ADVERTISEMENT
Karnataka High Court
Sri Kishan vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 March, 2026
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO.25250 OF 2025 (GM-POLICE)
POLICE)
BETWEEN
SRI KISHAN
S/O LALARAMJI,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
R/AT 3RD CROSS,
VENKATAPURA,
KORAMANGALA,
BENGALURU-560034
560034
CURRENTLY SERVING SENTENCE IN
CENTRAL PRISON, MYSORE.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. PRADEEP PATIL., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. PRATHAP S.S., ADVOCATE)
AND
Digitally signed by
VARSHA N
RASALKAR 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
Location: HIGH
COURT OF BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
KARNATAKA
HOME DEPARTMENT,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU-560001
560001
2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES,
NO.9, SHESHADRI ROAD,
GANDHI NAGAR,
BENGALURU-560009
560009
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3. THE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT
CENTRAL PRISON,
MYSORE-570007
570007
.... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRADEEP C.S., AAG A/W
SMT. K.P. YASHODHA., AGA)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT,
ORDER OR DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS TO THE R3
TO RELEASE THE PETITIONER FROM PRISON FORTHWITH, IN VIEW
OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE HONORABLE APEX COUT IN
SUKHDEV YADAV @ PEHALWAN V/S STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND
OTHERS IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3271 OF 2025, PRODUCED AS
ANNEXURE -C.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 05.02.2025, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
FOLLOWING
CAV ORDER
1. The Petitioner is before the Court seeking for the
following reliefs:
a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
Mandamus to the respondent No.3 to release the
petitioner from prison forthwith, in view of the
order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v/s State of NCT of
Delhi & Others in Criminal Appeal No. 3271 of
2025) produced a as Annexure-C.
b) Pass such other order/s directions considering
the facts and circumstances of the case together
as to costs in the interest of justice.
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2. The petitioner was convicted for the offences
punishable under Section 302, 364A of Indian Penal
Code
e and awarded death sentence in SC
No.463/2003 by the IV Additional City Civil and
Sessions Court, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru. A
challenge having been made, this Court in Criminal
Appeal No.1197/2008 vide judgment dated 6.6.2013
modified the death sentence to life imprisonment.
The said modified order reads as under:-
under:
"On thorough consideration of the facts, we find
that the case does not appears to be one of the
rarest of rare case. It may be fact that it is a
gruesome murder and two innocent children h have
ave
been murdered. But none the less, the murder
does not appear to be rarest of rare case, which
calls for death sentence. Accordingly, the death
sentence awarded by the trial court is modified and
accused nos.1 to 3 are sentenced to life
imprisonment.
It is further directed that accused nos.1 to 3 shall
not be given commutation after completion of
fourteen years of imprisonment as a matter of
routine. The accused have to serve the life
sentence and they should be in jail in terms of
Section 57 of IPC. Accordingly, the reference and
appeals are disposed of."
3. The petitioner claims to have undergone twenty
years of actual imprisonment as on 15.1.2025. His
conduct being satisfactory and there being no
adverse report as per the Imprisonment Certificate
dated 15.1.2025, the petitioner claims that he is
entitled to premature release.
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4. Sri.Pradeep Patil/Sri.Prathap S.S., learned counsel
for the petitioner in this regard relies upon the
decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of (NCT of
Delhi) & others1more particularly Paras 3.2, 15,
15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4 and 16, which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
3.2. The relevant facts of the case are that on
17.02.2002, FIR No. 192/2002 was registered at P.S.
Kavi Nagar, District Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh under
Section 364/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter, "IPC") on the basis of a complaint filed by
Smt. Nilam Katara i.e. complainant and mother of the
deceased. On 28.05.2008, after completion of
investigation and trial, his co
co-convicts - Vikas Yadav
and Vishal
shal Yadav - were convicted for commission of
offences under Sections 302, 364, 201 read with
Section 34 of the IPC in SC No. 78/2002 by the
Additional Sessions Judge (01), New Delhi, ("Sessions
Court"). Thereafter, they were sentenced to undergo life
imprisonment
isonment as well as fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-
1,00,000/ each
under Section 302 of the IPC and in default of payment
of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
They were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten
years and fine of Rs. 50,000/
50,000/- each for their conviction
under Section 364/34 IPC and in default of payment of
fine, to undergo simple imprisonment of six months,
and rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.
10,000/-- each under Section 201/34 IPC and in default
of payment of fine, to under
undergo
go simple imprisonment for
three months. All sentences were to run concurrently.
15. The sentence imposed on the appellant herein,
inter alia, is recapitulated as under:
"Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission, and
fine of Rs. 10,000/
10,000/-."
The word "which" used after the words "life
imprisonment", is an interrogative pronoun, related
1
Criminal Appeal No.3271/2025 dated 29.7.2025
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pronoun and determiner, referring to something
previously mentioned when introducing a clause giving
further information
infor . Therefore, the sentence of life
imprisonment is determined as twenty years which is of
actual imprisonment. Further, during the period of
twenty years, the appellant cannot seek remission
during his sentence of twenty years of imprisonment
i.e., after
ter completion of fourteen years as per Section
433A of the CrPC but must continue his sentence for a
period of twenty years without any remission
whatsoever. Therefore, the appellant has no right to
make any application for remission of the above
sentence for a period of twenty years.
15.1. In Criminal Appeal Nos. 1531-1533
1531 1533 of 2015 filed
by Vikas Yadav as well as in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1528-
1528
1530 of 2015 which also included the appeal filed by the
appellant herein, the imposition of a fixed term
sentence on the appellants by the High Court was also
questioned but this Court observed that such a term of
sentence on the appellants by the High Court could not
be found fault with. Placing reliance on Gopal Singh v.
State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545, at paragraph
84 of its judgment in the aforesaid criminal appeal, this
Court observed that "Judged on the aforesaid
parameters, we reiterate that the imposition of fixed
terms sentence is justified."
15.2. In the instant case, as already noted, the life
imprisonment being twenty years of actual
imprisonment was without consideration of remission.
Soon after the period of twenty years is completed, in
our view, the appellant has to be simply released from
jail provided the other sentences run concurrently. The
appellant is not under an obligation to make an
application seeking remission of his sentence on
completion of ttwenty
wenty years. This is simply for the
reason that the appellant has completed his twenty
years of actual imprisonment and in fact, during the
period of twenty years, the appellant was not entitled to
any remission. Thus, in the instant case, on completion
of the twenty years' of actual imprisonment, it is wholly
unnecessary for the appellant to seek remission of his
sentence on the premise that his sentence is a life
imprisonment i.e. till the end of his natural life. On the
other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent
respondent-State and respondent-complainant
complainant
contended that once the period of twenty years is over,
which was without any consideration of remission, the
appellant had to seek remission of his sentence (life
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imprisonment) by making an ap application
plication to the
Sentence Review Board which would consider in
accordance with the applicable policy and decide
whether the remission of sentence imposed on the
appellant has to be granted or not. Such a contention
cannot be accepted for the following reas
reasons:
(i) firstly, because, in the instant case, the sentence of
life imprisonment has been fixed to be twenty years of
actual imprisonment which the appellant herein has
completed;
(ii) secondly, during the period of twenty years the
appellant was not en
entitled to seek any remission; and
(iii) thirdly, on completion of twenty years of actual
imprisonment, the appellant is entitled to be released.
15.3. This is because in this case, instead of granting
death penalty, alternative penalty of life imprisonment
imprisonmen
has been awarded which shall be for a period of twenty
years of actual imprisonment. That even in the absence
of death penalty being imposed, life imprisonment of a
fixed term of twenty years was imposed which is
possible only for a High Court or this Co
Court
urt to do so. The
period of twenty years is without remission inasmuch as
the appellant is denied the right of remission of his
sentence on completion of fourteen years as per Section
432 read with Section 433
433-A
A of the CrPC. Such a right
has been denied by the High Court but that does not
mean that on completion of twenty years of
imprisonment the appellant has to still seek reduction of
his sentence on the premise that he was awarded life
imprisonment which is till the end of his natural life. If
that was so, the High Court would have specified it in
those terms. On the other hand, the High Court has
imposed life imprisonment which shall be twenty years
of actual imprisonment without consideration of
remission. The High Court was of the view that for a
period
od of twenty years, the appellant has to undergo
actual imprisonment which would not take within its
meaning any period granted for parole or furlough.
15.4. In the instant case, the actual imprisonment of
twenty years was admittedly completed by the appellant
on 09.03.2025 which was without any remission. If that
is so, it would imply that the appellant has completed
his period of sentence. In fact, the award of the
aforesaid sentence was also confirmed by this Court. On
completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment on
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09.03.2025, the appellant was entitled to be released.
