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Karnataka High Court
Sri Ashwath S vs State Of Karnataka on 6 July, 2026
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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NC: 2026:KHC:35159
CRL.P No. 1586 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 1586 OF 2024 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
BETWEEN:
SMT. AISHWARYA GOWDA
D/O NANJUNDEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
R/AT NO.111/1, SAMBRAMA,
3RD CROSS, 3RD MAIN ROAD,
BEML LAYOUT,
RAJRAJESHWARI NAGARA,
BENGALURU - 560 098.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SANDESH J.CHOUTA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SANTOSH B Y.,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY VIJAYANAGAR POLICE STATION,
Digitally BENGALURU, REPRESENTED BY
signed by STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
VANDANA S HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
Location: BENGALURU - 560 001.
High Court
of Karnataka 2. DR. GIRISH A.C
S/O A M CHANDRAMOULI
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
R/A NO.760, 8TH CROSS,
5TH MAIN ROAD, VIJAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 040.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. B.N.JAGADEESH, ADDL. SPP FOR R1
SRI. SANGAMESH G.PATIL.,ADVOCATE)
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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C BY PRAYING TO QUASH THE
FIR IN CR.NO.23/2024 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 384, 420, 504, 506 OF
IPC, OF VIJAYANAGAR P.S., FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT AS
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOW PENDING ON THE FILE OF XXIV
ADDL.C.M.M., BENGLAURU AS PER ANNEXURE-A.
THIS PETITION IS BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON 08.04.2026
COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CAV ORDER
This petition by the sole accused seeks quashing of the
criminal proceedings registered as an FIR in Crime No.23/2024
dated 03.02.2024 pursuant to a complaint dated 03.02.2024 filed
by the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant for alleged offences
punishable under Sections 384, 420, 504, and 506 IPC pending on
the file of the I ACJM, Bangalore, currently being investigated by
the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Bangalore.
2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present petition
are as under:-
The 2nd respondent - de facto complainant, Dr.Girish filed
the instant complaint dated 03.02.2024 alleging that the petitioner
gained the trust and confidence of the de facto complainant and his
wife Dr.Manjula and on the representation of delivering high end
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cars, petitioner induced the 2nd respondent to transfer large sums
of money including Rs.2 crores obtained via property loan, Rs.65
lakhs through banking channels and further sum of Rs.4 crores in
cash at different times. It is further alleged that when repayment
was demanded, petitioner resorted to threats and ultimately
extorted a sum of Rs.5 lakhs and refused to return the amounts
back to the 2nd respondent and his wife and threatened them
resulting in filing of the instant complaint by the 2nd respondent.
Aggrieved by the impugned complaint and FIR, petitioner is before
this Court by way of the present petition.
3. Heard learned Senior counsel for the petitioner and
learned Addl.SPP for 1st respondent and learned counsel for 2nd
respondent - de facto complainant and perused the material on
record.
4. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in
the memorandum of petition and referring to the material on record,
learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
impugned FIR is a gross abuse of process of law and has been
filed as a malicious counter blast since on 02.02.2024 itself, i.e.,
one day prior to the impugned FIR dated 03.02.2024, petitioner had
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lodged a complaint against Dr.G.M.Manjula, wife of 2nd respondent
before the Police commissioner, Bangalore, alleging threats and
demands for usurious interest in pursuance of which, the
Thalaghattapura Police Station issued a notice to the said Manjula
on 03.02.2024. It was submitted that only thereafter that the 2nd
respondent lodged the present false and concocted complaint as a
retaliatory measure attempting to raise a dispute which is
fundamentally civil in nature and evident as per the material on
record, which indicates that essential ingredients of the alleged
offences are not made out and criminal machinery was being
misused for debt recovery which was impermissible in law and as
such, the impugned complaint, FIR and all further proceedings
pursuant thereto deserve to be quashed. In support of his
submissions, learned Senior counsel for he petitioner places
reliance upon the following judgments:-
(i) Indian Oil Corpn V.NEPC India & Ors. -
(2006) 6 SCC 736;
(ii) Lalit Chaturvedi & Ors v. State of U.P -
(2024) SCC ONLINE SC 171;
(iii) Naresh & Anr v. State of Karnataka & Anr. -
(2024) SCC ONLINE SC 268;
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CRL.P No. 1586 of 2024
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(iv) Harilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh - 2023
SCC ONLINE SC 1124;
(v) Usha Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal &
Anr. - (2023) 15 SCC 135;
(vi) Delhi Race Club V. state of Uttar Pradesh &
Anr. - (2024) 10 SCC 690;
(vii) Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of Jharkhand
(2025) SCC On Line SC 2058;
(viii) Mr.C.Gopalan V. State of Karnataka - W.P.
No.13519/2024 dated 13.10.2025;
(ix) Sri. BK Sanjay Krishnamurthy.V State of
Karnataka - Criminal Petition No.6311/2024 dated
13.10.2025;
(x) Ankul Singh V. State of UP & Anr. - (2025)
SCC On Line SC 2060;
(xi) Vedhasingh v. R.M.Govindan & Ors. -(2022)
SCC On Line SC 1010;
(xii) State of Haryana & ors. V. Bhajan Lal -
(1992) SUPP (1) SCC 335;
(xiii) Sanjal Bose V. State of West Bengal & Ors. -
(2026) SCC OnLine SC 525;
(xiv) Rikhab Birani vs. State of U.P -2025 SCC
OnLine 823;
(xv) Chanchalpathi Das. Vs. State of West Bengal
and Another -2023 SCC OnLine SC 650;
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(xvi) Vishal Noble Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh -
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680.
5. Per contra, learned Addl.SPP for the 1st respondent -
State and learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that
apart from the fact that the allegations in the FIR disclosed the
commission of cognizable offences, the petitioner had a dishonest
intention from the outset and induced the 2nd respondent to part
with a substantial amount of money and subsequently, intimidated
and extorted him and the FIR was lodged after exercising due
diligence and since the veracity of the allegations can be
determined only after thorough investigation and trial, there is no
merit in the present petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
In support of their submissions, they placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sau.Kamal Shivaji
Pokarnekar vs. State of Maharastra - Crl.A.No.255/2019 dated
12.02.2019.
