to
Rs.1,16,02,669/- (Rupees One Crore Sixteen Lakh Two
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine only) which is said to
be the disproportionate assets in question under the
present FIR.
10. Further, we have considered that the check
period is from the year 1996 to 2020, which is almost
twenty five years. It must be taken into account that over
such a long period of time, there is inflation and a natural
progression in the changing economy that affects the
value of assets such as property. This can
understandably lead to discrepancies in declaring the
value of assets over the years. Therefore, there should be
a more dynamic approach while considering an
individual’s income and assets over the span of two
decades, such as in the present case. The notion that the
declared value of an asset such as property or gold will
remain static is flawed. This has to be considered while
examining an individual’s assets and income while
making a determination regarding disproportionate
assets. Such an examination needs to reflect such
adjustments and changes as is natural with the
progression of time.
11. We find it pertinent to note that in cases
such as these where disproportionate assets are being
dealt with, the amounts under scrutiny cannot be looked
at in the same manner as one would do a Bank statement
or daily ledger of income and expenditure. The scrutiny
process cannot be as mechanical as that when you are
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examining declared assets and the income of an
individual over such a long period of time. There has to
be a certain margin that is given while making such an
assessment as there are invariably economical
fluctuations that would have taken place, especially over
the course of nearly twenty-five years. It is crucial to have
a nuanced appreciation of how time and economic
conditions affect asset value in such cases.
12. This Court has held in State of Haryana vs.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 that when allegations
made in the first information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused, powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process
of any court. We find that the present FIR in question and
the case against the Appellant is covered under these
findings in Bhajan Lal (supra).
13. In view of the above discussion, we find it
appropriate to quash FIR No, 0002 of 2023 dated
17.10.2023 pending against the Appellant. Consequently,
the appeal is allowed.
Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of.”
12.7 As can be seen from the aforesaid judgment, the Apex
Court has held that for evaluating cases relating to disproportionate
assets involving public servants, the authorities must consider
economic fluctuations and presume income tax returns to be
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accurate unless specifically proven to be false and the importance
and relevance of the income tax returns have been taken into
account and highlighted by the Apex Court.
12.8 In the instant case, it would be necessary to refer to
the source report (Translated copy) dated 18.11.2023 submitted by
the 2nd respondent – Dy.S.P., which is as hereunder;
Date: 18.11.2023
To,
The Superintendent of Police
Karnataka Lokayukta
Bangalore City Division-1
Bangalore
Sir,
Sub: Submissions of Source Report in respect of Sri N.
Satish Babu S/o. Late T. Narasimhaiah, aged 52 years,
Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Buildings
Division, K.R.Circle, Bangalore regarding possession of illegal
properties:
With reference to the above cited subject I submit that
the suspected Government Servant Sri N. Satish Babu,
Superintending Engineer, has been working in the office of the
Buildings division, Public Works Department. As per the basic
information gathered about it, he has acquired properties
highly disproportionate to his known source of income and the
details are as mentioned below:
1. Name of the S.G.O.: Sri N.Satish Babu
2. Present post held: Superintending Engineer,
Public Works Department
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3. Place of working: Office of the Superintending
Engineer, Public Works
Department, Buildings
division, Bangalore.
No. 23/A, 6th cross, 3rd
main, Jayamahal
Extension, Bangalore
4. Native place: Kolar District, Chintamani
BACKGROUND:
The suspected officer Sri N.Satish Babu, son of late T.
Narasimhaiah, aged 52 years, Superintending Engineer, Public
Works Department, Buildings Division, K.R. Circle, Bangalore
basically is from Chintamani, Kolar district. After completing his
B.E., he was appointed on 24-10-1994 in the Industries and
Commerce Department and thereafter joined the Public Works
Department in the year 2002 as Assistant Engineer. Thereafter
he was promoted phase-wise, at present he is serving as
Superintending Engineer, Buildings Division, K.R. Circle,
Bangalore. He married N. Sudha, daughter of Sri Hanumantha
Reddy of Chitradurga, in the year 1996 and she is presently
working as C.D.P.O. in the Women and Children Welfare
Department. She is residing at D.No. 228, JRC Layout, 6th
cross, Chitradurga along with her family, and the suspected
officer is residing at Government quarters at 23/A, 6th cross,
3rd main, Jayamahal Extension, Bangalore. They have two
daughters; the first daughter Smt. Manjusha is married and the
second daughter Kum. Sireesha is pursuing her education in
BBA.