The release of the appellant from jail does not depend
upon further consideration as to whether he has to be
released or not and as to whether remission has to be
granted to him or not by the Sentence Review Board. In
fact, the Sentence Review Board cannot sit in judgment
over what has been judicially determined as the
sentence by the Hig
Highh Court which has been affirmed by
this Court. There cannot be any further incarceration of
the appellant herein from 09.03.2025 onwards. On the
other hand, in the instant case, the appellant's prayer
for furlough was refused by the High Court and,
thereafter,
ter, this Court granted furlough only on
25.06.2025 as he had completed his actual sentence by
then, pending consideration of the amended prayer
made by the appellant herein on completion of his
sentence on 09.03.2025. Therefore, the continuous
incarceration of the appellant from 09.03.2025 onwards
incarceration
was illegal. In fact, on 10.03.2025, the appellant ought
to have been released from prison as he had completed
the sentence imposed on him by the High Court as
affirmed by this Court.
16. A copy of this order shall shall be circulated by the
Registry of this Court to all the Home Secretaries of the
States/Union Territories to ascertain whether any
accused/convict has remained in jail beyond the period
of sentence and if so, to issue directions for release of
such accus
accused/convicts,
ed/convicts, if not wanted in any other case.
4.1. By relying on Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan,
learned counsel submits that where a sentence
of life imprisonment is specified to mean a fixed
term of actual imprisonment without remission,
the convict becomes entitled to be released
immediately upon completion of the said period
of actual imprisonment,
imprisonment, and such release does
not depend upon any further consideration by
the Sentence Review Board or the grant of
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remission by the State. He would therefore
contend that once the period of sentence
imposed by the Court has been fully
undergone, any continued incarceration would
be illegal, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the aforesaid decision.
4.2. He relies on Section 57 of the IPC, which reads
as under:
57. Fractions of terms of punishment
punishment.----In
calculating fractions of terms of punishment,
imprisonment ffor
or life shall be reckoned as
equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.
4.3. Placing reliance on the aforesaid provision,
learned counsel submits that life imprisonment
is to be reckoned as equivalent to twenty years
of imprisonment, and therefore a convict who
has been sentenced to life imprisonment would
be entitled to be released upon completion of
twenty years of imprisonment. It is further
contended that unless a specific minimum
period of incarceration is prescribed in the
order of conviction, a sentence
sentence of life
imprisonment must be understood as being
satisfied upon completion of twenty years of
imprisonment. On that premise, it is submitted
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that the petitioner having completed the said
period of incarceration, the continued detention
is illegal and the present petition deserves to be
allowed.
5. Sri.Pradeep C.S., learned Additional Advocate
General would submit that:
5.1. The interpretation sought to be placed by the
petitioner on the operative portion of the
judgment passed in the aforesaid Criminal
Appeal is wholly misconceived. The petitioner
was originally convicted and sentenced to
death, which, in appeal, came to be commuted
to life imprisonment. The mere reference to
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code in the
judgment does not mean that the sentence of
life
ife imprisonment is restricted to a period of
twenty years. A sentence of life imprisonment
ordinarily means imprisonment for the
remainder of the natural life of the convict,
unless specifically limited by the Court.
5.2. He would further submit that it is only
only in cases
where the conditions governing premature
release or remission are satisfied that a convict
may be released before completion of the entire
life term. Normally, a convict becomes eligible
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to seek premature release after undergoing
fourteen years of actual imprisonment.
However, in the present case, as this Court has
made reference to Section 57 of the IPC, the
petitioner would not even be entitled to seek
premature release until completion of twenty
years of imprisonment.
5.3. Learned Additional Advocate
Advocate General would
further contend that the reliance placed by the
petitioner on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Sukhdev Yadav is
misplaced. In the said case, the Court had
specifically fixed the sentence of life
imprisonment to mean twenty year
years
s of actual
imprisonment without remission, and it was on
the basis of such a judicial determination that
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
sentence stood completed upon the convict
undergoing twenty years of actual
imprisonment.
5.4. In the present case, however, the sentence
imposed is simple life imprisonment without
any judicial restriction limiting it to twenty
years. Such a restriction cannot be read into
the judgment merely by referring to Section 57
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of the IPC. According to the learned Additional
Advocate
dvocate General, any such interpretation
would be erroneous and would defeat the
purpose of sentencing.
5.5. He would further submit that while considering
questions relating to sentence and release, the
Court must have regard not only to the rights
of the conv
convict,
ict, but also to the interests of the
victim and the society at large. A sentence of
life imprisonment must therefore be understood
in its ordinary legal sense, namely,
imprisonment for the remainder of the natural
life of the convict, unless expressly limited
limited by
the Court.
5.6. Learned Additional Advocate General reiterates
that Section 57 of the IPC merely provides that
for the purpose of calculating fractions of terms
of punishment, life imprisonment may be
reckoned as equivalent to twenty years. The
said pro
provision
vision does not determine the actual
duration of a sentence of life imprisonment, nor
does it mandate the release of a convict after
completion of twenty years.
5.7. He further submits that the question of
remission or premature release falls entirely
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within th
the
e domain of the appropriate
Government, in exercise of its powers under
Section 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (earlier Section 432 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure). Therefore, Section 57 of
the IPC cannot be invoked to restrict or a
alter
the period of a sentence of life imprisonment.
5.8. He relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Gopal Vinayk Godse vs.
State of Maharashtra and others2, more
particularly Paras 8 and 9 which are reproduced
hereunder for easy reference:
8. Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act
26 of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life could
be undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous
imprisonment for life in a designate
designated d prison in India.
After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with
in the same manner as one sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for the same term. Unless the said
sentence is commuted or remitted by appropriate
authority under the relevant provision
provisions of the Indian
Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure,, a
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in
law to serve the life, term in prison prison.. The rules
framed under the Prisons Act enable such a prisoner
to earn remissions
remissions- ordinary, special and State-andand
the said remissions will be given credit towards his
term of imprisonment. For the purpose
purpose of working
out the remissions the sentence of transportation for
life is ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it
is only for that particular purpose and not for any
other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for
life or its prison equivalent,
equivalent, the life imprisonment, is
one of indefinite duration, the remissions so earned
do not in practice help such a convict as it is not
possible to predicate the time of his death. That is
2
1961 SCC OnLine SC 70
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why the rules provide for a procedure to enable the
appropriate Gov
Government
ernment to remit the sentence under
Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on a
consideration of the relevant factors, including the
period of remissions earned. The question of
remission is exclusively
exclusively within the province of the
appropriate Government; and in this case it is
admitted that, though the appropriate Government
made certain remissions under Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure
Procedure,, it did not remit the
entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the
petitioner has not yet acquired any right to release.
9. The petitioner made an impassioned appeal to us
that if such a construction be accepted, he would be
at the mercy of the appropriate
appropriate Government and
that the said Government, out of spite, might not
remit the balance of his sentence, with the result
that he would be deprived of the fruits of remissions
earned by him for sustained good conduct, useful
service and even donation of blood. The Constitution
as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure confer the
power to remit a sentence on the executive
Government and it is in its exclusive province. We
cannot assume that the appropriate Government will
not exercise its jurisdiction in a reasonable
reasonable manner.
5.9. By relying upon Gopal Vinayak Godse,
Godse
learned Additional Advocate General submits
that a sentence of life imprisonment ordinarily
means imprisonment for the remainder of the
natural life of the convict, unless the sentence
is commuted or remitted
remitted by the appropriate
Government in exercise of its statutory powers.
He would further submit that the said judgment
clearly lays down that the reference to twenty
years in Section 57 of the IPC is only for the
limited purpose of calculating fractions of te
terms
of punishment, and cannot be construed as
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fixing the duration of a sentence of life
imprisonment at twenty years. Therefore,
according to him, the petitioner cannot claim
release merely on completion of twenty years
of imprisonment.
5.10. He relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Mohinder Singh vs. State
of Punjab3, more particularly Paras 26 and 27,
which are reproduced hereunder for easy
reference:
26. Life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to
imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years or even 30
years, rather it always means the whole natural life.
This Court has always clarified that the punishment
of a fixed term of imprisonment so awarded would
be subjec
subjectt to any order passed in exercise of
clemency powers of the President of India or the
Governor of the State, as the case may be. Pardons,
reprieves and remissions under Article 72 or Article
161 of the Constitution of India are granted in
exercise of prerogative
prerogative power. As observed in State
of U.P. v. Sanjay Kumar [(2012) 8 SCC 537 : (2012)
3 SCC (Cri) 970] (SCC p. 546, para 24) there is no
scope of judicial review of such orders except on
very limited grounds such as the non
non-application
application of
mind while passin
passing the order, non-consideration
consideration of
relevant material, or if the order suffers from
arbitrariness. The power to grant pardons and to
commute sentences is coupled with a duty to
exercise the same fairly, reasonably and in terms of
restrictions imposed in several
several provisions of the
Code.
