Telangana High Court
Smt. Kurakula Shanta vs Sri Kurkula Gajendra Mohan on 16 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
WRIT APPEAL No.1198 of 2025
Date: 16-04-2026
Between :
Smt.Kurakula Shanta .... Appellant
And
1.Kurakula Gajendra Mohan and six others.
.... Respondents.
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar)
Heard Sri Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Sri T.P.S. Harsha and Sri Ekanth, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri
Manu, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 5.
2. The present Appeal is filed by the appellant assailing the order
dated 26.09.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge dated in
W.P.No.17870 of 2025 in setting aside the order dated 17.05.2025 passed
by the Revenue Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate &
Tribunal for Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens,
Hyderabad Division, Hyderabad District (for short ‘the Tribunal’).
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3. The Writ Petition is filed by respondent Nos.1 to 5 challenging the
orders passed by the learned Tribunal constituted under The Maintenance
and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (for short ‘The 2007
Act’ ) in Case No.D/234/2025 dated 17.05.2025 in declaring all the gift
deeds as null and void with consequential prayers.
4. The appellant herein is the mother of the respondent No.1, mother-
in-law of the respondent No.2 and grandmother of the respondent No.3 to
5 filed a case before the respondent No.6 (RDO) seeking cancellation of
seven gift settlement deeds executed in favour of her son i.e. respondent
No.1, secondly, for recovery of a sum of approximately Rs.1.63 crores,
which was fraudulently withdrawn from appellant’s Bank account, and
thirdly, seeking restoration of ownership and possession of the schedule
properties.
5. The learned Tribunal under the2007 Act allowed the application of
the appellant herein declaring the appellant as absolute owner of the ‘A’ &
‘B’ schedule properties therein, having acquired from her late husband and
cancelled all the seven gift settlements deeds with a direction to return
Rs.1,63,35,600/- back to the appellant restoring the share in the developed
properties.
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6. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Tribunal, the respondent
Nos.1 to 5 filed W.P.No.17870 of 2025 before this Court.
7. The primary contention of the respondent Nos.1 to 5 in the Writ
Petition is that the learned Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction declaring the
appellant as the absolute owner and that the learned Tribunal lacked
authority in directing cancellation of gift deeds or order repayment of
Rs.1,63,35,600/-; secondly, on the ground of non-compliance of section
23(1) of the 2007 Act that the gift must be subject to condition of care
which was allegedly not expressly included in the gift deeds; thirdly, the
application before the learned Tribunal is filed by the appellant nearly after
9 years from the first set of gift deeds; fourthly, on the ground of
procedural irregularities as regards the learned Tribunal placing reliance on
the statements of the daughters, which are not supported by oath; fifthly,
on the ground of non-compliance of Rules 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13 of The
Telangana Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules,
2011 (for short ‘The 2011 Rules’); sixthly, on the ground of fraud and
fabrication; and lastly, the draft order passed by the learned Tribunal was
prepared by the Senior Assistant and not by the Presiding Officer, thereby
violating the Judicial sanctity. Therefore, it was prayed to set aside the
order passed by the learned Tribunal.
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8. The appellant/respondent No.1 in the Writ Petition contended that
the Writ Petition was not maintainable since the appellate remedy existed,
and on that ground, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed; the learned
Tribunal passed the order by appreciating the evidence placed on record
that there are consistent fraudulent withdrawals, there is ill-treatment by
the respondent Nos.1 to 5 against the appellant, and there is deception in
execution of gift deed and also basing on the admissions made by
respondent No.1 during the course of hearing, rightly allowed the claim of
the appellant and also section 23 of the 2007 Act is a beneficial provision
which does not require explicit conditions and the conditions can be
implied one. Therefore, the learned Tribunal rightly held in consonance of
the 2007 Act protecting the Senior Citizens from abuse, coercion and
dispossession.
9. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge having
placed significant emphasis on the gift deeds executed in the years 2016,
2018 and 2024, observed that the appellant had approached the Tribunal
only in January, 2025. On that basis, it was held that there was an
inordinate and unexplained delay of about nine years in invoking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Court further held that the essential
preconditions under Section 23(1) of the 2007 Act were not satisfied, as
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there were no explicit conditions incorporated in the gift deeds, nor were
such conditions otherwise clearly established.