SOURCE OF CORRUPTION:
The suspected Government Officer Sri N.Satish Babu
was appointed in the Government service and he has
discharged duties in different districts of the state of Karnataka.
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During his tenure he used to extract illegal gratification from
the general public, contractors, commission agents, leading a
luxurious life and it is understood that he has purchased
properties in his name and in the names of his family
members.
It is learnt that the above officer has acquired properties
in the names of his wife, children and mother-in-law, and if a
raid is conducted, there is possibility of tracing more currency,
documents relating to his properties acquired and also gold
jewels.
It is prima facie found that the suspected officer Sri
N.Satish Babu has acquired more properties disproportionate
to his known source of income. The period from his joining
Government service i.e., from 24.10.1994 till today is
considered as check period.
DETAILS OF THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE
SUSPECTED GOVERNMENT OFFICER FROM THE DATE OF HIS
JOINING SERVICE AND THEIR APPROXIMATE VALUE:
(A)
Sl Description of the properties Approximate
No. ValueThe suspected Government Officer Sri N. –
Satish Babu has not submitted his details of
his assets and liabilities available with him
prior to his joining service.
(B)
Sl No. Description of the properties Approximate
Value
1 A residential house in the name of the 2,30,00,000.00
suspected Government Officer Sri N. Satish
Babu bearing no. 757,
Chikkabommanasandra, Yelahanka, Ward
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No.04, Bangalore (Allala Sandra, Jakkur
Plantation, Judicial Layout)
2 Site No. 228, JRC Layout, 6th cross, 25,00,000.00
Chitradurga in the name of Smt. N. Sudha,
wife of the suspected Government Officer
(The said site is gifted by her mother to her
daughter and the suspected officer has
constructed a house on the said land. Only
the said construction is taken into account)
3 Agricultural land in the name of Kumari 80,00,000.00
Sireesha, the second daughter of the
suspected Government officer bearing survey
no. 30, at Guddadavvanahalli, Kasaba Hobli,
Chitradurga District and Taluk measuring
11.09 acres.
4 Two floor house constructed in the 20,00,000-00
Agricultural land bearing survey no. 30,
measuring 11-09 acres at Guddadavvanahalli,
Kasaba Hobli, Chitradurga district and taluk
4 LIC polices which may be in the name of the 20,00,000-00
suspected Government Officer and in the
names of his family members
11 Bank Fixed Deposits which may be in the 10,00,000-00
name of the suspected Government Officer
and in the names of his family members
12 Maruti Swift Car bearing registration No. KA – 8,00,000-00
04-ML- 6330 in the name of the suspected
Government Officer
13 Two wheeler bearing registration no. KA-16- 70,000-00
6828- in the name of the suspected
Government Officer
14 Two wheeler of Honda Activa make bearing 80,000-00
registration no. KA16ET-7388 in the name of
the suspected Government officer
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15 Tata Punch Car bearing registration No. 22- 8,00,000.00
BH-3599C in the name of Ashuthosh Bram
C/o. Smt. N. Sudha
– Total value (Approximate) 4,02,50,000.00
(C) APPROXIMATE EXPENDITURE OF THE SUSPECTED
GOVERNMENT SERVANT:
Sl Details of the expenditure Approximate
No. Value1 Approximate value of Government registration 25,00,000.00
and stamp duty and property tax paid by the
suspected Government servant at the time of
buying of the properties in his name and in the
names of his family members2 Approximate family expenditure 30,00,000.00
3 Approximate educational expenses towards his 30,00,000.00
daughters (the first daughter has studied in a
foreign country)4 Home Appliances, Gold, Silver jewels value 60,00,000.00
5 Repayment of loans (Approximate) 60,00,000.00
6 Approximate expenditure for marriage of the first 20,00,000.00
daughter7 Maintenance expenses of the vehicles 5,00,000.00
maintained by the officer8 Expenses for the development of the land in 60,00,000.00
survey no. 30, measuring 11-09 acres in
Guddadavvanahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Chitradurga
district and taluk and also towards fencing,
borewell, shed for poultry and fish farming etc.