27. In order to check all arbitrary remissions, the
Code itself provides several conditions. Sub-sections
Sub sections
(2) to (5) of Section 432 of the Code lay down basic
3
(2013) 3 SCC 294
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procedure for making an application to the
appropriate Government fo forr suspension or remission
of sentence either by the convict or someone on his
behalf. We are of the view that exercise of power by
the appropriate Government under sub-section
sub section (1)
of Section 432 of the Code cannot be suo motu for
the simple reason that this this is only an enabling
provision and the same would be possible subject to
fulfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions are
mentioned either in the Jail Manual or in statutory
rules. This Court in various decisions has held that
the power of remission cannot be exercised
arbitrarily. In other words, the decision to grant
remission has to be well informed, reasonable and
fair to all concerned. The statutory procedure laid
down in Section 432 of the Code itself provides this
check on the possible misuse of power by the
appropriate Government. As rightly observed by this
Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [(2013) 2 SCC
452 : (2012) 11 Scale 140] , there is a
misconception that a prisoner serving life sentence
has an indefeasible right to release on compl
completion
etion of
either 14 years' or 20 years' imprisonment. A
convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to
remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to
any remission granted by the appropriate
Government under Section 432 of the Code which in
turnn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned
in the said provision and further substantive check in
Section 433-A
433 of the Code.
5.11. By relying upon Mohinder Singh, learned
Additional Advocate General submits that the
law is well settled that life imprisonment
imprisonment means
imprisonment for the remainder of the natural
life of the convict, unless the sentence is
commuted or remitted by the appropriate
Government in exercise of its statutory or
constitutional powers. Therefore, according to
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him, the petitioner cannot claim an automatic
right of release merely on completion of twenty
years of imprisonment.
5.12. He relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Life Convict Bangal @
Khoka @ Prasanta Sen vs. B.K.Srivastava and
others4, more particularly Para 17, which is
reproduced hereunder for easy reference:
17. The last decision which is directly on the point
similar to the case on hand is Mohd. Munna v. Union
of India [(2005) 7 SCC 417 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1688] .
The said case arose in a writ petition filed under
Article 32 of the Constitution. According to the
petitioner therein, the length of duration of
imprisonment for life is equivalent to 20 years'
imprisonment and that too subject to further
remission admissible under law. It was further
pointed out th
that
at on completion of this term, he was
liable to be released under Rule 751(c) of the West
Bengal Jail Code. The petitioner relied on the
Explanation to Section 61 of the West Bengal
Correctional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act 32
of 1992) whereunder im imprisonment
prisonment for life is
equated to a term of 20 years' imprisonment. As
said earlier, it is a case identical to the case on
hand. Here again, the Explanation to Section 61 of
the West Bengal Act was pressed into service. After
going into the very same provi
provisions
sions and considering
the decision of the Privy Council in Kishori Lal case
[(1944 45) 72 IA 1 : (1945) 58 LW 251 : AIR 1945
[(1944-45)
PC 64] as well as the decision of the Constitution
Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse case [AIR 1961 SC
600 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 736] , this Court concluded
thus: (Mohd. Munna case [(2005) 7 SCC 417 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 1688] , SCC pp. 425-27,
425 paras 13-17)
"13. The counsel contended that by virtue of Rule
751(c) of the West Bengal Jail Code, the petitioner
4
(2013) 3 SCC 425
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was liable to be released from jail on c
completion
ompletion of
twenty years. He also relied on the Explanation to
Section 61 of the West Bengal Correctional Services
Act, 1992 (W.B. Act 32 of 1992) wherein the
imprisonment for life is equated to a term of twenty
years' simple imprisonment for the purpose of
remission. But there is no provision either in the
Penal Code or in the Code of Criminal Procedure
whereby life imprisonment could be treated as
fourteen years or twenty years without there being a
formal remission by the appropriate Government.
Section 57 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
'57.Fractions
57.Fractions of terms of punishmentpunishment.-- --In
calculating fractions of terms of punishment,
imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent
to imprisonment for twenty years.'
The above section is applicable for ththe
e purpose of
remission when the matter is considered by the
Government under the appropriate provisions. This
very plea was placed before the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in Kishori Lal v. King Emperor
[(1944
[(1944-45) 72 IA 1 : (1945) 58 LW 251 : AIR 1945
PC 64] and the Privy Council held as under: (IA p.
10 : AIR p. 67)
'... Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as
one of twenty years, and subject to remission for
good conduct, he had not earned remission sufficient
to entitle him to discharge at at the time of his
application, and it was therefore rightly dismissed,
but in saying this, Their Lordships are not to be
taken as meaning that a life sentence must and in all
cases be treated as one of not more than twenty
years, or that the convict is nec
necessarily
essarily entitled to
remission.'
14. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons
Act and the Prisons Act by itself does not confer any
authority or power to commute or remit sentence. It
only provides for the regulation of the prisons and
for the terms of the prisoners confined therein.
Therefore, the West Bengal Correctional Services Act
or the West Bengal Jail Code do not confer any
special right on the petitioner herein.
15. In Godse case [AIR 1961 SC 600 : (1961) 1 Cri
LJ 736] , the Constitution Bench of this Court held
that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for
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any definite period and the imprisonment for life
must, prima facie, be treated as imprisonment for
the whole of the remaining period of the convicted
person's
rson's natural life. It was also held in AIR para 5
as follows: (AIR p. 603 : SCR pp. 444-45)
444
'5. ... It does not say that transportation for life shall
be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for
all purposes; nor does the amended section which
substitutes the words "imprisonment for life" for
"transportation for life" enable the drawing of any
such all
all-embracing
embracing fiction. A sentence of
transportation for life or imprisonment for life must
prima facie be treated as transportation or
imprisonment ffor
or the whole of the remaining period
of the convicted person's natural life.'
16. Summarising the decision, it was held in AIR
para 8 as under: (AIR pp. 603-04
603 : SCR p. 447)
'8. Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act
26 of 1955 a sentence o off transportation for life could
be undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous
imprisonment for life in a designated prison in India.
After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with
in the same manner as one sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for the same term. Unless the said
sentence is commuted or remitted by appropriate
authority under the relevant provisions of the Penal
Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisoner
sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to
serve the life term in pri
prison.
son. The Rules framed under
the Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn
remissions
remissions--ordinary, special and State--and and the
said remissions will be given credit towards his term
of imprisonment. For the purpose of working out the
remissions the sentence of ttransportation
ransportation for life is
ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is
only for that particular purpose and not for any
other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for
life or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is
one of indefinite duration, the remissions so earned
do not in practice help such a convict as it is not
possible to predicate (sic predict) the time of his
death. That is why the Rules provide for a procedure
to enable the appropriate Government to remit the
sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure on a consideration of the relevant factors,
including the period of remissions earned. The
question of remission is exclusively within the
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province of the appropriate Government; and in this
case it is admitted
admitted that, though the appropriate
Government made certain remissions under Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not
remit the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that
the petitioner has not yet acquired any right to
release.'
We are bound b by
y the above dicta laid down by the
Constitution Bench and we hold that life
imprisonment is not equivalent to imprisonment for
fourteen years or for twenty years as contended by
the petitioner.
17. Thus, all the contentions raised by the petitioner
fail and
and the petitioner is not entitled to be released
on any of the grounds urged in the writ petition so
long as there is no order of remission passed by the
appropriate Government in his favour. We make it
clear that our decision need not be taken as
expression of our view that the petitioner is not
expression
entitled to any remission at all. The appropriate
Government would be at liberty to pass any
appropriate order of remission in accordance with
law."
5.13. By relying upon Bangal @ Khoka @ Prasanta
Sen, learned Additional
Additional Advocate General
submits that the legal position is well settled
that life imprisonment cannot be equated to a
fixed term of fourteen or twenty years, and
unless there is a specific judicial direction
limiting the sentence or an order of remission
by the appropriate Government, a convict
undergoing life imprisonment cannot claim
release merely on completion of twenty years
of imprisonment
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5.14. On the basis of the aforesaid judgments,
learned Additional Advocate General submits
that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Sukhdev Yadav would have no application
to the facts of the present case, as in that
matter the sentence of life imprisonment had
been specifically restricted by the Court to
twenty years of actual imprisonment without
remission.
5.15. In the present case, however, the sentence
imposed upon the petitioner is simple life
imprisonment without any judicial restriction
limiting it to a fixed term. Therefore, according
to him, the petitioner cannot claim an
automatic right of release upon completion of
twenty years of imprisonment.
5.16. He would further submit that the question of
remission or premature release lies within the
exclusive domain of the appropriate
Government, to be considered in accordance
with the applicable statutory provisions and
policy.. Consequently, there can be no question
of directing the release of the petitioner merely
on the basis that he has completed twenty
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years of imprisonment, as contended on behalf
of the petitioner.
6. Heard Sri.Pradeep Patil learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri.Pradeep C.S., AAG for
respondents. Perused papers.
7. The points that would arise for consideration are:
(i) Whether the judgment passed by this
Court in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008,
while commuting the death sentence to
life imprisonment and directing that the
accused shall serve the sentence "in
terms of Section 57 of the IPC", can be
construed as restricting the sentence of
life imprisonment to a fixed term of
twenty years of imprisonment?
(ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to
claim release from pri
prison
son merely on the
ground that he has completed twenty
years of imprisonment, by placing
reliance on Section 57 of the Indian
Penal Code and the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhdev
Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State (NCT of
Delhi)?
(iii) Whether, in the abs absence
ence of a specific
judicial direction restricting the duration
of the sentence, a sentence of life
imprisonment must be understood as
imprisonment for the remainder of the
natural life of the convict, subject to
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commutation or remission in accordance
with law?
(iv) Whether the petitioner has any
enforceable legal right to be released
upon completion of twenty years of
imprisonment, or whether the question
of remission or premature release lies
within the exclusive domain of the
appropriate Government under the
applicable
pplicable statutory provisions and
policy?
(v) Whether the continued incarceration of
the petitioner after completion of
twenty years of imprisonment can be
said to be illegal, so as to warrant the
issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing his release?
(vi) What is the scope of interference by this
Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India in matters relating
to sentence remission, premature
release and executive powers exercised
by the appropriate Government?
(vii) What Order
8. I answer the above points as follows
9. Answer to Point No. (i):
(i):Whether
Whether the judgment
passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal
No.1197/2008, while commuting the death
sentence to life imprisonment and directing that
the accused shall serve the sentence "in terms
of Section 57 of the IPC
IPC",", can be construed as
restricting the sentence of life imprisonment to
a fixed term of twenty years of imprisonment?
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9.1. Sri. Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submits that the petitioner was
originally convicted and sentenced to death by
the
he IV Additional City Civil and Sessions Court,
Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru in SC No.463/2003,
for offences punishable under Sections 302 and
364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'). He submits
that on appeal, this Court in Criminal
Criminal Appeal
No.1197/2008, vide judgment dated 6.6.2013,
commuted the death sentence to life
imprisonment, while further directing that: (a)
the accused 'shall not be given commutation
after completion of fourteen years of
imprisonment as a matter of routine';
routine'; and (b)
'the accused have to serve the life sentence
and they should be in jail in terms of Section
57 of IPC.'
9.2. The learned counsel submits that the phrase 'in
terms of Section 57 of IPC' is a judicial
direction that restricts and defines the life
sentence
tence as a sentence of twenty years of
actual imprisonment. He submits that Section
57 of the IPC equates imprisonment for life
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with imprisonment for twenty years 'in
calculating fractions of terms of punishment',
and that when the Court expressly directed the
accused to serve the sentence 'in terms of
Section 57 of IPC', the Court judicially fixed the
life sentence at twenty years -- the equivalent
period specified by Section 57.
9.3. The learned counsel places heavy reliance on
the decision of the Hon'ble Supre
Supreme
me Court in
Sukhdev Yadav
Yadavand submits that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that where a life sentence
is expressed as being equivalent to twenty
years of actual imprisonment, the sentence
stands fully completed upon the convict
undergoing twenty years, and the convict is
entitled to be simply released from jail without
any further application for remission to the
Sentence Review Board.
9.4. Sri. Pradeep Patil submits that the petitioner
has, as on 15.01.2025, completed twenty years
of actual imprisonment with satisfactory
conduct and no adverse report, as certified in
the Imprisonment Certificate dated 15.01.2025.
He submits that the sentence imposed by this
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Court stands fully undergone, and the
continued detention of the petitioner is illegal
and unconstitutional, warranting the immediate
issuance of a writ of mandamus directing his
release.
9.5. He relies on Section 57 of the IPC, which reads:
'Fractions
ractions of terms of punishment.--In
punishment.
calculating fractions of terms of punishment,
imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as
equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.'
He submits that this provision, when read in
conjunction with the judgment of this Co
Court in
Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008, means that the
petitioner's sentence stands satisfied upon
completion of twenty years, and that any
further incarceration is illegal.
9.6. Sri. Pradeep C.S., learned Additional Advocate
General (hereinafter 'AAG'), appearing along
with Smt. K.P. Yashodha, learned Additional
Government Advocate (hereinafter 'AGA'),
submits that the interpretation placed by the
petitioner on the operative portion of the
judgment in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008 is
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wholly misconceived and contrary
contrary to well-
well
settled law.
9.7. The learned AAG submits that the operative
portion of Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008 does
not fix or restrict the sentence of life
imprisonment to twenty years. The substantive
sentence awarded is 'life imprisonment',
imprisonment', these
are the exact
exact words used. The subsequent
direction 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC' is not a
conversion of the life sentence into a fixed
twenty
twenty-year
year sentence. It is, at most, a
specification that the accused must undergo a
minimum period of actual imprisonment
equiva
equivalent
lent to the period under Section 57
before any question of remission or
commutation arises. The expression 'life
sentence' remains the operative term.
9.8. The learned AAG submits that if this Court had
intended to restrict the sentence of life
imprisonment to twenty years of actual
imprisonment, it would have done so in clear
and express terms,
terms as the High Court in
Sukhdev Yadav did, using the formulation
'Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of
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actual imprisonment without consideration of
remission.' No such
such language was used in
Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008. In the absence
of such specific language, the direction 'in
terms of Section 57 of IPC' cannot be construed
as having judicially fixed the sentence at
twenty years.
9.9. The learned AAG relies on 'Gopal Vinayak
Vin
Godse', a Constitution Bench decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.which holds that the
equating of life imprisonment with a definite
period for the purpose of working out
remissions is 'only for that particular purpose
and not for any other purpose.' He submits that
this binding Constitution Bench precedent
settles the scope of Section 57 of the IPC and
negates the petitioner's interpretation.
9.10. He also relies on 'Mohinder Singh' and
'Bangal @ Khoka',
Khoka', both of which conclusively
hold that life imprisonme
imprisonment
nt means the whole
natural life and cannot be equated with a fixed
term of fourteen or twenty years. He submits
that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Sukhdev Yadav is factually and legally
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distinguishable, being premised on a specific
and explicit
explicit judicial direction fixing the life
sentence at twenty years
years, which is entirely
absent in the judgment of this Court in Criminal
Appeal No.1197/2008.
9.11. I have heard learned counsel for both parties
with care and have perused the record,
including the judgment
judgment in Criminal Appeal
No.1197/2008, the relevant paragraphs of
Sukhdev Yadav
Yadav,, the Constitution Bench
decision in Gopal Vinayak Godse,, and the
decisions in Mohinder Singh and Bangal @
Khoka
Khoka.. The central question arising under
Point (i) is one of pure construction: does the
phrase 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC' in the
judgment of Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008,
read in its full context, amount to a judicial
restriction of the life sentence to a fixed term of
twenty years of imprisonment?
9.12. The
he operative portion
portion of the judgment in
Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008, dated
6.6.2013, reads: 'the death sentence is
modified and accused nos.1 to 3 are sentenced
to life imprisonment. It is further directed that
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accused nos.1 to 3 shall not be given
commutation after com
completion
pletion of fourteen years
of imprisonment as a matter of routine. The
accused have to serve the life sentence and
they should be in jail in terms of Section 57 of
IPC.' This is the sentence imposed that must be
interpreted.
9.13. The first and foundational obser
observation
vation is that
the sentence imposed is expressed as 'life
imprisonment' and then further and separately
as 'the life sentence.' The Court used the term
'life sentence' as the substantive and governing
term of the punishment. The sentence is not
described a
as
s a sentence 'which shall be twenty
years' or 'of twenty years of actual
imprisonment.' The use of the term 'life
sentence' as the operative description is of
decisive significance.
9.14. The second observation is structural. The
judgment in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008
No.1197/2008
contains two distinct and sequential directions:
Direction (A): The accused shall not be given
commutation after completion of fourteen years
of imprisonment as a matter of routine.
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Direction (B): The accused have to serve the
life sentenceand they
they should be in jail in terms
of Section 57 of IPC. These are two separate
and complementary directions. Direction (A)
deals with the period of fourteen years
years,
prohibiting routine commutation at that stage.
Direction (B) uses the expression 'life sentence'
as the operative term and adds the Section 57
reference as the specification of the minimum
period of actual imprisonment.
9.15. The combined reading of both Directions is this:
(a) the accused must serve a life sentence; (b)
they must be in jail, and their period
period of actual
imprisonment for the purpose of Section 57
equivalent is twenty years,
years meaning twenty
years is the minimum actual imprisonment
before any question of remission or
commutation can arise, replacing the otherwise
applicable fourteen-year
fourteen period under
nder Section
433-A
A CrPC. This reading gives full effect to
both directions and maintains internal
consistency in the judgment. On the contrary,
the petitioner's reading
reading, that the life sentence
was fixed at twenty years,
years would render
Direction (A) redundant and unnecessary, since
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if the sentence was fixed at twenty years, there
would be no question of commutation even
after fourteen years at all.
