Karnataka High Court
Sri Ganapathy Manickam vs State Of Karnataka on 5 March, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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CRL.P No. 16837 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 16837 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SRI. GANAPATHY MANICKAM,
S/O MANICKAM,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
R/AT G.1302, PURVA HIGHLAND,
19, MAALLASANDRA OFF,
KANAKAPURA ROAD,
NEAR KUMARAN SCHOOL,
THALAGHATTAPURA,
BENGALURU - 560 062.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. YESHU MISHRA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally
signed by
SANJEEVINI J 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
KARISHETTY
Location: High BY CYBER CRIME POLICE STATION,
Court of REPRESENTED BY SPP,
Karnataka
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU - 560 082.
2. RAGHAVENDRA PANDIT,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
R/AT NO. U13, GANESHA BLOCK,
1ST MAIN ROAD, SESHADRIPURA,
BENGALURU.
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3. SILICOMP INDIA PVT. LTD.,
(ALSO KNOWN AS FIME INDIA),
A SUBSIDIARY OF FIME SAS,
FRANCE, THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVE RAGHAVENDRA PANDIT,
REGISTERED OFFICE AT SARODE BUILDING,
NO. 743, 15TH CROSS, 6TH PHASE,
100 FEET ROAD, J.P.NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 078.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. B.PUSHPALATHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1;
SMT. SHIVANI P.MURTHY, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. ARJUN RAO, ADVOCATE FOR R2 AND R3)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 BNSS PRAYING TO QUASH
THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CC.NO.7576/2024 PENDING ON
THE FILE OF THE XLV ADDL. CJM, BENGALURU FOR THE
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 43, 65 AND 66 OF
THE I.T. ACT, 2000 AND SECTION 447 OF THE COMPANIES
ACT, 1956 AND SECTIONS 34, 120B, 379, 408, 420, 409, 403,
381, 418, 405 AND 415 OF THE IPC, 1860 ARISING OUT OF
CRIME NO.1650/2018 REGISTERED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 -
CYBER CRIME POLICE STATION, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
Heard Sri.Yeshu Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, Sri.B.Pushpalatha, learned Addl. SPP appearing for
respondent No.1, Smt.Shivani P. Murthy, learned counsel
appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and have perused the
material on record.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner is similarly placed to that of the
accused in Crl.P.No.6306/2024 C/w Crl.P.No.6295/2024,
disposed on 29.04.2025, wherein this Court has held as
follows:
“8. The afore-narrated facts of relationship between the
complainants/Company and the petitioners is a matter of
record. The petitioners getting relieved on resignation or
otherwise is also a matter of record. It would suffice if the
issue in the lis is considered from registration of the
complaint. Prior to registration of the subject complaint, the
Company in which the petitioners were employed institutes a
suit in O.S.No.3604 of 2018. The relief sought in the suit is as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs in the instant case humbly
pray before this Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to pass
a judgment and decree against the Defendant by:
a) Directing the Defendants to pay damages to the
tune of ₹7,34,43,754/- (Rupees Seven Crore
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Thirty Four Lakh Forty Three Thousand Seven
Hundred and Fifty Four only) to the Plaintiffs on
account of loss of business, revenue, profits,
reputation, leak of IP among with interest @ 18%
p.a. from the date of filing of the suit till
realization;
b) Restraining the Defendants, their proprietors, partners
or directors, as the case may be, its principal officers,
servants, agents, representatives, contractors, assigns,
sister concerns and any other person working for and
on behalf of the Defendants, from divulging or
disclosing confidential and proprietary information of
the plaintiffs to any third party or to use such
information for their own benefit and to the detriment
of the plaintiffs or parting with the Computer
Systems/equipments, emails, softwares, client
database and dealings details, technological know-now,
trade secrets and various other extremely confidential,
crucial and vital electronic records, documents, data,
information of the Plaintiff No.1 and from reproducing
and/or substantially reproducing and/or copying the
Plaintiff’s said properties;
c) Restraining the defendants, its proprietors, partners or
directors, as the case may be, its principal officers,
servants, agents, representatives, contractors, assigns,
sister concerns and any other person working for and
on behalf of the Defendants, from infringing in any
manner the copyright in the literary work subsisting in
the documents, presentations, flow charts, algorithms,
coding sheets, source code of the Plaintiff’s softwares,
etc. and from reproducing and/or substantially
reproducing and/or copying and/or imitating and/or
publishing and/or using the Plaintiff’s said literary work
or any part thereof in any manner whatsoever;
d) Restraining the Defendants, its officers, servants,
agents, representatives, contractors, and assigns,
sister concerns and any other person working for
and on behalf of the Defendants from soliciting
the clients and employees of the Plaintiffs by
inducing them to leave the employment of the
Plaintiffs and join the Defendant No.1;
e) A decree for delivery up of all the Computer
Systems/equipments, emails, softwares, client
database and dealings details, and various other
electronic records, documents, data, information of the
Plaintiff No.1 available in any form with the Defendants,
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its officers, servants, agents, representatives,
contractors and assigns, sister concerns and any other
person working for and on behalf of the Defendants, to
the authorized representative of the Plaintiffs;
f) An order for rendition of accounts of the Defendants to
show the unjust profit which the Defendants have
derived through illegal and wrongful means which have
caused loss to the Plaintiff and subsequently an order
for damages on the basis of the rendition of accounts.
g) An order as to costs in the proceedings including the
legal costs; and
h) Any other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit
and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
present case.”
