Jharkhand High Court
Pratik vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Home … on 11 March, 2026
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
1. Pratik, aged about 38 years, S/o Vinay Kumar Singh, posted as Assistant
Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office, Plot
No.1502/B, Airport Rd., Kunwar Singh Colony, P.O. Hinoo, P.S. Airport,
Ranchi, Jharkhand-834002
2. Shubham Bharti, aged about 29 years, S/o Bhola Shankar Prasad,
posted as Assistant Enforcement Officer, Directorate of Enforcement,
Ranchi Zonal Office, Plot No.1502/B, Airport Rd., Kunwar Singh Colony,
P.O. Hinoo, P.S. Airport, Ranchi, Jharkhand-834002 ... Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand through Home Secretary, Government of
Jharkhand, having office at Jharkhand Mantralaya, Project Bhawan, P.O.
& P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi, Jharkhand 834004
2. Union of India through Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) having
office at CBI Headquarters, CGO Complex, P.O. & P.S. Lodhi Road, New
Delhi-110003
3. Officer In-Charge, Airport Police Station, having office at Airport Police
Station, P.O. Airport and P.S. Doranda, Ranchi
4. Home Secretary, Government of India, Room No.113, North Block, New
Delhi
5. Santosh Kumar, Gosai Tank Road, Jaggi Compound, Upper Chutia,
Ranchi, Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S. Chutia, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand
... Respondents
-----
PRESENT
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
—–
For the Petitioners : Mr. S.V. Raju, A.S.G.I. (Through VC)
Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Advocate
Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Varun Girdhar, Advocate
Mr. Manmohit Bhalla, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Nnagamnthu S., Sr. Advocate (Through VC)
Mr. Achyut Keshav, A.A.G.-V
Mr. Shubham Gautam, A.C. to A.A.G.-V
For Respondent No.2-CBI : Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, Advocate
For Respondent No.4-UOI : Mr. Prashant Pallav, A.S.G.I.
Mr. Parth Jalan, A.C. to A.S.G.I.
Mr. Ayush. A.C. to A.S.G.I.
For Respondent No.5 : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate
Mr. Ritesh Kumar Gupta, Advocate
Ms. Nidhi Lall, Advocate
—–
C.A.V. on 24/02/2026 Pronounced on 11/03/2026
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This matter was mentioned on 15.01.2026 and seeing the urgency in
the matter, this matter was allowed to be listed on 16.01.2026 and on that
day, following order was passed:
“02/16.01.2026 Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Kapil Sibal,
learned senior counsel for the State appearing through Video
Conferencing.
2. This criminal writ petition was mentioned yesterday by
the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and seeing
the urgency in the matter, the matter was allowed to be listed
and that is how, this matter has been listed today.
3. In this criminal writ petition, following prayers have
been made:
(i) For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/,
direction(s) for quashing the entire criminal
proceedings including the FIR being Airport PS Case No.
5 of 2026 dated 13.01.2026, instituted for the alleged
offences under Sections 109(2), 117(2), 115(2), 127(2),
351(2), 352, 238 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which is now pending in the Court
of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi.
(ii) Or in alternate for issuance of appropriate
writ(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) for transferring the
investigation of the allegations made in FIR being
Airport P.S. Case No. 5 of 2026 to an independent
agency such as Central Bureau of Investigation to
conduct free and impartial investigation.
(iii) And be pleased to issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction commanding the Respondent
Authorities, specifically the Station House Officer,
Airport Police Station, to register a First Information
Report (F.I.R.) and take appropriate legal action against
the informant Santosh Kumar on the basis of the
Written Information/Report dated 13.01.2026
submitted by the Petitioner No. 1, which discloses
cognizable offences including obstruction of public
servant and fabrication of evidence, but has arbitrarily
remained unattended by the Police Authorities till date.
(iv) During the pendency of this Writ Application be
pleased to stay proceedings arising out of Airport P.S.
Case No. 05 of 2026 against the Petitioners.
(v) Any other relief or reliefs as Your Lordships may
deem fit and proper for which the petitioner is very
much entitled under the facts and circumstances of the
case and in the interest of justice.
4. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners submits that Ranchi Zonal Office of Directorate of
Enforcement is presently handling several high-profile and
sensitive investigations involving influential political figures
and senior bureaucrats, including matters relating to Chief
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Minister, former Minister and senior I.A.S. officers. These
investigations have wide public ramifications and are being
conducted under close judicial and public scrutiny. He further
submits that in this sensitive and high-stakes environment,
the petitioners are discharging their statutory duties strictly
in accordance with law. He then submits that petitioner no.1
is Assistant Director and petitioner no.2 is Assistant
Enforcement Officer in the office of Directorate of
Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office posted at Ranchi. He next
submits that the informant, namely, Santosh Kumar is the
principal accused in a large-scale misappropriation of
Government funds amounting to approximately Rs.23 Crores
from the Drinking Water and Sanitation Department,
Government of Jharkhand. He also submits that the ECIR
case has been registered against the said Santosh Kumar
and he was taken into custody by the police authorities and,
thereafter, he has been allowed bail. He further submits that
in absence of any summon by the Directorate of Enforcement
to the said Santosh Kumar, he suo motu appeared before the
office of Directorate of Enforcement on 12.01.2026 at about
01:20 P.M. He submits that when Santosh Kumar was talking
regarding his involvement in the siphoning of Government
funds in the Peyjal Scam, he became evasive and agitated
and in a sudden and unprovoked attempt to disrupt the
official proceedings, he picked up a glass water jug placed
on the table and voluntarily struck it against his own head,
causing a minor scalp injury before the staff present could
restrain him and, thereafter, the officers of the Directorate of
Enforcement have taken him to Sadar Hospital for treatment
and he was advised to go home. He then submits that
second medical opinion was also taken and, in this
background, Santosh Kumar has lodged the case with Airport
Police Station, which has been registered as Airport P.S. Case
No.05 of 2026 falsely alleging the case under Sections 109(2),
117(2) and other Sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023. He next submits that on 15.01.2026 at around 06:00
A.M., pursuant to the late-night communication, a
substantial police presence arrived at the office premises and
sought to treat the office as a crime scene, thereby
disrupting the normal functioning of a Central Government
agency. He submits that other averments are also made in
this petition, which requires to be looked into by this Court.
He submits that prima facie it is a pre-planned tactic to
disrupt the investigation being made by the Directorate of
Enforcement wherein high-profile persons of the State are
involved and, as such, protection is needed by this Court.
5. The High Courts are very slow in passing interim
protection at the initial stage of the FIR, however, in the
facts like present one brought before the High Court, the
High Court cannot be a mute spectator, however, all these
findings can be only given once the other sides are
responded in the petition.
6. Section 67 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act
protects the Government officials if in good faith, they are
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acting under the said Act.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners will array
the Home Secretary, Government of India as respondent
no.4 in this petition, in course of the day.
8. Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the
Union of India waives notice on behalf of the Home Secretary,
Government of India.
9. In the aforesaid background, the Home Secretary,
Government of India is directed to depute either CISF or BSF
or any other para military force, whichever is suitable at the
office of the Directorate of Enforcement, Ranchi.
10. Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the
Union of India will communicate this order to the Home
Secretary, Government of India.
11. The S.S.P., Ranchi is also directed to look into the
security of the office of the Directorate of Enforcement,
Ranchi. It is made clear that if any untoward incident
occurred in the said office, the S.S.P., Ranchi will be held
liable for that.
12. The CCTV footage installed at the premises of the
Directorate of Enforcement shall be preserved.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners will array the
informant, namely, Santosh Kumar as respondent no.5 in this
petition, in course of the day.
14. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel has appeared suo
motu on behalf of the informant and he waives notice on
behalf of the informant, namely, Santosh Kumar. He submits
that on telephone call by one of the petitioners, the
informant has gone to the office of the Directorate of
Enforcement and his name was also registered at the time
of entry and, thereafter, he was allowed to enter into the
office of the Directorate of Enforcement. He seeks 10 days’
time to file counter-affidavit.
15. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the petitioners
will serve two copies of the petition upon Mr. Sumeet
Gadodia, in course of the day.
16. Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned G.A.-III assisting Mr. Kapil
Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing through Video
Conferencing, will take instruction and file counter-affidavit
within one week.
17. Let this matter appear on 09.02.2026.
18. Till the next date, there shall be stay of further
proceeding and investigation by the police in connection with
Airport P.S. Case No.05 of 2026, pending in the Court of the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi.
19. In the meantime, learned counsel for the petitioners
will remove the surviving defects.
20. Office will proceed further as per the procedure.”
2. On 16.01.2026, Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel had appeared
on behalf of the State through Video Conferencing and he submitted that
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time may kindly be provided to him so that he may file counter affidavit and,
thereafter, the matter may kindly be heard.
3. On 09.02.2026, Mr. Nnagamnthu S., learned senior counsel had
appeared on behalf of the State through Video Conferencing along with Mr.
Rajiv Ranjan, learned Advocate General of the State of Jharkhand and on that
day, they pointed out that this Bench is having no roster of this matter and in
view of that, this case may go out of the list of this Bench. On that day, Mr.
Rajiv Ranjan, learned Advocate General was intended to file an affidavit to
that effect, however, the Court orally observed looking into the roster that the
objection as well merit of the case will be decided simultaneously.