9.16. The rule against surplusage in statutory and
judicial interpretation is well-established.
well established. Every
word in a judgmen
judgmentt or order is presumed to
have been used deliberately and to carry
meaning. Courts are not to be understood as
having used words without purpose. If the
petitioner's reading were accepted, Direction
(A) would become meaningless
meaningless, for why would
a Court prohibit
prohibit commutation after fourteen
years if the sentence itself was fixed at twenty
years and would automatically end at that
point? This internal incongruity is sufficient to
demolish the petitioner's interpretation.
9.17. I now turn to the decision in Sukhdev Yadav,
Yada
upon which the petitioner strongly relies. In
Sukhdev Yadav
Yadav,, the sentence imposed by the
High Court was expressed in the following
terms: 'Life imprisonment which shall be 20
years of actual imprisonment without
consideration of remission, and fine of
Rs.10,000/
s.10,000/-.'
.' The Hon'ble Supreme Court at
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Para 15 of the said judgment analysed the
word 'which' used after 'Life imprisonment' and
held that it is 'an interrogative pronoun, related
pronoun and determiner, referring to
something previously mentioned when
introducing a clause giving further information'
that
hat the sentence of life imprisonment is
'determined as twenty years which is of actual
imprisonment.'
9.18. The critical and material distinction between
Sukhdev Yadav and the present case is as
follows. In Sukhdev Yadav,, the High Court
specifically used the formulation 'Life
imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual
imprisonment'
imprisonment', here, the word 'which' links 'Life
imprisonment' directly and definitionally to '20
years of actual imprisonment,' converting the
th
nature of the sentence from an indeterminate
one to a determinate one. The sentence was
fixed, not merely described. In the present
case, no such definitional linkage exists. The
words used are 'life sentence' and 'in terms of
Section 57 of IPC',
IPC' these are not words of
definition but words of duration reference. The
contrast is stark and unmistakable. Sukhdev
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Yadav is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on
the language and facts.
9.19. I shall now examine Section 57 of the IPC in
detail. Section 57 reads: 'Fractions of terms of
punishment.
punishment.--In
In calculating fractions of terms
of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be
reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for
twenty years.' The marginal heading is
'Fractions of terms of punishment.' The
language of Section 57 is clear and its scope is
expressly limited. It applies 'in calculating
fractions of terms of punishment.' It does not
say that life imprisonment shall be deemed to
be twenty years for all purposes, or that a
convict sentenced to life imprisonment shall
shal be
released after twenty years. It is a specific and
limited provision for arithmetic calculation.
9.20. This limited scope of Section 57 of the IPC has
been definitively established by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India. In Gopal Vinayak
Godse
Godsewherein the Hon'ble Constitution Bench
held: 'For the purpose of working out the
remissions the sentence of transportation for
life is ordinarily equated with a definite period,
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but it is only for that particular purpose and not
for any other purpose.' The Constitution Be
Bench
elaborated that the sentence of life
imprisonment 'is one of indefinite duration, the
remissions so earned do not in practice help
such a convict as it is not possible to predicate
the time of his death.' This is a binding decision
of a Constitution Bench.
Bench. It cannot be departed
from.
9.21. In Mohinder Singh,
Singh, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reiterated, in unambiguous terms: 'Life
imprisonment cannot be equivalent to
imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years or even
30 years, rather it always means the whole
natural life
life.'' This statement leaves no room for
the contention that a reference to Section 57 of
the IPC in a judgment, or that Section 57 itself,
fixes the duration of life imprisonment at
twenty years.
9.22. In Bangal @ Khoka
Khoka,, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, after a comprehensive
comprehensive survey of
precedent, concluded: 'We are bound by the
above dicta laid down by the Constitution
Bench and we hold that life imprisonment is not
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equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years
or for twenty years as contended by the
petitioner.
petitioner.' This Court is more bound by this
dicta.
9.23. The submission of Sri. Pradeep Patil that
Section 57 of the IPC operates as a sentence
sentence-
defining provision
provision, fixing life imprisonment at
twenty years
years, is directly contrary to the
consistent interpretation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse,
Mohinder Singh and Bangal @ Khoka.
Khoka. These
decisions are binding on this Court. The
argument must be and is rejected.
9.24. A contextual reading of the judgment in
Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008 also supports
the above interpretation. The case involved the
gruesome murder of two innocent children. The
original sentence was death. This Court found it
was not the 'rarest of rare' case warranting
death, but did not treat it as a routine case
either. The judgment imposed a specific bar
against
nst routine commutation and directed
service of the life sentence 'in terms of Section
57 of IPC.' These directions reflect this Court's
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intention that the accused must serve a
substantial minimum period before even being
eligible for any remission consideration,
conside they do
not reflect an intention to cap the sentence at
twenty years. Reading the directions as capping
the sentence at twenty years would be wholly
inconsistent with the gravity of the offence and
the evident purpose of the directions.
9.25. For the for
foregoing reasons, I answer Point No.
(i) by holding that the judgment passed by this
Court in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008, while
commuting the death sentence to life
imprisonment and directing that the accused
shall serve the sentence 'in terms of Section 5
57
of the IPC', cannot be construed as restricting
the sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed
term of twenty years of imprisonment. The
direction specifies the minimum period of actual
imprisonment; it does not convert or fix the life
sentence as a twenty
twenty-year sentence.
10. Answer to Point No. (ii): Whether the petitioner
is entitled to claim release from prison merely
on the ground that he has completed twenty
years of imprisonment, by placing reliance on
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code and the
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judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State (NCT of
Delhi)?
10.1. Sri. Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submits that the petitioner has
served twenty years of actual imprisonment as
on 15.01.2025. He contends that
that upon
completion of twenty years, the sentence
imposed by this Court 'in terms of Section 57 of
IPC' stands fully served, and the petitioner is
entitled to be released forthwith,
forthwith exactly as the
Hon'ble Supreme Court directed in Sukhdev
Yadav
Yadav.
10.2. Learned counsel
counsel relies on Para 15.2 of Sukhdev
Yadav, which holds that 'on completion of the
twenty years of actual imprisonment, it is
wholly unnecessary for the appellant to seek
remission of his sentence on the premise that
his sentence is a life imprisonment i.e. till the
end of his natural life.' He submits that this
principle applies directly to the petitioner's
case, since this Court's direction 'in terms of
Section 57 of IPC' is, according to him, identical
in substance to the direction 'Life imprisonment
which shall be 20 years' in Sukhdev Yadav
Yadav.
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10.3. He submits that any other interpretation would
require the petitioner to make an application
for remission before the Sentence Review
Board, which would be unreasonable and
contrary to the spirit of the judgment in
Criminal
minal Appeal No.1197/2008. Since the
sentence has been served, the question of
remission simply does not arise.
10.4. Sri. Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits that
the petitioner is not entitled to claim automatic
release upon completion of twenty years. He
submits
ts that Section 57 of the IPC is not a
provision that mandates the release of a life
convict after twenty years. Its operation is
confined to calculating fractions of punishment.
This limited purpose of Section 57 is
established by the Constitution Bench in
in Gopal
Vinayak Godse and confirmed in Mohinder
Singh and Bangal @ Khoka.
10.5. The learned AAG submits that the reliance
placed by the petitioner on Sukhdev Yadav is
misplaced, as already submitted under Point
(i). He reiterates that Sukhdev Yadav is based
entirely
rely on the specific language used by the
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High Court in that case,'Life
case 'Life imprisonment
which shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment
without consideration of remission
remission'' which is
materially different from the language used in
Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008. The
The ratio of
Sukhdev Yadav cannot be imported into the
present case by a strained reading of the
direction 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC.'
10.6. The learned AAG submits that the question of
premature release lies within the exclusive
domain of the appropriate Government
Government under
Section 432/433-A
432/433 A CrPC (now Sections
473/474 BNSS). In the absence of an order of
remission by the appropriate Government, the
petitioner has no legal right to release, and no
writ of mandamus can be issued.
10.7. Under Point (ii), I must determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to claim release merely on
the ground of completion of twenty years of
imprisonment, relying on Section 57 of the IPC
and Sukhdev Yadav
Yadav.. The analysis must
proceed on the foundation alrea
already
dy laid under
Point (i), namely, that the judgment in Criminal
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Appeal No.1197/2008 did not fix the life
sentence at twenty years.
10.8. Section 57 of the IPC must be analysed first.
The provision reads: 'Fractions of terms of
punishment.
punishment.--In calculating fractions of terms
of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be
reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for
twenty years.' The marginal note -- 'Fractions
of terms of punishment' -- is the key to the
purpose of the provision. It applies only when
fractions of terms of
of punishment are required
to be calculated, typically for the purpose of
computing remissions admissible under the
prison rules or the relevant statutory
provisions. It does not operate as a provision
determining when a life sentence stands
completed.
10.9. The Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak
Godse (Para 8) specifically addressed this. The
Court referred to the practice of equating the
life sentence with a definite period 'for the
purpose of working out the remissions' and
held that such equating is 'only for that
particular purpose and not for any other
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purpose.' This restriction is plain: Section 57
operates only for calculating remissions and
fractions; it does not determine the actual
duration of the sentence. Reliance on Section
57 to claim that the sentence
sentence has been
completed upon serving twenty years is,
therefore, contrary to this binding Constitution
Bench decision.