(Emphasis added)
The relief sought was restraining the defendants, the
present petitioners from reproducing or copying plaintiff’s
property. Property was the information. Damages was also
sought on alleged loss of business on account of petitioners
leaving the Company and starting other Company which
was the 1st defendant – M/s. PAYHUDDLE Solutions Private
Limited. The said suit comes to be filed on 28-04-2018.
During the same time, the Company registers the complaint
in P.C.R.No.3850 of 2018. If not the entire complaint,
certain paragraphs are germane to be noticed. They read as
follows:
“…. …. ….
3. That the Accused no. 1 is a private limited company
engaged inter-alia in the business similar to that of the
Complainant Company No:1 and is being represented
through its Directors Mr.Ramiah Sambandam & Mr.Abishek
Chandrasekar who are responsible and hence liable for the
day to day affairs/ transactions of the Accused no.1 and
they are also Accused no.7 & 8 in the present Complaint as
they are personally liable for the wrongful acts and
conducts done by the Accused no.1 Company as
enumerated in the present complaint. Accused no.2 & 3
are the ex-directors of the Complainant Company No.1
and are currently employed with the Accused No.1
Company as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Technical
Director respectively. Accused no.4 to 6 are the ex-
employees of the Complainant Company No.1 and they are
also currently employed with the Accused no.1 company
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and holding senior management positions there. Accused
no.9 is an ex-consultant of the Complainant Company no.1
and is one of the founders of the Accused no.1 and
currently working with the Accused no.1 as its Marketing
Head.
4. That it is the case of the Complainants that the Accused
nos. 2 to 9 in furtherance of a conspiracy and with a
common malafide intention have committed serious fraud,
criminal breach of trust, theft, cheating, data theft,
damage to the computer systems, copyright infringement
of the Complainant Company No.1 by way of forming an
association of persons in the form of a corporate entity
‘PayHuddle Solutions Private Limited’ i.e. Accused no.1 and
stealing and misusing the emails, softwares, clients related
information & dealings details, technological know-how,
trade secrets and other confidential and non-confidential &
sensitive and non-sensitive information/ documents of the
Complainant Company No.1 like prices and exact
requirements of the clients, source codes, presentations,
flow charts, algorithms, coding sheets, etc. [hereinafter
also referred to as the ‘Compromised
Data/Information’] acquired by them or entrusted to
them in their official capacity for diversion of business/
clients from the Complainant Company No.1 to the
Accused no.1 over a period of time starting from January,
2017 if not early, thereby causing great wrongful loss to
the Complainant Companies and wrongful gain to
themselves. Further, the Accused no.1 Company very well
knowing that the said Compromised Data/ Information is
of the Complainant Company no.1 is dishonestly using the
said Compromised Data/ Information for its wrongful
commercial benefit in the course of its daily business
transactions.
5. That the Accused no. 2 & 3 being the Directors of the
Complainant Company No.1 had complete dominion over
all the resources/properties including the Compromised
Data/ Information of the Complainant Company No.1.
Similarly, the Accused no. 4 to 6 being the senior level
employees of the Complainant Company No.1 and Accused
no.9 being a consultant were entrusted with the
compromised Data Information of the Complainant
Company and whatever other data/ information they
acquired during the course of their employment with the
Complainant Company No.1. However, the Accused No.2
to 6 and 9 while employed at the Complainant Company
No.1 dishonestly and with malafide intention started
stealing and misusing all the resources/data/ information
of the Complainant Company entrusted to them in their
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official capacity for the creation of a competitive and a rival
entity i.e. Accused no.1 with the help of Accused no. 7 & 8.
It is pertinent to mention here that the intention of the
Accused persons was dishonest and malafide an inkling of
which the complainant company got in January 2017
around which time the accused had started misusing the
resources / data information/premises of the Complainant
Company for their own personal benefit and their ill motive
is further established as they finally incorporated the
Accused no.1 which is just a sham. Accused no.1 is just a
shield used by the other Accused persons to hide their
offences and if the deep investigation is being done
keeping in view the averments of the above complaint it
would reveal that the Accused No.1 has been incorporated
specifically for the purpose of diverting the business of the
Complainants and for illegal acts being carried out by the
Accused persons and the Accused no.7 and 8 have
conspired with other Accused persons to commit all the
offences for the profits and gains on the cost of the
Complainants.