4. In course of argument on 24.02.2026, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned
counsel appearing for respondent no.4-Union of India and Mr. Amit Kumar
Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners pointed out that an I.A.
filed on behalf of the State was served upon them, however, they have taken
the said I.A. from them saying that now they are not going to file the said
I.A. and in view of that, they have handed over the said I.A. to the office of
the learned Advocate General.
5. On 17.02.2026, Mr. Nnagamnthu S., learned senior counsel appearing
for the State of Jharkhand through Video Conferencing took time to examine
the rejoinder filed by the petitioners and on that day, the matter was further
adjourned for 24.02.2026 observing that the objection as well as merit of the
case will be decided simultaneously.
6. On 24.02.2026 when the matter was taken up, Mr. Nnagamnthu S.,
learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand through Video
Conferencing pointed out that I.A. No.2655 of 2026 has been filed on behalf
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of the State for modification of the order dated 09.02.2026. He submitted
that the said objection about roster was not noted in the order dated
09.02.2026 and in view of that, the said order may be modified/clarified by
inclusion of the said submission and, thereafter, he again pressed that the
roster is not of this Bench.
7. By way of referring his written submission, Mr. Nnagamnthu S., learned
senior counsel submitted that since objection with regard to roster of this
Bench is made, it may kindly be decided. He next submitted that there are
several cases with prayer to transfer the investigation from State police to CBI
where CBI has been added as proforma party and those cases have been
listed before another Bench and he has given instances of four criminal writ
petitions listed before another Bench and in view of that, he submitted that
this case has been erroneously listed before this Bench and, as such, this case
may go out of the list of the present Bench. He also argued to the extent that
if roster is not there of the particular Bench and it is decided by that particular
Bench, then in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the said
judgment will be said to be nullity.
8. On the other hand, Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the
petitioners through Video Conferencing submitted that the said objection was
not raised on the first date of listing of the present case i.e. on 16.01.2026
by Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel who had appeared on that day on
behalf of the State. He next pointed out that on 09.02.2026, when this matter
was listed before this Bench, learned counsel for the State had mentioned
this matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of this Court saying that this
matter was wrongly listed before this Bench and in view of that, proper order
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( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
may kindly be passed, however, the Hon’ble Chief Justice has simply asked to
go before that Bench where the matter was listed and request before the
Bench. He submitted that thereafter the said objection was taken on
09.02.2026, however, the Court orally observed on that day that seeing the
roster, the objection and merit of the case will be decided simultaneously. He
further submitted that the prayer made in I.A. No.2655 of 2026 appears to
be misconceived one as in the order dated 17.02.2026, it has already been
observed that the objection as well as merits of the case will be decided
simultaneously. By way of referring roster of this Bench, he emphatically
submitted that this Bench is having the roster and in view of that, it is rightly
listed before this Bench and this Court is only required to decide the matter.
9. The submissions made by Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for
the petitioners have been supported by Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I.
appearing for the respondent no.4-Union of India and Mr. Deepak Kumar
Bharati, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.2-Central Bureau of
Investigation. Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I. has further pointed out by
way of producing roster that this Court is having roster of Criminal Writ
relating to Delhi Police Establishment Act (CBI) and P.C. Act. He submitted
that one matter relating to CBI investigation filed by the Canara Bank being
W.P.(Cr.) No.443 of 2025 was listed before this Bench and counter affidavit
was also called in that case vide order dated 26.08.2025 and that case is
being listed before this Court and nobody has raised objection in that matter.
He submitted that in identical situation, another criminal writ petition being
W.P.(Cr.) Filing No.4238 of 2026 which is also relating to CBI investigation and
that case was listed before this Bench and certain order has been passed and,
-7- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
in that case, also, nobody has raised any objection. On these grounds, he
submitted that this Court is having roster of such matters.
10. Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.2-CBI further submitted that administrative powers of constitution of
Benches is there to the Chief Justices of the High Courts providing roster,
transfer of cases including part-heard cases from the board of Single Judge
to a Division Bench for disposal on being satisfied that the case involved
constitutional issues and that has been considered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand,
reported in (1998) 1 SCC 1. He also submitted that there is clear cut roster
of this case before this Bench and in view of that, this Court has rightly heard
this matter on merit.
11. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.5-
informant has not raised this objection.
12. Roster notified w.e.f. 09.01.2026 and 16.02.2026, so far as this Court
is concerned, is stipulated as under:
9 Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay (Monday to . A.B.A.- Fresh filing, Orders & Admission
Kumar Dwivedi Friday) . Criminal Revision :- Fresh Filing, Orders,
(Whole day) Admission & Hearing
. A.B.A.; B.A.; Cr.M.P.; Cr.Rev. & Criminal
Writ relating to Delhi Police Establishment
Act (CBI) and P.C. Act :- Fresh Filing,
Orders, Admission & Hearing
. All matters related to Fodder Scam:- Orders,
Admission & Hearing
. Tied-up & Assigned matters
13. From reading of the above roster, it is crystal clear that this Bench has
been assigned to hear the matters like A.B.A., Criminal Revision, B.A., Cr.M.P.,
Criminal Review and Criminal Writ relating to Delhi Police Establishment Act
(CBI) and P.C. Act- fresh filing, orders, admission and hearing matters and
the matters related to fodder scam. In the present criminal writ petition, the
-8- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
prayer (ii) is made for transferring the investigation of the allegations made
in FIR being Airport P.S. Case No.5 of 2026 to an independent agency such
as Central Bureau of Investigation to conduct free and impartial investigation.
The roster said the criminal writ relating to Delhi Police Establishment Act
(CBI) and P.C. Act, which clearly suggests that this is the roster of this Bench.
On the first date, when this matter was taken up on 16.01.2026, Mr. Kapil
Sibal, learned senior counsel had appeared on behalf of the State of
Jharkhand through Video Conferencing and he had simply requested the
Court to allow him time to file counter affidavit and, thereafter, the matter
may kindly be heard. On that day, he had not taken such objection. This Court
has not made the present petition as part-heard. The Registry of this Court
has suo motu listed the matter on different dates, as noted herein above.
14. This Court is not in habit of keeping any matter part-heard as well as
having no fascination of deciding a particular case. In this background, the
facts remain only because a senior counsel has appeared through Video
Conferencing and he has prayed that this Court should recuse to hear the
matter, the answer is simply ‘No’ as the path of recusal is very often a
convenient and a soft option when the roster is there. Furthermore, if a party
or his counsel can at length argued on the question of recusal of a Judge
before him, a new practice will start. A Judge really has no vested interest in
doing a particular matter. However, the oath of office taken under Article 219
of the Constitution enjoins the Judge to duly and faithfully and to the best of
his knowledge and judgment, perform the duties without fear or favour,
affection or ill-will while upholding the Constitution and the laws. In a case,
where unfounded and motivated allegations of bias are sought to be made
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( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
with a view of forum hunting/Bench preference or brow-beating the Court,
then, succumbing to such a pressure would tantamount to not fulfilling the
oath of office. The judgments of a Judge are being criticized and who are
criticizing they are required to remember that from the nature of our office,
we cannot reply to their criticism. The Judge is required to rely on his/her
own conduct itself to be its own vindication.
15. In the case of Indore Development Authority (Recusal Matter-
5J.) v. Manohar Lal and others, reported in (2020) 6 SCC 304, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 47 as under:
“47. Recusal is not to be forced by any litigant to choose a
Bench. It is for the Judge to decide to recuse. The
embarrassment of hearing the lengthy arguments for recusal
should not be a compelling reason to recuse. The law laid
down in various decisions has compelled me not to recuse
from the case and to perform the duty irrespective of the
consequences, as nothing should come in the way of
dispensation of justice or discharge of duty as a Judge and
judicial decision-making. There is no room for prejudice or bias.
Justice has to be pure, untainted, uninfluenced by any factor,
and even decision for recusal cannot be influenced by outside
forces. However, if I recuse, it will be a dereliction of duty,
injustice to the system, and to other Judges who are or to
adorn the Bench(es) in the future. I have taken an informed
decision after considering the nitty-gritty of the points at issue,
and very importantly, my conscience. In my opinion, I would
be committing a grave blunder by recusal in the circumstances,
on the grounds prayed for, and posterity will not forgive me
down the line for setting a bad precedent. It is only for the
interest of the judiciary (which is supreme) and the system
(which is nulli secundus) that has compelled me not to recuse.”
16. In the case of Krishna Swami v. Union of India and others,
reported in (1992) 4 SCC 605, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in
paragraph 67 as under:
“67. To keep the stream of justice clean and pure, the judge
must be endowed with sterling character, impeccable integrity
and upright behaviour. Erosion thereof would undermine the
efficacy of the rule of law and the working of the Constitution-10- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )itself. The Judges of higher echelons, therefore, should not be
mere men of clay with all the frailties and foibles, human
failings and weak character which may be found in those in
other walks of life. The Judges of higher judiciary should be
men of fighting faith with tough fibre not susceptible to any
pressure, economic, political or any sort. The actual as well as
the apparent independence of judiciary would be transparent
only when the office holders endow those qualities which
would operate as impregnable fortress against surreptitious
attempts to undermine the independence of the judiciary. In
short the behaviour of the Judge is the bastion for the people
to reap the fruits of the democracy, liberty and justice and the
antithesis rocks the bottom of the rule of law.”
17. Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The
quality in decision making is as much necessary for a Judge to command
respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary.
