Karnataka High Court
Sri K D Devadas vs State By on 27 April, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 24.04.2026
Pronounced on : 27.04.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.5119 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
1 . SRI K.D.DEVADAS
S/O LATE DAMODARAN
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
R/AT KANADI HOUSE,
PERIMAGOTHUKARA VILLAGE,
TRISOOR DISTRICT,
KERALA STATE - 680 571.
2 . SRI K.D.VENUGOPAL
S/O LATE DAMODARAN
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS,
R/AT KANADI HOUSE,
PERIMAGOTHUKARA VILLAGE,
TRISOOR DISTRICT,
KERALA STATE - 680 571.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI S.G.RAJENDRA REDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE BY
BELLANDURU POLICE,
BENGALURU,
2
REPRESENTED BY S.P.P,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . UNNIMAYA
D/O UNNI DAMODARAN,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
KANADI HOUSE,
PERINGOTTUKARA,
KIZHAKKUMMURI,
TRISSUR, KERALA.
(AMENDED VIDE ORDER DATED
09.04.2026)
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI RAJATH, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF
B.N.S.S., PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL PETITION AND SET
ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 18.03.2026 IN
CRL.MISC.NO.11191/2025 PASSED BY THE LXII ADDL. CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU CITY (CCH-63) AND RESTORE
THE ORDER OF ANTICIPATORY BAIL DATED 29.09.2025 GRANTED
IN CRL.MISC.NO.7934/2025 BY THE LXII ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU CITY (CCH-63).
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 24.04.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
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CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners - accused Nos.10 and 11 are before this Court
calling in question an order of the concerned Court dated
18-03-2026, whereby the concerned Court cancels the anticipatory
bail granted to these petitioners and directs them to surrender
within 7 days from the date of the order and have sought for a
direction for restoration of the anticipatory bail granted on
29-09-2025.
2. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
2.1. A complaint comes to be registered on 25-07-2025 which
becomes a crime in Crime No.366 of 2025 for the offences
punishable under Sections 308(2), 351(1), 351(4), 352, 351(2),
351(3), 46, 61 and 62 of the BNS. After registration of the crime,
the concerned Court grants anticipatory bail to these petitioners in
Crl.Misc.No.7934 of 2025 on 29-09-2025. In the interregnum, on
26-08-2025, a contempt case is filed before the High Court of
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Kerala, by the father of the 2nd respondent against the petitioners,
for violation of the order of status quo granted by the High Court of
Kerala on 21-07-2025 in O.P.(C) No.1657 of 2025, in a pending civil
dispute between the parties. The genesis of the dispute pertains to
management of the Peringottukara Vishnu Maya Temple ('Temple'
for short). Subsequently, on the strength of the order of the trial
Court in Kerala, in O.S. No. 49 of 2025, the petitioners enter into
the temple and perform pooja.
2.2. When the petitioners enter into the temple, a scuffle is
said to have happened between the parties on 07-10-2025. The
order of the trial Court is then stayed by the High Court of Kerala in
O.P.(C) No. 2441 of 2025 on 07-10-2025. On the same day i.e., on
07-10-2025, a crime comes to be registered on a complaint made
before the Anthikkad Police Station, Kerala by one Praveen, who is
the son of petitioner No.2, in Crime No.873 of 2025, for offences
punishable under Sections 126(2), 132 and 221 of the BNS. On
11-10-2025, one more crime comes to be registered in Crime
No.886 of 2025 against the petitioners herein and other accused,
for the offences punishable under Sections 329(3), 324(4), 296(b),
5
351(3) and 3(5) of the BNS on the complaint of one Vishnu Priya,
who is the sister of the 2nd respondent, for the scuffle which
occurred in the temple on 07-10-2025. Based upon the registration
of the crime in Crime No. 886 of 2025, the Public Prosecutor/State
moves an application under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. seeking
cancellation of bail granted to these petitioners in Crl.Misc.No.7934
of 2025. The concerned Court, by the impugned order, cancels the
bail of these petitioners on the score that the petitioners have
violated the conditions of bail granted on 29-09-2025. It is this
that has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition.
3. Heard Sri. S G Rajendra Reddy, learned counsel appearing
for petitioner, Sri. B N Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public
Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri. Rajath, learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
vehemently contend that cancellation of bail has happened only on
one score that a crime is registered on 11-10-2025 for the alleged
incident of entry into the temple on 07-10-2025. This, according to
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the prosecution was in violation of the conditions of the bail.
Learned counsel would submit that the crime is registered on
07-10-2025, the status quo order is granted by the Kerala High
Court on 07-10-2025 or the order that had permitted the
petitioners to enter the temple was stayed on 07-10-2025.
Therefore, all the events have taken place on 07-10-2025. The
fulcrum of the crime in crime No.886 of 2025, registered against
these petitioners subsequently, was on an event dated 07-10-2025,
that has happened without the knowledge of the petitioners.
5. Per-contra, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd
respondent-complainant would vehemently refute the submissions
to contend that the petitioners have violated the bail conditions and
have continued to violate, as two separate crimes are registered at
a later point in time. He would submit that the anticipatory bail so
granted has been taken for granted by the petitioners. Therefore,
this Court must not entertain the petition and direct the petitioners
to surrender and seek for regular bail, if they so desire. He would
7
seek dismissal of the petition by placing reliance upon the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of SUMIT v. STATE OF U.P.1.
6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor, would toe
the lines of the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent in
contending that the petitioners have violated the conditions of bail
and the concerned Court has rightly cancelled the bail.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties and
perused the materials available on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts, dates and link in the chain of
events are all a matter of record. The genesis of the criminal
proceedings is a civil dispute pending between the parties,
pertaining to the management of the Temple, before the trial Court
in Kerala in O.S.No.49 of 2025. In the said civil case, the petitioners
file an interlocutory application for temporary injunction. The trial
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 186
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Court on 24-06-2025, in IA 2/2025 in O.S.No.49 of 2025 passes the
following order:
"O R D E R
This is an application filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.49/2025
under Order 39 Rule 1 and S.151 CPC seeking a temporary
injunction.
2. Averments of the petitioners are as follows: The first
petitioner is the trust, namely 'Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy,
Kanadi Devasthanam Tharavad', represented by its trustee. The
petitioner nos. 2 to 7 are the trustees of the first petitioner, and
the respondent is the Managing Trustee of the first petitioner.