10.10. Para 9 of Gopal Vinayak Godse is also
instructive. The petitioner therein made an
'impassioned appeal' contending that if a life
sentence means imprisonment for the whole
natural life, he would be 'at the mercy of the
appropriate Government' which 'out of spite,
might not remit the balance of his sentence.'
The Constitution Bench acknowledged this
concern but held: 'The Constitution as well as
the Code of Criminal Procedure confer the
power to remit a sentence on the executive
Government and it is in its exclusive province.
We cannot assume that the appropriate
Government will not exercise its jurisdiction in
a reasonable manner.' This reasoning
reasoning applies
with equal force in the present case.
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10.11. In Mohinder Singh (Para 27), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court specifically addressed and
rejected the claim of a convict serving life
imprisonment to 'indefeasible right to release
on completion of either 14 years or 20 years
imprisonment.' The Court stated clearly: 'A
convict undergoing life imprisonment is
expected to remain in custody till the end of his
life, subject to any remission granted by the
appropriate Government under Section 432 of
the Code.' The expectation
expectation of natural-life
natural
imprisonment, subject only to executive
remission, is the settled legal position. No
amount of reliance on Section 57 of the IPC
alters this.
10.12. In Bangal @ Khoka (Para 17), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, applying the ratio of Gopal
Vinaya
Vinayak Godse and Mohd. Munna,
Munna
categorically rejected a similar claim and held:
'We hold that life imprisonment is not
equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years
or for twenty years as contended by the
petitioner.' The petitioner therein was not
entitled to b
be
e released 'on any of the grounds
urged in the writ petition so long as there is no
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order of remission passed by the appropriate
Government in his favour.'
10.13. On the reliance placed on Sukhdev Yadav, I
have already held, under Point (i), that the said
decisio
decision
n is factually distinguishable. In
Sukhdev Yadav
Yadav,, the sentence was
definitionally fixed at 'Life imprisonment which
shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment
without consideration of remission.' The
completion of twenty years in that case was the
completion of a judicially-fixed
fixed sentence. In the
present case, no such judicially-fixed
judicially fixed sentence
exists. The petitioner has completed twenty
years of imprisonment pursuant to a continuing
life sentence,
sentence he has not completed the
sentence. The ratio of Sukhdev Yadav has,
therefore, no application.
10.14. Para 15.2 of Sukhdev Yadav, which the
petitioner particularly relies upon, must be read
in context. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was
addressing the specific situation where the
sentence had already been judicially fixed at
twenty
ty years of actual imprisonment and the
convict had completed those twenty years. The
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observation that 'it is wholly unnecessary for
the appellant to seek remission' was made
because the sentence had been completed by
judicial design. The same observation cannot
be transplanted into a case where the sentence
is a continuing life sentence and has not been
fixed at twenty years.
10.15. Accordingly, I answer Point No. (ii) by holding
that the petitioner is not entitled to claim
release from prison merely on the groun
ground that
he has completed twenty years of
imprisonment. Section 57 of the IPC does not
mandate or authorise release after twenty
years; the decision in Sukhdev Yadav is
distinguishable and not applicable to the facts
of this case; and the three binding decis
decisions
ions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gopal Vinayak
Godse
Godse, Mohinder Singh and Bangal @
Khoka
Khoka, conclusively negate such a claim.
11. Answer to Point No. (iii): Whether, in the
absence of a specific judicial direction
restricting the duration of the sentence, a
sentence of life imprisonment must be
understood as imprisonment for the remainder
of the natural life of the convict, subject to
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commutation or remissio
remission
n in accordance with
law?
11.1. Sri. Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for the
petitioner, does not directly contend that the
general principle,
principle life imprisonment means
imprisonment for remainder of natural life
life, is
incorrect. His contention is that in the present
case, this Court has given a specific judicial
direction (viz., the direction 'in terms of Section
57 of IPC') that restricts and fixes the duration
of the sentence. He submits that this specific
judiciall direction takes the case outside the
scope of the general principle, making it
governed by the Sukhdev Yadav principle
instead.
11.2. He submits that Sukhdev Yadav itself
recognises that courts have the power to fix the
duration of a life sentence at a specific
specific term,
and that where such a direction exists, the
general principle does not apply. He argues that
this Court's judgment in Criminal Appeal
No.1197/2008 contains such a direction.
11.3. Sri. Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits that in
the absence of a specific judicial direction
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restricting the duration of a life sentence to a
fixed term, the sentence must be understood,
in accordance with well-settled
well settled law, as
imprisonment for the remainder of the natural
life of the convict. He submits that this principle
is established
tablished by the Constitution Bench in
Gopal Vinayak Godse
Godse,, reaffirmed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh
and Bangal@ Khoka,
Khoka, and is not departed from
in Sukhdev Yadav
Yadav.. He submits that in the
present case, there is no specific judicial
direction fixing the sentence at twenty years.
The general principle therefore applies, and the
sentence is imprisonment for the remainder of
natural life.
11.4. Point (iii) raises a question of general legal
principle that has a direct bearing on the
outcome of this cas
case.
e. The question: must a
sentence of life imprisonment, in the absence of
a specific judicial direction restricting its
duration, be understood as imprisonment for
the remainder of the natural life of the convict?
11.5. The answer is provided by a long, consistent
consisten
and unbroken line of decisions of the Hon'ble
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Supreme Court of India. The Constitution Bench
in Gopal Vinayak Godse (Para 8) declared: 'A
sentence of transportation for life or
imprisonment for life must prima facie be
treated as transportation or imprisonment
imprisonment for
the whole of the remaining period of the
convicted person's natural life.' The use of the
phrase 'must prima facie be treated' establishes
this as the default rule -- the starting point of
any analysis of life imprisonment.
11.6. The qualification 'unless
'unless the said sentence is
commuted or remitted by appropriate authority'
in Gopal Vinayak Godse identifies the only
legitimate routes by which the sentence may
end before the natural death of the convict: (a)
commutation or remission by the appropriate
Government
rnment under the CrPC (now BNSS); (b)
commutation or remission by the President of
India or the Governor of the State in exercise of
the prerogative powers under Articles 72 and
161 of the Constitution of India respectively; or
(c) a specific judicial dire
direction
ction fixing the
sentence at a definite term (as discussed in
Sukhdev Yadav).
Yadav). In the absence of any of
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these routes, the sentence continues for the
remainder of the convict's natural life.
11.7. In Mohinder Singh (Paras 26 and 27), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reaffirmed this
principle: 'Life imprisonment cannot be
equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20
years or even 30 years, rather it always means
the whole natural life.' The Hon'ble Supreme
Court also expla
explained
ined the constitutional scheme:
pardons and remissions under Articles 72 and
161 of the Constitution are prerogative powers
of the executive, subject to limited judicial
review. The power of remission under Section
432 CrPC is also vested in the executive. The
power of courts is to impose sentence; the
power to subsequently alter or remit the
sentence (except in specific circumstances) lies
with the executive.
11.8. In Bangal @ Khoka (Para 17), the principle
was restated with the same clarity: 'life
imprisonment is not equivalent to imprisonment
for fourteen years or for twenty years.' The
Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that the
petitioner therein would not be entitled to
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release 'so long as there is no order of
remission passed by the appropriate
Government in his
h favour.'
11.9. It is also appropriate to note Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, which guarantees that no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure
established by law. The continued incarceration
of the petitioner
petitioner pursuant to a valid sentence of
life imprisonment is in full conformity with
Article 21 -- it is deprivation of liberty
according to a procedure established by law,
namely, the procedure of conviction and
sentencing under the IPC and CrPC by a
competent court. The general principle that life
competent
imprisonment means imprisonment for the
whole natural life is, therefore, constitutionally
valid and cannot be challenged on the ground
of violation of Article 21.
11.10. Regarding the petitioner's contention that this
case
se falls outside the general principle by virtue
of a specific judicial direction (the direction 'in
terms of Section 57 of IPC'), this Court has
already held under Point (i) that the said
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direction does not restrict or fix the duration of
the sentence at twenty years. The specific
judicial direction exception recognised in
Sukhdev Yadav (and discussed in the context
of sentences specifically worded as 'Life
imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual
imprisonment') does not apply in the absence
of such specific language. The general principle
therefore operates in full force in the present
case.
11.11. Accordingly, I answer Point no. (iii) by holding
that in the absence of a specific judicial
direction restricting the duration of the
sentence, the sentence of life
life imprisonment
imposed on the petitioner must be understood
as imprisonment for the remainder of his
natural life, subject to commutation or
remission in accordance with law.
12. Answer to Point No. (iv): Whether the
petitioner has any enforceable legal right
right to be
released upon completion of twenty years of
imprisonment, or whether the question of
remission or premature release lies within the
exclusive domain of the appropriate
Government under the applicable statutory
provisions and policy?