6. Both sides have filed their written synopsis along with
documents in support of their contentions, which are taken in
record. The learned Addl.SPP has also placed the investigation
material collected, which is taken on record.
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7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
8. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be
necessary to state that while the impugned complaint and FIR were
filed and registered on 03.02.2024, the petitioner had lodged a
complaint against Dr.Manjula wife of the complainant earlier on
02.02.2024, in pursuance of which, the police authorities issued a
notice to the said Dr.Manjula dated 03.02.2024. The complaint
dated 02.02.2024 reads as under;
EªÀjUÉ, ¢£ÁAPÀ:
¥ÉÆð¸ï DAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ - 560 053.
EAzÀ,
L±ÀéAiÀÄð UËqÀ
gÁdgÁeÉñÀéj£ÀUÀgÀ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ - 560 098.
ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉÃ,
«µÀAiÀÄ: qÁ: ªÀÄAdļÀ Vjñï gÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ fêÀ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ,
¸ÀļÀÄî DgÉÆÃ¥ÀUÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ªÀiÁ£À¹PÀ »A¸É MvÀÛqÀ ¤ÃqÀÄwÛgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ.
ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ L±ÀéAiÀÄðUËqÀ £ÁzÀ £Á£ÀÄ qÁ:
ªÀÄAdļÀVjñï gÀªÀgÀ §½ ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀ «ZÁgÀPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ K¦æ¯ï 2022 jAzÀ
¢£ÁAPÀ: 05/08/2022 ªÀgÉUÉ ¨ÁåAQ£À ªÀÄÄSÁAvÀgÀ gÀÆ. 2,36,00,000/- (JgÀqÀÄ PÉÆÃn
ªÀÄƪÀvÁÛgÀÄ ®PÀë gÀÆ¥Á¬ÄUÀ¼ÀÄ) UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀÄvÉÛãÉ. vÀzÀ£ÀAvÀgÀ gÀÆ. 2,36,00,000/-
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NC: 2026:KHC:35159
CRL.P No. 1586 of 2024
HC-KAR
UÀ½UÀÆ ¢£ÀzÀ §rØ, ªÁgÀzÀ §rØAiÉÄAzÀÄ ¥sɧæªÀj 2023 gÀªÀgÉUÀÆ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 05/02/2023
gÀªÀgÉUÀÆ £À«ÄäAzÀ »A¸ÁvÀäPÀªÁV, §®ªÀAvÀªÁV §rØ ºÁUÀÄ C¸À®Ä ¸ÉÃj gÀÆ.
5,70,00,000/- (LzÀÄ PÉÆÃn J¥ÀàvÀÄÛ ®PÀë gÀÆ¥Á¬ÄUÀ¼ÀÄ) gÀÆUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉ¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
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E£ÀÆß C¸À®Ä gÀÆ. 2,36,00,000/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÁªÀÅ PÉÆqÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ vÀPÀgÁgÀÄ vÉUÉ¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ
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CzÁVAiÀÄÆ qÁ: ªÀÄAdļÀVjñï gÀªÀgÀÄ AiÀiÁgÀ ªÀiÁwUÀÆ vÀ¯É ¨ÁUÀzÉ EA¢UÉ gÀÆ.
5,00,00,000/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÉÆqÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁPÀÄwÛgÀÄvÁÛgÉ £ÁªÀÅ »AwgÀÄV¸À
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gËrUÀ½AzÀ PÀgÉ ªÀiÁr¹ fêÀ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ¸ÀÄvÀÛªÄÀ ÄvÀÛ
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zÀAiÀÄ«lÄÖ F «µÀAiÀĪÀ£ÀÄß UÀt£ÉUÉ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ qÁ: ªÀÄAdļÀ VjÃ±ï «gÀÄzÀÝ ¸ÀÆPÀÛ
PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀî¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ PÉýPÉƼÀÄîvÉÛãÉ.
EAw vÀªÀÄä «±Áé¹,
(¸À»/-)
L±ÀéAiÀÄð UËqÀ
9. The Police notice dated 03.02.2024 at Annexure-D, reads
as under:-
vÀ®WÀlÖ¥ÀÄgÀ ¥ÉÆð¸ï oÁuÉ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀ
¢£ÁAPÀ: 03.02.202.
¸ÀA: ¹DgïJA/10/¦nµÀ£ï/nd¦J¸ï/2024
¥ÉÆð¸ï £ÉÆÃn¸ï
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CRL.P No. 1586 of 2024
HC-KAR
F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ¤ªÀÄUÉ w½¸ÀĪÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉ, ²æÃ. L±ÀéAiÀÄðUËqÀ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¤ªÀÄä «gÀÄzÀÝ
ªÀiÁ£Àå ºÉZÀÄѪÀj ¥ÉÆð¸ï DAiÀÄÄPÀÛgÀÄ ¥À²ÑªÀÄ «¨sÁUÀ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀ gÀªÀjUÉ
zÀÆgÀÄ Cfð ¤ÃrzÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj zÀÆj£À ªÀiÁ»wUÁV ¢£ÁAPÀ: 05.02.2024 gÀAzÀÄ
vÀ®WÀlÖ¥ÀÄgÀ ¥ÉÆð¸ï oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è F PɼÀUÉ ¸À» ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ £À£ßÀ ªÀÄÄAzÉ
ºÁdgÁUÀ®Ä F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ¤ªÀÄUÉ w½¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
(¸À»/-)
¥ÉÆð¸ï ¸À¨ï E£ïì¥ÉPÀÖgï
vÀ®WÀlÖ¥ÀÄgÀ ¥ÉÆð¸ï oÁuÉ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀ- 560 109.
gÀªÀjUÉ,
qÁ: ªÀÄAdļÀ Vjñï
«dAiÀÄ£ÀUÀgÀ
¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀ
¥ÉÆÃ£ï £ÀA.9880268512
¸ÀzÀj F ¥ÉÆð¸ï £ÉÆÃnøÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÉÆæ¸É¸ï PÀvÀðªÀåzÀ ºÉZï.¹. 11570 ¦¹. 13944
gÀªÀgÀÄ qÁ: ªÀÄAdļÀ Vjñï gÀªÀgÀ PÀ®ìð& PÀªÀìð PÁ¸ÉänPï ¸Àdðj ¸ÉAlgï D¸ÀàvæÉ
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ¨ÁV°UÉ CAn¹ eÁj ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ."
