Gauhati High Court
Soven Mikir vs Sri Nalin Mikir Anr 9 Ors on 5 May, 2026
Page No.# 1/22
GAHC010205302025
2026:GAU-AS:6214
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/3036/2025
SOVEN MIKIR
S/O LATE KANTIRAM MIKIR, R/O VILL. BETKUCHI (KHEPINIJAL),
GUWAHATI 781034, ASSAM.
VERSUS
SRI NALIN MIKIR ANR 9 ORS
S/O LATE BOLO RAM MIKIR, VILL. KHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI), P.S.
GORCHUK, GUWAHATI 34, DIST. KAMRUP (M), GUWAHATI.
2:SRI MUNINDRA MIKIR
S/O LATE BOLO RAM MIKIR
VILLAGEKHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.SGORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DISTKAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI
3:SMTI RANGMILI MIKIR
S/O LATE BOLO RAM MIKIR
VILLAGEKHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.SGORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DISTKAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI
4:THE KHEPANIJAL GAON UNNAYAN SAMITEE
VILLAGEKHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI) P.SGARCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DISTRICT-KAMRUP(M)
GUWAHAT
Page No.# 2/22
5:SRI JOGEN BEY
S/O DEBARAM BEY
SECRETARY OF KHEPANIJAL GAON UNAYAN SAMITTEE
VILLAGE- KHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.S-GORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DISTKAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI
6:SRI DHARMESWAR TUMUNG
EX-PRESIDENT OF KHEPANIJAL UNNAYAN SAMITTEE
VILLAGEKHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.SGORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DISTKAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI.
7:SRI GAJEN BEY
S/O PUTI RAM BEY
EX-SECRETARY OF KHAPANIJAL GAON UNNAYAN SAMITTEE
VILLAGE- KHAPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.S-GORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DISTKAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI.
8:SRI PULIN MIKIR
S/O LATE JON MIKIR
VILLAGE- KHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.S-GORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DIST.- KAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI.
9:SRI INDRA MIKIR
S/O LATE JON MIKIR
VILLAGE- KHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.S-GORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
DIST.- KAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI
10:SMTI BENU MIKIR
D/O LATE SUTI RAM MIKIR
VILLAGE KHEPANIJAL (BETKUCHI)
P.S-GORCHUK
GUWAHATI-34
Page No.# 3/22
DISTKAMRUP(M)
GUWAHATI
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. B D DEKA, MR. A BHATRA,MR. A DEKA,N
CHAUDHURY,MR. M DAS
Advocate for the Respondent : MR D TALUKDAR (R-1 TO 7), MR A UPADHYAY (R-8,9,10),MS.
JYOTI CHETRY (R-8,9,10),MR P UPADHYAY (R-8,9,10),MR P CHOWDHURY(R-1 TO 7)
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
ORDER
Date : 05-05-2026
Heard Mr. B.D. Deka, learned counsel for the applicant and Mr. P.
Chowdhury, learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 1 to 7.
2. This application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1965 is preferred
by the applicant for condoning delay of 218 days in preferring the review
petition, under Chapter X of the Gauhati High Court Rules, read with Order
XLVII Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC, against the judgment and order dated 20.12.2024,
passed by this Court in Regular First Appeal, herein after RFA No. 82/2018.
3. Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant has
preferred a review petition, under Chapter X of the Gauhati High Court Rules,
read with Order XLVII Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC, for reviewing the judgment and
order dated 20.12.2024, passed by this Court in RFA No. 82/2018. Mr. Deka also
submits that the present applicant is a necessary party in the RFA No. 82/2018.
3.1. Mr. Deka further submits that during the pendency of the RFA, the present
opposite party Nos. 1 – 7 filed an interlocutory application, being I.A.(Civil) No.
4078/2019, for impleadment of the defendant Nos. 1, 2 & 3 of the Title Suit No.
Page No.# 4/22
277/2013, in the RFA, including the present applicant, as necessary party and
this Court, vide order dated 02.12.2019, was pleased to issue notice to the
defendant Nos. 1, 2 & 3, including the present applicant and on receipt of the
notice, the applicant entered appearance in the said IA. But, the same was
closed on 20.12.2024, for not being pressed.