10. The impugned order observed that the allegations of fraud and ill-
treatment made by the appellant were vague and unsupported by cogent
evidence. It was observed that the statements of the daughters, in the
absence of substantive proof, were insufficient to establish such
allegations. Consequently, the Tribunal was held to have erred in
cancelling the gift deeds solely on the basis of unsubstantiated claims. The
Court further held that the burden of proving fraud and coercion squarely
lay on the appellant and the Tribunal had wrongly shifted this burden onto
the respondent.
11. In addition, the impugned order noted serious procedural
irregularities in the functioning of the Tribunal. It was noted that the
Tribunal failed to adhere to the requirements under Section 6 of the 2007
Act and Rules 8, 10, 11, and 13 of the 2011 Rules, particularly with regard
to proper recording of evidence, adoption of conciliation procedures and
passing of a reasoned (speaking) order.
12. Therefore, the learned Single Judge set aside the order passed by the
learned Tribunal and allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent
No.1.
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13. Sri Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant mainly contended that the learned Single Judge failed to
appreciate the material evidence and misapplied the provisions of section
23 of the 2007 Act by overlooking the settled proposition of law that
conditions of care and maintenance need not be expressly stated in a gift
deed and they arise implicitly in intra-family transfers.
14. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have
appreciated that the fraud occurred soon after property transfers and ill-
treatment started immediately after obtaining assets and withdrawal of
large sums of money (Rs.31,25,000/- in two days) is unexplained.
15. It was also contended that learned Single Judge ignored the evidence
of daughters and the admission of son/respondent No.1, whereas the
learned Tribunal relied upon the statement of daughters corroborating the
ill-treatment by respondent No.1/son and own admission of respondent
No.1 with regard to unauthorized withdrawals, still the learned Single
Judge ignored the same.
16. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the 2007 Act is a beneficial
legislation, the standard is preponderance of probabilities and the Senior
Citizens cannot provide documentary evidence against their own children
and the learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that the Senior
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Citizens cannot provide documents against their own children. The learned
Single Judge erroneously held that the mother had to prove fraud beyond
reasonable doubt, contrary to the settled jurisprudence.
17. It is also contended that the fact of respondent No.1/son evicted the
mother/appellant, confined her to a single room and failed to provide
medical care and acted with cruelty is a serious issue, but the learned
Single Judge ought to have considered the ill-treatment against the
appellant/mother by the respondent No.1.
18. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the gift executed
with only family witnesses i.e. son and grandson as attesting witnesses
demonstrating the concealment and undue influence. The learned Tribunal
followed the due and proper procedure contemplated under the 2007 Act.
The Section Assistant merely typed the order dictated by the Presiding
Officer and the same is an authorized procedure and not unauthorized as
observed by the learned Single Judge.
19. Finally, it is contended that when both parties admitted the
ownership of mother, the declaration of the learned Tribunal that
mother/appellant being the absolute owner, cannot be considered as
jurisdictional error more particularly, the 2007 Act being a welfare Act
aiming to protect the Senior Citizens from exploitation, abuse and
8
fraudulent deprivation of property and with due respect, the approach of
the learned Single Judge, undermines the objective of Act, 2007.
20. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellant placed reliance on the decisions in Matangi Premlatha Vs.
State of Telangana 1, H.Deepika Vs. Maintenance Welfare of Parents
and others 2, H.Deepika Vs. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and
Senior Citizens Appellate Tribunal and others, 3 Urmila Dixit vs. Sunil
Sharan Dixit4, S. Vanitha vs. The Deputy Commissioner5 and S. Mala
v. District Arbitrator 6.
21. On the other hand, Sri Manu, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent Nos.1 to 5 contended that the object of the 2007 Act is to
provide need based maintenance to the parents and Senior Citizens and
also provide simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim
maintenance for parents/Senior Citizens. In the present case, the need is of
daughters and sons-in-law of the appellant and not that of the appellant,
who is the beloved mother of the respondent No.1.
1
2023 SCC Online TS 397
2
AIR 2020 TS 69
3
2022 SCC Online TS 654
4
(2025)1SCR 105
5
2021 15 SCC 730
6
2025SCC Online Mad 1764
9
22. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5 contended that the
appellant on the instigation of her daughters and sons-in-law wants
partition of the properties and the case is not filed for the reason that she
has no basic amenities and basic physical needs and not for the reason that
respondent No.1 has refused or failed to provide such amenities and
physical needs.
