Bombay High Court
Sohel Ali Aijaz Ali vs The State Of Maharashtra Thr Pso., … on 15 July, 2026
2026:BHC-NAG:9062
apeal255.2026.odt
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 255 OF 2026
APPELLANT :- Sohel Ali Aijaz Ali,
Age -34 years, Occu: Service,
R/o Fatakpura, Khamgaon,
Tq. Khamgaon, District Buldhana.
..VERSUS..
RESPONDENTS :- 1) The State of Maharashtra, through
P.S.O. Shegaon City, Tq. Shegaon
District Buldhana.
2) Prarkash Laxman Tayade,
Aged 65 years, Occu: Retired, R/o
Gaulkhed Road, Behind Hotel
Sharnam, Shegaon, Tq. Shegaon,
District Buldhana, Mob.
No. 8830037317.
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Mr. V.B. Bhise, counsel for appellant.
Mr. S.C. Joshi, APP for respondent No.1/State.
Mr. Hariom V. Dhage, counsel for respondent No.2..
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CORAM : Y.G. KHOBRAGADE J.
DATE : 15/07/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. Heard.
2. Admit.
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3. By the present appeal filed under Section 14(A) of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989, (for short ‘the Act of 1989), the appellant takes
exception to the order dated 18/05/2026 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Khamgaon, in Anticipatory Bail
Application No.168 of 2026, thereby refused to enlarge the
appellant/accused on anticipatory bail in connection with Crime
No. 261 of 2026 registered with Shegaon City Police Station,
District Buldhana, for the offences punishable under Section 296,
351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, read with Section
3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989. The appellant
has further prayed for enlarging on anticipatory bail in connection
with said crime during pendency of the trial.
4. Having regard to the submissions canvassed on behalf of
the appellant, respondent No.1/State, and respondent No.2 /
informant, I have carefully gone through the record. It reveals that
on 24/04/2026, respondent No.2/informant lodged a report at
Shegaon Police Station alleging that on 15/04/2026, one Sheikh
Akbar Sheikh Imam had called him at furniture shop situated at
Watika square. Accordingly, the informant visited the said place. At
that time, the present appellant/accused, his younger brother,
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parents, and his sister-in-law were present. So also, one Rehman
Sir, the informant along with Shekh Akbar were also present.
5. It is alleged that at that time, Shekh Akbar had told the
present appellant to treat his daughter properly and to discontinue
his alleged illicit relationship with his sister-in-law ( his brother’s
wife). At that time, Mr. Sheikh Akbar had played the conversation
recorded in his mobile between the present appellant/accused and
his sister-in-law. Upon hearing the recording, the present
appellant/accused allegedly became enraged and, in front of the
furniture shop and in the presence of the persons assembled there,
arrogantly abused the informant in his caste by saying that :- ” ge
eqlyeku gS | rq gekjs fcp eSa cksydj eknjpksni.kk er dj] rqe paHkkMks dh
vkSjrs Hkh nqljs vkneh ds ikl tkrh] esjsdks rqe fl[kkvks er] rsjh vkSdkr tqrs
lkQ dj.ks rd gS paHkkYMs vls cksywu R;kus eyk v’yhy] xfyPN o tkrhokpd
f’kohxkG dsyh o /kedkoys] rlsp R;kus eyk /kedkowu lkafxrys dh] eS] rqedks ns[k
yqaxk | eh paHkkj lektkpk vlY;kph lksgsy vyh ,tkt vyh ;kl iw.kZ ekfgrh
vlrkaukgh R;kus eyk okVhdk pkSdkrhy jksMoj tkrhokpd f’kohxkG d#u viekuhr
dsys”
6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant canvassed
that some matrimonial dispute exists between the appellant and
his wife. It is further submitted that the appellant had not abused
the informant within public view. Therefore, the ingredients of the
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offence under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act, 1989 does
not attracted. Hence, no bar is created under Section 18 of the Act
of 1989 would not operate.
7. In support of his submission, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant placed reliance in the case of Dharmendra s/o
Baliram Soni Vs State of Maharashtra and another [ 2022 (4)
Mh.L.J. (Cri.) 612], wherein this Court held in para Nos. 11 to 14
as under :-
“11. We may now, deal with the judicial
pronouncements directly on the issue cited by the
learned Advocate for the applicant. In the case of Dr.
Manali w/o Makrand Kshirsagar and another Vs. State
of Maharashtra and another, 2020 (3)Mh.L.J. (Cri.)
127=2020 All MR (Cri) 945, it is held that the acts
contemplated namely the insult or intimidation must
occur in any place within public view. It is further held
that the presence of this ingredient would be absolutely
necessary to constitute an offence under the said
provision of law. If the complaint discloses absence of
the ingredient, the same could not be sufficient to
accuse the person of having committed an offence under
this section.
12. While deciding the case of Dr. Manali (supra)
the Division Bench has considered the law laid down by
Division Bench in the case of Pradnya Pradeep Kenkare
and another Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2005
(3) Mh.L.J. 368. The relevant observations directly on
the point can be found from paragraph 8 of the
decision. We deem it appropriate to reproduce
paragraph No.8 of the said judgment.