10. The impugned complaint dated 03.02.2024 reads as
under:-
To,
The police Inspector
Vijayanagara Police Station
Vijayanagara, Bengaluru
From,
Dr. Girish A C
S/o. A.M. Chandramouli
th th
49 years, No. 760/ 8 Cross, 5 main
Vijayanagara, Bengaluru - 560 040.
Mob. 9480281652, 9880268512
Subject: complaint against Mrs. Aishwarya Gowda,
rd
aged 32 years residing at # 111/1, Sambarama, 3
rd
Cross, 3 Main, BEML Layout, Rajarajeshwari
Nagar, Bangalore.
Respected Sir,
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Myself Dr. Girish A C & my wife Dr. Manjula G M are living in
above mentioned address since past 5 years. We are also
running Curls & Curves cosmetic Surgery Centre hospital since
past 5 years in the same premises. Professionally we are
qualified doctors serving the society for 20 years. We attend
number of patients for various purposes relating to cosmetic
surgeries. In the mean time we happened to meet Mrs.
Aishwarya Gowda at Vijayanagara club near to 2 years back
through mutual friend. Mrs. Aishwarya Gowda approached me
various times regarding her cosmetic surgeries needs & got the
surgeries done with us for which she used to pay the necessary
fees. She used to meet myself & my wife too on many occasions
after her surgeries. She built trust with myself & my wife; she
even became close to my wife. She picturized herself to be a big
financier & looking into top real estate business. Mrs. Aishwarya
Gowda also made me & my wife to believe that she has high
political contracts & She is having several crores transaction
every year.
Mrs. Aishwarya Gowda often used to ask lakhs of rupees
initially, for which she used to pay back at proper time. Hence,
winning over our trust, pretending to be honest & loyal, she
further became close to my wife Dr. Manjula and the she
explained about her business related to high ends cars which are
imported & to be sold at lesser price. She encashed my wife's
confidence & myself & convinced us to put money now & then to
her bank account number 920020052425162, Axis Bank, IFSC
Code UTIB0001856, Srinivasanagara Branch. She misguided
and cheated us that she will deliver high -end cars worth 6-7
Crores. Believing this we trusted her & mode 2 Crore loan
against property in Kotak Bank on 01.10.2022 & same amount
was transferred to Mrs. Aishwarya's above mentioned bank
account on 05.08.2022. Afterwards we have paid 4 Crores cash
at different time to Mrs. Aishwarya Gowda. We met Mrs.
Aishwarya Gowda often at Vijayanagar club, Shanthinagar hotel
many times over a cup of coffee. After realizing that Mrs.
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Aishwarya Gowda is not genuine avoiding, misleading, cheating
we requested her several times to return our money back. She
was not returning our money giving one or the other reasons.
After that we strictly told her to return back our amount, to our
shock she threatened us that she will file false case against me
to the Police Station by lodging a false complaint of molestation,
rape and highlight in media. She asked me to come to
Vijayanagar Club and there with her personal body guards who
had deadly weapons, abused me with filthy language and
threatened me that she will spoil reputation of our esteemed
Curls & Curves Cosmetic surgery Centre hospital. Also, she
threatened me to murder & break my limbs & hands into pieces. I
was very much afraid at that point of time and couldn't react out
of fear. Then she demanded 5 laksh for not creating a scene of
false molestation case .
I then arranged somehow 2 lakhs cash the next day. She
extorted another 3 lakhs by causing extortion. When I found
threat to my life, I was forced to give Mrs. Aishwarya Gowda the
said amount. Regarding this issue after discussing with the
family. I am giving complaint now & hence the delay in lodging
the complaint.
We believe in the system of justice, hence I here by request
you to take proper action against Mrs. Aishwarya Gowda, uphold
justice and protect my family.
Thanking You,
Yours sincerely
(Dr. Girish A.C.)
11. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the
primary question that arises for consideration is, whether
continuation of the impugned criminal proceedings against the
petitioner would amount to an abuse of process of the court; in this
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context, it is relevant to state that the sequence of events
preceding the registration of the impugned FIR is of paramount
significance and the same would reveal that the petitioner having
lodged the aforesaid complaint on 02.02.2024 against Dr.Manjula,
wife of the complainant, in pursuance of which, the police
authorities acted upon it and issued a notice to her on 03.02.2024
while the impugned FIR was registered against the petitioner at 2
p.m. in the afternoon on 03.02.2024; this close proximity in time
strongly indicates that the impugned complaint is not merely a
spontaneous grievance but a calculated and retaliatory action
designed to pressurize and gain an upper hand in a financial
dispute and the 2nd respondent having consciously suppressed the
aforesaid prior complaint by the petitioner against his wife and the
police notice issued to her clearly casts a serious doubt on the
bonafides of the 2nd respondent thereby establishing that the
impugned complaint and FIR are nothing but a counter blast which
are not sustainable in law and warrant interference by this Court in
the present petition.
12. A plain reading of the complaint makes it evident that
the entire dispute stems from a series of a financial transactions
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between the parties over a period of two years and the petitioner
has not denied the transactions and the gravamen of the complaint
is merely non-payment of money simpliciter, without there being
any criminality in this regard; it is well settled that criminal justice
system cannot be used as a tool for recovery of money and the
remedy available to the 2nd respondent is before the civil court and
the attempt on the part of the respondent to cloak a purely a civil
dispute with a criminal colour is manifest in the facts and
circumstances of the instant case which is another circumstance
which would vitiate the impugned complaint and FIR, which
deserve to be quashed on this ground also.
13. There is no gainsaying the fact that the Apex Court has
repeatedly deprecated the practice of converting disputes which
are predominantly, overwhelmingly and essentially of a civil nature
into a criminal proceedings by giving the same a cloak of criminality
and a criminal texture / flavour which is impermissible in law. In
Indian Oil Corporation's case supra, the Apex Court held as
under:-
" 10. The respondents herein filed Crl. OP No.
1563 of 2000 and Crl. OP No. 2418 of 1999 respectively
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under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the said two
complaints on the following two grounds:
(i) The complaints related to purely contractual
disputes of a civil nature in respect of which IOC had
already sought injunctive reliefs and money decrees.