3.2. Mr. Deka also submits that the present applicant was not aware about the
judgment and order, passed by this court on 20.12.2024, in the aforementioned
RFA and also about closing of the aforesaid IA on 20.12.2024 and that the same
came to the knowledge of the applicant only on 01.04.2025, when he contacted
with the Advocate to inquire about the outcome of the said IA. Thereafter, the
applicant had contacted with the local counsel and also one counsel of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. Then, as per advice of the counsel of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, one Special Leave Petition, being SLP (Civil) No. 7498/2025,
was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. But, the same was dismissed on
withdrawal on 25.07.2025. Thereafter, the applicant had applied for the order of
the said SLP on 29.07.2025, but he received the same on 08.08.2025. Then, he
engaged one counsel to prepare the review petition for being filed before this
Court and the said counsel took 16 days time to prepare the same from the date
of the pronouncement of the judgment and order in the aforementioned RFA
and in that process, 218 days delay have been occurred, but there is no delay
from the date of the order of dismissal of the SLP. Mr. Deka also submits that
the delay is not intentional rather it is circumstantial and that the applicant has
a good case and the same may be heard on merit. Otherwise the applicant
would suffer serious prejudice.
3.3. Under the above mentioned circumstances, Mr. Deka has contended to
allow this application.
Page No.# 5/22
4. Per-contra, Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 1 –
7, has vehemently opposed the application. His contention is that the applicant
has suppressed material facts and pointed out that the applicant had made a
false statement before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the effect that he was
inadvertently not arrayed as a Respondent in the RFA No. 82 of 2018, and the
same is an incorrect statement made before the Hon’ble Supreme Court on
oath.
4.1. Mr. Chouwdhury has pointed out that this Court while hearing the RFA No.
82 of 2018, vide order dated 26.11.2019 (ANNEXURE-R-2_ had directed the
learned counsel for these respondents to examine as to whether the defendant
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was required to be impleaded in the R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018, filed
by the present respondents. Mr. Chowdhury also submits that the defendant
Nos. 1 to 3 were not made respondents in the RFA as the present respondents
did not claim any reliefs against the Defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 before this
Court. Then the respondents herein on the basis of the directions of this Court
had filed an application (ANNEXURE-R-3), under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) read with
Section 151 of the C.P.C., 1908, on 27.11.2019, for impleading the defendant
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in T.S. No. 277 of 2013 in the R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018, upon which
I.A. (C) No. 4078 of 2019 in R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018, was registered.
4.2. It is the further submission of Mr. Chowdhury that the respondent herein
also, along with the present application filed an amended Memo of Appeal
wherein the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were made as respondent Nos. 4, 5 and
6 in R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018. The present applicant who was arrayed as defendant
No.3 in the Suit was arrayed as respondent No.6. in the R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018.
The Applicant is totally silent about the Orders passed in I.A. (C) No. 4078 of
2019 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Then this court vide order dated
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02.12.2019 in (C) No. 4078 of 2019 in R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018 had issued show
cause notices to the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6
respectively.
4.3. Mr. Chowdhury also pointed it out that then as directed the respondents
had effect service of notice by dasti mode upon them as respondent Nos. 4 to 6
respectively. Then the impleaded respondents including defendant
No.3/respondent No.6 (RFA No.82 of 2018), the present applicant had filed his
Vakalatnama (ANNEXURE-R-7) before this Court on 24.02.2020. And as the
impleaded respondents including the present applicant are being represented by
their Advocates, it was for this reason the present respondents did not press the
I.A. No. 4078 of 2019 in R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018 on 20.12.2024 as the relief
sought for in the said application had materialised in the R.F.A. No.82 of 2018.
Further the Order dated 20.12.2024 passed by this Hon’ble Court in I.A. No.
4078 of 2019 in R.F.A. No. 82 of 2018 had showed that the said Respondent
No.6/present Applicant, namelyn Souven Mikir had been represented by his
Advocate in the proceeding of RFA No. 82 of 2018.
4.4. It is the further submission of Mr. Chowdhury that the applicant, thus, has
not moved to this Court with clean hands and he is guilty of suppressing
material fact and thereby, projecting false picture before this Court and also
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and on such count, the applicant is not
entitled to any equitable relief from this Court.
4.5. Mr. Chowdhury also submits that the contentions made in paragraph Nos.
3 – 6 of the present application are incorrect and misleading. He further submits
that Hon’ble Supreme Court did not condone the delay of 110 days in filing the
SLP (Civil) No. 7498/2025 and that the order of the SLP was passed on
25.07.2025 and the same was uploaded in the official website of the Hon’ble
Page No.# 7/22
Supreme Court on the same day and the certified copy of the said order was
available on the same day after it was being uploaded and that the applicant
received the certified copy of the same on 08.08.2025, from his counsel at Delhi
cannot be said to be properly explained.