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12.1. Sri. Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submits that the petitioner has an
enforceable legal right to be released upon
completion of twenty years of imprisonment.
He submits that this right flows from the
judicial direction in Criminal Appeal
No.1197/2
No.1197/2008,
008, read in conjunction with Section
57 of the IPC and the principle in Sukhdev
Yadav
Yadav.. He submits that the right to release
upon completion of the judicially
judicially-fixed
fixed period is
a judicial right, not merely an executive favour.
It is not a matter of remission or executive
discretion; it is a matter of the sentence having
been completed.
12.2. Sri. Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits that
the petitioner has no enforceable legal right to
automatic release upon completion of twenty
years. He submits that the power of remission
remission
and premature release is vested exclusively in
the appropriate Government under Section 432
of the CrPC (now Section 473 of the BNSS),
subject to the constraints of Section 433-A
433
CrPC (now Section 474 BNSS). He extracts and
relies upon these provisions.
provis
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12.3. Section 473(1) of the BNSS (corresponding to
Section 432(1) CrPC) reads: 'When any person
has been sentenced to punishment for an
offence, the appropriate Government may, at
any time, without conditions or upon any
conditions which the person sentenc
sentenced
ed accepts,
suspend the execution of his sentence or remit
the whole or any part of the punishment to
which he has been sentenced.
sentenced.'
12.4. The use of the word 'may' in Section 473(1) of
the BNSS makes the exercise of the power
purely discretionary with the appropriate
appro
Government. The convict does not have an
automatic or absolute right to remission or
release.
12.5. The learned AAG relies on Para 27 of Mohinder
Singh,, which states: 'there is a misconception
that a prisoner serving life sentence has an
indefeasible right
right to release on completion of
either 14 years or 20 years imprisonment.' He
submits that the present case involves precisely
this misconception being raised by the
petitioner. He submits that the Sentence
Review Board, when it considers any
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application for premature release, must do so
in accordance with the applicable policy and the
statutory provisions, and the Court cannot pre-
pre
empt or substitute that exercise of discretion.
12.6. Point (iv) requires this Court to determine
whether the petitioner has an enforceable
enforceable legal
right to automatic release upon completion of
twenty years, or whether the question of
premature release lies within the exclusive
domain of the appropriate Government.
12.7. As held under Points (i), (ii) and (iii), the
petitioner has no enforceable legal right to
automatic release, because: (a) the sentence
imposed is life imprisonment and not a twenty-
twenty
year sentence (Point i); (b) Section 57 of the
IPC does not mandate release after twenty
years (Point ii); and (c) life imprisonment
means imprisonmen
imprisonmentt for the remainder of
natural life (Point iii). These three findings
collectively and conclusively exclude the
existence of an enforceable legal right to
automatic release.
12.8. The statutory scheme governing remission and
premature release of life convicts is Sections
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432, 433 and 433-A
433 A of the CrPC (now Sections
473, 474 and 475 of the BNSS). The scheme is
as follows: Section 432/473 BNSS vests in the
appropriate Government the discretionary
discretionary
power to suspend or remit the sentence, at any
time, with or without conditions. Section
433/474 BNSS vests in the appropriate
Government the power to commute life
imprisonment to rigorous or simple
imprisonment for a term not exceeding
fourteen
en years. Section 433
433-A/474
A/474 BNSS
imposes a restriction: where a sentence of
imprisonment for life has been imposed on
conviction for an offence for which death is one
of the punishments provided by law, the
appropriate Government shall not exercise its
powers
ers of release or commutation unless the
person has served at least fourteen years of
imprisonment.
12.9. In the present case, the original conviction was
under Sections 302 and 364A IPC, both of
which provide for death as one of the
punishments. Therefore, Section
Sect 433-A
A CrPC /
Section 474 BNSS applies, and the minimum
period of actual imprisonment before remission
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can even be considered is fourteen years.
However, as held, this Court in Criminal Appeal
No.1197/2008 modified this threshold to
twenty years by its direction 'in terms of
Section 57 of IPC.' Thus, the petitioner was not
eligible for even consideration of remission until
he had served twenty years of actual
imprisonment.
12.10. Having now served twenty years, the threshold
for eligibility to apply for remissi
remission
on has been
crossed. The petitioner has crossed from
ineligibility to eligibility. He is now eligible to
make an application for premature release or
remission to the appropriate Government.
However, eligibility to apply is different from
having an enforce
enforceable
able legal right to be
released. The appropriate Government must
still consider the application on its merits, in
accordance with applicable policy, taking into
account all relevant factors. The decision
whether to remit the sentence or grant
premature release
release remains with the appropriate
Government.
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12.11. The power of remission is constitutionally and
statutorily vested in the executive. It is a power
coupled with a duty to exercise it fairly and
reasonably, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Mohinder Singh (Para 27). The Court
can ensure that this power is exercised fairly,
reasonably and in accordance with law,
law but it
cannot itself exercise the power by directing
the release of the convict. This distinction,
distinction
between ensuring fair exercise of the power
and exercising the power itself,
itself is the
constitutional boundary between the judiciary
and the executive.
12.12. Accordingly, I answer Point No. (iv) by holding
that:: (a) The petitioner has no enforceable
legal right to automatic release upon
completion of twenty year
yearss of imprisonment.
(b) The question of remission or premature
release lies within the exclusive domain of the
appropriate Government under the applicable
statutory provisions and policy. (c) The
petitioner, having crossed the minimum
threshold of twenty ye
years
ars of actual
imprisonment, is now eligible to apply for
premature release/remission to the appropriate
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Government, which shall consider such
application on its merits in accordance with
applicable law and policy.
13. Answer to Point No. (v): Whether the
continued
tinued incarceration of the petitioner after
completion of twenty years of imprisonment
can be said to be illegal, so as to warrant the
issuance of a writ of mandamus directing his
release?
13.1. Sri. Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submits that
that the continued
incarceration of the petitioner after completion
of twenty years of actual imprisonment is illegal
and unconstitutional. He draws the Court's
attention to Para 15.4 of Sukhdev Yadav,
Yadav
where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: 'There
cannot be any
any further incarceration of the
appellant herein from 09.03.2025 onwards...
the continuous incarceration of the appellant
from 09.03.2025 onwards was illegal.' He
submits that the same logic applies to the
petitioner
petitioner, since he has completed twenty years
and the sentence was specified 'in terms of
Section 57 of IPC', the continued detention post
completion of twenty years is illegal.
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13.2. Learned counsel submits that since the
detention is illegal, the writ jurisdiction of tthis
Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India is directly attracted, and a
writ of mandamus must issue directing the
third respondent to release the petitioner
forthwith. He relies on the well
well-established
established
principle that a writ of habeas corpus or
mandamus may be issued when a person is
detained without lawful authority.
13.3. Sri. Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits that
the continued incarceration of the petitioner is
not illegal. The petitioner is detained pursuant
to a valid warrant of commi
commitment
tment issued by a
competent court, pursuant to a valid and
subsisting sentence of life imprisonment. Since
the sentence of life imprisonment has not been
completed, commuted, or remitted, the
continued detention is entirely lawful. The
analogy with Sukhdev Yadav is misconceived,
as in that case the sentence had been
specifically fixed at twenty years and had been
fully undergone. No such completion of
sentence has occurred in the present case.
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13.4. The learned AAG submits that a writ of
mandamus can be issued only
only to compel the
performance of a mandatory public duty. In the
present case, there is no mandatory duty on
the third respondent to release the petitioner.
The duty of the third respondent is to hold the
petitioner in custody pursuant to the valid
warrant of commitment, and that duty is being
lawfully performed. No writ of mandamus,
therefore, can or should issue.
13.5. Point (v) requires determination of whether the
continued incarceration is illegal. The answer to
this question flows from the answers already
given
ven to Points (i) through (iv).
13.6. A detention is illegal when it lacks legal
authority
authority, when there is no valid court order or
warrant authorising the detention, or when the
sentence pursuant to which the detention is
maintained has been fully undergone, or w
when
the detention violates a constitutional or
statutory provision. None of these conditions is
satisfied in the present case. The petitioner is
detained pursuant to a valid warrant of
commitment, pursuant to a valid and subsisting
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sentence of life imprisonment
imprisonment passed by a
competent court and affirmed in Criminal
Appeal No.1197/2008. The sentence has not
been completed, commuted, or remitted. The
detention is therefore lawful.
13.7. The reliance placed by the learned counsel on
Para 15.4 of Sukhdev Yadav is specifically
fically and
expressly addressed and rejected for the
reasons elaborately discussed under Points (i)
and (ii). In Sukhdev Yadav,, the sentence had
been fixed at twenty years of actual
imprisonment by a specific judicial direction,
and the convict had complet
completed
ed that twenty
twenty-
year sentence. The continued incarceration
after the sentence was specifically and judicially
fixed at twenty years and fully undergone
undergone, that
was held to be illegal. In the present case, no
such twenty
twenty-year
year sentence was fixed. The
sentence is
is a continuing life sentence. The
twenty years served are part of the sentence
but do not constitute the whole sentence.