– Total approximate expenditure 2,90,00,000.00
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(D) APPROXIMATE INCOME OF THE SUSPECTED GOVERNMENT
OFFICER:
Sl Description of Income Approximate
No. Value1 Approximate net income from Salary of the 80,00,000.00
suspected government servant2 Approximate net income from Salary of the wife 40,00,000.00
of the suspected government officer3 Income derived from the sale of the immovable 1,00,00,000.00
properties belonging to Smt. N. Sudha, wife of
the suspected Government officer4 Approximate loan amount which may be 1,00,00,000.00
obtained by the Government Officer from
different banks by Government Officer5 Approximate rent that might have been received 10,00,000.00
by the suspected Government Officer and his
wife
– TOTAL INCOME APPROXIMATE 3,30,00,000.00
1 Total value of the properties 4,02,50,000.00
2 Total expenditure 2,90,00,000.00
3 Total properties and expenditure (1+2) 6,92,50,000.00
4 Total income 3,30,00,000.00
5 Properties illegally earned (3-4=5) 3,62,50,000.00
6 Percentagewise (5 / 4 \times 100 = 6) 110.00%
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- KG. RAMAKRISHNA
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Submitted:
Received the Source Report, Investigation Report and
Authority letter bearing No. LOK/INV(G)/City/03/2024 DATED
03-01-24 ON 8-01-2024 at 2.30 pm from the office of the
Superintendent of Police, and case is registered vide Police
Station case No. 3/2024 under section 13(1)(b) read with 13(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption act 1988 (as amended in
2019).
Sd/-
Dy.SP-2″
12.9 If the source report is examined, bearing in mind the
Lokayuktha Circular and in the light of the aforesaid judgments of
the Apex Court, it becomes evident that the respondents did not
verify or ascertain or take any steps to scrutinize the income tax
returns submitted by the petitioner and his wife, both of whom are
undisputedly public servants as well as their daughter and had
submitted their income tax returns regularly, which were relevant
and essential for the purpose of preparing and submitting the
source report; it is needless to state that the income tax returns of
the petitioner, his wife and daughter would necessarily have to be
verified and scrutinized by the respondents for the purpose of
preparing and submitting the source report; in the instant case, in
the absence of verification / scrutiny of the income tax returns of
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the petitioner, his wife and daughter and in the light of the
principles laid down by the Apex Court in Nirankar Nath Pandey’s
case supra, I am of the view that the source report submitted by
the 2nd respondent is incomplete, inadequate, sketchy, defective
and lacking in material particulars and details, thereby making it
desirable and warranting / requiring conducting of preliminary
enquiry before proceeding further in accordance with law.
12.10 A perusal of the source report will also indicate that
in Column B pertaining to Assets alleged to be acquired by the
petitioner, the value of which was disproportionate to the known
sources of income of the petitioner and his wife, Sl.No.2 refers to
property No.228, JRC Layout, 6th cross, Chitradurga, which is said
to be valued at Rs.25 lakhs; the details of acquisition of the said
property, even according to the 2nd respondent is traced to a gift
deed dated 09.09.2004 said to be executed by the petitioner’s
mother-in-law in favour of the petitioner’s wife; it is needless to
state that the said property which is said to be acquired under a gift
deed (obviously without any consideration) is sought to be
incorporated / included in the assets / properties of the petitioner
for the purpose of preparing the source report without verifying or
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ascertaining further details in this regard by ignoring the fact that
prima facie, a property acquired by way of a gift deed cannot be
said to be a property acquired by the petitioner by intentionally
enriching himself illicitly as contemplated under Section 13(1)(b) of
the P.C.Act; it follows therefrom that having included the said
property as one of the properties for the purpose of a source report
for alleged offences under Section 13(1)(b) of the P.C.Act, it was
both desirable and necessary / required for conducting of a
preliminary enquiry in the instant case for the purpose of preparing
a source report which is clearly sketchy, defective, inadequate and
incomplete on this ground also.