K.V. Damodaran, the father of the petitioner nos. 4 and 5 and
the respondent, was an ardent devotee of Sri Vishnumaya
Chathan Swamy, and he served as an oracle in Avanengad
Kalari. During his lifetime, K.V. Damodaran consecrated the idol
of Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy in his self-acquired property.
He named it as 'Kanadi Devasthanam Tharavad Kshethram'.
K.V. Damodaran worshipped the idol of Sri Vishnumaya Chathan
Swamy, conducted the rituals by himself, and permitted the
public to worship in the temple and to make offerings. Out of
the income so generated, K.V.Damodaran made the temple to
thrive and prosper. With the intention of bequeathing all his
earnings to Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy, K.V. Damodaran
executed a will on 26.10.1995 and had it registered as
129/3/1995 of SRO, Anthikkad. K.V. Damodaran died on
23.09.2003, and the will has come into operation. As per the
terms of the will, the first petitioner trust has come into being.
The respondent has been made the Managing Trustee. The
other sons of K.V. Damodaran are designated as co-trustees of
the first petitioner in the will. No rights have been given to his
daughters by K.V. Damodaran in the trust. The co-trustees are
directed to assist the Managing Trustee in his work to maintain
the trust. Through his will, K.V. Damodaran has directed his
lineal descendants to administer the first petitioner and to
expend the revenue generated for the improvement of the
temple and the family. Ignoring the mandate in the will, the
respondent changed the name of the trust to 'Peringottukkara
Devasthanam'. Against the purposes for which the trust was
9
constituted, the respondent has been using it for his financial
gain. He has started bank accounts in his name and the name of
'Peringottukkara Devasthanam'. The respondent has made no
attempt to create an account in the name of the first petitioner
trust. Amounts deposited by the devotees for several offerings
in the temple fall into the hands of the respondent, and he
refuses to reveal the accounts of the trust. The respondent has
also failed to conduct the yearly audit in the first petitioner
trust. Using the money generated from the trust, the
respondent has purchased numerous properties and vehicles in
the names of his daughters and himself. There are further
endeavours on the part of the respondent to exhibit himself as
the sole owner of the trust. The respondent is thus operating
contrary to the terms of the will of K.V. Damodaran.
O.S.2549/2024, O.S.14/2025, O.S.27/2025, and O.S.245/2025,
filed by the petitioners, are pending before various courts at
Thrissur. The co-trustees have been performing the rituals in
the temple for years. The respondent is trying to oust them
from the temple and make it his own. On 03.02.2025 while the
petitioner no. 2 was serving as an oracle and delivering
prophecies, and the other co-trustees translating it to the
devotees, the respondent, his henchmen, the respondent's
daughter and his son-in-law, came to the temple, obstructed the
conduct of the ritual, assaulted the petitioner nos. 2 to 7 and
caused them to leave the temple premises. Thereafter, the
respondent closed the temple doors from the inside and
prevented the petitioner nos. 2 to 7 from entering the temple
again. The petitioners have lodged a case with the police. The
respondent is not entitled to prevent the petitioners from
entering and performing rituals in the first petitioner trust. It is
highly necessary to prevent the respondent from causing
hindrance to the conduct of the rituals by the petitioners in the
temple, and for the same, this application is filed seeking a
temporary prohibitory injunction.
3. An objection is filed by the respondent, and it is as
follows: There are no co-trustees for Kanadi Devasthanam
Tharavad. The petitioner no. 3 is not entitled to represent the
trust. A will was executed by K.V. Damodaran on 26.10.1995,
and the respondent was appointed as the Managing Trustee of
Kanadi Devasthanam Tharavad. There is only a Managing
Trustee for Kanadi Devasthanam Tharavad and no co-trustees
as claimed. The petitioners are not entitled to institute any
10
litigation against the respondent. By the will, the Kanadi
Devasthanam Tharavad came into existence. The respondent
will continue as the Managing Trustee of Kanadi Devasthanam
Tharavad during his lifetime, and he is entrusted with the
administration of the properties of the trust. The petitioners will
acquire a role in the management of the trust only after the
lifetime of the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioners can
appoint another Managing Trustee and co-trustees for the
administration and management of Kanadi Devasthanam
Tharavad. Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy temple is located in
46 cents of property in survey no.514 of Kizhakkumuri village.
The respondent is the chief priest and oracle of Kanadi
Devasthanam Tharavad. He renders his services to Sri
Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy and invests his time in performing
rituals at the temple, receiving payment in return. He also earns
money from his service as an astrologer. With the intention of
causing obstructions to the festival conducted at Sri Vishnumaya
Chathan Swamy temple from 21.12.2024 to 29.12.2024, the
petitioner nos. 2 to 7 trespassed into the house of the
respondent and threatened them. They also pushed down the
respondent's grandson. Thereafter, on 04.01.2025 at around
4:30 p.m., they trespassed into the office of the temple, hurled
abuses at the employees, threatened them, and forcefully took
the office registers. Towards the same, the respondent lodged a
complaint before the SHO, Anthikkad, and a case has been
registered. The respondent has also approached the Hon'ble
High Court for police protection. At this juncture, the petitioner
nos. 2 to 7 shall not be allowed to enter into the petition
schedule property, and dismissal of the application is hence
prayed.
4. Heard both sides. To duly discharge their obligations
under the will executed by K.V. Damodaran, the petitioners
have approached the court to bring an end to the alleged high-
handed acts of the respondent. The petitioner nos. 2 to 7 allege
obstruction by the respondent in their conduct of rituals in the
first petitioner trust and they accuse him of violating their rights
over the petition schedule property.
5. The petitioner nos. 2 to 7 and the respondent are the
descendants of K.V. Damodaran. Admittedly, K.V. Damodaran, a
devotee of Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy, had constructed a
temple and consecrated the idol. Expressing his wishes and
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prescribing the mandate to run the temple after his lifetime,
K.V. Damodaran executed a will. He died on 23.09.2003, and
the will has come into effect by which the Kanadi Devasthanam
Tharavad came into existence in the form of a trust. No dispute
has been raised by the respondent regarding the will. Rather, he
agrees to have received the status of the Managing Trustee of
the first petitioner trust in accordance with the terms of the will.
Though the respondent admits the will, he denies the rights
claimed by the petitioner nos. 2 to 7 as co-trustees of the first
petitioner.