18. What has been discussed herein above and seeing the roster position
as noted herein above, it is crystal clear that this Court is having roster
relating to Delhi Police Establishment Act (CBI) and P.C. Act. Further, I.A.
No.2655 of 2026 appears to be misconceived one in view of the fact this Court
has already noted in the order dated 17.02.2026 that the objection as well as
merit of the case will be decided simultaneously and, as such, the objection
raised by Mr. Nnagamnthu S., learned senior counsel appearing for the State
of Jharkhand is not being accepted by this Court.
19. Accordingly, I.A. No.2655 of 2026 is dismissed.
20. On merit of the case, Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the
petitioners through Video Conferencing submitted that this criminal writ
petition has been filed by the petitioners for the reliefs as prayed in the
petition, such as:
(i) For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/, direction(s) for
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( 2026:JHHC:6369 )quashing the entire criminal proceedings including the FIR being
Airport PS Case No. 5 of 2026 dated 13.01.2026, instituted for
the alleged offences under Sections 109(2), 117(2), 115(2),
127(2), 351(2), 352, 238 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which is now pending in the Court of the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi.
(ii) Or in alternate for issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/
direction(s) for transferring the investigation of the allegations
made in FIR being Airport P.S. Case No. 5 of 2026 to an
independent agency such as Central Bureau of Investigation to
conduct free and impartial investigation.
(iii) And be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
commanding the Respondent Authorities, specifically the Station
House Officer, Airport Police Station, to register a First
Information Report (F.I.R.) and take appropriate legal action
against the informant Santosh Kumar on the basis of the Written
Information/Report dated 13.01.2026 submitted by the
Petitioner No. 1, which discloses cognizable offences including
obstruction of public servant and fabrication of evidence, but has
arbitrarily remained unattended by the Police Authorities till date.
(iv) During the pendency of this Writ Application be pleased to stay
proceedings arising out of Airport P.S. Case No. 05 of 2026
against the Petitioners.
(v) Any other relief or reliefs as Your Lordships may deem fit and
proper for which the petitioner is very much entitled under the
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( 2026:JHHC:6369 )facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice.
21. Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the petitioners through
Video Conferencing further submitted that Ranchi zonal office of Directorate
of Enforcement is presently handling several high-profile and sensitive
investigations involving influential political figures and senior bureaucrats,
including matters relating to Chief Minister, former Minister Shri Alamgir Alam
and senior IAS officers such as Ms. Pooja Singhal and Shri Chhavi Ranjan and
these investigations have wide public ramifications and in that environment,
the petitioner nos.1 and 2, who happened to be the Assistant Director and
Assistant Enforcement Officer of Directorate of Enforcement respectively are
discharging their duties. By way of referring paragraph 6 of the writ petition,
Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I, submitted that the informant-Santosh Kumar
is the principal accused in a large-scale misappropriation of Government funds
amounting to approximately Rs.23 Crores from the Drinking Water and
Sanitation Department, Government of Jharkhand. He then submitted that
Sadar P.S. Case No.562/2023 was registered against him by the State
authorities on 28.12.2023 under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the
Indian Penal Code, relating to criminal breach of trust, cheating and forgery,
in which, charge-sheet has been submitted, confirming involvement of
Santosh Kumar in the systematic siphoning of public funds and pursuant to
the said scheduled offences, the Directorate of Enforcement initiated
investigations under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act by recording
ECIR No. being ECIR/RNZO/04/2024 against him. He next submitted that in
that investigation, it has been revealed that Santosh Kumar had laundered
the proceeds of crime through shell entities, including M/s Rockdrill
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Constructions, in order to conceal and project the illicit funds as untainted.
He also submitted that the learned Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA,
New Delhi by orders dated 10.09.2025 and 19.11.2025 confirmed the
provisional attachment of the assets of informant-Santosh Kumar. In this
background, he submitted that summons under Section 50 of the PMLA were
issued to informant-Santosh Kumar, requiring his appearance on 10.11.2025,
however, he failed to appear citing medical grounds and ongoing treatment
at CMC, Vellore. He further submitted that petitioner no.1 was already
engaged on 12.01.2026 in pre-scheduled official proceedings, including the
recording of statements in other ongoing sensitive investigations and on that
day, the informant-Santosh Kumar appeared at the zonal office without prior
intimation, schedule or summons and on request, petitioner no.1 was agreed
only to a limited preliminary interaction and at about 01:20 P.M., when the
informant-Santosh Kumar was talking regarding his involvement in the
siphoning of Government funds in the Peyjal scam, he became evasive and
agitated and in a sudden and unprovoked attempt to disrupt the official
proceedings, he picked up a glass water jug placed on the table and
voluntarily struck it against his own head, causing a minor scalp injury before
the staff present could restrain him. He then submitted that thereafter the
informant-Santosh Kumar was immediately taken to Sadar Hospital, Ranchi
by the petitioners and the OPD Card registration No.2719 was prepared in
which the informant has himself stated that the said wound was self-inflicted
by the informant. The informant was treated for a superficial scalp wound
and discharged at about 03:30 P.M. and he was offered the option to return
home, but he stated that he felt fit and accompanied the officers back to the
-14- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
ED office voluntarily. On the same day, as abundant caution, another medical
examination was done at about 08:10 P.M. on 12.01.2026 and the
Government Medical Officer certified the informant as medically fit and
physically fit with no injury other than the self-inflicted scalp wound, thereby
negating any allegation of custodial violence. He referred Section 67 of the
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act and submitted that the petitioners being
the officials of Enforcement Directorate are protected under that Act. He next
submitted that the informant has lodged the present FIR being Airport P.S.
Case No.05 of 2026 on 13.01.2026 at about 12:30 P.M. under Sections 115(2),
117(2), 127(2), 109(2), 351(2), 352, 238 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023. He referred the above sections with their particulars and
Indian Penal Code sections, which read as under:
Sl. No. Particulars BNS Sections IPC Sections 1. Voluntarily causing grievous 115(2) 323 hurt 2. Punishment for voluntarily 117(2) 325 causing grievous hurt 3. Wrongful Confinement 127(2) 342 4. Attempt to murder 109(2) 307 5. Criminal Intimidation 351(2) 503 6. Intentional insult with intent 352 504 to provoke breach of peace 7. Causing disappearance of 238 201 evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender 8. Acts done by several persons 3(5) 34 in furtherance of common intention
22. By way of referring above sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023, Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I submitted that in this type of case, even
-15- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
intentionally Section 109(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 has been added
only to make out a case of cognizable in nature as if the matter is not
cognizable, the police is not authorized to register the FIR and investigate the
case unless authorized by the learned Magistrate and he referred to Section
174(2) of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. He next submitted
that the petitioners have also lodged complaint before the same police station
on 13.01.2026 indicating that false allegations have been made by the
informant-Santosh Kumar against them, however, no FIR has been registered
and the complaint of the petitioners is not being investigated. He relied in the
case of State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and
others, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 561. He referred paragraphs 20 and 38
of the said judgment, which read as under:
“20. The only other decision to which I need refer is that of
the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [AIR
1945 PC 18 : (1944) 71 IA 203 : 217 IC 1] which constitutes,
as it were, the charter of the prosecution all over, for saying
that no investigation can ever be quashed. In a passage oft-
quoted but much misunderstood. Lord Porter, delivering the
opinion of the Judicial Committee, observed: (IA pp. 212-13)
“In Their Lordships’ opinion, however, the more serious
aspect of the case is to be found in the resultant interference
by the court with the duties of the police. Just as it is
essential that every one accused of a crime should have free
access to a court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted
if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged,
so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not
interfere with the police in matters which are within their
province and into which the law imposes on them the duty
of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory
right on the part of the police to investigate the
circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without
requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it
would, as Their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it
should be held possible to interfere with those statutory
rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
The functions of the judiciary and the police are-16- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of
individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is
only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own
function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court
to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under
Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions
in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present,
however, the court’s functions begin when a charge is
preferred before it, and not until then.”
I do not think that this decision supports the wide
proposition canvassed before us by Shri Somnath Chatterjee. In
the case before the Privy Council, similar charges which were
levelled against the accused in an earlier prosecution were
dismissed. The High Court quashed the investigation into fresh
charges after examining the previous record, on the basis of
which it came to the conclusion that the evidence against the
accused was unacceptable. The question before the Privy
Council was not whether the fresh FIR disclosed any offence at
all. In fact, immediately after the passage which I have
extracted above, the Privy Council qualified its statement by
saying:
“No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still
more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would
have no authority to undertake an investigation.”
If anything, therefore, the judgment shows that an
investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is
disclosed by the FIR. It shall also have been noticed, which is
sometimes overlooked, that the Privy Council took care to
qualify its statement of the law by saying that the judiciary
should not interfere with the police in matters which are within
their province. It is surely not within the province of the police
to investigate into a report which does not disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not
impose upon them the duty of enquiry in such cases.
38. In these circumstances, though I see no alternative
save to stop all further investigation on the basis of the FIR as
laid, no offence being disclosed by it under Section 4 of the Act,
I am unable to accept the contention of Shri Ashok Sen that all
documents, books, papers and cash seized so far during the
investigation should be returned to the firm and its partners
forthwith. The firm appears to be on the brink of an economic
crisis, as any scheme of this nature is eventually bound to be.