(ii) Even if all the allegations in the complaints
were taken as true, they did not constitute any
criminal offence as defined under Sections 378, 403,
405, 415 or 425 IPC.
19. Section 378 defines theft. It states:
"378. Whoever, intending to take dishonestly
any movable property out of the possession of any
person without that person's consent, moves that
property in order to such taking, is said to commit
theft."
The averments in the complaint clearly show
that neither the aircrafts nor their engines were ever
in the possession of IOC. It is admitted that they were
in the possession of NEPC India at all relevant times.
The question of NEPC committing theft of something
in its own possession does not arise. The appellant
has therefore rightly not pressed the matter with
reference to Section 378.
14. In Lalit Chaturvedi's case supra, the Apex Court held
as under:-
" 5. This Court, in a number of judgments, has
pointed out the clear distinction between a civil wrong in
the form of breach of contract, non-payment of money or
disregard to and violation of the contractual terms; and a
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criminal offence under Sections 420 and 406IPC.
Repeated judgments of this Court, however, are
somehow overlooked, and are not being applied and
enforced. We will be referring to these judgments. The
impugned judgment dismisses the application filed by the
appellants under Section 482CrPC on the ground of
delay/laches and also the factum that the charge-sheet
had been filed on 12-12-2019. This ground and reason is
also not valid.
9. We will assume that the assertions made in the
complaint are correct, but even then, a criminal offence
under Section 420 read with Section 415IPC is not
established in the absence of deception by making false
and misleading representation, dishonest concealment or
any other act or omission, or inducement of the
complainant to deliver any property at the time of the
contract(s) being entered. The ingredients to allege the
offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the
averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of
money from the appellants. The police is to investigate
the allegations which discloses a criminal act. Police does
not have the power and authority to recover money or act
as a civil court for recovery of money.
11. In this case entrustment is missing, in fact it is
not even alleged. It is a case of sale of goods. The
charge-sheet does refer to Section 506IPC relying upon
the averments in the complaint. However, no details and
particulars are given, when and on which date and place
the threats were given. Without the said details and
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particulars, it is apparent to us, that these allegations of
threats, etc. have been made only with an intent to
activate police machinery for recovery of money."
15. In Naresh's case supra, the Apex Court held as under:-
6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that
although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised
sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing
such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil
nature. This is what was held:
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be
cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only
for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or
not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are
present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A
complaint disclosing civil transactions may also
have a criminal texture. But the High Court must
see whether a dispute which is essentially of a
civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In
such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and
is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case,
the High Court should not hesitate to quash the
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criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process
of the court."
16. A perusal of the impugned complaint and FIR will
indicate that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are
prima facie not made out or forthcoming and the same are
conspicuously absent from the impugned complaint and FIR; in this
context, it is significant to note that it is well settled that for an
offence of cheating, it is absolutely essential to demonstrate that
there was a fraudulent or dishonest intention on the part of the
petitioner at the very inception of the transaction; in the instant
case, the complaint itself speaks of a two year long relationship
between the petitioner and 2nd respondent and his wife with
multiple transactions between them and mere subsequent failure to
repay a loan cannot retrospectively impart a criminal intent to the
initial transaction and the impugned complaint which is bereft of
any specific averment to show deception at the outset is vitiated
and the same deserves to be quashed on this ground also.
17. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that in
addition to the present proceedings, the 2nd respondent -
complainant has also instituted another proceeding against the
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petitioner under Section 138 of N.I.Act which is pending
adjudication; though the questions / issue as to whether parallel /
simultaneous / dual proceedings arising out of IPC offences and
offences under the N.I.Act have been referred to a larger Bench by
the Apex Court in the case of J.Vedhasingh vs. R.M.Govindan &
others - 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1010, after noticing the divergent
views of the Apex Court in the case of G.Sagarsuri vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh - (2000) 2 SCC 636 and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao
vs. Gorantla Venkateshwara Rao - (2011) 2 SCC 703 on one
hand and the case of Sangeetaben Mahendra Bhai Patel vs.
State of Gujarath - (2012) 7 SCC 621 and V.S.Reddy & Sons vs.
Muthyala Ramalinga Reddy - Crl.A.No.1285/2015 dated
28.09.2015 on the other hand, having regard to the fact that even
according to the 2nd respondent - complainant himself, the
petitioner is alleged to have issued cheques in his favour in respect
of the subject transactions, it cannot be said that there was any
criminal intention on the part of the petitioner at the inception so as
to attract the offence of cheating as alleged by the 2nd respondent
and consequently, I am of the view that the impugned complaint
and FIR deserve to be quashed on this ground also.
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18. In Anukul Singh's case supra, the Apex Court held as
under:-
11. Before adverting to the facts of the present case,
it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal principles
governing the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. It is well established that though the High Court
possesses wide and plenary inherent jurisdiction, such
power is not unbridled or unlimited, but circumscribed by
self-imposed restraints evolved through judicial
pronouncements.
11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative categories where
quashing of proceedings is justified. These are:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or, where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and
not exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to
balance two competing considerations - (a) preventing
abuse of process of law, and (b) ensuring that criminal
proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed
questions of fact.
11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned
that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
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Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a "mini-trial" or
weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within the
domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is confined
to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR/complaint and
accompanying material, the ingredients of the alleged
offence are disclosed. [See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal
Kapoor, HMT Watches v. Abida and Rathish Babu
Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar, it
was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or
inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the
exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in proceedings
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI v. Aryan
Singh, it was emphasized that the High Court had
exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the merits of the
prosecution's case and holding that charges were not
proved, which is a matter strictly for trial.
11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been
recognized where the defence relies upon
unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence of sterling
quality - such as documents of undisputed authenticity -
which ex facie demonstrate that continuation of criminal
proceedings would be unjust and oppressive. This
principle was recognized in Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills
Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd., and followed in subsequent
decisions.
11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge
are: while the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, it is the
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duty of the High Court to intervene where continuation of
criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil
nature and criminal colour has been artificially given to it.
Conversely, where disputed questions of fact arise
requiring adjudication, the matter must ordinarily proceed
to trial.