Therefore, the continued incarceration is not
illegal.
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13.8. For a writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner
must demonstrate: (a) a clear legal
legal right to the
performance of a specific act; and (b) a
corresponding legal duty in the respondent to
perform that act; and (c) the respondent's
failure to perform that duty. As held under
Point (iv), the petitioner has no enforceable
legal right to auto
automatic
matic release upon
completion of twenty years. Since the first
prerequisite legal right is not established, the
foundation for a writ of mandamus is absent.
The writ cannot issue.
13.9. It must also be noted that issuing a writ of
mandamus directing the release of a convict
whose sentence is validly subsisting would, in
substance and effect, amount to this Court
exercising the power of remission and
commutation
commutation, a power vested by the
Constitution and the statutes in the executive
Government and not in the judiciary.
judiciary. Such an
exercise would be ultra vires the jurisdiction of
this Court in writ proceedings. This Court has
no power to direct the release of a life convict
by assuming to itself the power of remission
that belongs to the appropriate Government.
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13.10. This Court
Court is also guided by the principle of
judicial restraint in matters of criminal
sentencing and execution of sentences. The
Court's role, in the context of writ jurisdiction,
is to ensure that the law is applied correctly
and that fundamental rights are prot
protected
ected, not
to substitute its discretion for that of the
sentencing court or the executive. As long as
the detention is pursuant to a valid sentence
and the prisoner's fundamental rights are not
violated, this Court does not interfere with the
continued exe
execution of the sentence.
13.11. For the above reasons, I answer point No. (v0
by holding that the continued incarceration of
the petitioner after completion of twenty years
of imprisonment is not illegal, and that no writ
of mandamus can be issued directing his
release.
lease.
14. Answer to Point No. (vi): What is the scope of
interference by this Court under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India in matters
relating to sentence remission, premature
release and executive powers exercised by the
appropriate Government?
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14.1. Sri. Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submits that this Court has full and
ample jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India to examine the
legality of the petitioner's detention and to
issue appropriate directions. He submits that
the
he question before the Court is not one of
remission or executive discretion,
discretion it is a
question of interpreting a judicial direction and
enforcing the legal right flowing from it. He
submits that this question is squarely within the
writ jurisdiction of this
thi Court.
14.2. He submits that where a Court has given a
direction
direction, whether expressly or by implication,
implication
for release upon completion of a specific period,
the enforcement of that direction is a judicial
function, not an executive one. The present
case, according to him, involves enforcing such
a direction.
14.3. Sri. Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits that
while the High Court's writ jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 is wide, it is not unlimited.
In matters of sentence remission and
premature release, the Court's jurisdiction is
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supervisory and review-based,
review the Court can
ensure that the appropriate Government acts in
accordance with law, but cannot itself exercise
the executive power of remission or substitute
its judgment for that of the appropriate
Government in
in deciding whether a convict
should be released.
14.4. He submits that in the present case, there has
been no application for remission before the
appropriate Government, no order on such
application, and no illegality in the continued
detention. In such circumstances,
circumstances, there is
nothing for this Court's writ jurisdiction to act
upon.
14.5. The scope of this Court's writ jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India is unquestionably wide. Article 226
empowers this Court to issue directions, orders
or writs,
writs including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari
certiorari, to any person or authority
including the Government, for the enforcement
of fundamental rights and for any other
purpose. Article 227 vests in this
this Court the
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power of superintendence over all courts and
tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction.
14.6. However, the breadth of Article 226 jurisdiction
does not mean that this Court is entitled to
exercise all governmental powers. The
Constitution carefu
carefully
lly distributes power among
the three branches of government, and the
courts are required to act within the domain
assigned to them. In matters of criminal
sentences, the execution and modification of
sentences are matters governed by statute,
and the power
power to remit or commute sentences
is specifically and exclusively vested in the
appropriate Government or the
President/Governor under Articles 72/161. This
Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, cannot
arrogate to itself the power of remission.
14.7. In the context of the present case and matters
of this nature, this Court's writ jurisdiction
extends to the following permissible forms of
interference: (i) examining whether the
continued detention of the convict is pursuant
to a valid court order
order, if not, a writ
rit of habeas
corpus may issue; (ii) examining whether the
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appropriate Government has failed or refused
to consider an application for remission in
accordance with statutory procedure,
procedure if so, a
mandamus may issue directing consideration of
the application; (iii) examining whether an
order of the appropriate Government on a
remission application is arbitrary, mala fide, or
vitiated by non-application
non of mind, if so, the
order may be quashed and fresh consideration
directed; (iv) giving effect to the completion
completi of
a judicially
judicially-fixed
fixed sentence by directing release,
release
as was done in Sukhdev Yadav.
14.8. In the present case, this Court has already held
that: (a) the continued detention is pursuant to
a valid life sentence (so no habeas corpus
issue); (b) there is no appli
application
cation for remission
before the appropriate Government (so no
question of the Government having failed to
consider); (c) no order of remission has been
passed by the appropriate Government (so no
question of quashing); and (d) the sentence is
not a judicia
judicially-fixed twenty-year
year sentence (so
Sukhdev Yadav category does not apply).
None of the permissible forms of writ
intervention is attracted in the present case.
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14.9. This Court, however, does take note of the
direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para
16 of Sukhdev Yadav, which directed a
circulation to all Home Secretaries of States
and Union Territories to ascertain whether any
convict has remained in jail beyond the period
of his sentence. This direction was in the
context of cases where sentences had been
specifically fixed by judicial direction. For cases
like the present, where the sentence is a
continuing life sentence, the appropriate
Government's power of remission under Section
473/474 BNSS is the prescribed mechanism for
any early release.
14.10. The scope of this Court's jurisdiction in the
present case is, therefore: (a) to examine and
confirm the legality of the detention (b) to
clarify the legal position regarding the
petitioner's eligibility to apply for premature
release; and (c) to direct that if an application
for premature release is made by the
petitioner, the appropriate Government shall
consider it on its merits within a reasonable
time, without being bound by the direction
against 'routine commutation at fourteen years'
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(which direction has been rendered spent by
the passage of twenty years). This Court
cannot, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, direct
the automatic release of the petitioner.
15. Answer to Point No. (vii): What Order?
15.1. Having answered all Points for Determination,
this Court must now determine the appropriate
order to be passed in this writ petition. The
findings on all six preceding Points, taken
together, clearly indicate that the primary
prayer
prayer, for a writ of mandamus directing the
immediate release of the petitioner,
petitioner cannot
cann be
granted.
15.2. This Court has held that: (a) the life sentence
was not fixed at twenty years; (b) Section 57
IPC does not mandate release after twenty
years; (c) life imprisonment means
imprisonment for the remainder of natural life;
(d) there is no enforceable
enforceable legal right to
automatic release; (e) the continued
incarceration is not illegal; and (f) this Court's
writ jurisdiction does not extend to directing
release in these circumstances.
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15.3. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I
pass the following
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is DISMISSED.
(ii) The prayer for a writ of mandamus directing
Respondent No.3 to release the petitioner
from prison forthwith is REJECTED.
SPONSORED
(iii) It is clarified that the direction in the
judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal
No.1197/2008, that the accused shall serve
the sentence ‘in terms of Section 57 of IPC’,
does not restrict the sentence of life
imprisonment to a period of twenty years.
The sentence of life imprisonment imposed
on the petitioner is a sentence for the
remainder of his natural life, and remains so
unless commuted or remitted by the
appropriate Government or the
President/Governor in accordance with law.
(iv) The petitioner, having served twenty years
of actual imprisonment as stipulated in the
judgment of this Court in Crimin
Criminal
al Appeal
No.1197/2008, has crossed the minimum
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threshold specified by this Court for eligibility
for remission consideration. He is accordingly
entitled to submit an application for
premature release or remission to the
appropriate authority in accordance with
applicable statutory provisions and the
State’s remission policy.
(v) If and when such application is made, the
appropriate Government/Sentence Review
Board shall: (i) consider the same on its
individual and case
case-specific
specific merits; (ii) take
into account all
all relevant factors including the
period of actual imprisonment, the conduct
of the petitioner, the nature of the offence,
the interests of the victims, and the
applicable policy; (iii) not treat the direction
against ‘routine commutation after
completion of fourteen years’ in Criminal
Appeal No.1197/2008 as an absolute bar to
consideration of any application made after
completion of twenty years; and (iv) pass a
reasoned order thereon within ninety (90)
days of receipt of the application.
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(vi) Nothing in this judgment
judgment constitutes or shall
be construed as an expression of opinion
that the petitioner’s application for
premature release, if made, ought to be or
shall be granted. The decision on any such
application remains entirely within the
domain of the appropriate
appropriate Government.
(vii) Pending applications, if any, stand
dismissed.
Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
Prs
List No.: 19 Sl No.: 2