Considering the manner in which the firm has manipulated its
accounts and its affairs, I have no doubt that it will secret the
large funds and destroy the incriminating documents if they are
returned to it. The State Government, the Central Government
and the Reserve Bank of India must be given a reasonable
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( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
opportunity to see if it is possible, under the law, to institute an
enquiry into the affairs of the firm and, in the meanwhile, to
regulate its affairs. I consider such a step essential in the
interests of countless small depositors who, otherwise, will be
ruined by being deprived of their life’s savings. The big black
money bosses will take any loss within their stride but the small
man must receive the protection of the State, which must see
to it that the small depositors are paid back their deposits with
the agreed interest as quickly as possible. I therefore direct that
the documents, books, papers, cash and other articles seized
during the investigation shall be retained by the police in their
custody for a period of two months from today and will be
returned, on the expiry of that period, to persons from whom
they were seized, subject to any lawful directions which may be
given or obtained in the meanwhile regarding their custody and
return.”
23. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I.
submitted that once the ingredients of those sections are not there, the FIR
is fit to be interfered with.
24. Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I. further relied in the case of Lalita
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2014)
2 SCC 1. He referred paragraph 120.1 of the said judgment, which reads as
under:
“120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.”
25. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. S.V. Raju, learned A.S.G.I.
submitted that once the said allegation is made before the police and if the
cognizable offence is made out, the police was required to register the FIR
immediately and if any doubt was there, at least preliminary inquiry was
required to be done, which was not done by the police. In this background,
he submitted that if such allegations are there and the accused/informant,
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( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
who is having three criminal antecedents, is being protected by Jharkhand
police against whom Jharkhand police itself has lodged two cases i.e., Kotwali
P.S. Case No.22/2024, dated 12.01.2024, registered for the alleged offence
under Sections 379 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code and Ranchi Sadar P.S.
Case No.251/2024, dated 08.06.2024, registered for the alleged offence
under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and
the aforesaid ECIR case has also been registered against the informant, in
which, the informant has revealed that 10% of the total tender value is
siphoned off and disbursed to the Departmental Minister to the tune of 5%
share, commission share of 1.5% to 2% to the Secretary of the concerned
Department and commission share of 3% to the Engineer-in-Chief and others.
He also submitted that the informant has also made statements and
confessed that out of siphoning amount of Rs.23 Crores, he withdrew
approximately Rs.12 Crores in cash and distributed it to high-ranking officials
of the State Government and distribution to the different officials has been
disclosed at page 22 of the petition. He submitted that in this background,
prima facie it appears that the informant is being utilized by certain officials
of the State authorities to initiate registration of present case on exaggerated
and unfounded allegations with the effect of harassing the officers of the
Enforcement Directorate and adversely impacting the ongoing investigation.
He next submitted that if such a situation is there, it is not expected that
Jharkhand police will make a fair investigation that too of an FIR made by an
accused, who is having three criminal antecedents and who is also an accused
of siphoning off the money upon higher officials of the Department. In view
of that, he submitted that this Court is required to find out as to whether any
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( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
exceptional circumstance is made out to handover the investigation of the
case to an independent agency such as CBI or not. According to him, it is a
fit case to transfer the investigation to the CBI. He also submitted that at this
stage, this Court is not required to make any mini trial if such allegations are
there and true facts will emerge once the investigation will be conducted by
the independent agency like CBI. He next submitted that this matter may
kindly be handed over to the CBI.
26. On the other hand, Mr. Nnagamnthu S., learned senior counsel
appearing for the State of Jharkhand vehemently opposed the prayer and
submitted that these two petitioners are two individuals, who are the
Enforcement Directorate officials and Mr. Raju, has not appeared for the
petitioners rather he has appeared for the Enforcement Directorate. He next
objected that respondent no.2 is the Union of India through CBI and in view
of that, in a case where the prayer is made to handover the matter to CBI,
the Union of India cannot be represented through CBI. He then submitted
that in the case of Republic of India (CBI) v. Shubra Kundu, reported in
Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary Nos.39440/2023, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed that the CBI which is created under a statute
cannot represent ‘Republic of India’ and in view of that, amendment was
allowed to be made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in that case to that effect.
He also drawn attention of the Court to page 64 of the writ petition and
referred to the prayers made therein and submitted that the law and order is
the State subject and if such complaint is brought to the knowledge of the
State police, the State police is rightly conducting the investigation. He then
submitted that two rejoinders have been filed by the petitioners and those
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rejoinders have been affidavited by Mr. Debidatta Sarangi, who is posted as
Assistant Director of Directorate of Enforcement office of Joint Directorate of
Ranchi zone. He next submitted that the said rejoinders are not filed by the
petitioners, which is again not in accordance with law. He further drawn
attention of the Court to Section 67 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering
Act and submitted that if the action is done in good faith, then only in that
case, protection will be provided and good faith has been defined under
Section 2(11) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. He submitted that the said
act cannot be said to be done in good faith and in view of that, Section 67 of
the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act is not attracted. He also submitted
that Section 218 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 197 of Cr.P.C. is also
not protecting the petitioners as the said act was not done in the official
capacity. He also referred paragraphs 2 to 10 of the writ petition as well as
paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the writ petition and submitted that the facts
are disclosed therein, which are mis taught. He referred to page 136 of the
writ petition, which is the complaint made by petitioner no.1 to the police
station and submitted that it was simply a letter informing the police therein
no prayer is made for registration of the FIR and in view of that, the police
has not registered the FIR. He referred to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., reported in
(2014) 2 SCC 1 and submitted that the said judgment is in two parts, which
also suggests that if cognizable offence is made out forthwith, the FIR is
required to be registered and if there is any doubt, preliminary inquiry should
be done within stipulated time. In this background, he submitted that it was
only request on behalf of the petitioners and in view of that, if the FIR is not
-21- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
registered and, as such, there is no illegality. He also submitted if only
allegation is made out and no case is made out, the case is not required to
be registered. He relied upon the judgment passed in the case of T.T. Antony
v. State of Kerala, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181. He referred to
paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgment, which reads as under:
“18. An information given under sub-section (1) of Section
154 CrPC is commonly known as first information report (FIR)
though this term is not used in the Code. It is a very
important document. And as its nickname suggests it is the
earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence
recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It sets
the criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of
the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion
under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and
forwarding of a police report under Section 173 CrPC. It is
quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more
informations than one are given to a police officer in charge
of a police station in respect of the same incident involving
one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he
need not enter every one of them in the station house diary
and this is implied in Section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague
information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the
information first entered in the station house diary, kept for
this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station
is the first information report — FIR postulated by Section
154 CrPC. All other informations made orally or in
writing after the commencement of the investigation into the
cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the
first information report and entered in the station house diary
by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may
come to his notice during the investigation, will be
statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such
information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and
entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect
be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with
the scheme of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions
cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the
investigating agency learns during the investigation or
receives fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR
under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be
irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in
the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a
different situation in which H having killed W, his wife,-22- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )informs the police that she is killed by an unknown person or
knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister, H owns up
the responsibility and during investigation the truth is
detected; it does not require filing of fresh FIR against H —
the real offender — who can be arraigned in the report under
Section 173(2) or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be. It is of
course permissible for the investigating officer to send up a
report to the Magistrate concerned even earlier that
investigation is being directed against the person suspected
to be the accused.
19. The scheme of CrPC is that an officer in charge of a
police station has to commence investigation as provided in
Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of entry of the first
information report, on coming to know of the commission of
a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on
the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion
under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and
forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section
173(2) CrPC. However, even after filing such a report, if he
comes into possession of further information or material, he
need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make
further investigation, normally with the leave of the court,
and where during further investigation he collects further
evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the
same with one or more further reports; this is the import of
sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrP.C.”
27. Mr. Nnagamnthu S., learned senior counsel appearing for the State of
Jharkhand through Video Conferencing further submitted that if such
allegations are made by the informant, the police has rightly registered the
FIR in light of Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
By way of referring the judgment passed in the case of State of Karnataka
v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 382, he
submitted that holding a preliminary inquiry before registering a case is not
mandatory in every case, even in cases which do not fall within the category
of cases referred to in Section 173(3)(i) of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023. He also submitted that the police is not biased in conducting
the investigation fairly and in view of that, there is no illegality. He next
-23- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
submitted that if the prayer (ii) is made with regard to handing over the
matter to the CBI and if that will come once, this Court may not incline to
interfere with the prayer (i), which is made for quashing of the FIR. He then
submitted that there are lines of judgments of quashing of the FIR, the Court
is not required to make any roaming inquiry. To buttress this argument, he
referred to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the
case of King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, reported in AIR 1945
PC 18 and submitted that there is a statutory right on the part of the police
to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without
requiring any authority from the judicial authorities. He further submitted that
the said power cannot be utilized by the Court according to whim and caprice.
To buttress this argument, he relied upon the judgment passed in the case of
Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, reported in (1977) 4 SCC
451 and submitted that statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In the same line, he further
relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Union of India v. Prakash
P. Hinduja, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 195 and submitted that during the
course of investigation which would meant from the time of lodging the First
Information Report till the submission of the report by the Officer-in-Charge,
the Court is not required to interfere with the investigation. He also submitted
that it is well-settled that if an offence is disclosed, the Court’s interference is
not permitted in light of the judgment passed in the case of Satvinder Kaur
v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (1999) 8 SCC 728. He then submitted
that the legal position has been recently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
-24- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401. He referred paragraph 33
of the said judgment, which reads as under:
“33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the
High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of
stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”,
during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section
482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and in what circumstances and whether the High Court
would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the
accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the
investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under
Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of/not
entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/
complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC
and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final
conclusions are as under:
33.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a
cognizable offence.