6. A copy of the will is produced. Primarily, K.V.
Damodaran expects his children to live in harmony, to extend all
their services to the deity, that is, Sri Vishnumaya Chathan
Swamy, and to work for the prosperity of the temple and their
family. To ensure the same, K.V. Damodaran constituted a trust
by his will, namely Kanadi Devasthanam Tharavad,
Kizhakkumuri, Peringottukara, Thrissur, and declared that his
assets would devolve upon Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy
after his death. Further, K.V. Damodaran appointed his younger
son, the respondent, as the Managing Trustee and his other
male descendants who have attained majority as the co-
trustees of the first petitioner. By the will, K.V. Damodaran
directed the co-trustees to assist the Managing Trustee in
administering the trust. With the income obtained from the
temple, the Managing Trustee, with the assistance of co-
trustees, are bound to look after the well-being of the temple
and the family.
7. As per the case of the respondent, the petitioner nos. 2
to 7 do not have any rights in the trust pursuant to the will, and
their role will come only after his lifetime. The terms of the will
are very clear and unambiguous. At the time of designating the
respondent as the Managing Trustee of the first petitioner trust,
K.V. Damodaran appointed his other male descendants who
have attained majority as its co-trustees. They are vested with
the duty to extend assistance to the respondent in the
administration of the first petitioner. It is not at all possible to
interpret the will in such a manner as argued by the respondent
and consider him as the sole trustee of the first petitioner trust.
There is nothing available in the will to see that the major male
descendants of K.V. Damodaran shall step in only after the
death of the respondent. Instead, their part commences along
12
with the constitution of the trust. Thus, undoubtedly, by virtue
of the will of K.V. Damodaran, the petitioner nos. 2 to 7 do
enjoy the status of co-trustees in the first petitioner trust and
can participate in its functioning. Furthermore, in the third page
of the will, K.V. Damodaran has stipulated that upon his demise,
his sons shall work in unity, serve the deity, and manage the
temple to foster prosperity for the family. As discernible from
the will, K.V. Damodaran directed all his sons to extend services
to Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy, of which the performance of
rituals becomes a part. K.V. Damodaran never intended to vest
complete authority in the respondent either in the running of the
trust or in serving the deity in exclusion of other major male
members of the family.
8. Perusal of the contentions raised by both parties
reveals the existence of disputes between them in connection
with the running of the first petitioner trust. The will executed
by K.V. Damodaran determines the rights of both parties in the
management of the trust. Neither of them can deny the rights of
the other and claim sole authority over the first petitioner trust.
The petitioners allege that the respondent started bank accounts
in his name instead of that of the trust to collect the income
generated from the temple. According to the petitioners, the
respondent has even dared to change the name of the trust to
'Peringottukara Devasthanam', which is not permitted by the
will. The petitioners also narrate an incident that occurred on
03.02.2025, in which the respondent and his henchmen
obstructed the conduct of the rituals performed by the petitioner
nos. 2 to 7 at the petition schedule property. None of these
allegations are addressed by the respondent in his counter
statement. He simply denies the rights of the petitioner nos. 2
to 7 and challenges their authority to question. Therefore, it
appears that there was an attempt on the part of the
respondent to exclude the petitioner nos. 2 to 7 from the
working of the first petitioner trust. Thus, there exists a prima
facie case in favour of the petitioners.
9. There is no stipulation in the will authorizing the
Managing Trustee alone to perform the rituals and do the
offerings in favour of Sri Vishnumaya Chathan Swamy. K.V.
Damodaran, in his will, has made clear that all his sons shall
dedicate themselves to serve the deity. Being the major male
descendants of K.V. Damodaran and co-trustees of the first
13
petitioner, the petitioners nos. 2 to 7 are entitled to be involved
in the management of the trust and in providing services to the
deity. The respondent is not permitted to take any actions that
may hinder it. Balance of convenience is also hence in their
favour.
10. The petitioner nos. 2 to 7 are the co-trustees of the
first petitioner, and on whom rights are vested by operation of
the will of K.V. Damodaran. It is necessary to see that their
rights are protected. If the relief sought by the petitioners is not
granted, they would certainly sustain an irreparable injury. In
this backdrop, I am of the view that the petitioners shall be
given the relief sought.
In the result, the application is allowed. The respondent
and his henchmen shall not prevent the petitioner nos. 2 to 7
from entering into the temple described in the petition schedule
property and from rendering services and performing rituals in
favour of the deity."
The trial Court, in terms of the aforesaid order, allows the
application filed by the petitioner and restrains the 2nd respondent
from preventing entry of the petitioners into the Temple. The said
order is subsequently challenged before the High Court of Kerala in
O.P.(C)No.1657 of 2025, wherein the High Court by its order dated
21-07-2025 orders both parties to maintain status quo over the
affairs of the temple, since there was a possibility of settlement
between the parties. The order reads as follows:
"ORDER
Heard the learned counsel for both the petitioner and
respondents in part. During the arguments, this Court finds
that there is an element of settlement between the
14
parties in this case. Hence, with the consent of both counsels,
the matter is referred for mediation. Parties shall present at the
Mediation Centre, attached to the High Court of Kerala on
28.07.2025 at 11.30a.m. The Director of the Mediation Centre
shall assign the matter to Senior Advocate/Mediator. The
Advocate/Mediator may take the service of Senior Counsel for
mediation. Until the report of mediation, both parties shall
maintain the status quo over the temple and its affairs.
List the matter after the receipt of the mediation report."
9. During the pendency of the aforesaid civil proceedings, on
a complaint filed by the 2nd respondent on 24-07-2025, a crime
comes to be registered in Crime No.366 of 2025 for the offences
punishable under sections 308(2), 351(1), 351(4), 352, 351(2),
351(3), 46, 62 and 61 of the BNS, by the jurisdictional police in
Bengaluru against the petitioners' children. The petitioners are
however not arraigned as accused in the said crime. Apprehending
their arrest, the petitioners prefer an application for anticipatory
bail under Section 482 of the BNSS before the concerned Court in
Bengaluru. The concerned court by its order dated 29-09-2025 in
Crl.Misc.No.7934 of 2025 grants anticipatory bail to the petitioners.
The order reads as follows:
".... .... ....
13. Further it is settled law by the catena of decisions
that "the accused is to be presumed as innocent until guilt
15
is proved by the prosecution in full-fledged trial by
discharging its burden of proof. Until then, it is not just
and proper to put the accused in jail as a measurement of
punishment in the pre-trail stage." It is settled position of
law by the Catena of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court and
various High Courts that "securing the presence of the
accused for trial and protection of witnesses form
tampering are the main considerations at the stage of
granting bail."