23. It was also contended by the respondent No.1/son that the appellant
is getting about Rs.70,000/- per month towards pension and Rs.30,000/-
per month towards rental income from a residential house and therefore the
application under Rule 4(1) of the 2011 Rules for maintenance is not
maintainable and the provision of section 4 of the 2007 Act is not attracted.
24. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 5 further contended that
there is no fraud as contemplated by Section 23 of the 2007 Act and there
is abnormal delay of nine years where the learned Tribunal failed to take
into consideration of the development of the land into structures as per the
Supplementary deed dated 16.12.2018 and Development Agreement dated
01.02.2021. It is further contended that learned Tribunal exceeded
jurisdiction and acted in perversity by holding that the son has grabbed the
Senior Citizen’s property and money without the consent of the appellant.
The reason for cancelling all the 7 registered documents wherein an order
10
the learned Tribunal that the appellant herein desires to live her rest of life
without any tension being created by the respondents and accordingly
directed cancellation of all the 7 gift deeds.
25. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents
that as per Rule 21(3)(iv) of the 2011 Rules, the application for eviction
has to be made before collector and district magistrate and RDO has no
jurisdiction. In case of eviction, issuance of notice in writing calling upon
all persons to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be
issued against them is mandatory and the appellant has not made
application before the District Collector and District Magistrate.
26. It is further contended that the learned Tribunal failed to follow the
provisions of the Act more particularly, Sections 4, 6(4), 6(6) and 8 of the
2007 Act and Rules 8, 10 and 30 of the 2011 Rules and failed to provide an
opportunity of evidence, no enquiry was conducted and passed the order
on hearsay evidence. It is therefore contended that the learned Tribunal
failed to act judiciously and acted arbitrarily and unreasonably by not
following the mandatory provisions of the 2007 Act.
27. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5 further contends that
there is violation of principles of natural justice, since the learned Tribunal
failed to provide an opportunity to respondent Nos.1 to 5 and after
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reasonable hearing, and therefore, contended that the order passed by the
learned Tribunal is bad in law.
28. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for respondents relied
upon the decisions in Md.Kuddus Ali Vs. State of West Bengal 7,
Chairman and MD VSP Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu 8,
Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and
others9, Union of India and others Vs. Tantia Construct Pvt. Ltd.10, and
contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is just and
reasonable, do not call for re-appreciation by the Division Bench.
29. We have given our earnest consideration to the respective
contentions raised and perused the record.
30. The learned Tribunal, after examining the material on record, found
that the appellant had approached the tribunal not for maintenance but for
protection of her property and to seek redressal against the alleged
financial exploitation by Respondent No. 1, her own son. The respondents
filed counter before tribunal contending that the 2007 Act contemplated
only for grant of maintenance to destitute parents and that the appellant,
who was receiving pension and had her own residence, could not invoke
7
2024 SC Online Calcutta 593
8
2008(5) SCJ 164
9
AIR 1999 SC 22
10
2011(3) SCC 294
12
the provisions of the 2007 Act. It was further contended that the transfers
in question had been made by the appellant voluntarily and out of love and
affection.
31. On perusal of the material placed on record, it is the case of
appellant before the Tribunal is that after the demise of her husband she
continued to reside with the respondent no. 1 and his family and had, for
several years, supported them financially. According to the appellant, the
respondent no.1 had initially obtained her signatures on certain documents
on the pretext of assisting her in matters relating to Aadhaar, PAN cards
and other formalities. She further submitted that she had little knowledge
of digital banking and financial transactions and had trusted her son in
these affairs. It was her submission that taking advantage of this trust, the
respondent no. 1 secured execution of several documents and transferred
properties which stood in her name to himself and to the members of his
family.
32. The contention of the respondent No. 1 is that, in the absence of an
express condition in the gift deeds, the appellant is not entitled to seek
cancellation under Section 23(1) of the 2007Act cannot be accepted. It is
the consistent case of the appellant that the so called gift deeds were not
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voluntary, but were obtained by fraud and misuse of the trust reposed in
her son.
33. It is relevant here to state Section 23 of the 2007 Act:
“23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances
1. Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act,
has by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition
that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic
physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to
provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of
property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or
under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be
declared void by the Tribunal.
2. Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of
an estate and such estate or part, thereof is transferred, the right to
receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the
transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but
not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of
right.
3. If any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-
sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the
organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section
5.”
34. Section 23(1) requires two elements: (i) the transfer must have been
made subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide basic
amenities and physical needs to the transferor; and (ii) the transferee
refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs.
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35. In Urmila Dixit case(4 supra ) it is held that
the appellant has submitted before us that such an undertaking stands
grossly unfulfilled, and in her petition under Section 23, it has been averred
that there is a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such
a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh 18 must be
appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial nature of the legislation
and not strictly which would render otiose the intent of the legislature.
Therefore, the Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below had
rightly held the gift deed to be cancelled since the conditions for the well-
being of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree
with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a
beneficial legislation.
36. In S.Mala case(6 Supra) it is held that
the phrase “subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the
basic amenities” in the statute is not meant to imply that such a condition
must be explicitly stated in the Gift or Settlement Deed. The interpretation
of this provision is broader. It should be states that the transfer may be
deemed to have been made under fraud, coercion, or undue influence, if the
transferee fails to provide the agreed-upon care. The condition to provide
for the senior citizen’s maintenance is implied, based on the relationship
between the senior citizen and the transferee, typically one of familial love
and affection.
37. It is therefore clear from the above decisions that Section 23(1) of
the 2007 Act must receive a purposive and liberal interpretation. The
absence of an express condition in the document does not defeat the
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statutory protection, as the obligation to maintain the senior citizen can be
implied from the very nature of the relationship. Where such implied
obligation is breached, the law steps in and treats the transfer as vitiated.
The emphasis is not on the form of the document, but on the conduct of the
transferee and the fulfillment of the obligation of care.
38. Therefore, in the present case, the fraudulent manner in which the
transfers were secured, coupled with the respondent’s subsequent conduct
of abandonment, clearly attracts Section 23(1). A broader interpretation is
thus warranted to give effect to the protective object of the Act, and the
Tribunal was fully justified in declaring the transfers void.
39. The Tribunal, upon detailed consideration, also relied on the bank
statements which clearly revealed that substantial amounts running into
crores were transferred from the appellant’s account without her
knowledge. The money in the account was routed through a joint bank
account operated by the respondent no. 1 and was thereafter transferred to
accounts belonging to him and his immediate family members. These
amounts were utilised for various personal expenditures of respondent no.
1 including payments to builders, purchase of a car and educational
expenses of respondent no. 5. Admittedly, the bank account in question
was the appellant’s pension account into which her husband’s retirement
16
benefits and pension were credited, and respondent No.1 had no
entitlement to withdraw or appropriate the said funds for his personal use.
40. In addition to the financial aspects, the Tribunal also recorded
specific findings regarding ill-treatment and neglect. It was observed that
after securing control over the appellant’s assets, the respondent ceased
communication with her, created a hostile living environment through his
family members, and compelled her to leave the shared residence and live
in isolation. The Tribunal further noted that despite repeated attempts by
the appellant to reconcile, the respondent remained indifferent and failed to
provide emotional or physical support, thereby subjecting her to mental
distress.
41. It is relevant to note some of the extracts of statements made by
respondent no.1before Tribunal, vide File No.D/234/2025 as under:
“On 15.02.2025, Respondent No.1 admitted that he is the only son and he
had been upset with his mother over a family discussion around a family
function, which is why he stopped talking to her. He claimed that he was
surprised that she had filed a case, but he was willing to do whatever she
wanted. He admitted to taking her money and property saying he believed
he had the right as he is her only son. When the tribunal asked him about
the withdrawal of Rs.30lakhs in a single day, he confirmed it and said he
gave Rs.5 lakhs to his daughter as pocket money. The tribunal felt it is hard
to believe such a large amount would be given to a college student as
pocket money.
17
Respondent started blaming his brother-in-law for supporting his mother
about giving information about bank transactions and property transfers.
On 22.02.2025, the respondent No.1 admitted that he is a short-temper and
said he was not happy with his mother. He expressed that the tribunal and
law protects only senior citizens rather than the respondents or else he
would not care anyone. And the same is recorded by the tribunal as lack of
respect towards the tribunal or law and observed lack of emotional
attachments with his mother and disrespectful he behaved before the
tribunal.”