It reads thus:-
“8. However, the learned Advocate is justified in
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contending that the complaint nowhere discloses that
the said expression was used in public view. In fact, the
contents of the FIR nowhere disclose that the said
expression was communicated to the complainant either
in the place accessible to the public or in the presence of
the public. It is nowhere stated by the complainant that
at the time when the said statement was made by the
petitioner No.2, i.e. on 15th August, 2004 at 9:30 a.m.,
there was any stranger to witness the said incident. The
provisions of section 3(1)(x) of the said Act would be
attracted only in case of insulting or intimidating a
member of the scheduled caste in any place within a
public view. The expression “in any place within public
view” has specific meaning. It does not mean that every
allegation made in a public place that itself would
amount to an offence under the said Act. The expression
“public view” has been prefixed by the preposition
“within” which in fact follows the expression “in any
place”. In other words, the expression relating to the
location of the alleged offence is qualified by the
requirement of being “within public view”. The act of
insult or intimidation must be visible and audible to the
public in order to constitute such act to be an offence
under section 3(1)(x) of the said Act. In the provision of
law comprised under section 3(1) (x) of the said Act,
the word “view” refers to that of ‘public’ but prefixed by
the expression “in any place within”. Being so, the word
“public” not only relates to the location defined by the
word “place” but also to the subjects witnessing the
incidence of insult or intimidation to the member of
scheduled caste or tribe. Therefore, the incidence of
insult or intimidation has to occur in a place accessible
to and in the presence of the public. The presence of
both these ingredients would be absolutely necessary to
constitute an offence under the said provision of law.
The complaint disclosing absence of both or even any
one of those ingredients would not be sufficient to
accuse the person of having committed an offence under
Section 3(1)(x) of the said Act.”
13. It is to be noted that the facts of the case of
Pradnya (supra) are similar to the facts of this case. In
the case of Pradnya, the offence alleged was committed
in the cabin of the Principal of college and the Principal
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alone was present with the informant in the cabin. In
our view, the proposition in the judgments cited supra
has settled the legal position. The decisions in the case
of Dr. Manali and Pradnya (supra) was followed by the
Division Bench of this Court in the case of Avakash s/o
Sudhakarrao Ingole Vs. State of Maharashtra and
another reported in 2022(3) Mh.L.J. (Cri.)17 = 2021
ALL MR (Cri) 3435 to which one of us (G.A. Sanap) was
a member. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Hitesh Verma Vs. State of Uttarakhand and another,
2020 Mh.L.J Online (Cri) (S.C.) 41 = (2020) 10 SCC
710, had an occasioned to consider the provisions of
Section 3(1)(r) and (s) of the SC ST Act. It is held in
this case that the basic ingredients that the words
uttered in any place within public view must be
established. It is held that if this ingredient is not
satisfied then the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and (s)
would not get attracted.
14. We have already stated the relevant facts and
the material collected during the course of investigation.
In this case except the informant/respondent No.2 there
is no independent witness to the incident. The incident
according to the prosecution occurred inside the cabin.
It therefore, goes without saying that this basic
ingredient of the occurrence of the atrocities as
contemplated under Section 3(1) (r) and (s) in any
place within public view has not been made out. The
solitary statement of the informant-respondent No.2 if
appreciated in the backdrop of the law laid down in the
judgment cited supra, would show that the offences
alleged to have been committed by the applicant /
accused have not been made out. In order to consider
the submissions and to apply the provisions of law and
the law laid down in the judicial pronouncements, we
have undertaken the exercise of a prima-facie
consideration of the material on record. The material,
on prima-facie consideration does not make out the
offence. The continuation of prosecution, in view of the
above observation, would be miscarriage of a justice.
Therefore, the prosecution deserves to be quashed.
Hence following order:-
ORDER
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(A) Criminal Application is allowed in terms of
prayer clause (i) which reads thus:-
“quash and set aside the FIR No.174/2020, Dt.
17/03/2020 registered with Non-applicant No.1 Police
Station, Dharni, Tq. Dharni, Dist. Amravati for the
offence punishable under sections 504 and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(r),(s) of the SC and
ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Application allowed.”