14. The allegation against petitioners is that petitioners
along with other accused all are having with common intention
and demand money from the complainant, otherwise they will
destroy the name of the temple belongs to the complainant and
also tried to control the administration of the Vishnu Maya
temple. Hence the complaint. Based on the complaint case
registered against petitioners and started investigation. All the
offences are not punishable with death or imprisonment for life,
it need full-fledged trial about commission the offences. It is
urged that the petitioners are ready and willing to furnish surety
to the satisfaction of this Court to ensure their attendance
before the I.O and the Court and they are also ready to abide by
any conditions imposed by Court. As such, possibility of the
abscondance of petitioners is too remote. The allegation alleged
against the petitioners are purely civil in nature. The petitioners
are permanent residents of Thrissur, Kerala. The apprehension
and interest of the prosecution that the petitioners may tamper
with the prosecution witnesses, flee away from justice can be
taken and safeguarded by imposing some suitable conditions.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that it is fit case to grant bail.
Hence by considering all these aspects, I am of the opinion that
the petitioners are entitled for bail and accordingly, I answer the
above Point No.1 in the Affirmative.
15. Point No.2: In view of my findings on Point No.1, I
proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
The anticipatory bail petition filed by the
petitioners/Accused No.11 and
10/Mr.K.D.Venugopal and Mr.Devadas, under
Section 482 of BNSS is hereby allowed and bail
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application of petitioner No.3, 4 / accused
No.8 and 9 are hereby dismissed as
withdrawn.
The respondent police are hereby directed to
enlarge the petitioners on anticipatory bail in the
event of their arrest in Crime No.366/2025 of
respondent Police Station for the offence
punishable under Sections 46, 61, 62, 308(2),
351(1), 351(2), 351(3), 351(4), 352, 248, 318 of
BNS on execution of their personal bond for
Rs.1,00,000/- each with one surety for the like sum
on the following conditions:
1. That the petitioners shall appear before
the I.O. within 30 days from the date of this order
and shall co-operate in the matter of investigation
or whenever called by the I.O.
2. That the petitioners shall mark their
attendance once in 30 days preferably on 2nd
Saturday in between 10.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m.
before the Jurisdictional Police till filing the final
report.
3. That the petitioners shall not hold any
threat to the complainant and shall not tamper with
any of the prosecution witnesses directly or
indirectly.
4. That the petitioners shall furnish their
residential address proof and that of their surety.
5. That the petitioners shall not indulge in
similar type of offences in future.
6. That the petitioner shall appear before the
trial court regularly without fail on receipt of the
summons.
7. That if the petitioners fails to obey any of
the above said conditions, then this bail order
automatically stands cancelled.”
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On the same day, the trial Court in Kerala, in an interlocutory
application filed by the petitioners in O.S.No.49 of 2025, for
implementing its previous order dated 24-06-2025 passed in
IA 2/2025, grants police protection to the petitioners to enter the
temple. The order dated 29-09-2025 passed in IA 17/2025 reads as
follows:
“O R D E R
The averments in the petition are as follows:- The
petitioner is the 3rd plaintiff in the above numbered suit. The
petitioner contended that, as per the order in IA 2/2025, the
petitioners are permitted to conduct/perform pooja in the trust
temple. As per the order in IA 2/2025, the respondents are
restrained from obstructing the petitioners’ performance of the
pooja. However, even after the order in IA 2/2025, the 1st
defendant is not permitting this petitioner from entering the
temple and performing the rituals. After obtaining a copy of the
order in IA 2/25, the defendant closed the doors of the temple.
However, the defendant permitted other people to enter the
temple through a gate near his house, and this respondent was
attempting to obstruct the petitioners from entering the temple.
This act of the respondents constitutes a violation of the court’s
order in IA 2/2025. The respondents are violating the order of
the court. To enforce and execute the order in IA 2/2025, it is
necessary to get the help of the police. Therefore, the petitioner
filed this petition to seek police protection to enforce the order
of the court in IA 2/2025.
2. The averments in the objection are as follows :- The
petitioners filed this petition on an experimental basis to harass
the respondent. This respondent filed CMA 57/2025 before the
Hon’ble District court against the order of this court in IA
2/2025. The Hon’ble District court dismissed the said application
against which an OP(C) 1657/25 was preferred in Hon’ble High
Court. The Hon’ble High Court referred the matter for mediation
18
and mediation talks are going on between the parties. The
respondent has been protecting the disputed temple by
performing pooja. The petitioners are the respondents, brothers
and their children. Many litigations are pending between the
respondents and petitioners. On 04.01.25 the petitioners
trespassed into the office of the temple and abused the staff and
forcibly took away the documents and office registers. The
petitioners are highly influential and politically connected. Police
protection was ordered in favour of the resplendent by the
Hon’ble High Court in WP(C) 784/2025. The Thiruvabharanagal
in the temple were stolen and a police complaint was registered
against the same. In these circumstances if the petitioners enter
into the temple with police protection that would cause
inconvenience to the respondent to perform pooja and also
cause inconvenience to the devotees for offering prayers. Hence
the petition may be dismissed with costs.
3. Heard both sides. Perused records.
4. In this case, the court had already issued a temporary
injunction order in IA 2/25 after hearing both sides. There is no
stay pending against the enforcement of the said order. The
plaintiffs’ grievance is that, despite the order in their favour, the
defendants are not permitting them to enter the temple
premises and perform poojas and rituals. Admittedly, the
injunction order granted by the court below is in force. The
respondent contends that the court below erred in passing the
impugned order.
5. The vital point to be considered is whether the court is
entitled to enforce the order in I. A. 2/25 by affording police
protection. The Honourable High Court in MOHAMMAD v.
MOHAMMED HAJI, 1986 KLT 134 held that the Court can
resort to police protection by invoking inherent power for
enforcing an order passed. The Honourable Apex Court in
Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal (AIR 1962 SC 527) held as
follows: “S.151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be
deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the
face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the
provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it
or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been
19
conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by
virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it.”
6. From the decisions above, it is clear that whenever the
interests of justice require compelling attention of the court to
do justice to the party who is faced with a violation of his legal
rights, the court should definitely prevent such transgressions or
violations. For that, the court can fall back on its powers under
Section 151 of the CPC. In this case, the respondents admitted
that, as per the order dated June 24, 2025, in IA 2/25, there is
an order restraining them from preventing the petitioners from
entering the temple and rendering services and performing
rituals in favour of the deity at the disputed temple. Admittedly,
there is no stay order pending against the order dated June 24,
2025, in IA 2/25 by the Appellate Court. The respondent
contended that numerous litigations are pending between him
and the petitioners. According to the respondent if the
petitioners enter the temple with police protection, it would
cause inconvenience to the respondent in performing pooja and
also cause inconvenience to the devotees in offering prayers.