12. The specific case of the appellant is that his
father purchased land comprised in Khasra Nos. 18, 19,
20, 21 and 22 situated at Village Sherpur Mafi, District
Moradabad, from one Akil Hussain. This land was used
for the purposes of Qurbani. According to the appellant, in
order to usurp the said property, the Shaher Imam of
Bilari, in collusion with the district administration and
under pressure exerted upon the local police, ensured
that a series of false criminal cases were foisted against
him. As many as eight FIRs were lodged against the
appellant, including the present one, all of which, in
substance, arise out of a civil dispute relating to
ownership and possession of the property. Initiation of the
present criminal proceedings, therefore, amounts to a
clear abuse of the process of law, squarely falling within
the illustrative categories delineated in Bhajan Lal,
particularly where the dispute is manifestly civil in nature
and the prosecution is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive.
13. The record reveals that within a short span, as
many as eight FIRs were registered against the appellant.
The gravamen of the allegations in the present FIR is that
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Respondent No. 2/complainant approached the appellant
for a loan of Rs. 2,00,000/-, but was allegedly advanced
only Rs. 1,40,000/-. It is further alleged that, in connection
with the said transaction, an agreement to sell dated
09.11.1998 was executed in respect of a plot owned by
the complainant, and that the appellant procured three
cheques from Respondent No. 2, which, upon
presentation, were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds.
Even if accepted in entirety, these allegations disclose, at
best, a civil dispute and do not prima facie constitute the
essential ingredients of the criminal offences alleged.
14. It is significant to note that prior to registration
of the present FIR, the appellant had already initiated
proceedings against Respondent No. 2, namely a
complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act (Complaint
No. 2402840/2005) before the N.I. Court, Moradabad, as
well as FIR No. 120/2002, in which, the complainant
himself was arrested. The present FIR was lodged nearly
three months after the filing of the Section 138 complaint
and seven months after FIR No. 120/2002. The plea that
the FIR is a retaliatory counterblast to the proceedings
legitimately initiated by the appellant, therefore, carries
substantial weight.
15. The mala fide nature of the complaint is further
fortified by the fact that, by judgment dated 15.01.2025,
the trial Court convicted Respondent No. 2 under Section
138 of the N.I. Act, sentencing him to one month's
imprisonment and imposing a fine of Rs. 90,000/-. This
conviction lends strong support to the appellant's case
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that the initiation of the present FIR was a retaliatory
measure, maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive to
neutralise the lawful action taken by him.
16. Despite this background, the police proceeded
to file a charge sheet dated 16.04.2003 against the
appellant for offences under sections 420, 467, and 468
IPC. Even if the allegations are assumed to be true, they
unmistakably arise out of a commercial/contractual
transaction relating to loan and repayment, which has
been given a criminal colour. The case thus falls squarely
within categories (1) and (7) of Bhajan Lal, namely, where
the allegations do not disclose the commission of an
offence, and where the proceedings are maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive. Continuation of such
prosecution would amount to an abuse of process of law
and consequently, warrant quashing under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into
criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Ltd., it was held that criminal law cannot be used as
a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of
process. The following paragraphs from the decision are
apposite:
"9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
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make out the case alleged against the accused. For
this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a
whole, but without examining the merits of the
allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a
meticulous analysis of the material nor an
assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the
allegations in the complaint, is warranted while
examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a
clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the
criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated
with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to
cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and
inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be
used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The
power should be used sparingly and with abundant
caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged.
If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the
complaint, merely on the ground that a few
ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the
complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so
bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely
necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a
civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a
civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial
transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from
furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in
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civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the
nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different
from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the
complaint relates to a commercial transaction or
breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is
available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground
to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is
whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a
criminal offence or not.
10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take
notice of a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This
is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that
civil law remedies are time consuming and do not
adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes
also, leading to irretrievable break down of
marriages/families. There is also an impression that if
a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal
prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent
settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and
claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by
applying pressure though criminal prosecution should
be deprecated and discouraged."
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal it was emphasized that criminal prosecution
must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or
private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam,
this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in
respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to
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harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation,
constitute an abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court
disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as
a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money
recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution
where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned
High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but
to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following
paragraphs are relevant in this context:
"9. What we have been able to understand is that there is
an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No. 4
might have parted with some money in accordance with the
oral agreement and it may be that the appellant - herein owes
a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No. 4.
However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of
cheating could be said to have been committed by the
appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded
that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be
something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the
intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right
from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not
disclose any element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent
pronouncement of this Court in the case of "Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh", (2024) 10 SCC 690.
In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes
cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been
exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was
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relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the
matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the
petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment
of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition
precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should
undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the
petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the
petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why
should the High Court make an attempt to help the
complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the
accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the
case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery
of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code,
2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the
entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing
for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client has filed any civil
suit or has initiated any other proceedings for recovery of the
money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery
of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more
particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a
First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police.
This amounts to abuse of the process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we refrain from
observing anything further. If the Respondent No. 4 has to
recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any
other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be
permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings.
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15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High
Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first
directed the appellant to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the
Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear before
the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of
settlement. That's not what is expected of a High Court to do in
a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a
miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any
other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court
is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the
FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High
Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles as
enunciated in the decision of this Court in the "State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal", 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335"
20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present
case, it is manifest that the dispute - concerning repayment of
loan money and the alleged coercion in execution of
documents - is purely civil in character. The essential
ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima facie made out.
The institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession, particularly
after the appellant had already initiated lawful proceedings,
reinforces the inference of mala fides.
21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the proceedings,
misdirected itself in law by failing to apply the ratio laid down in
Bhajan Lal, and the subsequent authorities referred to above,
which uniformly hold that the machinery of criminal law cannot
be permitted to be misused for settling civil disputes or to
wreak vengeance.
22. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 22.10.2019
of the High Court is set aside. FIR No. 47 of 2003 dated
05.02.2003 and the consequential charge sheet dated
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16.04.2003, pending before the trial Court, are hereby
quashed. This judgment, however, shall not preclude the
parties from pursuing civil remedies as may be available to
them in accordance with law.