6. That although the Accused persons in collusion with each
other had started the fraud and process of diverting the
business of the Complainant Companies to the Accused
no.1 over the period of time with every effort not to leave
any evidence behind, yet, the loss of business projects,
clients, tenders, resignations from the Accused persons
and many other employees leaving the Complainant
Company No.1 and joining the Accused no.1 Company and
all this happening at the same time seemed out of place
and the Complainant Companies were constrained to
enquire and investigate, internally. During its investigation
starting from 9th May, 2017 i.e. the date when the Accused
no.2 also resigned, the Complainant Companies discovered
few shocking facts with evidences which pointed directly
towards the various offences committed by the Accused
nos.1 to 9 in furtherance of a conspiracy. Following are the
few incidents/discoveries which prima facie highlight the
guilt of the Accused persons and make the Accused liable
of offences for fraud Criminal breach of trust, cheating,
theft, data theft, damage to computer systems and the
data stored therein, wrongful withholding of company
property and misappropriation of property, copyright
infringement, tampering with the computers.
7. ‘PayHuddle Solutions Private Limited’ i.e. Accused no.1 is a
company incorporated on 16th March, 2017 engaged in the
same line of business as that of the Complainant Company
No.1 with one of its Directors being Mr.Ramiah
Sambandam (Accused no.7) who is the father of the
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Accused no.2 and second Director being Mr.Abishek
Chandrasekar (Accused no.8) who is the nephew (sister’s
son) of the Accused no.2 i.e. Mr.Prakash Sambandam. It is
pertinent to mention here that Mr.Ramiah Sambandam
(Accused no.7), father of the Accused no.2 is an 81 year
old man and has no experience whatsoever in the field the
Accused no.1 is engaged in, in fact he is an agriculturist
and was doing some other small business but definitely not
IT related. It is pertinent to mention herein that the
accused No. 7 has colluded with other Accused persons
without having any knowledge in IT sector and along with
the Accused no. 8 tried to mislead the Complainant
company. The accused No. 7 and 8 have conspired with
the other Accused persons and in furtherance to their
common intention and ill motive committed the offences as
alleged in the subsequent paras of this complaint. This
shows that the Accused no.1 was formed by the other
Accused persons with malafide and dishonest intentions
just to shield their offences when both of its Directors are
directly related to the Accused no.2 and they were in fact
made Directors just to deceive others. It is therefore
necessary under such suspicious circumstances that a
detail investigation be carried out.
…. …. ….
22. Soon after the establishment of the Accused no.1
Company in March, 2017, all the Accused started
instigating the employees of the Complainant
Company to join the Accused no.1 and as a
consequence as many as 10 more employees gave
resignation from the Complainant Company and
eventually joined the Accused no.1 Company which
again is not normal. All the names and the dates and
details can be provided if required.
23. That the Accused no.2 & 3 have not only breached
the fiduciary duty they owe towards the Complainant
Company No.1 being its Directors but have also
breached many statutory duties they owe towards
the Complainant Company under the Companies Act,
2013 thereby jeopardizing the interests of the
Complainant Company No.1 to a great extent when
they were in fact entrusted and obligated to protect
those interests.
24. That the Complainant Company No.1 has a statutory
protection for its software and its source code,
computer programs and other electronic records,
documents, etc under the Copyright Act 1957 being
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the owner of the same and by the aforesaid acts/
conducts of the Accused persons, they have
infringed the IP Rights of the Complainant Company
no.1 in the said properties and thus made
themselves liable under Section 63 of the Copyright
Act, 1957.
25. That under Section 64 of the Copyright Act 1957 the local
police having the jurisdiction to investigate can seize all
the copies of the infringed work or any supporting
material. Further under the provisions of the Act the local
police having the jurisdiction can also seize the
laptops/computer systems or other devices were-in this
data is stored illegally by the Accused persons.
26.That the Complainant Company’s all data base stored
in its computers, laptops, or in other electronic
devices relating to any confidential information or
other relevant information relating to its customers,
etc are protected under the provisions of the
Information Technology Act 2000 (as amended). The
police officer investigating the above offence can
confiscate the computer, computer system or
computer network including floppies, compact disks,
tape drives or any other accessories wherein the
illegally downloaded data is stored.
27. That, after analyzing the abovementioned discoveries and
documents produced by the Complainant Company along
with this complaint it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that
the Accused persons acted in collusion with each other
with ulterior motive and having dishonest malafide
intention from the very beginning to cheat the
Complainant as the Complainant Company would not have
done the acts it had done and would have done the acts it
had not done if not so deceived by the Accused persons,
thereby making wrongful gain to themselves and wrongful
loss to the Complainant. The aforesaid actions/inactions on
part of the Accused persons clearly amount to cheating
under section 420, criminal breach of trust under Section
405 & dishonest misappropriation of property under
Section 403 of the Indian Penal Code and Data Theft under
Section 66 r/w Section 43 of the Information Technology
Act. The Accused persons have also made themselves
liable under Section 452 of the Companies Act, 2013 for
wrongfully obtaining the aforesaid properties of the
Complainant Company and wrongfully withholding and
using it for unlawful purposes and also under Section 447
of the Companies Act for fraud. The Accused are also liable
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under Section 63 of the Copyright Act for copyright
infringement.