33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report
that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.
33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised
sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in
the “rarest of rare cases” (not to be confused with the
formation in the context of death penalty).
33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of
which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry
as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at
the initial stage.
33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an
exception rather than an ordinary rule.
33.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought
not to tread over the other sphere.
33.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.
33.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
-25- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
judicial process should not interfere at the stage of
investigation of offences.
33.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court
do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act
according to its whims or caprice.
33.12. The first information report is not an
encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court should
not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police
must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be
premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts
that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated
or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After
investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no
substance in the application made by the complainant, the
investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary
before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by
the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known
procedure.
33.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide,
but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
court.
33.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks
fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the
self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the
parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960
SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , has the
jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.
33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by
the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the
power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether
the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable
offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits
whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a
cognizable offence and the court has to permit the
investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in
the FIR.
33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable
and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered
by the High Court while passing an interim order in a
quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section
482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
-26- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the
pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with
circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to
be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally,
when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy
and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court,
the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim
order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted”
and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory
bail under Section 438CrPC before the competent court. The
High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing
the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either
during the investigation or till the investigation is completed
and/or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section
173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition
under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
33.17. Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie
of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant
of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the
broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section
482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief
reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is
required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the
application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can
consider what was weighed with the High Court while
passing such an interim order.
33.18. Whenever an interim order is passed by the High
Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the
aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does
it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no
coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague
and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or
misapplied.”
28. Mr. Nnagamnthu S., learned senior counsel appearing for the State
through Video Conferencing further relied upon the judgment passed in the
case of ED v. Niraj Tyagi, reported in (2024) 5 SCC 419 and submitted
that in that case, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when
the investigation by the police is in progress, the Court should not go into the
merits of the allegations in the FIR. He also referred paragraphs 15 and 20 of
-27- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
the writ petition and submitted that this Court is not required to make a mini
trial at this stage. He next submitted that vide order dated 16.01.2026, this
Court has directed to preserve the CCTV footage, however, the same has not
been preserved and even the CCTV camera is not installed in light of the
several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is in violation. He
also submitted that in those judgments, it has been held that interrogation
must be held in the background of CCTV footage. On these grounds, he
submitted that no materials are there either to quash the FIR or to handover
the matter to the CBI at this stage and, as such, this writ petition may kindly
be dismissed.
29. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
no.5-informant vehemently argued that the petitioners are accused of
custodial torture case and the actions of the petitioners as well as
Enforcement Directorate officials are outrageous. He further submitted that
even the petitioners have not approached this Court with clean hand and vital
information of CCTV footage has been suppressed. He relied in the case of
Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, reported in (2021) 1 SCC 184 and
referred paragraphs 19 and 21 of the said judgment, which read as under:
“19. The Union of India is also to file an affidavit in which
it will update this Court on the constitution and workings of
the Central Oversight Body, giving full particulars thereof. In
addition, the Union of India is also directed to install CCTV
cameras and recording equipment in the offices of:
(i) Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
(ii) National Investigation Agency (NIA)
(iii) Enforcement Directorate (ED)
(iv) Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB)
(v) Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI)
(vi) Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO)
(vii) Any other agency which carries out interrogations
-28- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )and has the power of arrest.
As most of these agencies carry out interrogation in their
office(s), CCTVs shall be compulsorily installed in all offices
where such interrogation and holding of accused takes place
in the same manner as it would in a police station.
21. The SLOC and the COB (where applicable) shall give
directions to all police stations, investigative/enforcement
agencies to prominently display at the entrance and inside
the police stations/offices of investigative/enforcement
agencies about the coverage of the premises concerned by
CCTV. This shall be done by large posters in English, Hindi
and vernacular language. In addition to the above, it shall be
clearly mentioned therein that a person has a right to
complain about human rights violations to the National/State
Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Court or the
Superintendent of Police or any other authority empowered
to take cognizance of an offence. It shall further mention that
CCTV footage is preserved for a certain minimum time period,
which shall not be less than six months, and the victim has
a right to have the same secured in the event of violation of
his human rights.”
30. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel
for the informant submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed the
Union of India to install CCTV cameras and recording equipment in the offices
of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), National Investigation Agency
(NIA), Enforcement Directorate (ED), Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB),
Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) and Serious Fraud Investigation
Office (SFIO) and it has also been observed that the CCTV footage is required
to be preserved at least for six months and the victim has a right to have the
same secured in the event of violation of his human rights. He then submitted
that the conduct of the petitioners are further doubtful in view of the fact that
the petitioners have not earlier made the informant as respondent in the
present case and he on instruction has appeared suo motu before this Court
and pursuant to that, the informant has been made party and he was given
-29- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
time to file counter affidavit, which has been recorded in the order dated
16.01.2026. He submitted that on the said date, on his submission the Court
has directed to preserve CCTV footage installed at the premises of the
Directorate of Enforcement. He referred to paragraphs 13, 14 and 16 of the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-State of Jharkhand and
submitted that it has been stated therein how the CCTV footage has been
managed and that has been replied in paragraphs 98 and 99 of the rejoinder
of the petitioners speaking otherwise. With regard to CCTV footage, he also
referred to pages 852, 857 and 860 of the rejoinder of the petitioners and
submitted that these documents have been manufactured later on with
regard to installation of CCTV camera in the premises of Enforcement
Directorate and, as such, the conduct of the petitioners is very doubtful and
his client, who is the informant, is the victim. He further relied upon the
judgment passed in the case of Tomaso Bruno and another v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 178 and referred paragraphs 24,
27 and 28 of the said judgment, which read as under:
“24. With the advancement of information technology,
scientific temper in the individual and at the institutional level is
to pervade the methods of investigation. With the increasing
impact of technology in everyday life and as a result, the
production of electronic evidence in cases has become relevant
to establish the guilt of the accused or the liability of the
defendant. Electronic documents stricto sensu are admitted as
material evidence. With the amendment to the Evidence Act in
2000, Sections 65-A and 65-B were introduced into Chapter V
relating to documentary evidence. Section 65-A provides that
contents of electronic records may be admitted as evidence if
the criteria provided in Section 65-B is complied with. The
computer generated electronic records in evidence are
admissible at a trial if proved in the manner specified by Section
65-B of the Evidence Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 65-B makes
admissible as a document, paper printout of electronic records
stored in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer,-30- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )subject to the fulfilment of the conditions specified in sub-
section (2) of Section 65-B. Secondary evidence of contents of
document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence
Act. PW 13 stated that he saw the full video recording of the
fateful night in the CCTV camera, but he has not recorded
the same in the case diary as nothing substantial to be adduced
as evidence was present in it.
27. [Ed. : Para 27 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./12/2015 dated 19-3-2015.] . As per Section 114
Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, if a party in possession of
best evidence which will throw light in controversy withholds it,
the court can draw an adverse inference against him
notwithstanding that the onus of proving does not lie on him.
The presumption under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the
Evidence Act is only a permissible inference and not a necessary
inference. Unlike presumption under Section 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, where the court has no option but
to draw a statutory presumption, under Section 114 of the
Evidence Act, the court has the option; the court may or may
not raise presumption on the proof of certain facts. Drawing of
presumption under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence
Act depends upon the nature of fact required to be proved and
its importance in the controversy, the usual mode of proving it;
the nature, quality and cogency of the evidence which has not
been produced and its accessibility to the party concerned, all of
which have to be taken into account. It is only when all these
matters are duly considered that an adverse inference can be
drawn against the party.
28. The High Court held that even though the appellants
alleged that the footage of CCTV is being concealed by the
prosecution for the reasons best known to the prosecution, the
accused did not invoke Section 233 CrPC and they did not make
any application for production of CCTV camera footage. The
High Court further observed that the accused were not able to
discredit the testimony of PW 1, PW 12 and PW 13 qua there
being no relevant material in the CCTV camera
footage. Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the
accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and
circumstances of the case, in our view, the prosecution in
possession of the best evidence, CCTV footage ought to have
produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to
draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under
Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act that the
prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to
them had it been produced.”
31. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel
-31- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
for the informant submitted that the footage of CCTV was concealed and that
was the subject-matter in that case and in light of the said judgment also,
the petitioners’ conduct is deprecable and in view of that, this matter is not
required to be handed over to the CBI.
32. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel appearing for the informant
further referred to relevant sections mentioned in the FIR and submitted that
in terms of the allegations, cognizable offence is made out and, as such, the
FIR has been rightly registered because the injury has been caused to the
informant due to assault made by the petitioners. He then submitted that the
wrong statement has been made that the informant has voluntarily went back
to the office of Enforcement Directorate at 04:00 P.M. when such injury was
there upon the body of the informant. He next submitted that prior to visit to
the office of Enforcement Directorate, petitioner no.1 had called on the mobile
phone of the informant and his wife asking the informant to appear and it is
not correct to say that the informant has appeared suo motu on 13.01.2026
in the office of Enforcement Directorate. He also relied upon the judgment
passed in the case of D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal and others,
reported in (2015) 8 SCC 744. He referred paragraphs 36 and 38.8 of the
said judgment, which reads as under:
“36. That leaves us with the question of initiation of criminal
proceedings in cases where enquiry establishes culpability in
custodial deaths and for deployment of at least two women
constables in each district. We see no reason why appropriate
proceedings cannot be initiated in cases where enquiry
establishes culpability of those in whose custody a victim dies or
suffers any injuries or torture. The law should take its course
and those responsible duly and appropriately proceeded against.