8. It is further relied in the case of Afshamaskar Laikhkan
Pathan @ Afsha Firdos Ujede and others Vs State of Maharashtra
and another [2025 (2) Mh.L.J. (Cri.) 300] , wherein the Division
Bench of this Court (Aurangabad Bench) observed in para-23 as
under :-
“23. Prima facie, the presence of accused Nos. 1 to
4 at the spot of the incident at the alleged time of the
offence cannot be ruled out at this stage in the light of
allegations made in the First Information Report which
is supported by their CDRs. Respondent No.2 has
alleged in the First Information Report itself that
applicant Nos. 1 to 4 had also abused her by making
casteist remarks while beating her. Although some
improvements have been made in the statement
recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure dated 04.08.2022, we find that the
allegation that casteist, abuses were hurled at
respondent No.2 find place in the First Information
Report although, they are lacking in particulars. The
question that falls for consideration is whether these
alleged acts on the part of applicant Nos. 1 to 4 will
attract the rigors of section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the
Atrocities Act. Section 3(1)(r) is attracted when a
member of scheduled caste is intentionally insulted or
intimidated with an intention to humiliate him/her in
any place within ‘public view’. Likewise Section 3(1)(s)
is attracted when a member of Scheduled Caste or
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Scheduled Tribe is abused by the name of caste in any
place within a ‘ public view’. Perusal of the said
provisions would indicate that mere insult or
intimidation with a view to humiliate or hurling abuses
in the name of caste will not constitute an offence
under the said provisions. The offence under the said
provisions will be made out only if such act of insult/
intimidation with a view to humiliate and/ or abuse in
the name of caste is in public view. It will be pertinent
to mention here that the incident need not be in a
public place. It has to be in public view.”
9. Per contra, the learned APP canvassed that, as per the
contents of the FIR, the incident occurred in broad daylight at
about 1.30 p.m. in front of the Apana Furniture Shop, near Watika
Shopa at Shegaon. It is alleged that the appellant/accused
intentionally abused the respondent No.2/informant by uttering
his caste in public view. The applicant is well aware that,
informant belongs to Scheduled Caste, as both of them are known
to each other since last more than two years. Therefore, as per the
provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 1989, the bar is created for
enlarging appellant/accused on anticipatory bail. Hence, the
learned APP prayed for rejection of the appeal.
10. Learned counsel for the appearing for respondent No.2
supported the argument canvassed on behalf of the prosecution.
11. Needless to say that, while dealing with the appeal for
anticipatory bail in respect of the offences punishable under
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Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of Act of 1989, it is necessary to
ascertain about occurrence of the incident of casteist. It is well
settled principle of law that, if the incident of casteist is occurred
within the public view, in that event, as per the provision of
Section 18 of the Act of 1989 bar is created to enlarge the accused
on anticipatory bail.
12. In case of Kiran Vs Rajkumar Jivraj Jain and another
[2025 SCC OnLine SC 1886], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
held that where the incident had taken place outside the house of
the appellant, which could be seen by any member of the public, it
was a place within public view. There is no gainsay that in the facts
of the case, all the ingredients necessary to prima-facie constitute
the offences punishable under Section 3 of Act of 1989, as alleged
in the FIR, stood satisfied. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
has observed in para-8 and 9 as under :-
8. In the present case, as noted above, the incident
took place outside the house of the appellant which
could be viewed by anybody. It was indeed a place
within public view. There is no gainsaying that in the
facts of the case all ingredients necessary to prima facie
constitute offences under Section 3 of the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act, 1989 as alleged in the
FIR stood satisfied. Furthermore, the occurrence of
incident was fortified by recovery of clothes and
weapons.
9. In the above view, there is no escape from the
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conclusion that offence under the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is
made out from the bare reading of the FIR. The High
Court in proceeding to evaluate the testimony of
witnesses and to opine on that basis that there were
certain discrepancies, no offence was made out,
committed a manifest error. The anticipatory bail
granted by overlooking of and disregarding the bar of
Section 18 of the Act was a clear illegality and
jurisdictional error committed by the High Court. The
order of the High Court could not be sustained in the
eye of law.
13. In the case of Afshamaskar Laikhkan Pathan @ Afsha
Firods Ujede and others (supra), the Division Bench of this Court
at Aurangabad Bench, while dealing with proceedings seeking
quashing of the FIR, held that where the acts alleged against the
accused are committed in a place within public view with an
intention to insult or intimidate a person belonging to a Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the basis of his or her caste, the
provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 would be attracted.
14. In the present case, as per the contents of the FIR, the
present appellant/accused abused respondent No.2 by uttering his
caste name in front of a furniture shop situated near Watika
Square, Shegaon, in the presence of other persons. The FIR further
speaks that the respondent No.2 was abused in his caste and
issued the life threat. Therefore, considering the law laid down in
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the case of Kiran (supra), the bar under Section 18 of the Act of
1989 it creates to enlarge the appellant/accused on anticipatory
bail.
15. A perusal of the statements of the witnesses recorded
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reveals that
the appellant/accused allegedly abused respondent No. 2 by
uttering his caste name in a place within public view. These
statements shows prima facie support to the allegations made in
the First Information Report.
16. It is pertinent to note that, by order dated 27/05/2026,
while issuing notice, this Court had granted ad interim protection
to the appellant by way of anticipatory bail, subject to certain
terms and conditions. Since the provisions of Section 18 of the Act
of 1989 creates a bar as appellant/accused allegedly abused the
respondent No.2 in his caste in public place.
17. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case,
present appeal stands dismissed and the earlier interim order
granted by this Court stands vacated.
JUDGE
rkn
Signed by: Mr. R.K. NANDURKAR
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 17/07/2026 18:45:43