42. One aspect which weighed significantly with the Tribunal was the
conduct and statements of the respondent no. 1 during the course of the
proceedings. The record shows that during the initial hearings, the
respondent no. 1 made several statements acknowledging the financial
transactions in question and even expressed willingness to restore the
funds to the appellant. However, after obtaining legal advise, the
respondent no. 1 retracted from these statements and filed a counter
affidavit denying the allegations. This shift in stand assumes significance
in appreciating the true nature of the transactions.
43. During the hearing before the tribunal, the respondent no.
1acknowledged that he had withdrawn large amounts from the appellant’s
account and had transferred the same to the accounts of his family
members. When questioned about a substantial withdrawal made in a
single day, the respondent no. 1 confirmed the transactions.
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44. The respondent no. 1 also stated that he had stopped speaking to his
mother following a family disagreement and acknowledged that he was
upset with her. The record further indicates that he has short temper and
expressed that he was compelled to appear before the Tribunal only
because the law protects senior citizens. The Tribunal considered these
statements to reflect a lack of respect towards the institution as well as an
absence of emotional concern towards the appellant.
45. This Court finds it difficult to accept that a son can justify severing
ties with his aged mother over such trivial issues. A mother, who makes
unparalleled sacrifices in raising her child, cannot be reduced to
estrangement and neglect on account of ordinary family disagreements.
Such conduct, particularly when it follows immediately after last transfer
of properties and funds, reveals the true intention behind the transactions.
The conduct of the respondent no. 1 post-transfer is not merely relevant but
decisive, it demonstrates that once the properties and funds were secured,
the obligation of care was abandoned. The respondent no. 1, while
asserting a right over the properties, is unwilling to take back or care for
his mother, which itself strikes at the very foundation of such transfers. In
these circumstances, it is not only within the power but also the duty of the
Court to intervene; otherwise, the law would stand as a silent spectator to
injustice. Therefore, the learned Single Judge’s conclusion that fraud and
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coercion has not been pleaded by the appellant is contrary to the material
available on record.
46. The learned Single Judge held that there was an abnormal delay of
nine years in approaching the Tribunal. However, the appellant has
consistently maintained that she became aware of the fraudulent
transactions only in November, 2024, as respondent No. 1 was in complete
control of her financial affairs, including the operation of her bank
accounts and related transactions. The material on record further discloses
that it was only after the transfer of the last property that respondent No. 1
began to exhibit neglectful and hostile behaviour towards the appellant,
thereby bringing to light his true intentions. It was in these circumstances
that the appellant realized the extent of the financial exploitation
committed upon her. Therefore, the delay stands satisfactorily explained
and cannot be a ground to deny relief.
47. The learned Single Judge also held that the Tribunal had recorded
that the application was filed under Rule 21(3) of the 2011 Rules, and
further held that Rule 21(3) deals with eviction and the power would lie
with the District Collector, not with the Revenue Divisional Officer acting
as the Tribunal.
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48. The material on record shows that the application was in substance
filed under Section 4(1) of the 2007 Act seeking protection of the
appellant’s rights and property, and not for eviction under Rule 21(3). The
reference to Rule 21(3) in the Tribunal’s order appears to be a mistaken or
inapt reference, which does not alter the true nature of the proceedings.
Importantly, the Tribunal has not passed any order of eviction against the
respondent no. 1 or his family members. The relief granted is confined to
cancellation of fraudulent transfers and restoration of property, which
squarely falls within the scope of Section 23 of the Act. Therefore, Rule
21(3) has no application to the facts of the present case.
49. Even otherwise, Rule 21(3) cannot be read in isolation so as to
curtail the jurisdiction of the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under
Section 7 of the 2007 Act. The Tribunal, ordinarily presided over by the
Revenue Divisional Officer, is the primary adjudicatory authority
empowered to grant reliefs relating to protection of life and property of
senior citizens. It is a settled principle that Rules are intended to
supplement the parent statute and cannot override its substantive
provisions. A harmonious construction would make it clear that while the
Collector may exercise limited quasi-judicial powers in matters of eviction
under Rule 21(3), the Tribunal retains the adjudicatory power to determine
rights, cancel fraudulent transfers and order restoration of property.