4.6. Mr. Chowdhury further submits that the averments made in the remaining
paragraphs are also incorrect and misleading and under such circumstances, he
has contended to dismiss this petition.
4.7. Mr. Chowdhury has also referred to a decision of a co-ordinate bench of
this Court, in the case of Union of India (Railways) vs. Manipur Tea
Trading Company, reported in 2008 (4) GLT 897, to contend that
condonation of delay in filing review petition is discretionary and it should be
exercised only when there are reasonable explanations or sufficient cause and
the same is to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the given case.
4.9. Referring to another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay vs. Amateur Riders Club,
Bombay, reported in 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 603, Mr.
Chowdhury submits that the applicant must furnish judicially reasonable
grounds for condonation of delay and as the applicant herein has failed to
explain the delay, the same cannot be condoned to the prejudice of the
respondent herein. Therefore, he has contended to dismiss the application.
5. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, this
Court has carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed
on record and has also perused the decisions referred by Mr. Chowdhury,
learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 1 – 7.
6. It appears that the judgment in RFA was passed on 20.12.2024 and the
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Review Petition was filed on 26.08.2025. The Registry, as directed has
calculated the delay as under:-
Sl. No. Months Days
01. December, 2024 11 days
02. January, 2024 31 days
03. February, 2024 28 days
04. March, 2025 31 days
05. April, 2025 30 days
06. May, 2025 31 days
07. June, 2025 30 days
08. July, 2025 31 days
09. August, 2015 22 days(preceding 3 days
being holidays
Total 245 days
Limitation 30 days
Delay in filing Review Petition 215 days (245-30 = 215)
6.1. Further, the steps taken by the applicant on different dates indicated in
the chart below:-
Sl. No. Relevant dates Activities
01. 20.12.2024 Judgment in RFA delivered and I.A. for
impleadment closed
02. 01.04.2025 Applicant came to know about the outcome
of the case when enquired about the same
from his counsel
03. 24.04.2025 SLP (Civil) No. 7498/2025 filed in Supreme
Court
04. 25.07.2025 SLP dismissed on withdrawal
05. 29.07.2025 Applicant applied for the order of the SLP
on 29.07.2025
06. 08.08.2025 Received certified copy
07. 26.08.2025 Review petition filed
7. It is to be noted here that in the case of Manipur Tea Trading Company
Page No.# 9/22
(supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court has held that it is well settled
proposition of law that question as to whether or not there is sufficient cause or
reasonable explanation for condonation of delay, the same is to be decided on
the facts and circumstances of a given case and that the power to extend the
prescribed period of limitation, on the concerned application, is a discretionary
one and could be exercised only when there are reasonable explanations or
sufficient cause as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
7.1 Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court, in several earlier cases, has laid down the
principles for condonation of delay and the same are discussed herein below:-
7.2. In the Case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr.
vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, has observed
as under:-
“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay
by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963
in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to
parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression
“sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in
a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice –
that being the life purpose for the existence of the
institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this
Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in
the hierarchy, and such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit
by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
Page No.# 10/22meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highest that
can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits
after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not
every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The
doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense
pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause
of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for
the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non deliberate
delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence,
or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he
runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected
not on account of its power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning
the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact
that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation
and not a private party was altogether irrelevant.
The doctrine of equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant, are
accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even-handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when
Page No.# 11/22
the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation
of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of
an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the
matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought
to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making,
file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on
its part is less difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve. In any event, the State which
represents the collective cause of the community does
not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts
therefore have to be informed with the spirit and
philosophy of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”.
So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its
application to matters at hand with the end in view
to do even- handed justice on merits in preference to
the approach which scuttles a decision on
merits.————-”
7.3. Again in the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy;
reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, Hon’ble Supreme Court went a step further and
made the following observations:-
“It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter
of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can
be exercised only if the delay is within a certain
limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of
the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes
delay of the shortest range may be un-condonable due
to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in
certain other cases, delay of a very long range can
be condoned as the explanation thereof is
Page No.# 12/22satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation
as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise
of discretion and normally the superior court should
not disturb such finding, much less in revisional
jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was
on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse.
But it is a different matter when the first court
refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the
superior court would be free to consider the cause
shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such
superior court to come to its own finding even
untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their
remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of
legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan
for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time
would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer
causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to
seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a
lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending
period for launching the remedy may lead to unending
uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is
enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit
finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a
period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are
not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They
are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The
idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive
for a legislatively fixed period of time.