28. It is submitted that the Complainant filed a police
complaint before the Cyber Crime Police Station,
Bengaluru on 23rd November, 2017 vide Reg. No. 2115/17.
However, the police have not taken any action whatsoever
with the complaint for reasons unknown and having no
other alternative, the Complainants are before this Hon’ble
Court.
29. That the above stated conducts of the Accused
persons are illegal and unlawful which has resulted
in a loss of about 977,000 Euros (approx INR
7,83,29,000 ,000 Rupees Seven Crores Eighty Three
Lakhs and Twenty Nine Thousand only) to the
Complainant company thus, it is imperative that an
enquiry/investigation be conducted against the
Accused persons and appropriate action be taken
forthwith against them for fraud, cheating, criminal
breach of trust, data theft, misappropriation &
wrongful withholding of the Complainant Company
property, conspiracy with common intention and
other offences that they are found guilty of during
the investigation.
30. That the Accused persons have their office within the
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court and the offences have
also been committed by the Accused persons within the
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, hence this Complaint.
WHEREFORE, the Complainant most humbly
prays that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to take
cognizance for the offences punishable under
sections 405, 408, 409, 415/ 420, 418, 379, 381,
403, 120B and 34 of Indian Penal Code, read with
Sections 43, 65, 66 and 76 of The Information
Technology Act, 1963, read with Sections 447, 452
of The Companies Act, 2013, and read with Section
64 of The Copyright Act, against the accused and
secure their presence and punish them for having
committed the above said offences in the interest of
justice and equity.
For Silicomp India Pvt. Ltd.
Sd/-
COMPLAINANTS
Sd/-
ADVOCATE FOR COMPLAINANTS”
(Emphasis added)
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On the said complaint, the learned Magistrate refers the
matter for investigation. The order, referring the matter
under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for investigation,
reads as follows:
“Complainant present. Counsel for the complainant
present.
Perused the records. Register this case as PCR. This
case is referred to SHO, Cyber Crime P.S. the offence
punishable u/s 405, 408, 409, 415, 420, 418, 379, 381,
403, 120B R/w 34 of IPC and U/s 43, 65, 66 and 76 of IT
Act and U/s 447, 452 of Companies Act 2013 R/w 64 of
the Copyright Act u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation
and report. Await report by:
01-06-2018.”
The contention now is that the private complaint so filed
did not accompany with it an affidavit as is necessary in
law.
The gist of the complaint:
9. The contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that, if the matter had to be referred for
investigation, an affidavit which would depict that the
complainants had initially knocked at the doors of the
jurisdictional police under Section 154(1) of the Cr.P.C.,
and the same had not been entertained by the
jurisdictional police as also on approach, the higher
Authority under Section 154(3) is mandatory. It is only
these contents in the affidavit which ought to have
merited entertainment of the complaint. The
submissions to the contrary is that, the complainants
have never sought investigation under Section 156(3).
Therefore, there was no mandatory duty cast upon
them to file an affidavit along with the private
complaint. The law, in this regard, as to whether an
affidavit would be required or not is by now too well
settled. The requirement of seeking investigation under
Section 156(3) or taking of cognizance by the learned
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Magistrate under Section 190(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C., will
not take away the obligation of the complainants to
support the complaint by way of an affidavit.
10. The Apex Court in the case of PRIYANKA
SRIVASTAVA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH1 has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power
under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial
mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police
taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A
litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of
the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen
with clean hands must have free access to invoke the
said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert
litigations takes this route to harass their fellow
citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the
same.
30. In our considered opinion, a stage has
come in this country where Section 156(3) CrPC
applications are to be supported by an affidavit
duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the
invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned
Magistrate would be well advised to verify the
truth and also can verify the veracity of the
allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant
more responsible. We are compelled to say so as
such kind of applications are being filed in a
routine manner without taking any responsibility
whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That
apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming
when one tries to pick up people who are passing
orders under a statutory provision which can be
challenged under the framework of the said Act or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But
it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a
criminal court as if somebody is determined to
settle the scores.
1
(2015) 6 SCC 287
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31. We have already indicated that there
has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1)
and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section
156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt
out in the application and necessary documents to
that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a
direction that an application under Section 156(3)
be supported by an affidavit is so that the person
making the application should be conscious and
also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is
made. It is because once an affidavit is found to
be false, he will be liable for prosecution in
accordance with law. This will deter him to
casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate
under Section 156(3). That apart, we have
already stated that the veracity of the same can
also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard
being had to the nature of allegations of the case.
We are compelled to say so as a number of cases
pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial
dispute/family disputes, commercial offences,
medical negligence cases, corruption cases and
the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in
initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated
in Lalita Kumari [(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC
(Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned
Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in
lodging of the FIR.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The said elucidation has been reiterated by the Apex
Court in the case of BABU VENKATESH v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA2 in the following paragraphs:
“…. …. ….