This court, as per the order dated June 24, 2025, in IA 2/25,
has issued an order restraining the respondent from preventing
the petitioners from entering the temple and rendering services
and performing rituals in favour of the deity at the disputed
temple. In view of the rival contentions raised by the
respondent in the objection to the petition, the apprehension of
the petitioners can not be said to be unreasonable. In such
circumstances, it is always open to the court to render
necessary assistance to the aggrieved party by invoking powers
under S.151 CPC. In view of the discussions above, the petition
is liable to be allowed.
In the result, the petition is allowed. The SHO, Anthikkad,
is directed to provide necessary police aid to the petitioners in
implementing the order dated 24/6/2025 in IA 2/25.”
On the strength of this order, the petitioners enter the temple for
conducting pooja. On 07-10-2025, a scuffle takes place between
both the parties in the temple and both the parties are alleged to
20
have verbally abused and assaulted each other. On the same day,
the order of the trial Court granting police protection to the
petitioners comes to be challenged before the High Court of Kerala
in O.P.(C)No.2441 of 2025, wherein the order of the trial Court in
IA 17/2025 comes to be stayed. The order of the High Court of
Kerala dated 07-10-2025 reads as follows:
“ORDER
Adv. Sri. T. Naveen takes notice for the respondents.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the
learned counsel for the respondents.
3. It is submitted omitted by the learned counsel for the
petitioner that this court already passed an order of status quo
in an earlier petition, OP(C) No.1657/2025 and later the matter
has been referred to the mediation center on 21.07.2025. The
matter is under mediation and which is under progress.
4. Meanwhile, the respondents filed an IA under Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before the Sub Court,
Thrissur and with the police protection, they came inside the
temple and conducting the poojas which is against the status
quo order passed by this Court in OP (C) No.1657/2025. The
respondents counsel submit that there is no such order passed
by this Court, but the respondents were conducting the pooja
with the help of Police and they want to continue to do the pooja
in the temple.
5. Considering the facts and circumstances of the
case, when this Court granted order of status quo and
referred the matter to the mediation center, if the
respondents want any clarification, the respondents
ought to have approach this Court for any clarification or
seeking permission to conduct the poojas or rituals etc.
21But, the trial court cannot interpret the order of this court
and passes order which against the propriety of the High
Court order.
6. Such being the case, the order passed by the trial
court in IA No.17/2025 in OS No.49/2025 dated 29.09.2025 is
hereby stayed.
7. The parties shall inform the progress in the mediation.
Post on 13.10.2025.”
10. Again, on the same day, i.e., on 07-10-2025, the
jurisdictional police in Kerala register a crime in Crime No. 873 of
2025, based on a complaint lodged by the son of petitioner No.2,
against the 2nd respondent for the offences punishable under
Sections 125(2), 132, and 221 of the BNS, in relation to the
incidents alleged to have occurred in the temple on 07-10-2025.
Four days thereafter, i.e., on 11-10-2025, another crime in Crime
No. 886 of 2025 comes to be registered against the petitioners, on
the basis of a complaint lodged by the sister of the 2nd respondent,
for the offences punishable under Sections 329(3), 324(4), 296(b),
351(3), and 3(5) of the BNS, in respect of the same incident, which
occurred on 07-10-2025. Subsequently, on an application filed the
Public Prosecutor under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. for
cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted to the petitioners, the
22
concerned Court in Bengaluru in terms of the impugned order,
cancels the anticipatory bail granted to the petitioners. The order
dated 18-3-2026 passed in Crl.Misc.No.11191 of 2025 reads as
follows:
“10. Point No.1: Learned Public Prosecutor argued that
the respondents have got released by this Court in
Crl.Misc.No.7934/2025 on 29.09.2025 that they have got
release by this Court. That the Court has imposed conditions,
inspite of Court order that the respondent have not obey the
Court order condition No.5, it amounts to contempt of Court.
Therefore he prays to allow the application and to cancel the
bail order.
11. Counsel for the respondents argued that the
respondents are no way intention to disobey the order passed
by the Court. Inspite of it the prosecution has filed the
application to cancel the bail order. It is not intentional one
but bonafide one. Therefore he prays to dismiss the
application filed by the prosecution.
12. It is settled principles of law that bail once granted
can be cancelled if the accused misuses the liberty or violates
the conditions imposed by the Court. On perusal of material
placed on record, it is evident that the prosecution has
produced detailed report stating that the petitioner is
involved in crime No.886/2025 U/Sec.296(b), 324(4),
329(3) r/w. Sec.3(5) of BNS and also the petitioner has
violated the other conditions and I.O also filed detailed
report in this regard, which are indicated that the
accused had approached and threatened the
prosecution witnesses. The said material is prima-facie
credible supported by the document.
13. The records further discloses that the accused
has not complied with the condition of not to tamper or
threaten the prosecution witnesses and also other
conditions. The conduct of the accused clearly
demonstrates that he has disregarded the authority of
23the Court and the sanctity of the bail condition. It is
noted that the bail is not an absolute right but a
conditional liberty, and the accused is bound to strictly
adhere to the terms imposed. When such conditions are
violated, the Court is empowered to cancel the bail to
ensure fair administration of justice.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently
held that interference with witnesses, likelihood of
tampering with evidence or violation of conditions are
strong grounds for cancellation of bail. In the present
case the act of threatening witnesses strikes at the root
of a fair trial. Non-compliance with conditions reflects
deliberate disobedience. The accused has misused the
concession granted by the Court. Hence this Court is of the
opinion that continuation of bail would not be conducive to a
fair, trial and justice. In view of the above discussion, this
Court holds that the prosecution has successfully established
that the accused has violated the bail conditions and misused
the liberty granted. Hence my answer to the above point is in
the Affirmative.
15. Point No.2 :-In view of the discussion made on
point No.1, I proceed to pass the following:-
ORDER
The bail petition under Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C filed by
the prosecution is hereby allowed.
The bail granted to the accused vide order dated:
29.09.2025 in Crl.Misc.No.7934/2025 (Cr.No.366/2025) of
Bellanduru Police Station is hereby cancelled.
The accused is directed to surrender before this Court
within 7 days from the date of this order.
In case of failure to surrender, the investigation officer
is at liberty to secure the presence of the accused in
accordance with law.”