Page No.# 13/22
It must be remembered that in every case of delay,
there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his
plea and to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not
put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court
must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But
when there is reasonable ground to think that the
delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to
gain time, then the court should lean against
acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the
delay, the court should not forget the opposite party
altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a
loser and he too would have incurred quite large
litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline
that when courts condone the delay due to laches on
the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate
the opposite party for his loss.”
7.4. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649,
Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring to earlier authorities, broadly culled out the
principles of condonation of delay as under:-
“21.1.i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay,
for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy
and purpose regard being had to the fact that
these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining
Page No.# 14/22fact- situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal
the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the
part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice
and cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot
be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay
and a delay of short duration or few days, for
to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal
delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration.
It is so as the fundamental principle is that
the courts are required to weigh the scale of
Page No.# 15/22
balance of justice in respect of both parties
and the said principle cannot be given a total
go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation
by taking recourse to the technicalities of law
of limitation.
xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinized and the approach should be based on
the paradigm of judicial discretion which is
founded on objective reasoning and not on
individual perception.
Xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.
7.5. In addition to aforesaid principles, Hon’ble Supreme Court also added
some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, in the aforesaid
case and these are: –
“a) An application for condonation of delay should be
drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard
manner harbouring the notion that the courts are
required to condone delay on the bedrock of the
principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
seminal to justice dispensation system.
b) An application for condonation of delay should not be
dealt with in a routine manner on the base of
Page No.# 16/22individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard
being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet
a conscious effort for achieving consistency and
collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be
made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity
can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to
be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
7.6. Again in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), while dealing with
the issue of condonation of delay, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the
object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based
on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy
for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to
see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly.
Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws
come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the
sleepy.
30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount
consideration in exercising the courts’ discretion
wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes.
Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings
in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and
timely payment of compensation to the land losers
facilitating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is
equally an integral part of public policy. Public
interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of
acquisition, as the case may be, should not be
allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled
legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable
litigation unless the claimants are guilty of
Page No.# 17/22deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not
entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not
forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not
the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These
public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind
by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing
with the application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of
law years after the termination of legal proceedings
would not serve any public interest. Settled rights
cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning
inordinate delay without there being any proper
explanation of such delay on the ground of
involvement of public revenue. It serves no public
interest.
31. It is true that when the State and its
instrumentalities are the applicants seeking
condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain
amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same
for citizen and for governmental authorities. The
Limitation Act does not provide for a different
period to the Government in filing appeals or
applications as such. It would be a different matter
where the Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of
fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or
agents and where the officers were clearly at cross
purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts
are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from
consideration and those factors may go into the
judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts
are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the
learned counsel for the respondent was made to
suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We
cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar
without there being any proper foundation in the
pleadings.”
8. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid
Page No.# 18/22
decisions and discussion, is that courts are not supposed to legalize injustice,
but are obliged to remove injustice. Therefore, liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non- pedantic approach has to be adopted while dealing with an
application for condonation of delay if ‘sufficient cause’ is being shown. The
terms ‘sufficient cause’ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy
and purpose and having regard to the fact that these terms are basically elastic
and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. The
paramount and pivotal consideration is substantial justice; the technical
considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. In respect
of deliberate causation of delay the presumption is not available but, gross
negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of, besides
lack of bona-fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay, which is a
significant and relevant fact. The courts should not adhere to strict proof, but
are required to be vigilant so that there is no real failure of justice. The
approach of the court must be liberal but at the same time it must be
reasonable also. In case of inordinate delay, a strict approach is required to be
taken while in case of delay of short duration, a liberal delineation is required.
The fundamental principle, being weighing the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in
the name of liberal approach. While condoning delay the conduct, behaviour
and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors
to be taken into consideration. In the case of the explanation, being offered is
concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should
be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. The
entire gamuts of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should
be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective
Page No.# 19/22
reasoning and not on individual perception. The State or a public body or an
entity, representing a collective cause, should be given some acceptable
latitude. But, the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental
authorities.
9. Thus, having informed ourselves about the proposition of law presently
holding the field in respect of condonation of delay, now an endeavour will be
made how far the applicant has been able to explain the delay of in preferring
the connected review petition.