11. It was submitted that, the Magistrate was
required to apply his mind before passing an order
under Section 156(3)CrPC. It was further submitted
that, unless an application under Section 156(3)CrPC
was supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the
complainant, the learned Magistrate could not have
passed an order under the said provision.
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20. It could thus be seen that, though this
Court has cautioned that, power to quash criminal
proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and
with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases, it has specified certain category of cases
wherein such power can be exercised for quashing
proceedings.
21. We find that in the present case, though
civil suits have been filed with regard to the same
transactions and though they are contested by
Respondent 2 by filing written statement, he has
chosen to file complaint under Section 156(3)CrPC
after a period of one-and-a-half years from the date
of filing of written statement with an ulterior motive
of harassing the appellants. We find that, the present
case fits in the category of No. 7, as mentioned
in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .
… … …
23. After analysing the law as to how the
power under Section 156(3)CrPC has to be exercised,
this Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of
U.P. [Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6
SCC 287 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 294 : (2015) 4 SCC
(Cri) 153] has observed thus : (SCC p. 306, paras 30-
31)
“30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come
in this country where Section 156(3)CrPC applications are
to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the
applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the
learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the
truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations.
This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible.
We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications
are being filed in a routine manner without taking any
responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons.
That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming
when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders
under a statutory provision which can be challenged
under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take
undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is
determined to settle the scores.
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31. We have already indicated that there has to
be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3)
while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the
aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and
necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The
warrant for giving a direction that an application under
Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the
person making the application should be conscious and
also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is
because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be
liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will
deter him to casually invoke the authority of the
Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have
already stated that the veracity of the same can also be
verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to
the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to
say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere,
matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial
offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and
the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in
initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita
Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the
learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in
lodging of the FIR.”
24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has
come where applications under Section 156(3)CrPC are to
be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant
who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate.
25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate
case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify
the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The
Court has noted that, applications under Section
156(3)CrPC are filed in a routine manner without taking any
responsibility only to harass certain persons.
26. This Court has further held that, prior to
the filing of a petition under Section 156(3)CrPC,
there have to be applications under Sections 154(1)
and 154(3)CrPC. This Court emphasises the necessity
to file an affidavit so that the persons making the
application should be conscious and not make false
affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would
be deterred from causally invoking authority of the
Magistrate, under Section 156(3)CrPC. Inasmuch as if
the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be
liable for prosecution in accordance with law.
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27. In the present case, we find that the
learned Magistrate while passing the order under
Section 156(3)CrPC, has totally failed to consider the
law laid down by this Court.
28. From the perusal of the complaint it can be
seen that, the complainant Respondent 2 himself has
made averments with regard to the filing of the
original suit. In any case, when the complaint was
not supported by an affidavit, the Magistrate ought
not to have entertained the application under Section
156(3)CrPC. The High Court has also failed to take
into consideration the legal position as has been
enunciated by this Court in Priyanka
Srivastava v. State of U.P. [Priyanka
Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 : (2015)
3 SCC (Civ) 294 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 153] , and has
dismissed the petitions by merely observing that
serious allegations are made in the complaint.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, in its later judgment, in the case of RANJIT
SINGH BATH v. UNION TERRITORY CHANDIGARH3 has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
5. We have carefully perused the decision of this
Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava reported in
(2015) 6 SCC 287. This Court has noted that there was
misuse of the provisions of sub Section (3) of Section
156. In paragraphs 30 and 31, this Court held thus:
“30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in
this country where Section 156(3) CrPC applications are to
be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who
seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate
would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify
the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the
applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say
so as such kind of applications are being filed in a
routine manner without taking any responsibility
whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart,
it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one
tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a
statutory provision which can be challenged under the
framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take3
Criminal Appeal No.4313 of 2024 decided on 06-03-2025
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undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is
determined to settle the scores.
31. We have already indicated that there has to
be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and
154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3).
Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the
application and necessary documents to that effect
shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that
an application under Section 156(3) be supported by
an affidavit is so that the person making the
application should be conscious and also endeavour to
see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once
an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for
prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him
to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate
under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already
stated that the veracity of the same can also be
verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to
the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled
to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal
sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes,
commercial offences, medical negligence cases,
corruption cases and the cases where there is
abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal
prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are
being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would
also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.”
(underlines supplied)
6. Section 154 of the CRPC reads thus:
“154. Information in cognizable cases.