38.8. The State Governments shall launch in all cases where
an enquiry establishes culpability of the persons in whose
custody the victim has suffered death or injury, an appropriate-32- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )prosecution for the commission of offences disclosed by such
enquiry report and/or investigation in accordance with law.”
33. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia submitted that in
a routine way, the matter cannot be transferred to the CBI for investigation.
He also submitted that once such allegation of assault is there, as per
paragraph 38.8 of the said judgment, the inquiry and investigation is required
to be done against the said officers.
34. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel further relied upon the judgment
passed in the case of Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P., reported in
(2005) 9 SCC 631, particularly paragraph 8 thereof and submitted that
guidelines have been issued that the Courts are also required to have a
change in their outlook, approach, appreciation and attitude, particularly in
cases involving custodial crimes and they should exhibit more sensitivity and
adopt a realistic rather than a narrow technical approach, while dealing with
the cases of custodial crime so that as far as possible within their powers, the
truth is found and the guilty should not escape so that the victim of the crime
has the satisfaction, and that ultimately the majesty of law has prevailed.
Relying on the above judgment, he submitted that the Court is also required
to consider the nature of allegation which was made in the custody.
35. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel appearing for the informant also
relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Thapar and others
v. Union of India and others, reported in (2018) 10 SCC 753 and in the
case of Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana and others, reported in
(2025) 5 SCC 149 and submitted that at the initial stage, the investigation
is not required to be handed over to the CBI. Relying on the above judgments,
-33- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel for the informant vehemently opposed
the prayer of quashing of the FIR as well as handing over of the matter to
the CBI and submitted that this writ petition may kindly be dismissed.
36. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in reply submitted that
the objection has been made with regard to the representation of the Union
of India through CBI is misconceived. He further submitted that in the case
of Republic of India (CBI) v. Shubra Kundu (supra) much reliance has
been placed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the State of
Jharkhand and in that case, the CBI has filed the petition and in view of that,
it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Republic of India
cannot be represented through CBI and CBI is the creation of statute. He
submitted that in the present case, the CBI works under the Union of India
and that objection is technical in nature. He also submitted that roster of this
Bench is there of the criminal writ petition relating to Delhi Police
Establishment Act (CBI) and P.C. Act and in view of that, this Court is
competent to hear the matter. He next submitted that in light of the allegation
no cognizable offence is made out for superficial nature of injury and only to
help other high profile persons with the help of the informant, who is an
accused in other two cases including P.M.L.A. cases, the case has been
investigated by the police and further on 14.01.2026, at about 06:00 a.m.,
Jharkhand police has reached to the office of the Enforcement Directorate
and treated the said office as crime scene in absence of any notice to the
petitioners under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023. He also submitted that pages 852, 857, 859, 860 of the rejoinder are
misconstrued by the learned counsel for the respondent no.5 with regard to
-34- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
the correspondence for installation of CCTV camera in the office. He also
submitted that the informant was not taken into custody and the arguments
of learned counsel on behalf of the respondent no.5 that custodial violence
has been made, that is also not made out. He next submitted that no summon
for a particular date was issued, however, the informant has appeared suo
motu.
37. Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for respondent no.4-
Union of India by way of referring paragraphs 23 and 24 of the writ petition
submitted that on 14.01.2026 at about 11:20 P.M. the Investigating Officer
Sri Pankaj Kumar Sharma issued an official notice by e-mail styled as a ‘Notice
for preservation of evidence’ calling for immediate compliance and on
15.01.2026 at around 06:00 a.m., pursuant to the said late-night
communication, a substantial police presence arrived at the office premises
and sought to treat the office as a crime scene, thereby disrupting the normal
functioning of a Central Government agency and in view of that, subsequent
sequence of event reveals a clear attempt by the informant-Santosh Kumar
to misuse the criminal machinery as a shield against a lawful and advanced
investigation into the siphoning of approximately Rs.23 Crores of public fund.
He relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Salib @ Shalu @ Salim
v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2023) 20 SCC 194
and referred paragraph 26 thereof, which reads as under:
“26. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court
invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the
FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or-35- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a
duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed
against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking
personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the
FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary
pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments
made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence.
Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into
the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In
frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to
look into many other attending circumstances emerging from
the record of the case over and above the averments and, if
need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in
between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution
need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is
empowered to take into account the overall circumstances
leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for
instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes
importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking
vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”
38. Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for respondent no.4-
Union of India further relied upon the judgment passed in the case of
Mahmood Ali & others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported
in (2023) 15 SCC 488 and referred paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said
judgment, which read as under:
“12. We say so because once the complainant decides to
proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for
wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he would ensure that
the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary
pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments
made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence.
Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into-36- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not.
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes
a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection
try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case
but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the
case as well as the materials collected in the course of
investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple
FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the
issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal
grudge as alleged.”
39. Relying on the above judgments, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I.
appearing for respondent no.4-Union of India submitted that the Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, is required to take into account overall circumstances
leading to initiation of registration of the case.
40. On these grounds, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned A.S.G.I. appearing for
respondent no.4-Union of India submitted that if such allegations are there
and high-profile persons’ cases are being investigated by the Enforcement
Directorate in the State of Jharkhand, the malafide action on behalf of the
high-ups against the Enforcement Directorate’s officers cannot be ruled out
and, as such, it is a fit case to handover the matter to CBI for investigation.
41. Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.2-CBI submitted that the CBI is constituted under a special statute and in
relation to the matters which were come within the purview thereof, the CBI
could exercise its jurisdiction. He relied upon the judgment passed in the case
-37- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
of Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, reported in (2009) 1 SCC
441 and referred paragraph 66 of the said judgment, which reads as under:
“66. The Act is a special statute. By reason of the said
enactment, CBI was constituted. In relation to the matter
which were to come within the purview thereof, CBI could
exercise its jurisdiction. The law and order, however, being a
State subject, CBI derives jurisdiction only when a consent
therefor is given by the statute. It is, however, now beyond
any controversy that the High Court and this Court also direct
investigation by CBI. Our attention has been drawn to the
provisions of the CBI Manual, from a perusal whereof it
appears that the Director, CBI exercises his power of
superintendence in respect of the matters enumerated in
Chapter VI of the CBI Manual which includes reference by
the State and/or reference by the High Courts and this Court
as also the registration thereof. The reference thereof may
be received from the following:
“(a) Prime Minister of India
(b) Cabinet Ministers of the Government of India/Chief
Ministers of the State Governments or their equivalent
(c) The State Governments
(d) Supreme Court/High Courts.”
The CBI Manual having been framed by the Union of India,
evidently, it has accepted that reference for investigation to
CBI may be made either by this Court or by the High Court.
Thus, even assuming that reference had been made by the
State Government at the instance of the High Court, the
same by itself would not render the investigation carried out
by it to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction as assuming
that the reference had been made by the High Court in
exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in a public interest litigation, the same would also be
valid.”
42. Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent no.4-CBI also relied upon the judgment passed in the case of
Khurshid Ahmad Chohan v. Union of Territory of Jammu and
Kashmir and others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1491 and he
referred paragraphs 15 to 18, 24 and 27 of the said judgment, which read as
under:
-38- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
“15. It is a settled position of law that the credibility of an
investigation agency should be both impeachable and un-
questionable. The power to transfer investigations to a cer-
tain investigating agency must be sparingly used in the in-
terest of justice and to maintain public trust in the institution.
If the investigating agency is privy to the dispute, it may raise
doubts on the credibility of the investigation and thus, would
be a valid ground to transfer the investigation. In this regard,
gainful reference may be made to the decision of this Court
in Mohd. Anis v. Union of India, wherein it was held as fol-
lows:
“5. … Fair and impartial investigation by an independ-
ent agency, not involved in the controversy, is the de-
mand of public interest. If the investigation is by an
agency which is allegedly privy to the dispute, the credi-
bility of the investigation will be doubted and that will be
contrary to the public interest as well as the interest of
justice.” (SCC p. 148, para 5) “2. … Doubts were ex-
pressed regarding the fairness of the investigation as it
was feared that as the local police was alleged to be in-
volved in the encounters, the investigation by an officer
of the U.P. Cadre may not be impartial.”
16. Similarly, this Court in the case of R.S. Sodhi v. State
of U.P., noted that:
“2. … We have perused the events that have taken
place since the incidents but we are refraining from en-
tering upon the details thereof lest it may prejudice any
party but we think that since the accusations are directed
against the local police personnel it would be desirable to
entrust the investigation to an independent agency like
the Central Bureau of Investigation so that all concerned
including the relatives of the deceased may feel assured
that an independent agency is looking into the matter and
that would lend the final outcome of the investigation
credibility. However faithfully the local police may carry
out the investigation, the same will lack credibility since
the allegations are against them. It is only with that in
mind that we having thought it both advisable and desir-
able as well as in the interest of justice to entrust the-39- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation forth-
with and we do hope that it would complete the investi-
gation at an early date so that those involved in the oc-
currences, one way or the other, may be brought to book.