23. In the result, the Criminal Appeal stands allowed in the
above terms.
24. Pending Application(s), if any, stand disposed of."
19. In Arshad Neyaz Khan's case supra, the Apex Court
held as under:-
" 17. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 ("Inder Mohan Goswami"),
while dealing with Section 420 IPC, this Court observed
thus:
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is
manifest that in the definition there are two separate
classes of acts which the person deceived may be
induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be
induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property
to any person. The second class of acts is the doing
or omitting to do anything which the person deceived
would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived.
In the first class of cases, the inducement must be
fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts,
the inducing must be intentional but need not be
fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention
which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person
guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had
a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of
making the promise. From his mere failure to
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subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume
that he all along had a culpable intention to break the
promise from the beginning."
19. It is settled law that for establishing the offence
of cheating, the complainant/respondent No. 2 was
required to show that the appellant had a fraudulent or
dishonest intention at the time of making a promise or
representation of not fulfilling the agreement for sale of
the said property. Such a culpable intention right at the
beginning when the promise was made cannot be
presumed but has to be made out with cogent facts. In
the facts of the present case, there is a clear absence of
dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the
appellant during the agreement for sale. We must hasten
to add that there is no allegation in the FIR or the
complaint indicating either expressly or impliedly any
intentional deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on
the part of the appellant right from the time of making the
promise or misrepresentation. Nothing has been said on
what the misrepresentations were and how the appellant
intentionally deceived the complainant/respondent No. 2.
Mere allegations by the complainant/respondent No. 2
that the appellant failed to execute the agreement for sale
and failed to refund the money paid by the
complainant/respondent No. 2 does not satisfy the test of
dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a
valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 IPC.
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21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it
is the case of the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the
offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under
Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is
committed by the accused, then in the same breath it
cannot be said that the accused has also committed the
offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable
under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC
690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal
breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal
intention is necessary at the time of making false or
misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal
breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient.
Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is
lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating,
the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person
by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation,
both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the
offences that are independent and distinct. The said
offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set
of facts as they are antithetical to each other."
20. In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court reiterated the
principle laid down by it in Delhi Race Club's case supra to the
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effect that offences punishable under Section 420 and 406 cannot
co-exist on the same set of facts and held as hereunder:-
" 38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint
fails to spell out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted
above. We may only say, with a view to clear a serious
misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the
courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that
offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section
405IPC, punishable under Section 406IPC, is committed by
the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that
the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as
defined and explained in Section 415IPC, punishable under
Section 420IPC.
43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of
trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is
necessary at the time of making a false or misleading
representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust,
mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of
criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with
the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same.
Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or
dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any
property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-
exist simultaneously.
46. It has been held in State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal
Nathalal [State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal, 1967 SCC
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OnLine SC 58 : AIR 1968 SC 700 : (1968) 2 SCR 408] :
(SCC OnLine SC para 8)
"8. The term "entrusted" found in Section 405IPC
governs not only the words "with the property" immediately
following it but also the words "or with any dominion over the
property" occurring thereafter--see Velji Raghavji Patel v.
State of Maharashtra [Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of
Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 185 : AIR 1965 SC 1433
: (1965) 2 SCR 429] . Before there can be any entrustment
there must be a trust meaning thereby an obligation annexed
to the ownership of property and a confidence reposed in
and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him
for the benefit of another or of another and the owner. But
that does not mean that such an entrustment need conform
to all the technicalities of the law of trust -- see Jaswantrai
Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [Jaswantrai Manilal
Akhaney v. State of Bombay, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 46 : AIR
1956 SC 575 : 1956 SCR 483] . The expression
"entrustment" carries with it the implication that the person
handing over any property or on whose behalf that property
is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further
the person handing over the property must have confidence
in the person taking the property so as to create a fiduciary
relationship between them. A mere transaction of sale
cannot amount to an "entrustment"."
49. From the aforesaid, there is no manner of any
doubt whatsoever that in case of sale of goods, the property
passes to the purchaser from the seller when the goods are
delivered. Once the property in the goods passes to the
purchaser, it cannot be said that the purchaser was
entrusted with the property of the seller. Without entrustment
of property, there cannot be any criminal breach of trust.
Thus, prosecution of cases on charge of criminal breach of
trust, for failure to pay the consideration amount in case of
sale of goods is flawed to the core. There can be civil
remedy for the non-payment of the consideration amount,
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but no criminal case will be maintainable for it. [See : Lalit
Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. [Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P.,
(2024) 12 SCC 483 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171] and
Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand [Mideast
Integrated Steels Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2023 SCC
OnLine Jhar 301] .]
21. Viewed from this angle also, the impugned complaint
and FIR deserve to be quashed.
22. The complainant has also made allegations of extraction
interalia alleging that the petitioner who is the alleged debtor of
crores of rupees extorted a sum of Rs.5 lakhs from her creditor, the
2nd respondent herein by putting him by fear of injury; this
allegation of extortion is clearly and inherently improbable and
absurd and on the face of it, this allegation appears to be a
malicious embellishment to invoke a more serious offence which is
impermissible in law and the impugned complaint and FIR in
relation to the alleged offence of extortion deserve to be quashed.
23. Insofar as the allegation of intentional insult and criminal
intimidation as contemplated under Sections 504 and 506 IPC are
concerned, a perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that
the allegations in this regard are general omnibus and vague
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without providing any particulars or details as to the date, time,
place or specific words used which are made with malafide
intentions only to activate the police machinery which is not
sustainable in law and the same deserves to be quashed on this
score also.
24. In Lalit Chaturvedi's case supra, the Apex Court held
as under:-
" 5. This Court, in a number of judgments, has pointed
out the clear distinction between a civil wrong in the form of
breach of contract, non-payment of money or disregard to
and violation of the contractual terms; and a criminal offence
under Sections 420 and 406 IPC. Repeated judgments of
this Court, however, are somehow overlooked, and are not
being applied and enforced. We will be referring to these
judgments. The impugned judgment dismisses the
application filed by the appellants under Section 482CrPC on
the ground of delay/laches and also the factum that the
charge-sheet had been filed on 12-12-2019. This ground and
reason is also not valid.