(Emphasis added at each instance)
24
The concerned Court cancels the anticipatory bail solely on the
score that a crime in Crime No.886 of 2025 was registered against
the petitioners before the jurisdictional police in Kerala and that the
petitioners violated the conditions of the bail order by threatening
the prosecution witnesses in the said crime.
11. The concerned Court fails to take note of the fact that the
petitioners had only entered the temple to perform the pooja,
pursuant to the order passed by the trial Court in Kerala in the
pending civil proceedings. A scuffle allegedly takes place between
both the parties on 07-10-2025 in the temple, which is
subsequently portrayed as an act of threatening the prosecution
witnesses. It is pertinent to note that, both the parties lodge
criminal complaints against each other in respect of the same
incident that occurred on 07-10-2025. But, the concerned Court
cancels the anticipatory bail granted to the petitioners solely on the
basis of the complaint lodged in Crime No.886 of 2025. The High
Court of Kerala has also stayed the order of grant of police
protection to the petitioners on 07-10-2025 itself. Thus, all the
alleged incidents occur on or prior to 07-10-2025, subsequent to
25
the trial Court granting police protection to the petitioners. In such
circumstances, the same cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
construed as threatening the prosecution witnesses, constituting
violation of the conditions of the bail order.
12. In light of the aforesaid circumstances, it becomes
apposite to refer to the law laid down by the Apex Court on the
issue of grant and cancellation of anticipatory bail.
12.1. The Apex Court in the case of SUMIT supra, holds as
follows:
“……. ……. …….
11. A plain reading of the order referred to above would indicate
that the anticipatory bail was granted by the High Court as
prayed for but the same was limited only upto filing of the
chargesheet. Once the chargesheet was filed, the protection
earlier granted came to an end and in such circumstances, the
appellant once again prayed for anticipatory bail by way of a
fresh application which came to be rejected by the High Court.
12. We fail to understand what is the idea in restricting the
grant of anticipatory bail upto the stage of completion of
investigation and filing of the chargesheet.
13. Either the Court may grant anticipatory bail or may decline.
However, once having exercised its discretion in favour of the
accused upon consideration of the overall matter, there was no
26
good reason for the High Court to restrict it upto the stage of
filing of the chargesheet.
14. In the earlier order passed by the High Court referred to
above in para 10 the High Court observed that having regard to
the nature of the allegations, the role of the applicant and all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused could be
said to have made out a case for grant of anticipatory bail.
15. If the aforesaid be so, then the High Court should have
indicated while declining to grant anticipatory bail by way of the
impugned order as to what was so particular or what was so
gross that the High Court thought fit not to grant anticipatory
bail.
POSITION OF LAW
16. In Bharat Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2003) 8 SCC 77,
this Court held that there is no restriction in Section 438 Cr.
P.C. to grant anticipatory bail even when charge sheet has been
filed and cognizance is taken. The relevant part of the said
decision reads as thus:–
“7. From the perusal of this part of Section 438 of CrPC, we
find no restriction in regard to exercise of this power in a
suitable case either by the Court of Session, High Court or
this Court even when cognizance is taken or a charge-sheet
is filed. The object of Section 438 is to prevent undue
harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and
detention. The fact, that a court has either taken cognizance
of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a
charge-sheet, would not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the
courts concerned from granting anticipatory bail in
appropriate cases. The gravity of the offence is an important
factor to be taken into consideration while granting such
anticipatory bail so also the need for custodial interrogation,
but these are only factors that must be borne in mind by the
courts concerned while entertaining a petition for grant of
anticipatory bail and the fact of taking cognizance or filing of
a charge-sheet cannot by itself be construed as a prohibition
against the grant of anticipatory bail. In our opinion, the
courts i.e. the Court of Session, High Court or this Court has
the necessary power vested in them to grant anticipatory
27bail in non-bailable offences under Section 438 of CrPC even
when cognizance is taken or a charge-sheet is filed provided
the facts of the case require the court to do so.”…
[Emphasis supplied]
17. The very same view as aforesaid came to be reiterated
in Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 1 SCC 684. In
the said case the High Court had rejected the application
seeking anticipatory bail on the ground that the chargesheet
had been filed, such approach was held to be erroneous. The
Court observed that a Constitution Bench in Shri Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, clearly held
that the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as
the applicant has not been arrested:
“7. We are of the considered opinion that the approach
adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. The
application for anticipatory bail has been rejected without
considering the case of the appellant solely on the ground
that the challan has now been presented.
8. We may notice here that the provision with regard to the
grant of anticipatory bail was introduced on the
recommendations of the Law Commission of India in its
Forty-first Report dated 24-9- 1969. The recommendations
were considered by this Court in a Constitution Bench
decision in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [(1980)
2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465]. Upon consideration of the
entire issue this Court laid down certain salutary principles to
be followed in exercise of the power under
Section 438 CrPC by the Sessions Court and the High Court.
It is clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be granted at
any time so long as the applicant has not been
arrested. When the application is made to the High Court or
the Court of Session it must apply its own mind on the
question and decide when the case is made out for granting
such relief.”
[Emphasis supplied]
18. In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC
1, the following questions were referred to the larger Bench of
five judges:
28
i. Whether the protection granted to a person under
Section 438 CrPC should be limited to a fixed period so as
to enable the person to surrender before the trial court
and seek regular bail?
ii. Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at the
time and stage when the accused is summoned by the
court?
19. The Constitution Bench answered the reference as under:
“91.1. Regarding Question 1, this Court holds that the
protection granted to a person under
Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a fixed
period; it should enure in favour of the accused without any
restriction on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3)
read with Section 438(2) should be imposed; if there are
specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open
for the court to impose any appropriate condition (including
fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event), etc.91.2. As regards the second question referred to this Court,
it is held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order
does not end normally at the time and stage when the
accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are
framed, but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if
there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the
court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it
to do so.”
[Emphasis supplied]
20. The following observations made by the Constitution Bench
in paras 77.3 and 77.4 respectively of Sushila Aggarwal (supra)
are also relevant which reads as under:
“77.3. In these circumstances, the mere fact that an accused
is given relief under Section 438 at one stage, per se does
not mean that upon the filing of a charge-sheet, he is
necessarily to surrender or/and apply for regular bail. The
analogy to “deemed bail” under Section 167(2) with
anticipatory bail leads this Court to conclude that the mere
subsequent event of the filing of a charge-sheet cannot
compel the accused to surrender and seek regular bail. As a
29matter of fact, interestingly, if indeed, if a charge-sheet is
filed where the accused is on anticipatory bail, the normal
implication would be that there was no occasion for the
investigating agency or the police to require his custody,
because there would have been nothing in his behaviour
requiring such a step. In other words, an accused, who is
granted anticipatory bail would continue to be at liberty
when the charge-sheet is filed, the natural implication is that
there is no occasion for a direction by the court that he be
arrested and further that he had cooperated with the
investigation.