We direct accordingly.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
17. Thus, the power to transfer an investigation to the
CBI is not to be exercised as a matter of course. The Consti-
tution Bench in State of West Bengal v. Committee for Pro-
tection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal (CPDR)16, exam-
ined the circumstances under which Constitutional Courts
may invoke their jurisdiction to direct a CBI investigation. The
Court observed that while the power to transfer investigation
to the CBI must be exercised with circumspection and only
in exceptional circumstances, such power is nonetheless
available to be exercised when it is necessary to secure the
ends of justice or to prevent infringement of fundamental
rights. The Court further held that such extraordinary juris-
diction may be invoked to ensure a fair and impartial inves-
tigation where state machinery appears to be ineffective, bi-
ased, or complicit. The relevant observations from the said
judgment are extracted below:
“70. Before parting with the case, we deem it neces-
sary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any
order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed
limitations on the exercise of these constitutional pow-
ers. The very plenitude of the power under the said arti-
cles requires great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the
question of issuing a direction to CBI to conduct investi-
gation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible
guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such
power should be exercised but time and again it has been
reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a
matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled
some allegations against the local police. This extraordi-
nary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and
in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to
provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations
or where the incident may have national and international-40- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )ramifications or where such an order may be necessary
for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental
rights. Otherwise CBI would be flooded with a large num-
ber of cases and with limited resources, may find it diffi-
cult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the
process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfac-
tory investigations.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
18. The settled principle of law that emerges from the
abovementioned decisions is that the power to transfer the
investigation of a criminal case to the CBI is an extraordinary
measure, which must be exercised sparingly with great cau-
tion, and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. This
jurisdiction must not be invoked lightly or in a routine fash-
ion, but only where the facts of the case disclose a compel-
ling necessity to ensure fairness in investigation, preserva-
tion of public faith in the administration of justice and pro-
tection of fundamental rights of the parties involved. In ex-
amining the prayer made by an aggrieved person seeking
transfer of investigation to the CBI, the Court must neces-
sarily be guided by the strict parameters laid down in binding
precedents. These include, inter alia, instances where the
State police authorities appear to be biased or complicit,
where the investigation has been tainted by delay, irregular-
ity, suppression of material facts, or where the complexity
and inter-State ramifications of the matter necessitate the
involvement of a central agency.
24. This Court has addressed the grave issue of custodial
torture, inhuman treatment, and custodial deaths in a series
of notable judgments including D.K Basu v. State of West
Bengal, State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi and Nilabati
Behera v. State of Orissa. This Court has not only condemned
the nature and extent of such violations as affronts to human
dignity and constitutional rights but has also underscored the
imperative for a thorough, impartial, and effective
investigation into every instance of custodial violence. The
Court has repeatedly emphasised that accountability must be
ensured through proper legal and procedural mechanisms so
that such acts do not go unchecked or unpunished.
27. Considering the unprecedented gravity of this
custodial torture case, the systematic cover-up orchestrated
by local police machinery, the institutional bias demonstrated
in the handling of the complaint, and the complete failure of
local authorities to conduct a fair investigation and the
unrelenting stand taken by the respondent State, we are
-41- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
constrained to direct transfer of investigation to the CBI. The
local police at Kupwara have demonstrated complete
institutional failure by first illegally detaining the appellant
from 20th February, 2023, then subjecting him to barbaric
and systematic torture resulting in permanent mutilation and
finally refusing to register the complaint filed by the
appellant’s wife while simultaneously creating counter-
narratives to shield the perpetrators from accountability. By
directing the very Senior Superintendent of Police, who
summoned the appellant at the Joint Interrogation Centre,
Kupwara, just to conduct an enquiry at such a belated stage,
combined with the pendency of NDPS cases, creates a
conflict of interest, making it impossible for any fair
investigation to be conducted at the local level. Only
investigation by an independent agency, i.e., CBI can restore
public faith in the criminal justice system, ensure that this
dehumanising crime does not go unpunished, and guarantee
that the truth emerges without any institutional bias or cover-
up attempts. The majesty of law demands nothing less than
complete independence and impartiality in investigating
crimes that shock the conscience of society and violate the
most fundamental principles of human dignity enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the transfer of
investigation to the CBI becomes not merely advisable but
constitutionally imperative to ensure justice and uphold the
rule of law.”
43. Relying on the above judgments, Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, learned
counsel appearing for respondent no.4-CBI submitted that if such allegations
are there as in the case in hand, the matter can be handed over to the CBI.
44. Mr. Deepak Kumar Bharati, learned counsel appearing for respondent
no.4-CBI further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Calcutta
High Court in the case of Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata Zonal Office
I v. State of West Bengal and others and State of West Bengal and
others v. Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata Zonal Officer I and
another in MAT Nos. 169 of 2024 and 191 of 2024 respectively and
submitted that in the said cases, the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court has
transferred the case to the CBI. He submitted that in view of the aforesaid
judgment and in light of the allegations in the present case, it is a fit case to
be transferred to the CBI.
-42- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )
45. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties
and going through the materials on record, it transpires that the Ranchi zonal
office of the Directorate of Enforcement is presently handling several high-
profile and sensitive investigations involving influential political figures and
senior bureaucrats, including matters relating to Chief Minister, former
Minister Sri Alamgir Alam, and senior IAS officers such as Ms. Pooja Singhal
and Shri Chhavi Ranjan. The informant is an accused in Peyjal Scam and the
allegation is there of misappropriation of Government fund of approximately
Rs.23 Crores. The informant in his statement, has stated before the
Enforcement Directorate that 10% of the total tender value is siphoned off
and distributed to the Departmental Minister to the tune of 5% share,
commission share for the Secretary of the concerned Department was to the
tune of 1.5%-2% and commission share to Engineer-in-Chief and others was
to the tune of 3%. The informant was noticed earlier by petitioner no.1 to
appear for investigation and pursuant to that, the informant has written a
letter disclosing therein that his treatment is going on at CMC, Vellore and he
took time and all of a sudden as alleged, he appeared in the office of the
Enforcement Directorate on 12.01.2026 and it has been pointed out that
petitioner no.1 was engaged in another matter and he has not been able to
entertain him, however, on request, he has talked with the informant and in
course of talking, the informant has suo motu hit his head by way of taking
water jug from the table and pursuant to that, he has received injury in the
head. The petitioners have taken him to Sadar Hospital, Ranchi and he was
examined by the doctor and the OPD Card was prepared, contained in
Annexure-5 of the petition at page 134. The doctor has himself noted that
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the informant has disclosed that the said injury was self-inflicted by the
informant and no bleeding was found, as examined by the Medical Officer,
Sadar Hospital, Ranchi, contained in Annexure-5. On the next date i.e. on
13.01.2026, the informant has lodged the FIR before the Airport Police Station,
which was registered as Airport P.S. Case No.5 of 2026. On 15.01.2026, it is
alleged that substantial police force has reached to the office of Enforcement
Directorate and treated the said office as a crime scene. Even if such
allegations are true, the question remains what was the haste by the State
police to reach to the office of Enforcement Directorate in the early morning
of 15.01.2026. If the petitioners have done so, they were required to be
noticed under Section 35(3) of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 by
the police and inquired from them and if certain cogent materials were found
against them, they were required to proceed in accordance with law. The
manner police had reached to the office of the Enforcement Directorate that
too in the early morning prima facie suggests that it was on the instigation of
some high-ups, who are accused under the Prevention of Money-Laundering
Act. The two agencies being Central Government agency as well as the State
machinery are fighting amongst each other with regard to the allegations
made by the informant. The fairness of investigation is important not only for
the accused, but even for the victim. A reference may be made to the
judgment passed in the case of Nirmal Singh Kehlon (supra).
46. The proper and fair investigation on the part of the investigating officer
is the backbone of the rule of law, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Shashi Thomas v. State, reported in (2006) 12 SCC
421.
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47. If there is no fair trial and investigation, justice becomes the victim and
that has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Zahira
Habibullah H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2004) 4 SCC
158. It has been held in paragraph 18 of the said judgment, which reads as
under:
“18. According to the appellant Zahira there was no fair
trial and the entire effort during trial and at all relevant times
before also was to see that the accused persons got
acquitted. When the investigating agency helps the accused,
the witnesses are threatened to depose falsely and the
prosecutor acts in a manner as if he was defending the
accused, and the court was acting merely as an onlooker and
when there is no fair trial at all, justice becomes the victim.”
48. The investigation in criminal matter must be free and that was the
subject-matter in the case of Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in
(2010) 12 SCC 254. Paragraph 32 of the said judgment reads as under:
“32. The investigation into a criminal offence must be free
from objectionable features or infirmities which may
legitimately lead to a grievance on the part of the accused
that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior
motive. It is also the duty of the investigating officer to
conduct the investigation avoiding any kind of mischief and
harassment to any of the accused. The investigating officer
should be fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility
of fabrication of evidence and his impartial conduct must
dispel any suspicion as to its genuineness. The investigating
officer “is not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with
such evidence as may enable the court to record a conviction
but to bring out the real unvarnished truth”. (Vide R.P.
Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ
1239] , Jamuna Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(1974) 3 SCC
774 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 250 : AIR 1974 SC 1822] , SCC at p.