21
50. This position is reinforced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 24
of Urmila Dixit case (4 Supra) referring it’s own decision in S. Vanitha
case (5 Supra) held as under:
this Court observed that Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is
necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act,
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to
be transferred. This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which
is to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly.
Therefore, the Revenue Divisional Officer, acting as the Maintenance
Tribunal, had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the application and
grant the reliefs sought, and the objection based on Rule 21(3) is devoid of
merit.
51. The learned Single Judge held that the order is in violation of the
procedure laid down under the 2007 Act as the draft was prepared by the
Section Assistant. In the present case, as the note itself clearly records that
the draft was prepared as per the dictation of the Revenue Divisional
Officer, there is nothing on record to show that the decision-making power
was delegated.
52. The mere circulation of the file or the presence of a signature of the
DAO on the note file does not, by itself, establish any illegality. These are
internal administrative processes which do not affect the adjudicatory
22
function. Unless it is shown that the order was passed without application
of mind or that the decision was taken by an unauthorized person, such
internal procedures cannot vitiate the order. The Tribunal order reflects due
consideration of the pleadings, evidence and submissions of both parties,
and therefore cannot be find fault with on the basis of internal file note file
or drafting assistance.
53. The contention that the respondent no.1 did not sign the docket
proceedings is also unfounded. The record clearly establishes that the
respondent appeared before the Tribunal, participated in multiple hearings,
and filed a detailed counter. Having thus submitted to the jurisdiction and
participated in the proceedings, cannot later turn around and challenge the
validity of the proceedings on technical grounds.
54. The contention with regard to non-adherence to the conciliation
procedure is also misplaced. Section 6 of the Act, 2007 states:
“6. Jurisdiction and procedure.
6. The Tribunal before hearing an application under section 5 may, refer
the same to a Conciliation Officer and such Conciliation Officer shall
submit his findings within one month and if amicable settlement has been
arrived at, the Tribunal shall pass an order to that effect.”
The above provision shows that the legislature has consciously used the
word “may”, thereby making the reference to a Conciliation Officer
23
discretionary and not mandatory. The Tribunal is thus vested with the
discretion to adopt conciliation where it considers appropriate, and it is not
a condition precedent for adjudication. In the present case, the record
reveals that several hearings were conducted and during the initial stages,
the respondent himself expressed willingness to return the money. The
mere absence of formal conciliation proceedings does not vitiate the
proceedings, particularly when both parties were afforded full opportunity
of hearing.
55. The contention that admissions were not recorded on oath is equally
unsustainable. Section 8 of the Act, 2007 clearly provides that the Tribunal
may follow such summary procedure as it deems fit. Although the Tribunal
is vested with the powers of a Civil Court, the provision does not mandate
that every statement or admission must necessarily be recorded in a formal
manner as in a civil trial.
56. The legislative intent is to ensure expeditious and effective
adjudication without being constrained by technical procedural
requirements. In such proceedings, the Tribunal is entitled to rely upon the
material placed on record, the conduct of the parties, and the statements
made during the course of hearings. In the present case, the respondent
had, during the initial hearings, orally admitted the transfer of money,
24
which was duly recorded by the Tribunal. Such admissions, viewed in the
context of the summary procedure contemplated under Section 8 of the
2007 Act, cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they were not
recorded on oath.
57. The allegation of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 8 of the Act
and Rule 8, 10, 11 of the Rules is also without merit. The record clearly
demonstrates that notices were duly issued, the parties were heard on
multiple occasions, documentary evidence including bank statements was
considered, and a reasoned order was ultimately passed. Section 8
mandates only a summary procedure and does not require a full-fledged
trial like civil proceedings. The essential requirements of natural justice i.e,
notice and opportunity of hearing stand fully satisfied.
58. In State Of Punjab And Another vs Shamlal Murari11 it is held that
“processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but
an aid to justice. It has been wisely observed that procedural prescriptions
are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the
administration of justice. Where the non- compliance, tho’ procedural, will
thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing of justice to parties, the rule is
mandatory. But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without
injury to a just disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory
requirement into a dominant desideratum. After, all Courts are to do
11
1976 AIR 1177
25
justice, not to wreck this end product on technicalities. Viewed in this
perspective, even what is regarded as mandatory traditionally may,
perhaps, have to be moderated into wholesome directions to be complied
with in time or in extended time.”