77.4. At the same time, however, at any time during the
investigation were any occasion to arise calling for
intervention of the court for infraction of any of the
conditions imposed under Section 437(3) read with Section
438(2) or the violation of any other condition imposed in the
given facts of a case, recourse can always be had under
Section 439(2).”
[Emphasis supplied]
21. In the High Court of Delhi v. CBI, 2004 SCC OnLine Del 53,
somewhat similar question arose whether Section 170 Cr.
P.C. prevents the Trial Court from taking a charge-sheet on
record unless the accused is taken into custody. The Delhi High
Court observed as under:
“15. Word “custody” appearing in this section does not
contemplate either police or judicial custody. It merely
connotes the presentation of accused by the investigating
officer before the Court at the time of filing of the charge-
sheet whereafter the role of the Court starts. Had it not been
so the investigating officer would not have been vested with
powers to release a person on bail in a bailable offence after
finding that there was sufficient evidence to put the accused
on trial and it would have been obligatory upon him to
produce such an accused in custody before the Magistrate for
being released on bail by the Court.
16. In case the police/investigating officer thinks it
unnecessary to present the accused in custody for the
reason that the accused would neither abscond nor would
disobey the summons as he has been cooperating in
investigation and investigation can be completed without
30arresting him, the IO is not obliged to produce such an
accused in custody.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
19. It appears that the learned Special Judge was labouring
under a misconception that in every non-bailable and
cognizable offence the police is required to invariably arrest
a person, even if it is not essential for the purpose of
investigation.
20. Rather the law is otherwise. In normal and ordinary
course the police should always avoid arresting a person and
sending him to jail, if it is possible for the police to complete
the investigation without his arrest and if every kind of
cooperation is provided by the accused to the investigating
officer in completing the investigation. It is only in cases of
utmost necessity, where the investigation cannot be
completed without arresting the person, for instance, a
person may be required for recovery of incriminating articles
or weapon of offence or for eliciting some information or clue
as to his accomplices or any circumstantial evidence, that his
arrest may be necessary. Such an arrest may also be
necessary if the investigating officer concerned or officer in
charge of the police station thinks that presence of the
accused will be difficult to procure because of grave and
serious nature of crime as the possibility of his absconding or
disobeying the process or fleeing from justice cannot be
ruled out.”
[Emphasis supplied]
22. The aforesaid decision of the Delhi High Court
received imprimatur of this Court in Siddharth v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2022) 1 SCC 676, wherein it was observed as under:
“9. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the High
Courts and would like to give our imprimatur to the said
judicial view. It has rightly been observed on consideration
of Section 170 CrPC that it does not impose an obligation on
the officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the
time of filing of the charge-sheet. We have, in fact, come
across cases where the accused has cooperated with the
investigation throughout and yet on the charge-sheet being
filed nonbailable warrants have been issued for his
production premised on the requirement that there is an
obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the
31court. We are of the view that if the investigating officer
does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey
summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody.
The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 CrPC does not
contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely
connotes the presentation of the accused by the
investigating officer before the court while filing the
chargesheet.
10. We may note that personal liberty is an important aspect
of our constitutional mandate. The occasion to arrest an
accused during investigation arises when custodial
investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or
where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or
accused may abscond. Merely because an arrest can be
made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must
be made. A distinction must be made between the existence
of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of
it [Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994
SCC (Cri) 1172]. If arrest is made routine, it can cause
incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a
person. If the investigating officer has no reason to believe
that the accused will abscond or disobey summons and has,
in fact, throughout cooperated with the investigation we fail
to appreciate why there should be a compulsion on the
officer to arrest the accused.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
12. In the present case when the appellant has joined the
investigation, investigation has completed and he has been
roped in after seven years of registration of the FIR we can
think of no reason why at this stage he must be arrested
before the chargesheet is taken on record. We may note that
the learned counsel for the appellant has already stated
before us that on summons being issued the appellant will
put the appearance before the trial court.”
23. Further, this Court in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022)
10 SCC 51 said in clear terms that the mandate laid down
in Siddharth (supra) should be strictly complied with.
24. In Md. Asfak Alam v. State of Jharkhand, 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 892 under a similar situation where the appellant therein had
been granted interim protection by the High Court under
Section 438 CrPC and the charge-sheet was filed before the
32
application seeking pre-arrest bail was finally heard, the High
Court rejected the pending anticipatory bail and directed the
appellant to surrender before the competent authority and seek
regular bail. In this backdrop, this Court observed as under:
“14. ……What appears from the record is that the appellant
cooperated with the investigation both before 8-8-2022,
when no protection was granted to him and after 8-8-2022,
when he enjoyed protection till the filing of the charge-sheet
and the cognizance thereof on 1-10-2022. Thus, once the
charge-sheet was filed and there was no impediment, at
least on the part of the accused, the court having regard to
the nature of the offences, the allegations and the maximum
sentence of the offences they were likely to carry, ought to
have granted the bail as a matter of course. However, the
court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually,
to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender
and seek regular bail before the trial court. Therefore, in the
opinion of this Court, the High Court fell into error in
adopting such a casual approach. The impugned order of
rejecting the bail and directing the appellant, to surrender
and later seek bail, therefore, cannot stand, and is hereby
set aside……”
[Emphasis supplied]
25. Thus, the position of law is well settled: once
anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues
without fixed expiry. The filing of a charge-sheet, taking
of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not
terminate protection unless special reasons are recorded.
The Constitution Bench in the case of Sushila Aggarwal (supra)
held that duration is a matter of judicial discretion and cannot
be confined by arbitrary timelines. In the case of Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694,
this Court similarly cautioned that anticipatory bail should not
hinge on procedural milestones.
26. Risk management can be taken care of by way of
imposing conditions of cooperation, attendance, and non-
tampering, not by imposing time limits. Where
circumstances change, modification or cancellation may
be sought under the BNSS, 2023, but expiry clauses
inserted at inception are unsustainable.
33
27. In such circumstances referred to above, the impugned
order passed by the High Court is set aside.
28. We order that in the event of arrest of the appellant
in connection with the offence enumerated above, he
shall be released on anticipatory bail subject to the terms
and conditions that the Investigating Officer deem fit to
impose.