10. It is not in dispute that this Court has pronounced the judgment in RFA
No. 82/2018 on 20.12.2024. It is also not in dispute that the period of limitation
for filing a review petition is 30 days. And from the calculation sheet of the
Registry at in para No. 6, herein above, that total delay is 245 days. And after
deducting 30 days the period, which the applicant is entitled to, the period
remained is 215 days are required to be explained by the applicant. And even
for the sake of argument and as contention of the supplicant, if we deduct the
period of pendency of the SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court from the date
of filing on 24.04.2025 till 25 07.2025, on which the same was dismissed, then
also from the there is delay of 129 days, which the applicant herein has to
explain in the present application.
10.1. Now, it is to be seen how the applicant has explained this much of delay.
From the statements and averments made in the application and also from the
submission of Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the applicant, it appears that
though the judgment of the RFA was pronounced on 20.12.2024, the applicant
came to know about the same only on 01.04.2025, when he inquired about the
Page No.# 20/22
outcome of the said RFA from his counsel. Thereafter, he preferred one SLP
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. But, the same came to be dismissed on
25.07.2025. And as per submission of Mr. Deka, the certified copy of the said
order was issued on 29.07.2025, and it was sent to the applicant by his counsel
from Delhi to Guwahati and he received the same only on 08.08.2025. But, in
support of the aforesaid contentions, the applicant had failed to produce any
supporting document.
10.2. Though the applicant and his counsel has contended that he had received
the certified copy of the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court on 08.08.2025, and his
counsel started to prepare the review petition on 09.08.2025 and took 16 days
time to file the same before this Court and from the date of dismissal of his SLP,
on 25.07.2025 there is no delay, as the review petition was filed on 35.08.2025,
yet this contention of Mr. Deka left this Court unimpressed as pointed it out by
Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel for the opposite party Nos. 1 – 7 that Hon’ble
Supreme Court has never condoned the delay in filing the SLP. Article 124 of the
Limitation Act provides that the period of limitation in filing the review petition is
30 days. And the period has to be counted from the date of pronouncement of
the judgment or order.
10.3. As pointed out by Mr. Chowdhury, the learned counsel for the respondent,
it appears that the applicant had made a false statement before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. He stated that he was inadvertently not arrayed as a
Respondent in the RFA No. 82 of 2018. Thus, it appears that the applicant has
not approached the Court with clean hands. It is the categorical submission of
Mr. Chowdhury that the applicant is guilty of suppressing material fact and
thereby, projecting false picture before this Court and on such count, the
Page No.# 21/22
applicant is not entitled to any equitable relief from this Court. There appears to
be considerable force in the submission of Chowdhury.
11. It is apparent from the facts and circumstances placed on record that in
the said RFA, the respondent herein, as per direction of this court has filed one
IA for the impleadment of defendant No.1, 2 and 3 and this Court, vide order
dated 02.12.2019, issued notice to the defendant No. 1, 2 and 3 and the
defendant No.3, the present applicant had entered appearance by filing his
Vakalatnama (ANNEXURE-R-7) before this Court on 24.02.2020. And as the
impleaded respondents including the present applicant, are being represented
by their Advocate the said I.A. was not pressed for which, on 20.12.2024, the
same was closed. These facts were suppressed by the applicant before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court and he had projected a false picture before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and also before this court on such count, the applicant is not
entitled to any equitable relief from this Court.
12. Thus, it appears that the applicant herein has demonstrated lackadaisical
propensity and that too in a non-challant manner towards the I.A. and also in
filing the review petition. There is gross negligence on his part, besides there is
also lack of bona fides, which is a very significant and relevant fact. Even
without adhering to strict proof, also it cannot be said that the delay is
satisfactorily explained. Whatever ground the applicant has assigned is deemed
unreasonable. Under such circumstances is the delay is condoned by taking a
liberal approach then there will be failure of justice.
13. Further, it appears that he has suppressed some material facts and
approached this Court with unclean hands seeking equitable relief which is not
at all permissible. Even if there is merit in the petition, as submitted by Mr.
Page No.# 22/22
Deka, learned counsel for the applicant, his approach to this court with unclean
hands, override the same.
14. Thus, applying the proposition of law in respect of condonation of delay,
as discussed and crystallized in para No.8, herein above, to the given facts and
circumstances of the present case, this Court find that the applicant herein has
failed to furnish judicially acceptable grounds for the delay of 139 days in filing
the review petition, with I.A. for delay condonation.
15. In the result, this court finds this application devoid of substance and
accordingly the same stands dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own
costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
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