(1) Every information relating to the commission of
a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge
of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or
under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and
every such information, whether given in writing or
reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the
person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered
in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the
State Government may prescribe in this behalf:
41[Provided that if the information is given by the
woman against whom an offence under section 326A,
section 326B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B,
section 354C, section 354D, section 376, section 376A,
section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376E or
section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is
alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such
information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or
any woman officer:
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Provided further that-
(a) in the event that the person against whom an
offence under section 354, section 354A, section
354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376,
2[section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B,
section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA,
section 376DB], section 376E or section 509 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to
have been committed or attempted, is
temporarily or permanently mentally or
physically disabled, then such information shall
be recorded by a police officer, at the residence
of the person seeking to report such offence or at
a convenient place of such person’s choice, in the
presence of an interpreter or a special educator,
as the case may be;
(b) the recording of such information shall be video
graphed;
(c) the police officer shall get the statement of the
person recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under
clause (a) of sub-section (5A) of section 164 as
soon as possible.];
(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-
section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the
informant.
(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of
an officer in charge of a police station to record the
information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the
substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the
Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such
information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence,
shall either investigate the case himself or direct an
investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to
him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer
shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police
station in relation to that offence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court in RANJIT SINGH BATH‘s case holds
that there should be an averment in the private
complaint regarding compliance of Section 154(1) and
(2) of the Cr.P.C., and an affidavit to that effect should
be filed.
11. A perusal at the private complaint so
registered, as quoted hereinabove, would leave none in
doubt that the rigour as enunciated by the Apex Court in
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the afore-quoted judgments have been violated or there
is no compliance with Section 154(1) and (3) of the
Cr.P.C., and no affidavit to that effect is filed. A bald
narration is made at paragraph 28 of the complaint
quoted supra that they have sought to register a
complaint before the Cyber Crime Police Station. No
document to that effect is produced. It is, therefore, in
such cases filing of an affidavit is imperative, is what the
Apex Court observes in the afore-quoted judgments.
12. The next contention is, whether the issue in the lis
with regard to breach of confidentiality is a civil dispute
between the parties and the said dispute is dressed with
a colour of crime. The excerpts of the complaint are
noticed supra. The complaint is with regard to causing of
loss by these petitioners. The complainants would take
two steps in 2018 – one to institute a civil suit and the
other to set the criminal law into motion. At best the civil
suit was entertainable and not the criminal law that is
being set into motion for the reasons more than one. It
is a business rivalry between the petitioners and the
complainants/Company and the rivalry emerging on the
score that the petitioners have started their own
Company which was the 1st defendant in the suit and
thereby taken away all the customers of the
complainants/Company which resulted in loss. Therefore,
these factors at best could be the ingredients of a civil
Suit seeking damages or orders of restraint against the
petitioners. The Company has acted correctly, in the
considered view of this Court, by filing a civil suit. But,
the Company has also chosen to set the criminal law into
motion. The two cannot be considered to go hand in
hand in the peculiar facts of the case.
13. While, there may be plethora of cases where
mere filing of a civil suit would not mean that setting of
criminal law into motion should be obliterated; it would
depend on the facts of each case and to be considered
on a case to case basis. In a given case, if the reading of
the complaint clearly indicates that a dispute which is
purely civil in nature is given a cloak of crime, the Courts
would not hesitate to step in and obliterate the same.
The cognizance for the afore-quoted offences are taken.
They range between Sections 406 to 120B of the IPC.
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Therefore, the offence is one of criminal breach of trust
and cheating. Both the offences cannot be allowed in the
case at hand. The criminal justice system should not be
put into use for the purpose of recovery of money, unless
the facts are glaring and make out a prima facie offence
under the criminal law. It therefore, becomes germane
to notice the law laid down by the Apex Court in
entertaining a criminal case for recovery of money or
business rivalry. The offences alleged are the ones
punishable under Sections 409 and 420 of the IPC.
Section 420 of the IPC reads as follows:
“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.–Whoever cheats and thereby
dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver
any property to any person, or to make, alter or
destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security,
or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is
capable of being converted into a valuable security,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
Section 420 of the IPC has its ingredients in Section 415
of the IPC to be met. Section 415 of the IPC reads as
follows:
“415. Cheating.–Whoever, by deceiving
any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces
the person so deceived to deliver any property to
any person, or to consent that any person shall
retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he were not so
deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in
body, mind, reputation or property, is said to
“cheat”.
Explanation.–A dishonest concealment of facts
is a deception within the meaning of this section.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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Section 415 of the IPC punishes a person who
dishonestly, right from the inception, lures the victim
into a transaction and misappropriates the money.
14. In the case at hand, there is no question of
luring each other. In identical circumstances, the Apex
Court in the case of VIJAY KUMAR GHAI v. STATE OF
WEST BENGAL4 has held as follows:
“27. Section 405 IPC defines “criminal breach
of trust” which reads as under:
“405. Criminal breach of trust.–Whoever, being in
any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over
property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use
that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which
such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express
or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such
trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits
“criminal breach of trust”.”
The essential ingredients of the offence of criminal
breach of trust are:
(1) The accused must be entrusted with the property or with
dominion over it,(2) The person so entrusted must use that property, or;
(3) The accused must dishonestly use or dispose of that property
or wilfully suffer any other person to do so in violation,
(a) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or;
(b) of any legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust.