9. We will assume that the assertions made in the
complaint are correct, but even then, a criminal offence
under Section 420 read with Section 415IPC is not
established in the absence of deception by making false
and misleading representation, dishonest concealment or
any other act or omission, or inducement of the
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complainant to deliver any property at the time of the
contract(s) being entered. The ingredients to allege the
offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the
averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of
money from the appellants. The police is to investigate the
allegations which discloses a criminal act. Police does not
have the power and authority to recover money or act as a
civil court for recovery of money.
10. The charge-sheet also refers to Section 406IPC,
but without pointing out how the ingredients of the said
section are satisfied. No details and particulars are
mentioned. There are decisions which hold that the same
act or transaction cannot result in an offence of cheating
and criminal breach of trust simultaneously. For the offence
of cheating, dishonest intention must exist at the inception
of the transaction, whereas, in case of criminal breach of
trust there must exist a relationship between the parties
whereby one party entrusts another with the property as
per law, albeit dishonest intention comes later.
11. In this case entrustment is missing, in fact it is
not even alleged. It is a case of sale of goods. The charge-
sheet does refer to Section 506IPC relying upon the
averments in the complaint. However, no details and
particulars are given, when and on which date and place
the threats were given. Without the said details and
particulars, it is apparent to us, that these allegations of
threats, etc. have been made only with an intent to activate
police machinery for recovery of money.
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25. The present case is a classic illustration falling within the
parameters and categories 1, 5 and 7 of paragraph-102 of the land
mark judgment of the Apex Court in Bhajanlal's case supra,
wherein it is held as under:-
" 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV
and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the
following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge."
26. As stated supra, the petitioner has placed reliance upon
her earlier / prior complaint dated 02.02.2024 lodged against
Manjula wife of the 2nd respondent and the police notice issued to
her on 03.02.2024; these documents are of sterling and
impeccable quality which irrefutably established that the impugned
complaint and FIR are nothing but a counter blast and are of
retaliatory nature which clearly negates the allegations made in the
complaint, leading to quashment of the complaint and FIR as held
by the Apex Court in Sanjal Bose's case supra, wherein it is held
as under:-
" 20. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
State of West Bengal submitted that the investigation was
conducted strictly in accordance with law and that specific
and clear roles have been attributed to the appellants in the
commission of the alleged offences. It was contended that
the complainant had consistently named the accused
persons including the appellants in the FIR and in his
statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of CrPC.
The CCTV footage seized during investigation, along with
medical records and other documentary material, prima facie
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establishes their presence and participation in the
occurrence in question. It was further urged that the
chargesheet was filed only upon due consideration of the
evidence collected, disclosing cognizable offences, and that
the questions sought to be raised by the appellants revolve
around disputed factual aspects which can be adjudicated
only upon trial. The State, therefore, supported the impugned
judgment of the High Court to the extent it declined to quash
the proceedings against the appellants and submitted that no
case for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India is made out.
32. Recently, this Court in Pradeep Kumar
Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, revisited and further
elucidated the parameters governing the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. While
drawing guidance from earlier precedents, this Court
delineated a structured four-step test to assess the
sustainability of a prayer for quashing criminal
proceedings. The said decision underscores that where
the material relied upon by the accused is of sterling and
impeccable quality; is sufficient to negate the allegations
in the complaint; remains unrefuted or incapable of
justifiable refutation by the prosecution; and where
continuation of the proceedings would amount to an
abuse of the process of Court and not serve the ends of
justice, the High Court would be justified in exercising its
inherent powers to quash the proceedings. For ready
reference, the relevant observations from the said
judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:--
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"20. The following steps should ordinarily
determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing,
raised by an accused by invoking the power vested
in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.: --
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by
the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e.,
the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by
the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in
the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the
material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual
assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is
such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss
and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as
false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon
by the accused, has not been refuted by the
prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that
it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial
would result in an abuse of process of the court, and
would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the
affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court
should persuade it to quash such criminal
proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Such exercise of power,
besides doing justice to the accused, would save
precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in
holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising
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therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would
not conclude in the conviction of the accused."
27. In Vishal Nobel Singh's case supra, the Apex Court
held as under:-
" 18. On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-
sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated are made
out at all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any
cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor have any
documents referred to any forgery or security or any forgery
for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to any
document which has been forged so as to be used as a
genuine document and much less is there any criminal
conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants herein in
the absence of any offence being made out vis-à-vis the
aforesaid sections.
19. In this regard, our attention was drawn to paras
42-44 and 46 of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal [Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal,
(2007) 12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259] , dealing with
Sections 420 and 467IPC, which are extracted hereunder
with regard to Section 420IPC, it was observed thus: (SCC
pp. 15-16)
"42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is
manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes
of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In
the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or
dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second
class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the
person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so
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deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be
fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the
inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or
dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the
offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to
show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the
time of making the promise. From his mere failure to
subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he
all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from
the beginning.
43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of Section
467IPC. ...
44. The following ingredients are essential for
commission of the offence under Section 467IPC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it;
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated in the
aforementioned section.
***
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is
not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking
private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the
accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of
the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts
under Section 482CrPC though wide has to be exercised
sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself
and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal
position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained."
(emphasis supplied)
20. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned
judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged
against the appellant-accused herein are made out. In fact,
we find that the allegations of criminal intent and other
allegations against the appellant-accused herein have been
made with a mala fide intent and therefore, the judgment of
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this Court in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] and
particularly sub-paras (1), (3), (5) and (7) of para 102,
extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of these cases.
It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit
the present prosecution to continue.
21. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC
692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] , reasoned that the criminal
process cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and held
that while entertaining an application for quashing an FIR at
the initial stage, the test to be applied is whether the
uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish the offence.
This Court also concluded that the court should quash those
criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate conviction
are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by
continuation of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid
observations squarely apply to this case.
22. We find that in recent years the machinery of
criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their
vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and
agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such
tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission
having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must
be nipped in the bud.
23. We say so for the reason that while the second
respondent complainant has made grave allegations against
the appellants herein and on whose behalf a charge-sheet
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has also been filed against such allegations, has failed to
appear before this Court to justify the same. Such acts would
not only cause deep fissures and mistrust between people
and also unnecessarily burden the law courts and the
criminal justice system."