29. Once the appellant is released by the Investigating
Officer, he shall thereafter appear before the Trial Court
and furnish fresh bail bond.
30. Before we close this matter, we would like to clarify
something important. Take a case, wherein an accused has
been released on bail, pending the investigation, and later upon
completion of the investigation, chargesheet is filed with
addition of new cognizable and non-bailable offences, then what
would be the position?
31. The aforesaid question was looked into and answered
by this Court in Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand, 2019
Cri LJ 3801, wherein this Court after discussing various
decisions, more particularly, the decision in Prahlad Singh
Bhati v. NCT Delhi, (2001) 4 SCC 280 held that with the
addition of a new cognizable and non-bailable offence
more particularly of a serious nature, the accused
becomes disentitled to the liberty earlier granted to him
in relation to the offences for which the FIR came to be
registered.
32. In such circumstances, the correct approach of the
Court concerned should be to apply its mind afresh as to
whether the accused is entitled for grant of bail in the
changed circumstances.
33. In Prahlad Singh Bhati (supra), the FIR initially was
registered under Sections 306 and 498A of
the IPC respectively. But, subsequently, the chargesheet
34
showed that the accused had committed offence under
Sections 302 of the IPC. This Court took the view that
with the change of the nature of the offence, the accused
could be said to have become disentitled to the liberty
granted to him in relation to the offence for which the FIR
was registered, more particularly, if the offence is altered
for an aggravated crime.
34. In such circumstances referred to above, we arrive at
following conclusions in respect of a circumstance
whereafter the grant of bail to an accused, further
cognizable and non-bailable offences are added:–
(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly
added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event
of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested.
(ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the
court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.
P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his
custody.
(iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under
Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr. P.C. respectively, can
direct for taking into custody the accused who has
already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail.
The Court in exercise of its power under Section 437(5)
as well as Section 439(2) respectively can direct the
person who has already been granted bail to be arrested
and commit him to custody on addition of graver and
non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary
always with order of cancelling of earlier bail.
(iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted
bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence
or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but
for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or
offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused
from the Court which had granted the bail.”
35
The Apex Court observes that once anticipatory bail is granted, it
ordinarily continues without a fixed expiry period. Further, the filing
of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons
does not terminate the protection granted to the accused, unless
special reasons are recorded.
12.2. Long before the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court in
the case of DOLAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA2, holds as
follows:
“1. Leave granted.
2. In a case arising out of FIR No. 735 dated 8-11-1993, relating to
the alleged dowry death of Smt Sunita — wife of Anil Kumar, the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak granted anticipatory bail to
the parents and the brother of the husband of the deceased Smt
Sunita and directed that they be released on bail on their furnishing
bail bonds in the sum of Rs 10,000 each with one surety each of the
like amount in the event of their arrest to the satisfaction of the
Arresting Officer. No bail has however been granted to the husband —
Anil Kumar. The State of Haryana filed a petition in the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana seeking cancellation of the anticipatory bail,
granted to the appellants by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak on
12-11-1993. The learned Single Judge of the High Court by his order
dated 8-9-1994, cancelled the bail observing:
“Dowry death is a serious matter and cannot be taken so lightly. No
positive finding has been recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge in
his order to the effect that the respondents and the deceased were
living separately. No prima facie case is made out which could justify
the grant of anticipatory bail. To my view of thinking, concession of
anticipatory bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge, was totally2
(1995) 1 SCC 349
36uncalled for. The order dated 12-11-1993 is, therefore, set aside and
the respondents are directed to be taken into custody.”
The appellants are aggrieved of the cancellation of the anticipatory
bail, granted to them. Hence this appeal.
3. It appears to us that whereas the learned Additional Sessions
Judge was not justified in observing in the last paragraph of his order
while granting anticipatory bail “it appears that possibly these
accused-appellants have been roped in falsely”, at that initial stage,
when possibly the investigation was not even completed let alone, any
evidence had been led at the trial, the High Court also fell in error in
cancelling the anticipatory bail granted to the appellants for the
reasons, which have been extracted by us above. The learned
Additional Sessions Judge had noticed that even according to the
statement in the FIR, the appellants were living separately from the
deceased and her husband and that the factum of separate residence
was also supported by the ration card. These considerations were
relevant considerations for dealing with an application for grant of
anticipatory bail.
4. Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage
and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered
and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and
overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order
directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally
speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly
(illustrative and not exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to
interfere with the due course of administration of justice or
evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse
of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The
satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the
record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet
another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail
once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner
without considering whether any supervening circumstances
have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the
accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of
bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost
sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail,
already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the
distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a non-
bailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail
already granted.
37
5. We are, therefore, satisfied that the cancellation of
anticipatory bail granted to the appellants, for the reasons
given by the High Court, was not justified. Nothing has been
brought to our notice either from which any inference may
possibly be drawn that the appellants have in any manner,
whatsoever, abused the concession of bail during the
intervening period.
6. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order
of the High Court and restore that of the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Rohtak dated 12-11-1993.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Apex Court distinguishes between the rejection of anticipatory
bail and the cancellation of anticipatory bail, by observing that
anticipatory bail once granted, can be cancelled only in the
presence of cogent and overwhelming circumstance. Further, bail
once granted, cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner, without
examining whether any supervening circumstances have arisen
rendering it no longer conducive to a fair trial, to permit the
accused to continue enjoying the liberty granted by way of bail
during the pendency of the trial.
13. If the law laid down by the Apex Court in the
afore-quoted judgments is pitted against the impugned order and
the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would unmistakably
emerge is, that the order passed by the concerned Court cancelling
38
the anticipatory bail granted to the petitioners, deserves to be set
aside, as all the incidents based on which the anticipatory bail is
cancelled occur on or before 07-10-2025 and there are no other
supervening circumstances which occur subsequently, justifying the
cancellation of the anticipatory bail. Further, if the impugned order
is permitted to continue, it would result in serious miscarriage of
justice to the petitioners. As a consequence, the order granting
anticipatory bail to the petitioners deserves to be restored.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) Impugned order dated 18-03-2026 passed in
Crl.Misc.No.11191 of 2025 by the LXII Additional City
Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City, stands
quashed.
(iii) Order dated 29-09-2025 granting anticipatory bail to
the petitioners in Crl.Misc.No.7934 of 2025 by the LXII
Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City
stands restored.
39
(iv) Liberty is reserved to the 1st respondent/State to move
an application seeking cancellation of bail, only if there
is violation of any of the conditions in its strict sense.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:MJ