28. “Entrustment” of property under Section
405 of the Penal Code, 1860 is pivotal to constitute
an offence under this. The words used are, “in any
manner entrusted with property”. So, it extends to
entrustments of all kinds whether to clerks,
servants, business partners or other persons,
provided they are holding a position of “trust”. A
person who dishonestly misappropriates property
entrusted to them contrary to the terms of an
obligation imposed is liable for a criminal breach of
trust and is punished under Section 406 of the Penal
Code.
4
(2022) 7 SCC 124
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29. The definition in the section does not
restrict the property to movables or immovables
alone. This Court in R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn. [R.K.
Dalmia v. Delhi Admn., (1963) 1 SCR 253 : AIR 1962
SC 1821] held that the word “property” is used in
the Code in a much wider sense than the expression
“movable property”. There is no good reason to
restrict the meaning of the word “property” to
movable property only when it is used without any
qualification in Section 405.
30. In Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI [Sudhir
Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1: (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 646] it was observed that the act of criminal breach
of trust would, inter alia mean using or disposing of the
property by a person who is entrusted with or has
otherwise dominion thereover. Such an act must not only
be done dishonestly but also in violation of any direction of
law or any contract express or implied relating to carrying
out the trust.
31. Section 415 IPC defines “cheating” which reads
as under:
“415. Cheating.–Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to
deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that
person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.”
The essential ingredients of the offence of
cheating are:
1. Deception of any person
2. (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that
person–
(i) to deliver any property to any person; or
(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any
property; or
(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or
omit if he were no so deceived, and which act
or omission causes or is likely to cause
damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property.
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32. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an
essential ingredient of the offence. A person who
dishonestly induces another person to deliver any
property is liable for the offence of cheating.
33. Section 420 IPC defines “cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property” which reads
as under:
“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.–Whoever cheats and thereby
dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any
property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the
whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which
is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted
into a valuable security, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
34. Section 420 IPC is a serious form of
cheating that includes inducement (to lead or
move someone to happen) in terms of delivery of
property as well as valuable securities. This
section is also applicable to matters where the
destruction of the property is caused by the way
of cheating or inducement. Punishment for
cheating is provided under this section which
may extend to 7 years and also makes the person
liable to fine.
35. To establish the offence of cheating in
inducing the delivery of property, the following
ingredients need to be proved:
(i) The representation made by the person was
false.
(ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the
representation he made was false.
(iii) The accused made false representation with
dishonest intention in order to deceive the
person to whom it was made.
(iv) The act where the accused induced the person
to deliver the property or to perform or to
abstain from any act which the person would
have not done or had otherwise committed.
36. As observed and held by this Court in R.K.
Vijayasarathy v. SudhaSeetharam [R.K. Vijayasarathy
v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739 : (2020) 2
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SCC (Cri) 454] , the ingredients to constitute an
offence under Section 420 are as follows:
(i) a person must commit the offence of cheating under
Section 415; and
(ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced to:
(a) deliver property to any person; or
b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or
anything signed or sealed and capable of being
converted into valuable security. Thus, cheating
is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute
an offence under Section 420 IPC.
37. The following observation made by this
Court in Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar [Uma
Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336
: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 49] with almost similar facts and
circumstances may be relevant to note at this stage :
(SCC pp. 338-39, paras 6-7)
“6. Now the question to be examined by us is
as to whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of
the complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is
made out much less offences under Sections
420/120-BIPC. The only allegation in the complaint
petition against the accused persons is that they
assured the complainant that when they receive the
insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they
would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant
out of that but the same has never been paid. … It
was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that
the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant
to agree so that the accused persons may take steps
for moving the consumer forum in relation to the
claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every
breach of contract would not give rise to an offence
of cheating and only in those cases breach of
contract would amount to cheating where there was
any deception played at the very inception. If the
intention to cheat has developed later on, the same
cannot amount to cheating. In the present case, it
has nowhere been stated that at the very inception
that there was intention on behalf of the accused
persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for
an offence under Section 420IPC.
7. In our view petition of complaint does not
disclose any criminal offence at all much less any
offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-BIPC
and the present case is a case of purely civil dispute
between the parties for which remedy lies before a
civil court by filing a properly constituted suit. In our
opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police
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investigation to continue would amount to an abuse
of the process of court and to prevent the same it
was just and expedient for the High Court to quash
the same by exercising the powers under Section
482CrPC which it has erroneously refused.”