28. The aforesaid facts and circumstances clearly
established that the impugned criminal proceedings are manifestly
attended with malafides and are instituted with an ulterior motive to
wreak vengeance upon the petitioner and the impugned
proceedings being an attempt to give a cloak of criminality and
convert an essentially, predominantly and overwhelmingly civil
dispute by giving the same a criminal colour / texture which is
impermissible in law, allowing such proceedings to continue would
be a gross abuse of process of court and would result in travesty of
justice warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.
29. A perusal of the material will indicate that there is a long
unexplained and inordinate delay on the part of the 2nd respondent
in lodging the impugned complaint on 03.02.2024 in relation to
alleged offences said to have been committed over a period of two
years and the impugned complaint and FIR are unsustainable in
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law on this ground also as held by the Apex Court in
Chanchalapathi Das's case supra, wherein it is held as under:-
" 18. It cannot be gainsaid that the High Courts
have power to quash the proceedings in exercise of
powers under Section 482CrPC to prevent the abuse of
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Though the powers under Section 482 should be
sparingly exercised and with great caution, the said
powers ought to be exercised if a clear case of abuse of
process of law is made out by the accused. In State of
Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy the Supreme Court had held
that the criminal proceedings could be quashed by the
High Court under Section 482 if the court is of the opinion
that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an
abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceedings are to be quashed.
19. This Court, way back in 1992 in the landmark
decision State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, after considering
relevant provisions more particularly Section 482CrPC
and the principles of law enunciated by this Court relating
to the exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226,
had laid down certain guidelines for the exercise of
powers of quashing, which have been followed in
umpteen number of cases. The relevant part thereof
reads as under
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
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in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision
in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge."
20. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy this
Court had observed that the court would be justified to
quash the proceedings if it finds that initiation or
continuance of such proceedings would amount to abuse
of the process of court.
21. As regards inordinate delay in filing the
complaint it has been recently observed by this Court in
Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of T.N. that though
inordinate delay in itself may not be a ground for
quashing of a criminal complaint, however unexplained
inordinate delay must be taken into consideration as a
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very crucial factor and ground for quashing a criminal
complaint.
22. In the light of the aforestated legal position, if
the facts of the case are appreciated, there remains no
shadow of doubt that the complaint filed by the
respondent complainant after an inordinate unexplained
delay of eight years was nothing but sheer misuse and
abuse of the process of law to settle personal scores with
the appellants, and that continuation of such malicious
prosecution would also be further abuse and misuse of
process of law, more particularly when neither the
allegations made in the complaint nor in the charge-
sheet, disclose any prima facie case against the
appellants. The allegations made against the appellants
are so absurd and improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach to a conclusion that there is a sufficient ground
for proceeding against the appellants-accused.
23. Before parting, a few observations made by
this Court with regard to the misuse and abuse of the
process of law by filing false and frivolous proceedings in
the courts need to be reproduced. In the Court in Dalip
Singh v. State of U.P.
"1. For many centuries Indian society cherished
two basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa"
(non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma
Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their
daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-
delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-
Independence era and the people used to feel proud to
tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences.
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However, post-Independence period has seen drastic
changes in our value system. The materialism has
overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal
gain has become so intense that those involved in
litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court
proceedings."
24. In Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India it was
observed as under :
"191. The Indian judicial system is grossly afflicted
with frivolous litigation. Ways and means need to be
evolved to deter litigants from their compulsive obsession
towards senseless and ill-considered claims."
25. We would like to add that just as bad coins
drive out good coins from circulation, bad cases drive out
good cases from being heard on time. Because of the
proliferation of frivolous cases in the courts, the real and
genuine cases have to take a backseat and are not being
heard for years together. The party who initiates and
continues a frivolous, irresponsible and senseless
litigation or who abuses the process of the court must be
saddled with exemplary cost, so that others may deter to
follow such course. The matter should be viewed more
seriously when people who claim themselves and project
themselves to be the global spiritual leaders, engage
themselves into such kind of frivolous litigations and use
the court proceedings as a platform to settle their
personal scores or to nurture their personal ego.
26. Having regard to the facts and circumstances
of the present case and for the reasons stated
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hereinabove, we deem it appropriate to quash the
criminal proceedings pending against the appellants in
the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, arising out
of FIR No. 33 of 2009 registered at Ballygunge Police
Station, and quash the same."
30. So also, in Harilal's case supra, the Apex Court held as
under:-
20. Although there might not have been a specific
question put to PW-9 as regards the delay in lodging the FIR
but the fact that it was a delayed FIR cannot be ignored.
When an FIR is delayed, in absence of proper explanation,
the courts must be on guard and test the evidence
meticulously to rule out possibility of embellishments in the
prosecution story, inasmuch as delay gives opportunity for
deliberation and guess work. More so, in a case where
probability of no one witnessing the incident is high, such as
in a case of night occurrence in an open place or a public
street"
31. In Rikhab's case supra, the Apex Court held as under;
18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court
referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab wherein it was
observed that a breach of contract does not give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the
transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep a
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promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings.
Thus, the dishonest intention on the part of the party who is
alleged to have committed the offence of cheating should be
established at the time of entering into the transaction with
the complainant, otherwise the offence of cheating is not
established or made out.
32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of
the considered opinion that continuation of the impugned complaint
and FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto would amount
to abuse of process of law / court warranting interference by this
Court in the present petition and consequently, the impugned
complaint and FIR and all further proceedings deserve to be
quashed.
33. In the result, I pass the following:-
ORDER
(i) Petition is hereby allowed.
(ii) The impugned complaint dated 03.02.2024 lodged by the
SPONSORED
2nd respondent – de facto complainant and impugned FIR in Crime
No.23/2024 dated 03.02.2024 registered by the 1st respondent –
Police and all further proceedings pursuant thereto insofar as the
petitioner – accused is concerned, are hereby quashed.
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(iii) It is made clear that the present order is passed without
prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in any other
pending / future civil litigation between the parties before any court
or forum and all rival contentions in this regard are kept / left open
and no opinion is expressed on the merits / demerits of the rival
contentions.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
Srl.