780, para 11 and Mahmood v. State of U.P. [(1976) 1 SCC
542 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 72 : AIR 1976 SC 69] )”
49. In view of the above, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the
investigation is being done or is done in a manner with an object of helping
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the party, the Court is required to pass appropriate order.
50. The issue whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of
Investigation, established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,
1946 to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State without the consent of the State
Government was referred for the opinion of the Constitution Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal and others v.
The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal
and others, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 571. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has made following observation in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the said judgment,
which read as under:
“17. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the stand
of the appellants that the exercise of power by the Supreme
Court or the High Courts to refer investigation to CBI directly
without prior approval of the State Government concerned
would violate the federal structure of the Constitution is
again misconceived as it overlooks the basic fact that in a
federal structure it is the duty of the courts to uphold the
constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional
limitations as an ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. In
support of the proposition, learned counsel placed reliance
on the decisions of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Union
of India [(1977) 3 SCC 592] , S.R. Bommai v. Union of
India [(1994) 3 SCC 1] and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of
India [(2006) 7 SCC 1] .
18. Relying on the recent decision by a Bench of nine
Judges of this Court in I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. [(2007) 2
SCC 1] , learned counsel submitted that the judicial review
being itself the basic feature of the Constitution, no
restriction can be placed even by inference and by principle
of legislative competence on the powers of the Supreme
Court and the High Courts with regard to the enforcement
of fundamental rights and protection of the citizens of India.
Learned counsel asserted that in exercise of powers either
under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the courts are
merely discharging their duty of judicial review and are
neither usurping any jurisdiction, nor overriding the doctrine
of separation of powers.”
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51. Be that as it may. It is well-settled that the direction for CBI inquiry
should not be ordered by the High Court in a routine manner. The
jurisprudence developed by several judgments is well-settled, which imposes
a significant self-restraint on the exercise of extraordinary constitutional
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is required to be
exercised sparingly, cautiously and only in exceptional situations and in a
routine manner, investigation cannot be handed over to the CBI. The Court is
required to satisfy on material that it necessitates CBI investigation.
52. It is well-known that public order (Entry 1) and the police (Entry 2) is
a State subject falling in List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and it is a
primary responsibility of the investigating agency of the State police to
investigate all the offences which are committed within its jurisdiction,
however, the investigation can be handed over to the CBI on satisfaction on
the conditions as specified therein only in exceptional circumstances, as has
been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases including in the case
of State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights, West Bengal (supra) and that power cannot be exercised in a
routine manner without examining the complexities, nature of offence and
other criterion.
53. Section 67 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act speaks as under:
“67. Bar of suits in civil courts.– No suit shall be brought in
any civil court to set aside or modify any proceeding taken or
order made under this Act and no prosecution, suit or other
proceeding shall lie against the Government or any officer of
the Government for anything done or intended to be done in
good faith under this Act.”
54. In light of the above provision, the officers of the Enforcement
Directorate are protected for suit or proceeding. However, the argument has
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been made on behalf of the learned senior counsel appearing for the State of
Jharkhand by way of referring Section 2(11) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023 that if it is done in good faith, that protection can be there. The above
submission can be appreciated only when fair investigation is done as to
whether the said act of the petitioners was done in good faith or not.
55. The CBI is already made respondent no.4 in the present case. The
Republic of India and the Union of India are not technically identical, though
they are often used interchangeably to refer to the nation. The Union of
India refers to the legal entity and federal structure of the states, while
the Republic of India is the official, sovereign, democratic name of the
country as a whole. In fact, in the year 1963 by an executive resolution, the
Government established the CBI and prior to that, there existed the Special
Police Establishment (SPE) under the DSPE Act, 1946 to investigate offences
committed by Central Government servants while discharging their official
duties. With the creation of the CBI, the SPE was made a wing of the CBI for
the purposes of investigation. The CBI derives its powers from the DSPE Act,
1946. The CBI functions under the administrative control of the Prime Minister.
The CBI is a central police agency that investigates cases, inter alia, of bribery
and corruption. In the year 1987, the Anti-Corruption Division was created in
the CBI.
56. The judgments relied by the learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent-State and the learned counsel appearing for the informant-
respondent no.5 are on different facts and the facts in the case in hand are
different and, as such, those judgments are not helping the respondent-State
as well as the informant-respondent no.5.
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57. Coming to the facts of the present case, the allegations are made that
the informant has suo motu hit his head by way of jug kept on the table,
however, the informant has alleged that the said act was done by the
petitioners and that is the subject-matter of investigation and in view of that,
the FIR cannot be quashed as the said allegations are not coming in the
parameters of the judgment passed in the case of State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 (1) Supp SC 335.
58. Annexure-8 annexed with the writ petition is the pre-existing medical
condition of the informant, wherefrom, it transpires that the informant is
having medical history, which is in the report of the Christian Medical College,
Vellore, which further suggests that the informant has long term treatment
of primary headache syndrome and seizure disorder and neurological issues
and it is before the alleged date of occurrence and the allegations are made
of dizziness and headache pursuant to the said alleged injury.
59. In paragraph 47 of the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the
petitioners with regard to the counter-affidavit of respondent-State, it has
been stated that the allegation in the present FIR is not used as statutory for
the first time to stall and mislead investigation but part of well documented
modus operandi adopted by the informant to intimidate the complainant and
investigating officers. The allegations are also there against the investigating
officer of Jharkhand police by the informant vide letter dated 17.06.2025
raised identical allegation against the investigating officer of police on his case.
Paragraph 47 of the said rejoinder affidavit is quoted herein below:
“47. That it is respectfully submitted that the allegation
in the present FIR is not used as a strategy for the first time
to stall and mislead investigation but part of a well-
documented modus operandi adopted by the Informant to-49- W.P. (Cr.) No. 52 of 2026
( 2026:JHHC:6369 )intimidate the complainants and the Investigating Officers.
The respondent is well aware of this fact as, the informant
vide letter dated 17.06.2025 has raised identical allegations
against the Investigating Officer of Police on his case. The
informant in the said letter at Sr. No. 19 stated “That I had
disclosed above-stated facts mentioned in paras 1 to 18
before the Case I.O.- Sri Deepak Narayan Singh during
my remanded period from 25.07.24 to 28.07.24. But all my
requests to him went in vain. The Case LO. threatened me
that ‘If you do not sign the confessional statement,
then your wife and children will be put into Jail.’ I had
no other option but to sign the confessional statement. This
confessional statement was never disclosed before me nor
was given for seeing. Further in the said “letter at Sr. No. 20
the informant states “That above stated facts mentioned in
paras 1 to 18 transpire that the then S.D.O. No.-3, Ranchi-
Sri Mukesh Kumar and Sri Sita Ram Baitha, the present S.D.O.
NO-3- Sri Anil Sharma, the DDO- Sri Chandrashekhar, the
D.A.O- Sri Parmanand Kumar and the S.D.C-Sri Hari Kishore
Mahto have fabricately implicated me in this false case by
means of a big conspiracy woven by them. Therefore, I
humbly pray you to kindly order or recommend for C.B.I/ED
probe into this case so that unbiased and impartial
investigation could be carried out and the real culprits could
be punished. For this, I will be highly obliged to your
kindness forever.” The said DDO, Chandrasekhar is the
complainant of subject FIR, whose investigation under
PMLA,2002 is being conducted by the Directorate of
Enforcement, Ranchi. The Respondent being in knowledge
of this complaint already since 17.06.2025 and well aware of
his modus of weaponisation of allegation, chose to ignore all
the evidence against the allegations in the FIR.”
60. The objection raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the
State of Jharkhand with regard to filing of the rejoinder affidavit by Mr.
Debidatta Sarangi, Assistant Director of Directorate of Enforcement office of
Zonal Directorate, Ranchi zone is not acceptable in view of the fact that there
is precedent in the Jharkhand High Court that the affidavit is required to be
filed by the Pairvikar and not by the accused in a criminal case. The writ
petition has also been sworn by the Pairvikar and the same person has also
sworn the affidavit on behalf of the petitioners as Pairvikar in the writ petition
and that objection was not made with regard to filing of the present writ
petition and, as such, said objection is not acceptable.
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61. What has been discussed above and in light of the allegations made
against the petitioners, who happened to be the officials of the Enforcement
Directorate, who are investigating the high-profile cases of the State of
Jharkhand and the Jharkhand police has also lodged two cases against the
informant and on the allegations of that person, Jharkhand police has acted
in haste as discussed herein above, which prima facie suggests that on the
instruction of the high-ups, the police has acted so. The investigation is
required to be done fairly. The said allegation is made against the Central
Government Agency. In view of that, fair investigation by an independent
agency is the need of the hour. In that view of the matter, the Court finds
that there is an exceptional circumstance to handover the matter to the CBI.
62. In the result, prayer (ii) with regard to handover the matter to the CBI
for investigation is allowed. The case being Airport P.S. Case No.5 of 2026
filed before the Airport Police Station shall forthwith be transferred to the CBI.
The Director, CBI shall direct for registration of the case by the CBI and
investigate the same in accordance with law. The Officer-in-Charge, Airport
Police Station will hand over the entire documents with regard to Airport P.S.
Case No.5 of 2026 to the CBI forthwith.
63. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.2-CBI shall intimate
this order to the Director, CBI for the needful.
64. Accordingly, this criminal writ petition is partly allowed in above terms
and disposed of.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Dated: 11th March, 2026
Ajay/ A.F.R.
Uploaded on
11th March, 2026
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