38. There can be no doubt that a mere
breach of contract is not in itself a criminal
offence and gives rise to the civil liability of
damages. However, as held by this Court
in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar [Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] ,
the distinction between mere breach of contract
and cheating, which is criminal offence, is a fine
one. While breach of contract cannot give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating, fraudulent or
dishonest intention is the basis of the offence of
cheating. In the case at hand, complaint filed by
Respondent 2 does not disclose dishonest or
fraudulent intention of the appellants.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, later, in the case of LALIT
CHATURVEDI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH5 has
held as follows:
“5. This Court, in a number of judgments, has
pointed out the clear distinction between a civil wrong
in the form of breach of contract, non-payment of
money or disregard to and violation of the contractual
terms; and a criminal offence under
Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC. Repeated judgments
of this Court, however, are somehow overlooked, and
are not being applied and enforced. We will be referring to
these judgments. The impugned judgment dismisses the
application filed by the appellants under Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C. on the ground of delay/laches and also the factum
that the chargesheet had been filed on 12.12.2019. This
ground and reason is also not valid.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Again, the Apex Court in the case of NARESH KUMAR v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA6 has held as follows:
5
2024 SCC OnLine SC 171
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".... .... ....
8. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties
relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by
one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal
offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit
Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing
with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a
mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa
Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has
held that every breach of contract would not give rise
to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be
shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise.
9. In the case at hand, the dispute between the parties
was not only essentially of a civil nature but in this case the
dispute itself stood settled later as we have already discussed
above. We see no criminal element here and
consequently the case here is nothing but an abuse of
the process. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the
order of the High Court dated 02.12.2020. The criminal
proceedings arising out of FIR No. 113 of 2017 will hereby
stand quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, clearly
holds that prosecution should not be permitted on
allegations of breach of contract for the purpose of
recovery of money.
15. In the light of the afore-quoted judgments, the
registration of crime is rendered unsustainable. While it
is correct that in a given case, on a given set of facts,
both civil and criminal laws could be set into motion as
there would be common ingredients, which has a flavour
of civil law and which has a rigour of criminal law. The
issue now would be, whether this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction can entertain the petition under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C., and obliterate the crime. This again is no
longer res integra. The Apex Court holds that in a
petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., this Court is
permitted to exercise its jurisdiction by reading the
complaint between the lines, as abuse of the process of
6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 268
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law has become rampant. The Apex Court in the case of
MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH7 has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
13. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused comes
before the Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the
criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous
or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the
Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a
little more closely. We say so because once the
complainant decides to proceed against the accused
with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal
vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the
FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure
that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are
such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be
just enough for the Court to look into the averments
made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In
frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a
duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above
the averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The
Court while exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of
the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the
stage of a case but is empowered to take into account
the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take
for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting
the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged.
14. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can
assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction
7
2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
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between consideration of materials that were tendered as
evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such
material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the
FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:–
“5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement
of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether
any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC
866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some
categories of cases where inherent power can and should be
exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is
important to bear in mind the distinction between a
case where there is no legal evidence or where there
is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would
not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the
evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.
Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of
oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be
circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and
should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an
instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time
the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused
to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden
death…..”
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(Emphasis supplied)
15. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal
proceedings arising from FIR No. 127 of 2022 dated
04.06.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur,
Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court in the case of PATEL ENGINEERING
LIMITED VS. STATE8, following the judgments of the
Apex Court, has held as follows:
“14. ………
The Apex Court holds that when petitions are filed
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., or under Article 226
of the Constitution to get the FIR quashed,
essentially on the ground that it is either
frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior
motives to wreak vengeance or civil disputes or
commercial transactions are projected to be a
crime, the Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 482 of the Cr.P.C., should not
restrict itself only to such of the cases, but is
empowered to take into account overall
circumstances and answer whether the crime
should be permitted to be investigated into or
not.
15. In the light of the afore-elucidated law by
the Apex Court, I deem it appropriate to exercise
the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
and obliterate the Damocles sword that hangs on
the head of these petitioners, in the light of the
fact that a pure commercial transaction or breach
of an agreement between the parties is sought to
be given a colour of crime; added to the fact that
the signatory to all the documents, the 2nd
petitioner is no more.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the facts obtaining in the case at hand as
narrated hereinabove and the judgments rendered by
8
Criminal Petition No.6513 of 2024, disposed on 06th August, 2024
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CRL.P No. 16837 of 2025
HC-KAR
the Apex Court quoted supra, if further proceedings are
permitted to continue against the petitioners, it would
undoubtedly become an abuse of the process of law and
result in miscarriage of justice.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petitions are allowed.
(ii) Impugned proceedings pending before the XLV
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Bengaluru in CC.No.7576/2024 qua the petitioners
stand quashed.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the
course of the order are only for the purpose of
consideration of the case of petitioners under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind
or influence the proceedings pending before any
other fora between the same parties.”
3. However, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents would dispute the position and contend that the
proceedings must not be quashed following the said order. In
the same breath, submits that the said order has become final.
4. In that light, I deem it appropriate to give the
benefit of the order so passed to the co-accused in the said
crime.
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HC-KAR
5. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) Impugned proceedings in C.C.No.7576/2024
pending before the XLV Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru qua the
petitioner stand quashed.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the
course of the order are only for the purpose of
consideration of the case of the petitioner under
Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, and the same shall not
bind or influence the proceedings pending before
any other fora between the same parties.
SD/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
CBC
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 68