59. In all, the procedural objections such as signatures of the Section
Assistant and DAO, non-signing of docket proceedings by the respondent
no.1, and alleged non-compliance with procedural rules, are purely
technical in nature and do not affect the validity of the proceedings. It is
well settled that procedural irregularities which do not cause prejudice
cannot vitiate substantive adjudication, particularly in proceedings under a
beneficial legislation.
60. The written statements of the daughters were not treated as
independent proof of title but were only considered as corroborative
material supporting the case of the petitioner. In any event, the findings of
the Tribunal are primarily based on documentary evidence, including bank
records and admitted transactions, and not solely on such statements.
Therefore, mere reference to the statements of family members does not
vitiate the proceedings.
61. The contention that the Tribunal lacks power to direct recovery of
money or to permit recourse to police authorities is equally untenable.
26
It is relevant to state Section 2(f) of the 2007 act states that:
“property” means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable,
ancestral or self acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or
interests in such property.”
The scope of this definition is sufficiently wide to include monetary assets
such as bank deposits and other financial resources. The power to protect
the property of a senior citizen necessarily includes the power to restore
misappropriated funds and undo fraudulent transactions. The direction
permitting the petitioner to approach police authorities is only an enabling
measure for enforcement and does not amount to excess of jurisdiction.
Such a direction is in the scheme of the Rules, which contemplate
involvement of police machinery for protection of the life and property of
senior citizens, and cannot be construed as an excess of jurisdiction.
62. It is also significant that the appellant confined her claim only to
properties which stood in her own name and not to those belonging to her
late husband. In fact, she acknowledged that any property belonging to her
husband would devolve equally upon all his legal heirs. This aspect, in the
view of this Court, lends credibility to her case and dispels the suggestion
that the proceedings were motivated by extraneous considerations.
63. The material on record also shows that the respondent no. 1 asserted
entitlement to the appellant’s property on the premise that he was the only
27
son in the family. Such assertion not only reflects a misunderstanding of
the law of succession but also reveals the underlying mindset which
appears to have guided his conduct.
64. The judgment dated 27.02.2026 in W.A. Nos. 197, 198 and 199 of
2026 relied by Respondents arose in a context where the challenge was
directed against orders passed under the 2007 Act and the Court was
dealing with the issue of maintainability of writ proceedings in the
presence of an effective statutory appellate remedy. The Division Bench,
on the facts of that case, found that the parties had an adequate alternative
remedy under the scheme of the 2007 Act and Rules and that the writ
jurisdiction ought not to have been invoked in the absence of exceptional
circumstances such as violation of natural justice or patent lack of
jurisdiction. The case did not turn on allegations of fraud, coercion, or
financial exploitation supported by admissions and documentary material,
but rather on procedural propriety and the hierarchy of remedies
contemplated under the statute.
65. Per contra, the present case stands on a different footing. The issue
here is not about bypassing a statutory remedy, but about the correctness of
findings based on clear material indicating misuse of trust, unauthorized
financial transactions and subsequent ill-treatment of a senior citizen.
28
Hence, the ratio of the aforesaid judgment, being confined to procedural
aspects, does not govern the facts of the present case.
66. Having considered the entire material placed before the Tribunal,
this Court is of the considered view that the findings recorded by the
tribunal cannot be said to be perverse or unsupported by evidence. While
this Court has the highest respect for the reasoning adopted by the learned
Single Judge, it must also be borne in mind that the present matter arises
under a beneficial legislation intended to protect elderly parents from
neglect and financial exploitation. The legislative intent behind the Act is
to ensure that senior citizens are able to spend their twilight years with
dignity, security and peace of mind.
67. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case,
including the statements made by the respondent no. 1, the bank
transactions on record and the surrounding conduct of the parties strongly
indicate that the appellant’s trust was misused. The Tribunal was therefore
justified in invoking its jurisdiction under the Act to protect the property of
the appellant and to direct restoration of the properties.
68. We, accordingly, hold that the order dated 17.05.2005 passed by the
learned Tribunal is just and reasonable and we confirm the said order by
setting aside the order dated 26.09.2025 passed in W.P.No.17870 of 2025.
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69. Subject to above observations, W.A.No.1198 of 2025 is allowed.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any shall stand closed. There shall
be no order as to costs.
________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
____________________
GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
Date: 16.04.2026
Vsv