12.11 A perusal of the aforesaid source report will also
indicate that in addition to the properties / assets standing in the
name of the petitioner and his wife who were both undisputedly
public servants, the properties standing in the name of their
daughter and petitioner’s mother-in-law (wife’s mother) have also
been included for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the
petitioner possessed assets disproportionate to his known sources
of income; however, a perusal of the source report will clearly
indicate that the same contains numerous / several inherent
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discrepancies, contradictions and lack of material particulars and
details which would necessitate conducting of a preliminary enquiry
by the respondents before proceeding further in the matter. Under
these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the
source report dated 18.11.2023 is clearly sketchy, defective,
incomplete, inadequate, insufficient and lacking in material
particulars and details, thereby making it desirable and requiring /
warranting conducting of preliminary enquiry by the respondents in
accordance with law in the facts and circumstances obtaining in the
instant case.
Point No.2 is also accordingly answered in favour of the
petitioner and against the respondents by holding that in the facts
and circumstances of the instant case, it would be necessary,
appropriate and desirable for the respondents to conduct a
preliminary enquiry before proceeding further in the matter.
Re-Point Nos.3 and 4:-
13. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that
pursuant to the aforesaid source report dated 18.11.2023, the
respondents not only registered the impugned FIR dated
08.01.2024 but also passed an order dated 08.01.2024 granting
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permission / approval under Section 17 of the P.C.Act to conduct
investigation against the petitioner in relation to the alleged
offences; while dealing with Point Nos. 1 and 2 supra, I have
already come to the conclusion that conducting of preliminary
enquiry prior to registration of the FIR and obtaining permission /
approval for investigation under Section 17 of the P.C.Act was not
only desirable but also required / warranted in the facts and
circumstances of the instant case; undisputedly, no such
preliminary enquiry was conducted by the respondents before
registration of the impugned FIR or granting permission / approval
for investigation under Section 17 of the P.C.Act and in the light of
the findings recorded by me hereinbefore, the impugned FIR
deserves to be quashed and the matter remitted back to the
concerned respondents with a direction to conduct a preliminary
enquiry in accordance with law and thereafter to proceed further in
the matter; insofar as the order dated 08.01.2024 passed under
Section 17 of the P.C.Act is concerned, as a consequence of
quashing the impugned FIR and remitting the matter back to the
concerned respondents with a direction to conduct a preliminary
enquiry and thereafter, proceed further in accordance with law, it is
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not necessary to advert to or express any opinion on the various
contentions / grounds urged by both sides as regards the said
order dated 08.01.2024 passed under Section 17 of the P.C.Act
except stating that since the FIR is hereby quashed, the said order
would consequently also have to be quashed and the matter
remitted back as stated supra.
Accordingly, Point Nos.3 and 4 are also answered in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondents.
14. In the result, I pass the following:-
ORDER
(i) Petition is hereby partly allowed.
(ii) The impugned FIR in Crime No.3/2024 at Annexure-A
dated 08.01.2024 registered by the respondents – Lokayuktha
against the petitioner for alleged offences punishable under
Sections 13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, (Amendment Act, 2018), is hereby quashed / set aside and
consequently, the order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the
respondents under Section 17 of the P.C.Act is also hereby set
aside.
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(iii) The matter is remitted back to the concerned
respondents to conduct a preliminary enquiry pursuant to the
source report dated 18.11.2023 and to thereafter proceed further in
accordance with law.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
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